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                                                   ABSTRACT 
 
This is a meaning centred study of the anorexic body. Its objective is to establish that 
anorexia nervosa is not exclusively a psychiatric condition and present a new 
enforceable alternative approach to the current “doctor-knows-best” treatment method 
which predominantly reiterates labelling and stereotyping in mental health practice. 
Contextual clinical narratives pose strong critical arguments reiterating that anorexia 
nervosa is solely due to mental illness which results to diminished autonomy, 
therefore, unconsented clinical interventions are within the rights of medical 
practitioners and not a violation of the person’s rights. This research shows that the 
clinical preference of disengaging with the subjective meaning underlying self-
starvation reinforces paternalistic intervention of medical practitioners to the 
detriment of asserting rights.  
 
Thus, this work is concerned with how to reconceptualise anorexia by meaningfully 
engaging and managing the anorexic body without using involuntary, coercive and 
forceful methods, thereby preserving their autonomous rights, best interests and 
subjective will. Although the current traditional approach under mental health laws is 
shown to produce no long-term recovery benefits or outcome for the anorexic body, 
Section 2 of the 1983 Mental Health Act still preserves the one-dimensional strict 
approach to the care and management of the anorexic body as they are detained for 
the treatment of both their physical and mental disorder. Through critical research and 
empirical work conducted in Nigeria, this thesis sustains the deconstruction of 
	 9	
anorexia nervosa as exclusively a psychiatric disorder and enables the development of 
a meaning-centred anorexic body highlighting the limitation of the traditional western 
medical model to acknowledge the significant cultural and social dimensions that 
overrule anorexia nervosa. This research showed that the meaning-centred anorexic 
body is acknowledged and valued as a self-determining agent outside the confined 
spaces of the Mental Health Act, adverse and resistant to the established stereotypical 
boundaries and impositions of psychology, law and psychiatry. 
 
In examining Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), this research underpins the meaning-centred approach within a human rights 
based framework. It therefore establishes that human dignity and autonomous choices 
are integral and indispensable in creating a balanced code of medical ethics. Through 
critical analysis and both legal and non-legal considerations, this research identifies 
the meaningful emergence of a modern anorexic body removed from strict confines of 
the mental health laws’ universal attraction and acknowledgement of the body as a 
docile object that needs to be institutionally regulated, disciplined, and subjected to 
punishment. The main contribution of this thesis is in bringing clarity to a very 
conflicting area by identifying a meaning centred approach to the understanding of 
anorexia nervosa. A conceptualised spectrum is introduced by distinguishing the 
meaning-centred anorexic body thereby enhancing the realisation of self-
determination. In this regard, this thesis establishes the values of autonomous choices 
as central to dignifying the anorexics experiences, morals and choices and therefore 
can possess the much-required capacity to regain and retain bodily control, bodily 
integrity and autonomy. It is based on this independent setting that a meaningful study 
of anorexia nervosa can emerge, highlighting the values of individual freedom and the 
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necessity of a human rights-based approach existing outside the traditionally 
modelled benevolent paternalism.  
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                                     INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
The notion that the anorexic body requires involuntary detention and psychiatric 
evaluation for the treatment of their eating disorder has emerged as one of the most 
disputed and contentious topics in the field of healthcare. Current research trends 
highlight the struggle by clinicians to find the appropriate setting for a comprehensive 
and uniform overview of the multifactorial nature of eating disordered behaviours. 
Psychological therapy, nutritional intervention and hospitalization are therefore, 
options utilized for the involuntary treatment of the anorectic.1 Clinical and legal 
rhetoric are unclear on whether mentally disordered individuals can refuse 
involuntary treatment on the grounds of human rights violations. The challenge is to 
provide sufficient individualised evidence to firstly disconnect anorexia nervosa as 
solely a mental illness and then dispel the mental health law narrative of exclusively 
connecting abnormal eating patterns to lack of mental capacity to make medical 
decisions. Critical analysis of the mental health laws reveals lacunae in bridging the 
gap between the autonomous actions of persons adjudged to be mentally ill and 
unconsented treatment enforced by clinicians. With self-starvation solely viewed as a 
psychiatric condition, it is difficult to find a sustainable balance between what 
constitutes individualised perspective underlying abnormal eating behaviour and the 
prevalent medical narrative that reinforces involuntary intervention. Medical 
responsibility to protect the welfare of disordered individuals therefore extends 																																																								1	National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health (UK). ‘Eating Disorders: Core Intervention in the 
Treatment and Management of Anorexia Nervosa, Bulimia Nervosa and Related Eating Disorders’  
2004 9(6) available at  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK49301/  [Accessed 3rd April 2018] 
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beyond offering basic relief for their mental disorder, to providing life-saving therapy. 
Thus treating the psychiatric condition is important to clinicians hence involuntary 
intervention is therefore administered readily without due consideration of the values 
of autonomy and bodily integrity of the individual.  Although involuntary psychiatric 
treatment most times produces negative experiences which do not influence recovery 
outcomes2, the individual’s identity as a self-determining agent is still relegated to the 
background in favour of life-saving interventions. Constant refusal and resistance of 
medical reasoning behind involuntary treatments by the anorexic is registered as 
underscoring the abnormal behaviour precipitated by the existing mental disorder 
regime. 
 
The prevalent paternalistic approach in treating mental disordered individuals 
reinforces the existing labelling, stigmatizing, discrimination and stereotyping of 
abnormal behaviours.3 Saya et al argues, “establishing the presence of mental illness 
is not sufficient ground for imposing involuntary psychiatric treatment”. 4  It is 
acknowledged that the issues surrounding involuntary treatment “centres on the issues 
of freedom and self-determination”.5 Invariably, contextual clinical narratives pose 
strong critical arguments that mentally disordered individuals have diminished 
autonomy. For clinicians, it is therefore rational to assert that involuntary treatment 
cannot violate a mentally disordered person’s rights.6 Accordingly, when backed by 
legislation, respect for human rights will not take precedence. Moreover, there is still 																																																								
2	Anna Saya, Chiara Brugoli, Gioa Piazzi, Daniela Liberto, Gregorio Di Ciaccia, Cinza Nioluand 
Alberto Siracusano ‘Criteria, Procedures, and Future Prospects of Involuntary Treatment in Psychiatry 
Around the World: A Narrative Review’ 2019 10(271) Font Psychiatry p.20 
3 Link  G. Bruce, Lawrence H. Yang,  Jo. C. Phelan and Pamela Y. Collins, ‘Measuring Mental Illness 
Stigma’ 2004 30(3) Schizophrenia Bulletin p.511 
4 Saya et al. op. cit., p.2 
5 Ibid 
6Eugene B. Brody, Biomedical Technology and Human Rights (Hants, Daltmouth Publishing Company 
Limited 1993) pp.180-185 
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the question of the yardstick to determine what is right and the resolution mechanisms 
to address rights in conflict.7 The challenge is to determine the extent to which 
unconsented treatment is ethically justifiable especially in instances where an 
individual’s right to autonomy and self-determination is not considered as a legally 
enforceable right. Although it is universally acknowledged that individuals have the 
right to participate in decision-making regarding their treatment, however, once the 
individual is categorised as a patient, their autonomous rights are significantly 
reduced.8 The individual, therefore, transitions from a person with rights to a sufferer 
at the benevolence of the medical system, denied basic dignity and freedoms despite 
the rationality of their morals and values.9  
 
 
I. Background 
 
Clinical views of the evolving nature of mental health and mental disorder are 
constantly shaped by psychiatry through diagnosis and prognosis, however, there is 
also established speculation and assumptions on the cause of mental disorder, which 
also forms part of the treatment prescription.10 Psychiatry established anorexia as a 
mental disorder with “the highest rate of mortality”.11 Although the complexities 
involved in treating and managing anorexia nervosa are gradually emerging from 
obscurity to becoming better understood in medicine, psychiatry, and law,12 there is 
still established uncertainty around the cause and also the lack of clarity to the large 																																																								
7 Justin Burley, The Genetic Revolution and Human Rights (New York, Oxford University Press 1999) 
p.105. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Brody, op. cit., pp.180-185. 
10	Anne Rogers and David Pilgrim, A Sociology of Mental Health and Illness (Berkshire, Open 
University Press 2014). p.1. 
11 Jane Morris and Sara Twaddle  ‘Anorexia Nervosa’ (2007)  334(7599) British Medical Journal p.898. 
12 Arthur H Crisp, ‘Anorexia Nervosa at Normal Body Weight – The Abnormal Normal Weight 
Control Syndrome’ (1981) 11(3) International Journal of Psychiatry  p.204. 
	 14	
cultural component of the diagnosis. The practice of equating forms of abnormal 
behaviour to mental illness decreased between the seventeenth and twentieth century 
due to the emergence of medical explanations and psychiatric solutions to disordered 
behaviours. Analysing competing explanations and interpreting observational 
concepts about anorexia nervosa is, on its own, an intellectual ‘tour de force’ and will 
always raise conflicting views. At no point in this research will the need arise to 
construct a convincing argument to downplay the severity of any form or variation of 
mental illness or psychiatric disorder. Treating or managing self-starving persons or 
individuals with variety of food restrictive patterns is, therefore, by no means a 
straightforward process and, in most cases, involves multiple approaches from diverse 
fields. There is, however, no misconception that extreme forms of food restriction can 
develop into mental illness with severe, relentless consequences,13 and can invariably 
result in very significant medical impairment, disability, and even death.14   It, 
therefore, follows that no matter how liberal a diagnosis may appear, paternalistic 
intervention is immediately initiated to impose involuntary treatments to manage the 
illness and understandably aid physical recovery. Preliminary research reveals 
accounts of unconventional and controversial methods of treating persons diagnosed 
with anorexia nervosa with little or no consideration of the broader spectrum of this 
condition. Saya et al notes that individuals treated involuntarily feel disempowered, 
loss of self-esteem and autonomy and make a plea for the acknowledgement of their 
dignity and respect.15 Forms of anorexia developed with consciousness and meaning 
outside the confines of the Mental Health Act 1983 has never been addressed or 
understood in this field of study.  A proper analysis shows patterns where the 																																																								
13 NHS Trust v L [2012] EWHC 2741 (COP) para.1. 
14 Hilde Bruch, ‘Anorexia Nervosa: Therapy and Theory’ (1982) 139 (12) The American Journal of 
Psychiatry p.1531. 
15 Saya et al. op. cit, p.19 
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intervention of medical practitioners supersedes the legal rule and doctrine of 
obtaining consent before any medical treatment. It is safe to say that in situations of 
psychiatric diagnosed mental disorder, human rights are second-tiered, whereas 
paternalistic considerations play a more dominant role in how clinicians decide on the 
extent and type of compulsory treatment methods suitable.16  
 
Gremillion considered the consensus approach of clinicians to anorexia as carefully 
coordinated to not only engineer weight gain but as active participants in the 
remodelling of their bodies outside defined choices.17 In resisting the reshaping or 
involuntary management of their bodies, there is also an acknowledged refusal to 
accept the alteration of their cultural ideals, bodily experiences and pathological and 
pathological behaviour.18 It has become evident that priority is given to the physical 
recovery of the patient rather than their choice to live as they please. Force-feeding a 
person is regarded as a form of involuntary treatment,19 and as such is contestable.20  
In retrospect, force-feeding or detaining someone for treatment against their will can 
give rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.21 It is fair to establish that the 
complexity of this disorder places anorexia nervosa sufferers at the lower end of 
																																																								
16 Stephen W. Touyz and Terry Carney, ‘Compulsory (Involuntary) Treatment for Anorexia Nervosa’ 
(2010)  Sydney Law School Legal Studies Research Paper  No (10/07) available at 
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228134167_Compulsory_(Involuntary)_Treatment_for_Anore
xia_Nervosa [accessed 15th May 2019]. 
17 Helen Gremillion, Feeding Anorexia - Gender and Power at a Treatment Center (North Carolina, 
Duke University Press 2003) p.44. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Simona Giordano, Conceptual and Ethical Issues in the Treatment of Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia 
Nervosa (1st edn. Oxford, Clarendon Press 2005).  p. 180. 
20  Rosalyn  Griffiths and Janice Russell, ‘Compulsory Treatment of Anorexia of Anorexia Nervosa 
Patients’ in   Walter Vandereycken, Pierre J.V Beumont (eds.), Treating Eating Disorders: Ethical, 
Legal and Personal Issues (London, Athlone Press 1998) p.178. 
21Eike-Henner Kluge, ‘The Ethics of Force Feeding in Anorexia Nervosa: a Response to Hebert and 
Weingarten’ (1991) available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1335318/  [accessed 
15th May. 2019]. 
	 16	
vulnerability, thus requiring greater rights protection under the law.22 Another critic of 
involuntary treatment relates to the mode of conducting day-to-day activities of these 
patients while institutionalised. The everyday routine of living an institutionalised life 
involves involuntary regimented treatment and eating practices, embedded in 
disciplinary, coercive, regimented, and controlling routine tantamount to inhumane 
and degrading treatment. Saya et al points out that “the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) provides that forced hospitalization should remain in the 
guaranteed context of article 3 which prohibits any inhuman and degrading 
treatment”23 Subjecting anyone to such rituals not only infringes on their freedom, 
liberty, and free will, but also encroaches on their self-image and self-identity as 
entrenched under Articles 3, 5, and 8 of the ECHR.24  
 
II. Aims and Objectives 
 
The complex interpretations of eating disorders are often lost in the contemporary 
clinical settings,25 as the lines between psychiatric and physical illness have remained 
blurred.26 Doncu points out that “psychiatric diagnosis is itself a game of measuring 
power and complexity” and there is rarely a demarcation between medical 
intervention aimed at restoring functioning and balancing out capacities that are 
already formed.27 Norfolk & Norwich Healthcare (NHS) Trust v W reveals a departure 
from the strict confines of the Mental Health Act criteria for only administering 																																																								
22 Elizabeth Wicks, ‘The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment under the European Convention on 
Human Rights (2001) 9(1) Medical Law Review pp. 17–40. 
22 Ibid. 
23	Saya et al., op. cit. p.2 
24 European Convention on Human Rights available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf [accessed 5th January 2019]. 
25 Su Holmes, Sarah Drake, Kelsey Odgers and Jon Wilson, ‘Feminist Approaches to Anorexia 
Nervosa: A Qualitative Study of a Treatment Group’ (2017) 5(36)  Journal of Eating Disorders  p.4. 
26 Roxana Elena Doncu, ‘Feminist Theories of Subjectivity: Judith Butler and Julia Kristeva’ (2017) 10 
Journal of Romanian Literary Studies pp.332-336. 
27 Ibid. 
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involuntary treatment to individuals with mental disorders.28 The inherent powers of 
the court to authorise the use of reasonable force and involuntary detention was 
extended to individuals not suffering from mental disorder.29 The courts decision 
authorising involuntary treatment was weighed on the consideration of the ability of 
W to accept the medical decision and refusal of medical treatment was regarded as 
inability to comprehend and retain information.30 It was therefore established that 
individuals who do not possess any form of mental disorder can still be adjudged to 
lack capacity and are incapable of furnishing their full consent in obtaining medical 
treatment and therefore can be involuntarily treated without their consent. Invariably, 
the same approach was also administered in Rochdale Healthcare (NHS Trust v C) 
where involuntary treatment was authorised although the individual “…was fully 
competent mentally and capable of comprehending and retaining information about 
the proposed treatment.”31 
 
 Foucault recognised the ability of the body to resist repression and constriction by 
authoritative powers.32 Institutions, such as hospitals, therefore skilfully serve as 
agents of manipulation and micromanaging of how the body operates. According to 
Foucault, “the body had become the object of such imperious and pressing 
investments; in every society, the body was in the grip of stringent powers which 
imposed on it constraints, prohibitions or obligations”.33 Critical analysis of the 
involuntary treatment of the anorexic body in the context of their human rights is 																																																								
28 [1996] 7 WLUK 38. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Rochdale Healthcare NHS Trust v C [1996] 7 WLUK 40. 
32Ladelle McWhorter, ‘Culture or Nature? The Function of the Term ”Body” in the Work of Michel 
Foucault’  (1989) 86(11)  Eighty Sixth Annual Meeting American Philosophical Association,  pp.608-
614. 
33  Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison (New York, Vintage Books 1995) 
p.136. 
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imperative,34 by securing a sound grounding in the theoretical foundations of human 
rights as entrenched under the ECHR, which is incorporated into English law by the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA).  In other words, by examining the application of 
involuntary treatments on the anorexic body, the aim is to establish a rights-based 
standpoint as well as explore the fundamental limitations to asserting their rights. The 
author reviews the human rights-based approach that positions the protection, respect, 
and fulfilment of the decisions and choices of an individual as central in all decision-
making processes.  
 
Saya et al insists “there is much to do in psychiatric field to ensure care, dignity and 
rights for patients”.35 The overall concern of this thesis is to provide a simple 
meaningful understanding of anorexia nervosa; with specific focus on whether 
involuntary treatments are in the best interest of the anorexic body and the human 
rights implications.36 The focus would be to the interpretation of these rights under 
the European Convention on Human Rights with particular reference to Article 3 
(prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) and Article 5 (right to liberty and 
security) and Article 8 (respect for private and personal life). Coercive involuntary 
treatment of the meaning-centred anorexic body sets the framework to explore the 
human rights approach under the ECHR.37 In addition to identifying the procedures 
for the anorexic body to make human rights claims and ascertain against whom such 
claim can be made, it is imperative to analyse case law especially previous court 
decisions which do not reflect the best interests of the patients, as they exclude their 																																																								
34 Jill Marshall, Personal Freedom through Human Rights Law? Autonomy, Identity and Integrity 
under the European Convention on Human Rights (Netherlands, Martinus Nijholf Publishers 2008) pp. 
13–14. 
35	Saya, et al., op. cit. p.20	
36	Ibid. 
37 Jill Marshall, ‘A Right to Personal Autonomy at the European Court of Human Rights’ (2008) (3) 
European Human Rights Law Review pp. 337–356. 
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wishes, choices and morals, are analysed.38 The human rights-based approach will 
engage the concept of best interest during treatment from a liberal and practical stance 
to include consent, freedom of choice and right to autonomy. By critically engaging 
the debate of paternalism and emphasising the obvious repercussions of this defence 
on individual liberties and autonomy of an anorexic patient, attention is drawn to 
developing comprehensive framework which highlights the best interest and 
compliments the right to autonomy of the anorexic body. 
 
III. Theoretical Approach  
 
This thesis explores the intersection between law and medicine with focus on the 
socio cultural, ethical and medical turbulence in the understanding of anorexia 
nervosa. The core argument in this thesis is that although clinicians acknowledge the 
multi-dimensional nature of anorexia, there is still sole dependence on involuntary 
treatments mechanism to achieve weight gain and aid recovery without due 
consideration to their autonomous choices and values. The current understanding of 
anorexia nervosa is mainly clinical driven and do not actively engage the versatile and 
complex nature of anorexia nervosa. Adopting a module that deconstructs anorexia 
from the regimented classification projected by clinicians would provide the base for 
acceptance of a more radical approach to the understanding of the multi-dimensional 
nature of anorexia nervosa. This work therefore, adopts an inter-disciplinary meaning 
centred and human rights-based approach. The meaning centred approach is drawn 
from outside law and provides an alternative method of understanding anorexia. Its 
effectiveness will enable a rethink of the current clinical approach that does not 																																																								
38 John Coggon, ‘Anorexia Nervosa, Best Interests, and the Patient’s Human Right to a “Wholesale 
Overwhelming of her Autonomy”: A Local Authority v. E’ (2013) 21(0) Medical Law Review pp. 1–
13. 
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include the multifactorial interplay of cultural variations and experiences. It therefore 
provides the core setting and link between female body perceptions and the 
explanation for female body liberation movement by identifying the key resources for 
their meaning centred behavioural adaptations. The human rights based approach 
underpins the implementation and adaptation of the meaning-centred approach within 
a rights based setting. The empirical study will seek to explore if anorexia nervosa can 
be found in non-western cultures where mental health laws do not recognise anorexia 
nervosa as a psychiatric condition, therefore, individuals whom fall within the 
physical spectrum offer a meaningful dimension for evaluation. Nigeria highlights the 
difference in institutionalised way of mental health practice as well as provides a 
distinct background for generalisation to be made about likely behavioural patterns 
and categories in analysing non-western bound syndromes. The non-psychiatric 
dimension provided by Nigeria simplifies and deconstructs anorexia by revealing an 
independence of mind and thinking not compliant with western established 
micromanagement. 
 
     RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
        
1. What is a meaning-centred anorexic body and can this approach to self-
starvation redefine anorexia as not exclusively a psychiatric condition? 
2. Are involuntary treatments in the best interests of the anorexic body and can the 
Mental Health Laws in the UK recognise the autonomous rights of the anorexic 
body?  
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3. Can a meaning-centred anorexic body be identified in non-western cultures and 
is there significance in addressing medical and psychiatric stereotypes and 
labelling?  
4. Are there human rights implications in the enforcement of involuntary 
treatments on the meaning centred anorexic body under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)?  
 
 
 
THESIS STRUCTURE  
                                 
 
 
Chapter 1 provides a background of the thesis by exploring medical-based 
stereotypical narrative of the anorexic body as representing non-voluntary actions, 
which presents the justifiable stance for the non-recognition of their autonomous 
rights to refuse involuntary treatment.  
 
Chapter 2 presents conceptualised analyses of the behavioural models underling the 
multifactorial realties of the anorexic behavioural substructure. In addressing the 
difference between the conceptual analysis of disease and illness, a broader theme of 
individualised assessment of anorexia nervosa as a meaningful disease emerges. 
Establishing the co-relation between body image discontent and self-satisfaction 
becomes pronounced in the assertion of bodily integrity and in exercising the rights to 
refuse treatment. Self-starvation and food refusal therefore become a symbol of 
resistance to paternalistic body control.   
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Chapter 3 evaluates the meaning-centred approach in the involuntary treatment of the 
anorexic body. This chapter seeks to uncover the meaning underscoring 
individualised experience as a solution to the ethical challenges facing the traditional 
anorexic body. Chapter four critically examines the meaning, values or reasoning 
underlying self-starvation, divergent and progressive beyond the traditional 
stereotypical concepts dominating in the field. Chapter 5 seeks to identify anorexia 
nervosa in non-western culture and determine the meaning of self-starvation as a 
culture bound syndrome. Establishing empirical validity of the meaning centred 
anorexic body would certify the role of starvation as a tool for self-expression and 
rights fulfilment thereby devaluing the universal stereotype equating the self-starved 
body as only representing the presence of mental disorder. 
 
Chapter 6 examines the ethical issues in the application of force-feeding as a 
treatment for mental disorder. The ethical challenges of involuntary intervention are 
evaluated in the assessment of best interests as complementary to highlighting 
convention rights to include the values, choices and decisions of the anorexic. 
Chapter 7 evaluates the conceptualisation of a meaning centred anorexic body as a 
bearer of rights by ensuring that their valued choices and experiences within health 
care are recognised. Further analysis of the idea that human rights considerations 
should precede involuntary medical intervention by inclusion of individuals as active 
or sole participants in the decision making process. This chapter establishes the 
underpinnings for a right-based approach grounded on the inclusion of their instinct 
values and personhood thereby creating the bases for autonomous choices. Chapter 8 
presents the conclusion, findings and recommendation. 
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                                                      CHAPTER 1 
 
 
                                      The Bioethics of Anorexia Nervosa 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
This chapter engages with the subject matter of the thesis by critically dissecting the 
scopes and dimensions of anorexia nervosa in mental health practice. This is a key 
background chapter which is essential for a bioethical analysis of disordered 
behaviour by expanding the core definitions of self-starvation outside the confined 
narratives of the Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders and the Mental 
Health Act 1983. The chapter starts by providing a thorough overview of the complex 
dimensions of anorexia nervosa, then the historical development registers the 
conflicting dimensions presented by both the medical and none medical regimes. The 
social cultural dimensions of anorexia becomes rather pronounced as the individual 
progresses from adolescence to adulthood which is reflected in their experiences, 
values and way of life. The narrow medical definitions of anorexia places emphasis 
on the visual presentation of the body and the discussions of apparent thinness as 
equating with the imagery and perception rather than a diminishing mental health. 
This chapter concludes by establishing that the belief surrounding anorexia only point 
to the issues of shallowness and superficiality promoted by the prevalent western 
visual culture.39 Invariably there is judgement and stereotype models of mental 
																																																								39	Emma Seaber, ‘Reading Disorders: Pro Eating Disorder Rhetoric and Anorexia Life –Writing’ 
(2016) 34(2) Literature and Medicine Journal pp.484-508. 
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disorder under which the medical model engages with anorexia “leaving little room 
for alternative narratives, thereby marginalizing accounts of anorexia that do not fit 
this framework”.40 
 
 1.1 Defining Anorexia Nervosa  
 
In exploring the historical details of anorexia nervosa, Dell’Osso, Abelli, Carpita, 
Pini, Carellini, Carmassi and Ricca note that anorexia was first recognized in late 
1700 and received its current name in 1874. 41 The first impression the medical 
experts had was on the cause of anorexia nervosa, which was noted because of 
endocrine disturbance.42 Medical narratives also have not given up on the possibility 
that anorexia is a disorder of the hypothalamus, especially as certain tumours of the 
hypothalamus lead to lack of interest in food consumption. 43  The changing 
dimensions and interpretations of anorexia were also reflective of the historical 
evolution of perspectives of self-starvation and the impact it had on various aspects of 
an individuals expression of their values, morals and culture. Anorexia Mirabilis in 
the middle ages was interpreted within aspects of religious beliefs, which equated 
thinness with spiritual awareness, purity, and holiness. The morals of perfection were 
intertwined with the condition and continued into the 1800’s where a dimension, 
which included material beliefs, was established. The beginning of the recognition of 
self imposed food refusal as having a psychological and psychoanalytic significance 
(nervous atrophy and hysteria) progressed into the 1900’s. However, conceptualised 
clinical significance reflecting emerging trends in the understanding of the thresholds 																																																								
40	Ibid.	
41 Liliana Dell’Osso, Marianna Abelli, Barbara Carpita, Stefano Pini, Giovanni Castellini, Claudia 
Carmassi and Valdo Ricca ‘Historical Evolution of the Concept of Anorexia Nervosa and 
Relationships with Orthorexia Nervosa, Autism, and Obsessive-Compulsive Spectrum’(2016) 12 Dove 
Press Journal: Neuropsychiatric Diseases and Treatment pp.1653-1654 
42 Ibid.. 
43 Ibid..  
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of anorexia is a fairly recent development (2000-2015).44  Dell’Osso et al also noted 
that although self-starvation were noted in the context of extreme fasting, the 
evolution of the meaning of self starvation in the last three centuries has become 
separated from spiritual connections of religious beliefs as the trends of body image, 
feminine appeal and ideals of beauty slowly emerge.45 The embodiment of the 
framework of self-starvation began to slowly reflect both cultural and social values 
and thus to a great length less reflective of clinical connation. However, in defining 
modern anorexia many authors have presented descriptions and analysis that 
conceptualise voluntary fasting practice within medical and psychiatry frameworks.46 
The orthodox definition of anorexia has for centuries followed the strict 
understanding furnished by clinicians who characterized eating related behaviours as 
both a substantial psychiatric and health impairment. 47 
 
Sarason and Sarason explain that the term anorexia nervosa means nervous loss of 
appetite; notwithstanding, those suffering from this behavioural disorder have 
distorted perceptions of their body which leads to the sustained efforts to remain thin 
through self starvation and excessive exercise. 48  Anorexic individuals are also 
naturally susceptible to both physiological and negative feelings of hunger, in 
addition to being strongly preoccupied with the morbid fear of food.49 Eating patterns 
of anorexics are unusual and disruptive as there is a “refusal to keep body weight at 
																																																								
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. p.1655. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Liliana Dell’Osso, Marianna Abellii, Barbara Carpita, Stefano Pini, Giovanni Castellini, Claudia 
Carmassi and Valdo Ricca ‘Historical Evolution of the Concept of Anorexia Nervosa and 
Relationships with Orthorexia Nervosa, Autism, and Obsessive-Compulsive Spectrum’ (2016) 12 
Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment p.1651. 
48 Irwin G. Sarason and Barbara R. Sarason Abnormal Psychology: The Problem of Maladaptive 
Behavior (New Jersey, Prentice Hall 2005). pp. 190. 
49 Ibid. 
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above 85% of the generally recognized normal level for age and height’.50 One would 
find them discussing and preparing appetizing meals for friends and family members, 
but often do not partake in eating what they have prepared. It is a common sight 
watching these anorexics cutting the food they appear to be eating, into small pieces, 
only to keep moving them about on the plates and refuse to consume them.51 Sarason 
and Sarason argue that the overall weight loss of an individual is not enough to solely 
account for the presence of anorexia nervosa.52  Weight loss is simple but not 
sufficient and there are often other distinguishable conditions for first base diagnoses 
of a person with anorexia nervosa. There is therefore a remarkable distinction 
between warning signs for anorexia and factors that explain the underlying meaning 
of anorexia. First the warning signs are indicated by the feeling of fatness and then the 
intense fear of becoming fat even when it is clear the individual’s body weight must 
have lowered up to at least 15 percent lesser than the normal level.53 If the individual 
is still developing, the weight loss must have at least 15 percent lower than what it is 
expected to be. In females, the frequency of the menstrual circle must also be taken 
into consideration. It is indicated that the female’s weight loss is so severe that she 
loses at least three consecutive menstrual circles.54   
 
Anorexia nervosa is described as an obsessive disorder that amounts to self-starvation 
and controlled feeding.55 Taylor explains that the individual embarks on dieting to the 
point that grossly reduces the body weight below optimum level that can threaten 
																																																								
50 Ibid. p.191. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. p.192. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Shelley E. Taylor, Health Psychology (New York, McGraw-Hill Publishers 2014) p.92.  
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their physical health and may lead to death.56 Alloy, et al identify the fear of weight 
gain as the reasoning behind severe food restriction in individuals identified as 
anorexic.57 Gazzaniga, et al also view anorexia nervosa as an eating disorder in which 
an individual develops an excessive fear of becoming fat, which leads to food refusal 
and restrictions.58 In context, many adolescent girls embrace self-starvation and strive 
to be thin, but majority of such adolescents fail to meet the clinical criteria of this 
disorder and only one percent of adolescent girls meet the anorexic body clinical 
criteria59 The identified criteria include the psychological characteristics that portray 
the person as having abnormal obsession with food and body as well as an objective 
measure of thinness.60  Gazzaniga, et al go on to report the presence of body 
dismorphia as most of the identified females who have anorexia continue to see 
themselves as being fat even though their body has become under-weight by fifteen to 
twenty-five percent.61 Gazzaniga, et al also identify other warning signs which 
precipitate the anorexic behaviour as revolving around constant obsession on weight 
gain or weight loss and in most cases there is an outright denial of body issues 
fixation from friends and close relatives.62 Self-starvation is always short-lived as the 
physical body weight degenerates to an unimaginable levels and medical 
professionals intervene to provide treatment in other to prevent death. Even at this 
stage, difficulties will still arise in enforcing treatment, as the individual would resist 
treatment despite being severely emaciated. 
																																																								
56 Ibid. 
57 Lauren B. Alloy, John H. Riskind and Margaret J. Manos Abnormal Psychology: Current 
Perspectives (Boston, McGraw-Hill Publishers 2005) p.449.   
58 Michael S. Gazzaniga, Todd F. Heatherton and Diane F. Halpern Psychological Science (New York, 
W.W.  Norton 2018). pp.449-450. 
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid.  
61 Gazzaniga  et al, op. cit., p.449-450. 
62 Ibid. 
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Coon and Mitterer view anorexia nervosa as an active self-starvation, or sustained 
loss of appetite, which has some psychological origins.63 The anorexic cycle usually 
begins with what could be regarded as normal dieting, progressing to dominate the 
individual’s life and eventually leading to very serious health problems.64 Anorexics 
make compulsive attempts to lose weight, which causes them not to desire food, 
however, the lack of food desire does not stop them from feeling physically hungry. 
However as the body adjusts to self-starvation the individual is able to cope without 
food for longer periods. In the early stages of food refusal, weight loss is seen as a 
strong motivation for food refusal. Coon and Mitterer further explain how to 
recognise anorexia nervosa. One way is to find out if the person is refusing to 
maintain body weight within the normal range and if the person’s body weight is less 
than the normal; then the person may be anorexic.65  
The second method is when there is intense fear of becoming fat or gaining weight 
even when the person is underweight. Third, an individual is concerned with 
disturbance in the body image or perceived weight of the individual.66There is undue 
influence of self-evaluation with body weight. The fourth is the absence of menstrual 
period due to severe emaciation and physical illness.  Alloy, et al appear to take in-
depth interest on the characteristics of an anorexic. According to them, even though, 
weight loss is a crucial indicator, however it is not all cases of anorexia nervosa that 
involve weight loss. 67  Citing the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-IV) criteria, they state that the cut-off line is a body weight that is 
less than 85 percent of what is normal for that particular person’s age and height. This 																																																								
63 Dennis Coon, John O. Mitterer and Martini Tanya  Introduction to Psychology: Gateways to Mind 
and Behaviour (Belmont, Cengage Learning Custom Publishing 2013). p.329-330 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid 
67 Alloy, et al., op. cit.  p.330. 
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condition may be because of the person’s weight or simply the person is developing 
without gaining weight in the process. There is equally overwhelming intense fear of 
becoming fat, an unrealistic body image and a projection of a thin body ideal. For 
clinicians an individual has to fit within the established diagnostic criteria. It therefore 
implies that the person cannot be diagnosed as anorexic if any of these symptoms is 
not present. The intensely and continual preoccupation with the fear of becoming fat 
is a reoccurring characteristic of anorexia nervosa amongst most writers, however the 
mode or method of self-starvation differ. For instance, according to Gleitman, et al, 
one way of achieving self-starvation may involve eating only food that has low 
calorie. 68 Another method involves inducing vomiting in order to purge any food 
consumed, and may include use of laxatives which should facilitate weight loss. 
Furthermore, strenuous exercises are embarked upon; with such exercises often 
lasting for hours in a day tends to reduce their weight drastically.69 This loss in body 
weight could get to a point as low as 50 percent of possible normal weight. 
 
On his views of anorexia nervosa, Gottesfeld references anorexia as a psychogenic 
malnutrition caused by voluntary reduction in consumption of calories, which results 
to the experience of severe weight loss.70 It is noted that anorexia is prevalent in 
mostly young females, especially the adolescents who adopt the anorexic body as a 
coping mechanism. Gottesfeld explains that some psychological factors that lead 
these young females into anorexia nervosa are the desire for revenge against their 
parents whom these adolescents believe are mistreating them; a need to alter their 
body contours to appear more sexless in order to avoid sexual contacts; a desire to 																																																								
68 Henry Gleitman, Alan J. Fridlund and Daniel Reisberg, Psychology (New York, WW. Norton & 
Company 2010). p.10. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Harry Gottesfeld, Abnormal Psychology: A Community Mental Health Perspective (Chicago, 
Science Research Association 1979).  pp.338-339. 
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appear lean in order to look more insignificant or less conspicuous; and finally many 
experience depression which results to loss of appetite and reduction in calorific 
intake.71 Additionally, majority of such adolescents had been obese before and would 
have dieted excessively in order to achieve the desired weight loss. From a slightly 
different viewpoint, Feldmen states that anorexia nervosa is a severe eating disorder 
in which the individual may refuse to eat which could result in a substantive 
depreciation of both cognitive and mental function.72 Such people would believe that 
their behaviour and appearance are normal and nothing unusual. The denial continues 
and remains unaltered even though they may be looking like skeletons. The age 
bracket for the people suffering from this disorder is between ages 12 to 20 years, 
mostly females even though few males may be involved. It is mostly people from 
stable homes, who are often successful, relatively affluent and attractive.73   
 
Sarason and Sarason further identify interplay of psychological, family and cultural 
factors as contributory to the underlying complex structure of anorexia. The genetic 
indication of anorexia leaves a trial that validates a biological susceptibility to 
anorexia because of the established patterns of family history of psychiatric problems 
reoccurring within a family lineage. 74 Anorexics in the binge type are more likely to 
abuse alcohol or drugs, and have other problems of impulse control which include 
stealing, come from less stable families, have more physical health problems, have 
more parental discord and have experienced more negative events in the recent past.75 
It is thought that genetics may play a role in developing anorexia, as the parents of 																																																								
71 Ibid. 
72 Robert S. Feldman, Understanding Psychology (Boston, McGraw-Hill Education 2014). pp.350-351. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Science News, ‘Understanding Anorexia’ (2015) available at 
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/02/150219101345.htm 
 [accessed 6th June 2019]. 
75 Sarason & Sarason, op. cit. pp.192-193. 
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anorexics tend to have more incidences of mood and substance abuse disorders.76 
There are also psychological and behavioural differences, which is reflected in mood 
swings and lack of initiative on the part of the person starving. Although the 
individual is quarrelsome, indecisive, loses concern about physical appearance there 
is also a very high initiative, strong will, frequent period of feeling exuberant, and 
pride in personal appearance.77  On the activity level, the anorexic body produces 
conflicting outcomes of energy levels. There are records of fatigue and physical 
exhaustion however such individuals also have seemingly inexhaustible energy 
characterised by over indulgence in physical exercises.78  Finally, on sexual activity, 
anorexia is characterized by decrease in sexual fantasies, feeling of interest, inability 
to maintain erection for the males and cessation of menstruation for the females. The 
behavioural consequences for both types of anorexia are obsessive preoccupation, and 
feeling of great deal of stress, depression, even after successful treatment, and 
increasing risk of suicide.79 Other consequences include disturbance in the body 
functioning such as retarded bone growth, anaemia, low body temperature, slow heart 
rate, basal metabolism rate, dry skin and no tolerance for cold. Some physiological 
changes that could follow include low level of serum potassium, which may cause 
cardiac arrhythmia, which is the tendency towards changing heart rate, which can 
result in death.80 
Alloy, et al further identify two subgroups of anorexia to include the restricting type 
and the binge-eating or purging type. The restricting type is where the person simply 
refuses to eat food and over-exercises in other to remain underweight. In the other 
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type, the binge-eating or purging type, the individual eats, sometimes he eats 
voraciously. However, the person compensates this much eating by making himself or 
herself vomit or by using one type of purgative or the other, such as laxatives.81 In 
some isolated cases, patients may report that food repels them to the extent that they 
never experience the usual appetites of hunger. However, most of the anorexics 
clearly experience normal appetites, at the early stages of the disorder, if not 
throughout the period.82 The element of unusual preoccupation with food is also 
present and a key element is basing their self-esteem mostly on their body shape. Fear 
of obesity appears to be next to low weight as the most typical feature of anorexia 
with such overwhelming evidence as claw-like hands, protruding ribs, and skull-like 
faces.83  
Gazzaniga and Heatherton equally add that anorexics are usually from the upper class 
in the society.84 The preconception that anorexics are predominantly from the upper 
echelon of the society dominated the early writing of researchers in the field. 
However, it is recently noted that although many of these anorexics are adolescent 
females who wish to be thin, fewer than one percent of these actually meet the clinical 
criteria for anorexia nervosa.85 Both the objective measure of thinness and the 
psychological characteristics indicating a very unusual obsession with food and body 
weight are included in the clinical criteria. As also noted by the authors, anorexics 
usually feel they are fat in spite of being at least 15 to 25 percent underweight. Issues 
of food and weight do not only permeate their lives, but also control both their 
																																																								
81 Alloy, et al., op. cit. pp. 447-448. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Michael S. Gazzaniga and Todd F. Heatherton, Psychological Science: Mind, Brain and Behaviour 
(New York, W.W. Norton 2003).p.298. 
85 Ibid. 
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perception of themselves and the world around them.86 Also viewed favourably at the 
onset of their self-imposed starvation, the family members and friends become 
worried when signs of anorexia nervosa emerge with their severely emaciated body. 
This is the point at which medical attention is needed to avert death from 
malnutrition. The difficulty in treating anorexics is obvious. Many of them still 
maintain they are fat or overweight, and have not attained the level of thinness they 
desired. One serious danger of this disorder is the health problem, which is the loss of 
bone density. The consequences of self-starvation are varied and have been noted as 
critical in some cases. Self-starvation for longer periods can result in muscle wasting, 
dry skin, becoming thin, dry and with brittle hair. Other side effects include 
dehydration, ceasing of menstruation, sleep disturbance and constipation.87 
 
Noting the adverse effects of anorexia nervosa, Gross notes the influence of societal 
norms in addition to the draw to stay thin as advancing the excessive concern for 
weight loss and thinness in female adolescence. There is however the negative 
outcome of problem the individual may experience about her menstrual status. 
Besides, amenorrhea is observed early in the development of anorexia nervosa. 88 
Other observable problems include depression, problem with the mood, lack of sexual 
interest and social withdrawal. These include low blood pressure, bradycardia (slow 
heart rate), constipation, hypothermia and sensitivity to cold. Gross further reports 
that there are signs that are secondary to the low food intake by the 
patients.89Adolescents who are anorexic often develop distorted impression of body 
image and nourishment.  When the dieting reaches the level of anorexia nervosa, the 																																																								
86 Ibid., p.298 
87 Ibid. 
88 Richard Gross, Psychology: The Science of Mind and Behaviour (London, Hodder Education 2015) 
pp.772-773.  
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individuals involved are likely to experience low self-esteem. This becomes more 
prevalent for groups that have much regard for weight and appearance. Gross notes 
that anorexia nervosa has the highest rate of mortality of any psychiatric disorder, 
which includes alcoholism and depression.90 
Anorexia nervosa “is notoriously difficult to research and treat”.91 The understanding 
of the dimensions, causes and symptoms of anorexia is not straight forward as many 
people suffering from anorexia are described as being chronically ill and near 
mortality.92 Various writers present keen and general perspectives and arguments on 
the severity of the complications or health implications of patient-centred anorexic 
body. However, engaging in wider narratives of underlying meaning and low 
recovery outcomes are underserved. Medically, it is easily deciphered as the 
definitions of anorexia are tailored within the refined spectrum of standard disease 
diagnosis. Similar to other diagnosable disorder, the preoccupation of clinicians and 
researchers alike are dominated with treatment options and every other accompanying 
factor undervalued. The clinical position embraces the narrative of the body suffering 
because of a defect in the mental state. Here the issue of anorexics appear simple – 
once the mental state is treated then the body will abate suffering and recover. In-
depth analysis has shown the difficulty in post and present management of the various 
dimensions of anorexia. Early researchers have embraced established medical 
framework for treating anorexia as being in their best interest without considering 
other social, cultural or political factors. The medical approach is static and has 
recorded some effective interaction. However, engaging with new meaning for 
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anorexic behaviour has become pertinent in today’s society.  First, all definitions of 
anorexia have already established core medical narrative, example, psychological/ 
mental underpinnings, societal, media/cultural relevance and genetic/biological 
components. All these aspects are crucial to understanding the multifaceted moving 
parts of anorexia; however, the objective of finding meaning outside the medical 
model is redundant and dismissed within the narrative. An innovative approach 
outside the medical field will endeavour to establish subjective meaning outside the 
current medical model by engaging the body as the subject not the object. The 
preoccupations of the feeding patterns of the individual are intertwined with severe 
psychological extremities. Therefore, dialogues beyond weight gain and recovery are 
disengaged.  
 
In analysing anorexia nervosa, there is a critical dissection of the significance of the 
psychological/ mental elements that informs the voluntary or involuntary actions of 
the individual. The understanding of the normal or abnormal relationship an 
individual has with food changes when self-starvation is evaluated through the lens of 
voluntary and involuntary actions. In reference to the mental or mind element, the 
person who starves voluntarily is impacted by food in a way that is unconnected to the 
constant thinking and unconsciously obsession over food. Although there is a 
preoccupation concerning eating food and the individual has all the listed warning 
signs of anorexia, there is an awareness of the significance of self starvation which 
continues after the person resumes eating. The dilemma is that the true form of 
anorexia of self-starvation is not purely established as a voluntary action since there 
are clinical indications of existing factors, which control the way the anorexic 
individual behaves or reacts to food.  However, for anorexia nervosa to have meaning 
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transcending established warning signs and clinical intervention, there has to be 
recognition of elements of voluntary starvation within the spectrum. The spectrum of 
an individuals eating behaviour can therefore be analysed through the lens of 
voluntary meaningful self-starvation. 
Understandably, a further suggestion of the implication of voluntary or meaning-
centred starvation becomes a rights interest. The significance of food refusal and 
extremities of re-feeding has attracted the attention of human rights proponents as the 
discourse is pushed beyond the basic definitions of anorexia, weight gain and 
recovery.  In order words, when anorexics are treated against their will for the cure of 
their mental illness, is the bodily integrity and autonomy also preserved in the 
process? Until recently, the medico-legal sphere has presented a uniformed approach 
in tackling psychiatric treatments of individuals with mental disorder and suggestions 
of anorexic bodies outside the existing controlled spectrum was novice in the field. 
Mental health law “provides for the involuntary detention and psychiatric treatment of 
persons with severe mental impairment”.93 However, options for seeking alternative 
methods of reducing the use of force have since emerged.94 A new approach by rights 
proponents for “recognition of the subjective will and preferences of persons with 
mental impairment has also emerged”,95primarily dependent on a disability plea under 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Advocacy reliant 
on a plea of disability does not address or recognise the dilemmas of voluntary or 
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meaningful anorexic bodies whose individual liberties and bodily integrity are still in 
jeopardy.96 
 
 
1.2 Medical Model of Mental Disorder  
 
Before the development of the first edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, the ideology that all forms of abnormal and irregular behaviour had 
elements of mental illness and insanity had been imprinted in the English society.97 
Therefore, in the absence of a clear scientific-based diagnostic manual, clinicians 
relied on the traditional one-drug/therapy-treats-all universal approach in the 
treatment and care of all individuals who exhibit abnormal behaviour. Historical 
citations from the medieval period also reveal an uncategorised and undetailed 
interpretation of the nature and treatment of mental disorder. 98  The basic 
understanding of mental disorder is, thus, traditionally dominated by significant 
arguments on the nature, meaning and universal implication. Numerous research 
outcomes demonstrate an irregular and disruptive trend in analysing the defining 
features of mental disorder and its peculiar patterns. Remarkably, the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) acknowledges that the boundaries of 
mental disorder are not precise and “lacks a consistent operational definition that 
covers all situations”.99 The DSM-5100 described mental disorders as a psychological 
and behavioural pattern, which can result in death, cause pain or escalate the risk for 																																																								
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intentional self-harm.101 Mental disorders reflect significant dysfunction in the core 
cognitive and mental function of the individual.102 Fact-based definition of mental 
disorder consists of “statistical facts, including biomedical and statistical information” 
conceptualised by the need to protect the most vulnerable of humanity from both 
conceivable and hypothetical abuse.103 Bingham, however, argues that the value-
based definitions of mental disorder show no positive outcome, as they do not address 
the “status of individuals in oppressive societies and over inclusive of mental or 
behavioural states that happen to be negatively valued in the individual’s social 
context”.104  
Investigations into the underlying causes of mental disease have progressed from the 
medieval period given the influence of science and technology. However, critical 
questions on whether “scientific diagnosis reflects a true mental disorder” is yet 
unanswered.105 It is stale that media-idealised body goals are embedded in western 
cultures.106 Non-western cultures do not present evidence of body dissatisfaction 
based on impressions from the media. Without media impact on body image, distorted 
perception, self-dissatisfaction and exaggerated fears of becoming thin or obese 
would become non-significant cultural factors. Body dissatisfaction has been linked to 
the idealised images in the media, which promote thin feminine features. Western 
women embrace this narrative and become invested in the images and messages 
circulated, hence developing distorted body images and unrealistic ideas concerning 
how they actually look in comparison with others. This problem also applies to 																																																								
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adolescent girls immersed in fashion magazines culture who endeavour to attain the 
perfect body. Attaining the ideal thin body becomes a reward in the quest for 
perfection and self-control. Szasz, for instance, believes that mental disorder remains 
a metaphor and myth not representing or belonging to a real class of medical disease, 
rather a carefully crafted conception of clinicians to further the agenda of paternalistic 
control.107 The justification for the application of involuntary therapeutic remedies is 
built on the reasoning that acquiring traditional medical training and expertise is 
sufficient to impress paternalistic control. Consequently, Szasz argues that mental 
illness becomes the justification for the incarceration of individuals who by law are 
not criminals and therefore need not be detained.108 Involuntary intervention is 
therefore presented attractively as restorative and beneficial to the human body, 
regarded as weak and spiritually unstable.109 A narrative that embraces established 
involuntary treatment methods is consistent with presumptive labelling and 
stereotyping accepted by legislators, jurists, and physicians. Embracing this 
established presumptive labelling transitions the patient into an inmate, “his prison 
into a “hospital”, and his warden into a “doctor”.110  
 
Critical observations disclose a lack of certainty on what constitutes bodily disease 
and which accrues to a level of un-diagnosable brain disorder. In practice, clinicians 
will include varying irregular and commonly criticised behaviours as constituting 
mental illness.111 Another highlighted problem in understanding mental disorder 
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shows an established dualist approach between mental and physical symptoms. In 
many ways, the biological person - “the body”, is excluded from the narrative, as the 
focus placed on neurological imbalance would form the basis of disordered behaviour 
and thinking.112 The challenge is to determine whether the medical label of mental 
disorder is designed to validate psychiatric paternalism and coercion or purely 
targeted towards wellness and recovery with no negative outcomes. Szasz objects to 
any core principles which furnish involuntary psychiatric intervention thereby 
advocating for a complete abolition. Thus, according to Szasz, the idea that a person 
should forgo their liberty and accept any form of involuntary treatment is “morally 
distasteful and legally dubious”.113 The question then is why the treatment of mental 
disorder should be different from the treatment of other types of illness, which does 
not have any special provision under the law.114 To this question, Szasz argues that 
mental illness does not exist and irregular behavioural patterns reflect the constant 
battle of an individual to exist and live freely and independently. The individual 
should be fully liable for his action, choices and decisions. The implication is that 
discrediting and dissecting the term mental illness might offer some much-needed 
meaning.115 First, clinical definitions of mental disorders are rounded on the analysis 
of the malfunction of the brain, entirely reliant on a medical, diagnostic model, thus 
isolating other substantive narratives.116  According to Szasz: 
“We call people physically ill when their body-functioning 
violates certain anatomical and physiological norms. Similarly, 
we call people mentally ill when their personal conduct violates 
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certain anatomical and physiological norms, similarly, we call 
people mentally ill when their personal conduct violates certain 
ethical, political and social norms.”117 
 
Psychiatric historians envisioned that the challenge would entail creating a viable 
system of classification and diagnostic evaluation, which invariably can establish 
treatment options as well as maintain a progressive framework, which can sufficiently 
tackle any idiosyncrasies that may arise within the spectrum.118 At this stage, for 
psychiatrists to achieve the required outcome, biological signals must trump cultural 
constructs.119 It, therefore, follows that the emergence of strong psychiatric monopoly 
occasioned a notable transition from analysing all forms of mental illness from a 
spiritual or demonic perspective “towards a conception of it as illness with progress of 
science”.120 Towards the eighteenth century, the redefinition of insanity and other 
forms of mental illness within the English society gradually emerged. In the first 
place, legal recognition of insanity through authoritative diagnosis transition 
necessitated the first departure from a “culturally defined phenomenon afflicting an 
unknown”.121 Also, the co-dependency relationship between psychiatry and mental 
disorder was gradually emerging; symbolic is the institutionalisation of individuals in 
asylums as the definitive solution to treating lunacy or madness.122Labelling the 
insane enhanced stereotypes, ensuring that moral boundaries were consistently drawn 
resulting in the exclusion and seclusion of individual possessing unique and unusual 
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traits of behaviour deemed aggressive or damaging.123 In the mid-eighteenth century, 
the psychiatric monopoly in the treatment of the mentally ill was fully formed hence 
the transfer of care and responsibility from the family and community to the 
clinicians. Scull notes that the psychiatrist capitalising on their presumed scientific 
expertise will assume the role of identifying the problem and providing the solution 
for management.124 
 In what follows, the powers and control of the psychiatrists gradually emerged to 
prominent standing with unrestrictive authority to upgrade or downgrade the status of 
the mentally ill.125 Following the removal of the cultural and moral approach, an 
inherited traditional disease-focused approach in treating and managing mental illness 
was developed around the 19th century, which was when enthused alienist engaged in 
the understanding, management and treatment of mental diseases.126 Evidently, there 
was a need for a more cohesive psychiatric classification system supported by 
numerous studies and extensive scientific, medical and clinical research to aid the 
better understanding of mental disorder.127 The objective for practitioners was to 
produce a conceptual framework based on both neurobiological and psychological 
traits.128 A system of descriptive psychopathy (DP) was utilised “to record the 
symptoms of mental disease, and it consists of a vocabulary, a syntax, assumptions 
about the nature of behaviour and some application rules”.129 The desirable outcome 
of the recommended DP will retain the professional medicine framework by 
unravelling the causative biological signal thereby delivering credible knowledge to 																																																								
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aid research and diagnosis for treatment.130 Similar medical accounts produced a 
mesh of theory bound conceptual presentations involving clinical observations, 
indeterminate variations of biological and psychosocial elements.131 However, the 
challenge remained that not all predetermined factors can be accounted for during the 
process and there is a difficulty in analysing the information presented during the 
original description in the instances of treatment failure.132  
International classification of diseases (ICD) was therefore first developed to enable 
effective cross-national communication within multiple fields – including law, 
medicine and psychiatry.133 The DSM-5134 provides the current break down of all 
mental disorders delivering “a classification system of mental disorders with 
associated criteria designed to facilitate more reliable diagnosis of the disorder”.135 
For the psychiatrist, the DSM-5 provides a consensus on the most concise and 
practical reference for clinical exercise within the field, including the knowledge and 
awareness of the intricacies of the disorder to facilitate proper management and 
treatment.136  According to Vahia, the DSM-5 “is a document that reflects current 
consensus of the leading academicians, clinicians, and researchers in the field of 
mental health.”137 The broad objective of the DSM-5’s classification system was to 
assert boundaries and limitations in identifying the various forms, patterns and 
irregularities of disordered behaviours.138 In addition to the provision of a standard 
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framework for defining mental disorders, the DSM-5 specifies the general diagnostic 
criteria for clinical detection, evaluation and management of eating disorder. 139 
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) intended to create a reliable 
categorisation system, which can assume universal applicability across the field of 
mental health as well as other broadened field of research. In essence, it was essential 
to develop a uniform and universal approach in the communication of the 
fundamental characteristics of mental disorder for active and productive engagement 
between clinicians and mentally disordered individuals. The issue, however, is that 
the boundaries between several disorders are not defined and multiple disorders may 
exhibit the same symptoms over time. While the DSM-5 aims to produce reliable 
outcomes, it has been criticised for enabling a system that focuses firstly on the 
recognition of the more noticeable symptoms during diagnosis, therefore, understating 
the cluster of less prominent symptoms which in retrospect should form a broaden 
spectrum which can fulfil the correct diagnostic criteria.140Major structural problems 
are reflected in the multiplicity of the disease an individual can suffer hence reducing 
specific symptoms to represent a particular illness might produce a false definite 
diagnosis.  A more valid approach will ensure that a cluster of disorders is analysed to 
“maximize their validity and clinical utility”.141 This approach, however, means that 
“individual disorder diagnostic” criteria are forgone and cannot be validated.142 A 
more fluid diagnostic concept indicates that clinicians can adopt multiple diagnostic 
approaches, which further individual understanding of the multifactorial nature of 
mental disorders.  
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The challenge remains the theoretical interpretation of mental disorders in this field, 
which mainly focuses on the psychiatric and medical aspects of the disease, precisely 
highlighting the effects on the mind and physical body of the individual.143 Recently, 
the objectives of clinicians have extended beyond aiding knowledge in the field but 
also the identification of “the characteristics of specific disorders and their implication 
for treatment and research”.144 The language of psychiatry is therefore weary to 
accommodate the existence of changing norms outside the standards presented by 
statistical manual (upgraded DP) hence further cementing the isolated and private 
grounds of professional medicine. Having adopted a clear paternalistic stance, 
psychiatric accounts of diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders are dominant, 
increasingly leading to silent embargos on any contradictions to the traditional 
established knowledge. It is noted that outlined patterns in the study of mental 
disorders trend on established diagnostic and classification models made for mainly 
clinical application and implementation regardless of the increased legal and ethical 
arguments. It, therefore, follows that engaging with other frameworks outside the 
psychiatric spectrums can be reactive, increasing criticisms of the essence and value 
of non-medical or bioethical interventions.   
 
1.3   Mental Health Act 1983 (United Kingdom) 
 
The Mental Health Act 1983 established that involuntary treatments are crucial in the 
management and care of the anorexic body; however such application can only be 
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fulfilled through legal means.145 Invariably, the care, treatment and detention of 
individuals established to be mentally ill is enforceable without obtaining consent.146 
Clinicians have however extended the management and treatment of mental disorder 
to include addressing physical deterioration as relevant to restoring mental stability. 
The Act also provides that medical treatment must include nursing care and 
rehabilitation, which generally must be under medical supervision. Section 3.3 of the 
Mental Health Act 1983 code of practice defines mental disorders to include “eating 
disorders, nonorganic sleep disorders and non-organic sexual disorders.” 147  It 
therefore means that the medical treatment, assessment for treatment and care of 
patients who are established to have eating disorders such as anorexia nervosa or 
bulimia nervosa or other forms of eating disorder are regulated under the provisions 
of the Mental Health Act 1983. 
 
The 1983 Mental Health Act provides that patients may be admitted to the hospital for 
assessment and treatment of their mental disorders. Where an application for such 
admission for assessment and treatment has been made, the grounds for the 
application may be that the persons is suffering from a mental disorder that requires 
detention for assessment of the state of their mental health and such detention should 
be for their own safety or the safety of others.148 In Riverside Mental Health v Fox, 
the application for detention or compulsory treatment would therefore be based on 
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written recommendations from two registered medical practitioners.149  The MHA 
recommends that the period for admission for assessment should not exceed 28 days 
unless it is extended by further application before the end of the 28 days.150  An 
individual may also be admitted for assessment in an emergency, where at least one 
medical practitioner or the nearest relative of the patient has made an emergency 
application. The medical practitioner should be one who is familiar with the patient 
and if not, should comply with section 12 relating to a single recommendation. The 
emergency application shall only last for 72 hours unless a second medical 
recommendation is received and that recommendation complies with all the 
requirements of section 3 and section 12.151 
 
The Mental Health Act therefore regulates the manner in which people diagnosed as 
having any form of mental disorder are treated and evaluated.152 When individuals are 
detained under S.2 of the Act, S.63 provides that: “The consent of the patient shall not 
be required for any medical treatment given to him for the mental disorder from 
which he is suffering…”153 The procedure for compulsory treatment for the cure of 
the existing mental disorder is a rather complex one and primarily focuses on the 
individual as a patient whom has lost their capacity to consent to treatment. The 
application for detention for the purpose of treatment is made on the grounds that the 
person is suffering from mental disorder and should receive treatment that can only be 
provided within the medical facility. Medical practitioners argue that detention for the 
purposes of compulsory treatment is necessary for safeguarding the health and 
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wellbeing of the individual as well as protect the safety of others.154 The application 
must be grounded on the written recommendations of two medical practitioners.155 At 
least one medical practitioner or the nearest relative of the patient may admit a patient 
for assessment in situation where an emergency application has been made. The 
medical practitioner should have an established familiarity with the patient and if not, 
should comply with section 12 relating to a single recommendation. The emergency 
application shall only last for 72 hours unless a second medical recommendation is 
received and that recommendation complies with all the requirements of section 3 and 
section 12.156 
 
An application can also be made for a patient that is already in hospital in which case 
the start of admission will be considered to be the time that the application was 
received. If a medical practitioner responsible for the treatment of a patient 
determines that an application should be made for the admission of a patient then they 
may do so in a written report. During the time of admission the patient may be 
detained in the hospital for 72 hours.157 An application for admission of a patient to 
hospital is valid for 14 days from the last time he was examined by a medical 
practitioner. In the case of an emergency application this period is 24 hours from the 
medical examination by the recommending practitioner or from the time of the 
application whichever is earlier.158 Applications can also be made by the nearest 
relative of the patient or by an approved medical practitioner. However, an 
application may not be made by a medical practitioner where the nearest relative to 
the patient has notified the practitioner or their local social services authority that they 																																																								
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object to the application or the practitioner has not consulted the nearest relative. The 
nearest relative does not need to be consulted where it is not practical or would result 
in unreasonable delay.159 The practitioners who personally examined the patient must 
give the recommendation that supports the applications. Where the practitioners 
examined the patient separately, the examinations should not be more than 5 days 
apart. The practitioner cannot give a recommendation where there would be a 
potential conflict of interest.160 Where a local services authority feels that a patient in 
their area may require admission to a hospital they will appoint a medical practitioner 
to examine the patient. The medical practitioner will make the application if they 
determine that such an application should be made.161 A patient may be granted a 
leave of absence from the hospital where the responsible clinician determines that it is 
in the interest of the patient. This period may be indefinite or for a specific period or 
for specific occasions. The leave of absence can be extended even in the absence of 
the patient. The leave of absence may be revoked by notice in writing where the 
clinician determines that it is necessary in the interest of the patients health or safety 
or the safety of others. 162 
The precedence established provides that the presence of mental disability renders 
such persons unable to think rationally or fulfil autonomous actions. The structural 
pattern of the Mental Health Act centers on the role of the individual as patient 
requiring paternalistic support. Clinicians therefore approach a self-starving 
individual cautionary of the long-standing notoriety of anorexia to produce fatal 
consequences should treatment be forgone. The mentally disordered individual 
profiled under the Mental Health Act is vulnerable, delicate and to a great extent 																																																								
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disabled and therefore lacks the capacity to start or complete voluntary actions. 
Understandably, the provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983 is intended to establish 
a framework which ensures that persons who are certified as suffering from any form 
of mental disorder such as anorexia nervosa can be compelled to undergo necessary 
treatment even in situations where they fail to accept the medical diagnosis and 
treatment options. Maclean therefore asserts that paternalistic intervention is 
necessary and required to validate and preserve individual autonomy especially where 
the individual capacity is lacking. 163  The objective of mental health law is 
generalised to regulate the conduct and behaviors of persons who have severe mental 
deficiency and psychiatric impairment. There is however no specification or in-depth 
definition of what level of mental and physical degradation should constitute severity 
for the purposes of administering the act.  The harm test (individual is adjudged to 
constitute harm to themselves and the next person) becomes the only practical test 
relied upon by clinicians to enforce involuntary treatment. For the anorexic body, 
clinical and legal interference therefore justified when the pattern of feeding are 
significantly altered presenting a source of concern for their friends and family.  
From a medical diagnosis standpoint, it is often significantly easier to evaluate what 
can constitute self-harm in a person, as refusal of food for extended periods has been 
noted to result in severe consequences. More so, how can the change in the feeding 
pattern of an individual affect the next person or result to their harm? The position of 
mental health laws always conflict concerning how to protect the interests of the 
individual and third party interests at the same time. Constitution of harm to oneself 
under the act is analysed within a one system approach that only evaluates the amount 
of food consumed and the length of self-starvation before arriving at a treatment 																																																								
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decision. Although the Act provides for detention for administering involuntary 
treatment, however, the lack of clarity lies in whether coercion and use of force-
feeding constitute an effective treatment for mental disorder. 164 Detaining an 
individual against his will, occasioned by the use of force and other coercive methods, 
constitutes an interference with their “individual liberty and bodily integrity”.165 
Removal of free will means individuals are not at liberty to consent or not consent to 
actions, which require the use of force, inhuman and degrading methods as means of 
restoring the previous body weight.  Dolan points out that there is a lack of balance 
between the interests the individual and what the law desires for them as clinical 
objectives override the demands of the individuals and only in rare cases are their 
demands met. 166 The objective of the MHA is to guarantee adequate protection and 
safety of individuals who lack competence, however, greater protection under section 
139 was granted to medical practitioners thus exempting them from both civil and 
criminal proceeding for involuntary treatment except “the act was made in bad faith 
or without reasonable care”. 167The extent of reasonable care in addressing acts of 
negligence is however subject to the standards indicated by a liable medical authority. 
Although section 1.3 of the Mental Health Act 1983 code of practice requires that 
treatment professionals involuntarily treating an individual must “keep to a minimum 
the restrictions they impose on the patient’s liberty, having regard to the purpose for 
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which the restrictions are imposed.”168  Section 63 of the Mental Health Act confers 
the ultimate decision making power on treatment of mental disorders as there is no 
prerequisite consideration to furnish consent “for the medical treatment given to him 
for the mental disorder which he is suffering”.169 The challenge is finding a balanced 
approach that ensures that the health and safety of the individual is preserved as well 
as ensuring that they possess the freedom needed for self-expression. Mental health 
law has been criticised for a rather rigid and restricted approach in dealing with 
people adjudged of having any existing mental disorders. According to Wilson “the 
debate has focused on the width of medical discretion by mental health law, rather 
than whether the discretion should exist at all”.170 Section 23.32 of the MHA practice 
code explains that the individual is entitled to receive in-depth information on type of 
treatment embarked upon and the associated risks, only then can consent be given 
voluntarily. Invariably, “permission given under any unfair or undue pressure is not 
consent”.171 
Sections 57 and 58A highlight the types of medical treatment for mental disorders 
which requires consent prior to medical treatments and therefore subject to special 
procedures.172 Treatments subject to the special procedure include neurosurgery for 
mental disorder, surgical implantation of hormones in other to reduce sex drive173, 
medications applied after an initial three months period-except as part of giving 
electro convulsive therapy174 and when administering electroconvulsive therapy and 
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other medication as part of the ECT.175 It therefore means that under Section 63 of the 
Act once a patient is detained, they can be treated for their mental disorder whether 
consent is given or not unless the provisions of sections 57, 58 and 58A apply. B v 
Croydon established that when a person continually refuses food and is subsequently 
detained under the Mental Health Act, the question of whether the person has capacity 
to consent to forceful feeding does not arise as the act invariably endorses force-
feeding and does not recognize a competent persons refusal.176  Section 23.37 of the 
Mental Health Act Code of Practice explains that the MHA intentions are to request 
consent from patients when feasible and seeks to ensure that medical treatments are 
not carried out just to treat the physical disorders of a patient except it is essential that 
treating the physical disorder addresses the mental disorder. 177  In South West 
Hertfordshire Health Authority vs KB, the judge agreed with the Hertfordshire health 
authority that “relieving the symptoms was just as much as relieving the underlying 
cause”.178 It therefore means that force-feeding by nasogastric tube is a vital part of 
the medical treatment that relieves the physical symptoms and also serves as 
treatment for her mental disorder. Similarly, in Riverside NHS Trust v Fox forced 
feeding was established as a legitimate treatment for anorexia patients under the 1983 
Mental Health Act.179 The outstanding question, however, is whether food applied 
forcefully, orally or through nasogastric tubes should be regarded as a valid and 
legitimate treatment of a patient’s mental disorder? 
 
It is established under the MHA that medical treatment is applied for the mental 
disorder from which the patient is suffering, however, the Act does not confer any 																																																								
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powers on medical professionals to impose treatment for any physical disorders that 
are unrelated to the patient's mental disorder.180 The causal link between physical and 
mental disorder has allowed the courts to utilize this section and declare some 
treatments (including reasonable restraint) as lawful despite the patient's refusal. The 
justification had been that some physical disorders might be symptomatic of, or may 
contribute to the severity of, or be the cause of, some mental disorders. Invariably 
treating the physical disorder is in effect treating the mental disorder. Section 63 has 
therefore been stretched to include within its scope, forced feeding for the treatment 
of anorexia. Individuals established as having anorexia nervosa may be forcibly 
detained for treatment under Sections 2 and 3 of the MHA whether they are 
competent or incompetent.  A Guidance on the Treatment of Anorexia Nervosa under 
the Mental Health Act 1983 published by the Mental Health Act Commission 
instructs that for the purposes of evaluating and treating an anorexic patient, such a 
patient may possibly be detained under the Act. Section 63 of the MHA further 
provides that medical practitioners are at liberty to apply medical treatment on a 
detained individual regardless of whether they possess the capacity to reject 
treatment.181 Giordano argues that the problem with the MHA is that it fails to 
communicate what exactly can be regarded as an appropriate treatment for a mental 
disorder and which treatments can be legally enforceable under the act182. Bridgman 
points out that it is possible that Section 63 of the MHA lacks the authority to justify 
restraint under the law. However, at first glance, there exists an underlying connection 
between the physical and mental aspects of this disorder and therefore seems 
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plausible that the Act can enforce treatment on physical disorders connected to the 
treatment of a patient’s mental disorder.183 
 
The rise of bioethics movement in the late sixties and seventies spearheaded 
worldwide, apprehension on the legal implication of treating detained patients without 
their consent. Furthermore, under the guidance of the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg numerous countries amended their mental health legislation 
between 1978-1992. In reviewing the criteria for involuntary admission in Strasbourg, 
“the image of the patient as a ‘citizen’ with rights’ emerged with an increased 
recognition that compulsorily admitted patients retained their legal rights during their 
stay.”184 However, Dolan argues that those legal rights are non-existent especially in 
treating anorexic individuals as it appears legally established in England and Wales 
that: “patients with anorexia nervosa can be compulsorily admitted and artificially fed 
regardless of absence of consent under the provisions of the MHA”.185 There is, 
therefore, still no significant recognition that a person’s psychiatric disorder or 
compulsory detention does not render a patient unable to make valuable decisions on 
the matters, which affect their wellbeing. 186 Re C (an Adult Treatment: Refusal of 
Treatment) noted that it would be a breach of common law not to acknowledge the 
refusal of a competent adult to be subjected to treatment. 187 However, the language of 
the Mental Health Act reinforces labeling and stereotyping of the anorexic body as it 
already references the autonomous individual as a patient prior to any medical 
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assessment. The implication is that an individual with no established mental disorder 
is already identified as a person suffering and in need of medical treatment and 
intervention. A person is regarded as possessing their full autonomous prior to the 
determination of their mental state and competence to consent to medical treatment. 
The issue however is that this autonomous person is not allowed under the Act to take 
the decision on the assessment of their mental state. This step is very crucial as there 
is no interpretation as to when the autonomous person transitions into a patient.  
Section 3 is of the Mental Health Act 1983 is most applicable to anorexia nervosa 
sufferers.188  Sectiom 3 stipulates that a patient who suffers from mental disorder in 
any extent “mental illness, severe mental impairment, psychopathic disorder…” may 
be admitted to a hospital and detained for treatment following an application for such 
admission. 189 Medical treatment that can be administered without consent includes 
nursing, psychological intervention and specialist mental health rehabilitation and 
care.”190The provisions of Sectiom 63 of the MHA in addition to the removal of the 
requirement of consent implies that anorexic patients admitted under the Act would 
not need to furnish their consent prior to medical treatment. Invariably the instant 
evaluation of disordered behavior is established by accounts of physical thinness due 
to self-starvation. The starving body is therefore aligned with the labeling and 
stereotypical dominating medical analysis of anorexia nervosa. Since consent is not 
sought prior to assessment for the determination of their mental disorder, the person’s 
capacity is already in question and can therefore be subjected to involuntary treatment 
after assessment. Weiss however argues that autonomous adults possess the freedom 
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and rational thinking to self-starve, However this may not be the case for younger 
women under the guardianship of their family.191  
Various treatment methods identified under the Act indicate that medications are 
administered within a three months period of detention, after which the period of 
detention can be extended for another three month with the purpose of administering 
additional medical treatment. However, individuals who object to extended detention 
periods are forced to continue treatment under the Act. Refusal of treatment on 
autonomous grounds signifies the manifestation of the symptoms of mental disorder. 
Medical practitioners have informally noted that the presence of mental disorder 
prohibits rational thinking and cloud logical judgment. In evaluating the mental state 
of the individual, rationality is therefore a pre-condition whether the individual will 
accept or refuse medical treatment. In situations where the individual asserts their 
right to refuse medical treatment, clinicians argue that refusal of medical treatment 
indicates disordered behavior as a mentally stable individual would understand the 
extent of physical deterioration. The deteriorating physical body then becomes core 
recognizable criteria to evaluate the mental state of the individual especially when 
there is no behavioral indication of constituting harm to oneself or another person. If 
asserting the rights to refuse medical treatment indicates the presence of mental 
disorder, it is within reasoning to label the MHA as contributory to the stereotypical 
views of mental disorders.  
Core challenges in asserting autonomy revolves around established principles under 
the Mental Health Act, which forgo the crucial elements of capacity once the 
individual is detained and conveys all authority for medical decision-making on 
approved medical practitioners. The justification for not requiring consent hinges on 																																																								
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section 63 of the Mental Health Act, which also creates a connection between the 
ethical issues that arise when consent is not required under section 2 of the Mental 
Capacity Act. Although the Act only references medical treatment as applicable 
regarding the treatment of mental disorders, clinical treatment under the Act extends 
to reversing the manifested physical disorder. In George’s Healthcare National 
Service Trust v S,192 detention under the Act was considered unlawful although 
consent was not sought in administering a treatment that could preserve life. 
Regardless, the court found that providing life-saving medical treatment must not be 
for purpose unconnected to mental disorder. Consequently, detention under Section 2 
of the 1983 MHA must therefore be solely connected to the treatment of mental 
disorders and clinicians ought to have made a distinction between the treatment 
administered to address the urgent treatment required by the pregnant woman and 
detention for her mental disorder.  
Understandably legal provisions guide medical decisions therefore clinicians will 
have to deliberate between respecting the autonomy and “promotion of his or her 
welfare”.193 The application of Section 63 of the MHA on non-consenting anorexic 
bodies is consistent once the individual is proven to self-starve and physical 
emaciation (under 17 BMI) been registered. S.63 therefore steps away from the 
general legal principles established under English common law that attributed all 
adults as competent to furnish their consent prior to any medical intervention.194 
However, once mental disorder is linked to physical deterioration, Article 2 (Right to 
life) of the ECHR is administered and arguments of preservation of life then 
supersede autonomous rights of the individuals. Although there is no exposed 
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indication that the individual is desirous of death or wishes to self-harm, clinicians 
however reference the long-term effects of self-starvation, which can result to death. 
The probability of death in this instance is not because of their mental disorder but as 
a biological consequence of self-starvation. Although the requirement of consent is 
for competent adults, the law also recognises that mental illness does not necessarily 
jeopardize the patient’s capacity to make medical decisions.195  
Giordano identifies some issues with the clinical evaluation of competence in 
disordered eating behaviours. Firstly, Giordano asserts, “people with eating disorders 
are typically intelligent, and not at all the stereotypical ‘insane’ person, detached from 
reality”.196 It is therefore difficult to accept that refusal of medical treatment by some 
of them demonstrates or affirms incompetency. It is therefore problematic to accept 
that although the anorexic individual may show competency by understanding the 
information presented to them yet they are also unable to make informed decision due 
to the presence of mental illness.197 Accepting an individual’s effective fulfilment of 
the competency requirement in processing medical information whilst reinforcing 
their incompetence in making his or her own medical decision presents a very 
conflicting stance. There should be consideration that the clinicians would adjudge 
the individual of failing to understand the information disclosed because of their 
conflicting opinions on treatment intervention. There is also no detailed definition of 
how an individual is expected to prove competency by understanding and retaining 
information furnished by clinicians. The paternalistic setting in the management of 
eating disorder implies that the individual has to agree and accept the decision of the 
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medical practitioner. A conflicting stance by the individual will equate to a lack of 
understanding of the information and equates incompetency.   
The MHA 1983 does not recognise the multifactorial nature and ever changing 
behavioural dynamics of the anorexic body, which necessitates difficulty to correctly 
apply the competence test. Self-starvation in itself reveals a great level of free will, 
self-denial and determination to continuously remain within a specific size. The 
accompanying dimensions of excessive exercise and taking slimming pills are also 
consciously curated to reinforce and fulfil those body specific goals. Clinical 
evaluations of anorexia nervosa are never done in isolation, as other symptoms not 
associated with self-starvation itself form part of the medical treatment. In a NHS 
Foundation Trust v Ms X, X already had a chronic dependence on alcohol, which 
resulted to irreversible liver damage.198 X could not however be detained under 
Section 2 of the MHA 1983 for the treatment of her alcohol dependence syndrome. 
However, medical practitioners focused on a collective treatment, which involved 
detention for the treatment of her anorexia nervosa. The efficacy of the understanding 
and retention of the information presented by medical practitioners to the anorexic 
body cannot be positively or productively evaluated when the act of self-starvation is 
at its core an autonomous choice and decision to refuse food.  Reinforcing feeding, as 
part of the treatment for anorexia will not present a logical narrative to the anorexic 
body as it defeats the meaningful value of their experience. Wilson notes that critics 
have requested an abolition of mental health laws on grounds of prejudice and 
“unnecessary interference with individual liberty and bodily integrity”. 199  It is 
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therefore predictable and unsurprising that mainstream rejection of third party 
medical decision-making is beginning to emerge.200  
 
1.4  Human Rights, Bioethics and Mental Disorders  
 
The ethical issue of stereotyping all persons adjudged as mentally ill is consistent and 
contentious across the field of healthcare. Pearn notes that every traditional 
interaction between the doctor and patient “has the potential to involve individuals in 
stereotypic views”.201 Pearn defines stereotyping as ascribing the same features 
present in a particular individual as applicable to a whole class of people.202 The 
practical implication in medicine is the “attitudinal tradition of medical paternalism” 
which establishes reduced autonomy, as the subject is deemed incapable of 
rationalising the diverse choices affecting their individual condition.203 The prevalent 
assumption is that the presence of mental illness diminishes competence and prevents 
patients from utilising the information presented to them in order to make the best 
decision. The capability of an individual to make decisions mainly affects their 
autonomous rights. Historically, clinicians are reluctant to engage directly with 
individuals once they exhibit a behavioural or psychological pattern consistent with 
mental disorder. Clinicians at this stage view their capacity to make rational decisions 
as compromised thereby reducing their autonomy204. Giordano firstly refutes the 
notion that a person’s reduced autonomy in making treatment decision is due to 
mental illness.205 Giordano insists that the law recognises that the incompetence of a 																																																								
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patient in an aspect of life does not mean that such a patient cannot make treatment 
decisions on other areas.206 It becomes very problematic to assume that incompetence 
is established once a person diagnosed with an eating disorder refuses treatment. 
Therefore, that an individual has a mental illness does not necessarily impair the 
individual’s right to autonomy as most people suffering from eating disorders are very 
aware, able to retain the information presented to them, intellectual and often very 
skilled.    According to Giordano:  
“The fact a person has received a diagnosis of mental illness 
does not give us reason to assume that she is incompetent. It 
may instead give us reason to investigate further her capacity to 
consent. This position is in line with the general principles of 
respect for autonomy that is accepted by the UK laws.”207  
 
Understandably, humankind is generally affected by any decisions with ethical 
implications in the field of medicine, science and technology.208 The socio-cultural 
diversity of human beings means that ethical dilemmas that arise from an illness or 
disease cannot be effectively appraised by relying only on the standard statistical 
framework guidelines presented in professional medical practice.209 In reality, some 
scholars argue that the values that reflect human rights thinking exist outside the core 
roles of physicians, but “…it goes further much further than the various professional 
codes of ethics concerned”.210 Essentially, psychosocial and cultural factors are also 																																																								
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feasible and potent factors in health analysis as opposed to sole reliance on scientific 
and technological factors.211 With advancement in knowledge and fact-finding, it is 
expected that conflict will arise in medical, ethical and socio-legal realms. 212 
Bioethical approaches, therefore, provides the intersection to addressing both legal 
and ethical issues and “contribute concepts and values that may be imported into legal 
rules, case laws, and statutory obligations”213 Credibility in analysing, interpreting 
and implementing traditional bioethical principles therefore, arrived through human 
rights.214 
 A conceptualised bioethical principle such as “Autonomy, Beneficence, Justice and 
Non-Maleficence” has merged into the theory and practice of human rights.215 The 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
referencing the 1948 Universal Declaration, 1997 Universal Declaration of the 
Human Genome and Human Rights and the 2003 International Declaration on Human 
Genetic Data conceptualised the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human 
Rights.216 The 2005 Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights reflected 
on the clarion call of providing a sustainable response to the ethical challenges 
precipitated by modern advancement in science and technology.217 UNESCO General 
Conference recognised that these ethical dilemmas “…should be examined with due 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms”218 and 
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resolved to provide a productive base for the resolution of the rapidly expanding 
challenges.  
Traditional bioethics doctrines address the doctor–patient relationship by analysing 
the morals behind medical treatments. The doctor-patient dynamic has often emerged 
as one of the core challenges in health care especially within the context of 
involuntary treatments. The fundamental dilemmas that arise once the individual 
refuses treatment raise strong legal and ethical concerns. Establishing a framework 
that offers independent guidance to behavioural patterns without the influence of 
undue coercion or restrictions becomes a matter for clinical concern “bearing in mind 
that a person’s identity includes biological, psychological, social, cultural and 
spiritual patterns”. 219  In essence, as the shift from strict professional medical 
framework occurs, the legal arena becomes active as the courts rely on the substantive 
principles of bioethics to redefine and analyse the ethical challenges. First, within the 
bioethical purview, the identity of the individual is recognised in the sense that 
preserves their dignity and fundamentally upholds their human rights. Article 3(1) of 
the Universal Declaration of Bioethics and Human Rights provides for the full respect 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms.220  
It therefore follows that the priority of the welfare and interests of the individual 
supersedes “sole interest of science or society”.221 Regardless of the merits of 
preserving dignity and protecting human rights, Brody considers the right to 
autonomous self-determination as an abstract concept that does not represent the best 
interest of the individuals especially in particular cases where actions or occurrences 
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that might lead to death are involved.222  The difficulty in applying autonomous rights 
arise from the ethos that insists that the presence of mental disorder signifies the lack 
of sound mind, which invariably reflects the lack of opportunities and choice.223 
Rationality on moral grounds does not consider mentally ill individuals as having free 
will and independence.224 It follows that a mentally impaired individual has no clear 
awareness of their actions and consequently cannot logically and rationally evaluate 
the result of their actions. Regardless, basic dignity and respect should be accorded 
notwithstanding their moral worth.225  
In the last century, the principle of autonomy has anchored its substance within the 
fundamental core foundations of human rights. 226  Essentially, patient rights 
movements have anchored the advocacy for self-determination as integral to a 
progressive modern day.227 Personal autonomy extends further to the respect of free 
choices and the actions of others. It is underlying the quest for “self-ownership and 
governance”, informed consent, respect of choices and voluntary decision-making 
recognising moral values.228 Smith argues that although it is essential that individuals 
express their choices independently and voluntarily, however, there are circumstances 
when such a power can be transferred to a medical expert during treatment.229 
Essentially, a determination is made not only regarding the autonomous nature of the 
individual but also on the ways to include and engage the relevant past decisions, 
expressions and inclinations. 230  Analysing autonomous rights circles to the 
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“justification in overriding a patient’s present autonomous choices or actions in light 
of his past or (anticipated) future choices and actions”.231 Smith notes that in various 
settings, depending on the prevalent condition of non-autonomous persons, the 
likelihood of overridden autonomy is very much heightened.232  
The principle of autonomy, therefore, highlights individual ownership of decision-
making. Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Bioethics and Human Rights 
provides for the right of individuals to “...make decisions, while taking responsibility 
for those decisions and respecting the autonomy of others…. For persons who are not 
capable of exercising autonomy, special measures are to be taken to protect their 
rights and interests”.233 It implies that for all thoughts and purposes, authority over 
their mind, body, decisions and actions without any external influences. Regardless of 
the negative or positive moral standing of the third party, conflicting positions will 
arise when the individual is adjudged incapable of utilising their autonomous rights. 
However, Article 6(1) provides for extending the right for individuals to give 
informed consent before any decision that affects their mental and physical 
wellbeing.234 Article 6(1) further states:  
“Any preventive, diagnostic and therapeutic medical 
intervention is only to be carried out with the prior, free and 
informed consent of the person concerned, based on adequate 
information. The consent should, where appropriate be express 
and may be withdrawn by the person”.235  
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Autonomy then conflicts significantly with the beneficence requirement of ensuring 
that the most effective quality medical care is administered even in situations where 
the individual regards such treatment as degrading and not in their best interest. 
Autonomy has become acknowledged as the foremost principle in medical ethics. 
Backed by case law and legislation, there is recognition that competent adults can 
accept or decline valuable life-saving medical treatment. A non-maleficence stance 
enables the doctors to step in to ensure that those decisions are in the individuals best 
interest and not harmful regardless of the legal and ethical considerations. The extent 
to which doctors are allowed to make certain difficult decisions and the ethical 
considerations for such decisions are often one of the challenges the courts face. 
Resolving the conflicts that arise in medical practice would necessitate the courts to 
engage equally the traditional settings of ethics, common law and medicine.  
Understandably, both the patient and the doctor would rely on the outcome (judicial 
decisions) to formulate a new attitude to conflicts that arise within healthcare. 
Invariably, the scenario provides that judicial resolution of these issues would pull 
from formulated principles using applicable legal tools. Customarily, the doctor-
patient relationship is always ethically scrutinised. The fiduciary duty of doctors 
ensures that the safety of patients is at the core of their professional obligation and 
integrity. The doctrine of informed consent forms an essential aspect of the 
relationship although conditional on the level of competency and capacity exhibited 
by the individual. The appeal for human dignity is a controversial one when viewed in 
light of competency. Clinicians often ensure they abide by the ethics of their 
profession in caring and managing the individual to recover from an illness, rather 
than fully acknowledging the appeal for the recognition of the principle of human 
dignity and self-worth. Recognising an individual as a rational agent justifies their 
	 68	
actions and the choices they make.236 Accordingly, the right thing to do is what an 
individual chooses, the right they have to express themselves freely, which appeals to 
Kantian ideologies of “justice to each persons will’.237 Free will therefore sometimes 
does not hinge on good or bad but on what an individual purports to be in their best 
interest.238   
The apparent argument for force-feeding and the use of coercion in doing so on moral 
grounds have exhausted itself, and selective interpretation fails to gather the definitive 
conclusions needed to anchor human dignity on the survival of human rights. The 
United Nations’ General Assembly in 1948 confronted the reality of systematic 
discrimination recognising “the inherent dignity and the equal inalienable rights” as 
the bases of “freedom, justice and peace”.239 Although the universal declaration are 
not binding, the essence was reflected in setting the parameters for human rights to 
flourish. This development created a “culture of human rights, and the states became 
inclined to adhere to the boundaries set without compromise”.240 The challenge, 
however, was the independence of states and government as sovereign and therefore 
cannot be compelled to codify, implement and sustain the realisation of human rights. 
States can, therefore, assume some obligation as shaped under international human 
rights through the implementation of international treaty documents.241 The United 
Nations’ intent in drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was to 
recognise the inherent aspiration of every man to attain a place of freedom without the 
fear of oppression and also the ability to access the protection guaranteed by the rule 																																																								
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of law.242 By interpretation, the United Nation General Assembly envisioned the idea 
of human dignity grounded in the appreciation of free will and the implementation of 
equality and dignity to the ethical or moral standing of individuals having been 
“endowed with reason and conscience”.243  Regardless of the distinction between 
individuals, the basis for this distinction being “race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinions, national or social origin, property, birth or status”.244 
Everyone has “the right to life, liberty and security of person”.245 Some decisions 
impact a person’s life, and realising those values mirror the internal questions of the 
value of human life.246 According to Harris, “[i]n a free society, individuals must be 
allowed to make these decisions for themselves, out of their faith, conscience and 
convictions”.247 Dworkin also notes that the most severe feature of slavery was the 
denial of the rights to make decisions, which individuals value, and respect.248 In 
every sense, when confronted with the worst atrocities known to humanity – the 
actions that arise from the neglect of human rights is grave. In Dworkin’s mind, the 
abolitionist intention of rescuing slavery and servitude was to restore dignity and self-
worth.249 
Multiple interpretations of human rights strongly reflect the accepted code of conduct 
of one person as it affects the next person. However, the unrestricted use of power 
remains vague in the systematic interpretation of informed consent. The 																																																								
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recommendations of the medical professionals are overriding so far the individual is 
made aware. Contextually, based on the interpretation of human rights, dignity and 
freedoms are allotted to an individual by the nature of being human. By corollary, 
they can be removed, displaced or also oppressed by the nature of their being human 
beings. For Brody, inherent rights and dignity succeed when the individual can 
exhibit or show reasonable competency to embrace the functional aspects of their life. 
In perspective, the conflict will resonate from the understanding of the nature of rights 
and the implications for every single individual.250 In this regard, if rights are 
universal, there is no assumption as to what these rights mean to an individual and in 
what ways they can be legitimately reflected and claimed. In many ways, there is an 
interception between culture that signifies a way of life and the meaning underlying 
behaviours, which forms part of human nature.251 
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                                                    CHAPTER TWO 
 
    
 
                                               Behavioural Substructure 
 
 
2.   
 The	 previous	 chapter	 analysed	 the	 discrepancies	 in	 the	 definition	 of	 anorexia	especially	the	overview	and	evolution	of	the	medical	model	of	what	constitutes	mental	 disorder	 and	 how	 this	 extended	 and	 generalised	 dimensions	 challenge	the	 implementation	 of	 autonomy	 or	 autonomous	 actions	 under	 the	 Mental	Health	Act.	It	therefore	follows	that	although	the	structural	patterns	of	the	MHA	1983	centres	on	the	role	of	individual	as	a	patient,	for	the	self	starving	individual,	the	 viable	 system	of	 evaluating	 their	 unusual	 or	 abnormal	 eating	 pattern	 does	not	present	an	accurate	profile	which	is	reflective	of	the	underlining	behavioural	pattern	 within	 a	 meaningful	 individualised	 narrative.	 Chapter	 1,	 therefore,	provided	the	crucial	structure	in	rethinking	the	overall	stereotyped	definition	of	anorexia	for	understanding	of	the	argument	for	self-starving	individuals	to	exist	meaningfully,	 freely	 and	 independently.	 This	 current	 chapter	 starts	 with	 a	synopsis	 of	 the	 underling	 structures	 of	 behavioural	 models	 that	 sufficiently	reveal	 the	 different	 realities	 of	 anorexia.	 The	 aim	 is	 to	 examine	 the	 multiple	variables	 that	 underscore	 abnormal	 behaviour	 beyond	 the	 criteria	 specified	 in	the	Diagnostic	 and	 Statistical	Manual	 of	Mental	 Disorder	 in	 other	 to	 present	 a	different	 reality	 representing	an	 individualised	way	of	 life	 and	experience.	The	discussion	in	this	chapter	provides	the	background	for	analysing	the	challenges	of	 conceptualization	 of	 the	 anorexic	 body	 especially	 in	 regards	 to	 current	thinking	 and	 approach	 to	 mental	 health	 practice	 and	 values.	 	 In	 light	 of	
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understanding	 the	 behavioural	 models,	 a	 systematic	 analysis	 of	 the	 emerging	notions	 of	 body	 image	 and	 self-starvation	 is	 discussed	 with	 the	 aim	 of	approaching	 disordered	 behaviour	 from	 alternative	 perspective	 rather	 than	pathology.	
 
 
2.1 Behavioural Models 
 
 The discrepancies in defining the concepts of illness and disease significantly reveal 
the different realities in understanding anorexia nervosa. Usdan and Lewis attempt to 
differentiate between the concepts of illness and disease.252 According to them, 
disease may be defined in chemical and cellular terms, with the assumption that only 
the symptoms that can be observed or related directly to underlying physiochemical 
processes are acceptable. The definition does not recognise illness in a clinical sense, 
rather illness is referenced as what a person experiences.253 Illness is therefore 
“something a man has”254 beyond the their biological anatomy. The contention is that 
medical doctors treat only the disease neglecting the person and their individualised 
illness, which is a culmination of their experiences. However, it has also been noted 
that a disease can constitute an illness. 255 Illness can be understood from two 
perspectives. One is the adaptive consequence of the illness, while the other is the 
illness behaviour itself.256  Illness cannot be said to be random phenomenon, as a 
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percentage of illnesses tends to concentrate in a small percentage of individuals and 
the particularities cluster in time.257  
 
Affective responses to situations in life that are stressful and difficult, such as loss of 
loved one, major changes in an individual’s life situation, could cause such people 
different illnesses. In a sense, members of a family where there is poor 
communication, fighting, less love and care for stress tend to be vulnerable to illness. 
Multiples variables interface as a response to effective situations necessitating focus 
on several factors in order to understand the illness of particular patients. For instance, 
a person experiencing poor health is hospitalised for complaining of a chest pain, with 
subsided pain and no tissue damage; however, examination revealed there was a 
multiple vessel coronary atherosclerosis.258 The treatment for the disease was limited 
to the underlying coronary artery disease whilst other possibilities or factors were 
neglected.259 These overlooked factors included the fact that the patient was tense, 
overly perfectionist and hard driving.260 There is also the consideration of other multi 
factorial circumstance surrounding the hospitalisation outcome, which might include 
the development of a recurring malignancy, confrontation with the teenage daughter 
about the company she kept and drug use. Other contributory factors may include 
dealing with opposition from obese wife who was taking mild tranquiliser against his 
intention to accept a recent promotion that would make him travel more.261 The 
interplay of these difficulties made the man increasingly tense, insomniac and 
conflicted, which resulted to the chest pain. In this case, the disease was clearly the 
coronary atherosclerosis while the other situational variables constituted part of the 																																																								
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man’s illness.262 The case of this man with chest pain suggests that there are physical 
illness and another type of unaccounted illness. Mental illness presents a state that 
involves the underlying identifiable physical defects and behavioural problems 
triggered by environmental factors surrounding and influencing the individual.  
 
Investigators and theoreticians reveal that it is insufficient to analyse or assess mental 
health on the general label. Functional definitions of mental health focus on 
established standards in terms of the positive striving through which an individual 
grows, matures, and accepts responsibilities as well as successfully coping and 
finding fulfilment. 263  A mentally healthy person therefore develops intellectual 
abilities, work skills including social sensitivity. Jahoda explains that there are three 
fundamental aspects of mental health.264 First, the active adjustment involves attempts 
at mastering the environment; unity of personality and stable integration of 
experience, and the correct perception of the world and self, irrespective of personal 
needs.265  The question remains, why these investigators and theoreticians should 
choose to define mental health in a way that unidentified or separates “positive 
feelings and positive functioning as key factors for mental health”.266 Clinicians 
readily assert that it is unnecessary to rely on negatively oriented criteria as they 
highlight an individual’s weaknesses. Preference is therefore given to the importance 
of and strength of personal assets when identifying and treating abnormal behaviour. 
Iheanacho reports that there are several models of behaviour disorders.267 These 																																																								
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models of evaluating disordered behaviour include the medical model, the 
psychoanalytic model, the behavioural model, the cognitive model, the humanistic 
model, and the socio-cultural model.268  
 
 
2.1.1.  Medical Model 
 
The medical model is the same as the disease or illness model.269 The definitions and 
terms in the medical model are rooted in medical belief that the root cause of 
abnormal disorder is found in physically examining the person and may reveal a 
hormonal imbalance, chemical deficiency and may include brain damage. Some of the 
major borrowed terms are symptoms, syndromes, illness, hospital, disorders (acute or 
chronic), or cure.270 Gottesfeld explains that a symptom is a physical or behavioural 
manifestation of illness. 271 Definitions of syndromes and the way they connect to 
disorders have been noted but underutilized in analysing the causes and reasoning 
especially when an individual ceases to manifest abnormal behaviour.272 Syndrome is 
a cluster of patterns, which manifests into symptoms for which a particular disease is 
known; whereas a disorder presents a collection of syndromes possessing common 
sets of causes or etiology.273 A disorder becomes acute when it lasts for a brief period 
and usually considered reversible. On the other hand, a chronic disorder refers to a 
disorder that is long lasting and cannot be reversed.  Alloy, et al refers to the medical 
model as the neuroscience perspective of abnormal behaviour as founded on the 
analysis of the causes of abnormal behaviour as traceable to the functioning of the 
																																																								
268 Ibid. 
269 Ibid. pp.72-73. 
270 Ibid. 
271 Gottesfeld, op. cit. p.55. 
272	Ibid.	
273	Ibid.	
	 76	
brain systems and the body.274 It is the oldest perspective of abnormal behaviour, but 
it is constantly being reviewed as fresh ideas emerge from current scientific research 
of the activities of the brain and body, especially as the biological basis of behaviour 
is unveiled with greater precision. 275  The authors assert that there is possible 
interaction between behaviour and organic functions that could result into illness. The 
genes, the nervous system, the endocrine system then become part of the biological 
mechanisms that could be investigated to reveal any possible specific pathologies.276 
Invariably, this perspective deals with mind-body problem, which is concerned with 
the relationship between the physical and the psychological issues in the functioning 
of the individual. There is a positive reactive chain as what affects one, can also affect 
the other. For example, a stressful job can lead to hypertension; the survivors’ 
immune system in a bereaved family could be altered, rendering them illness-
prone.277 On the other hand, altering the body chemistry can have great effects on the 
emotion and behaviour of the individual. It is highly difficult to separate the physical 
functioning from the mental functioning. Alloy et al points out that the ground 
breaking discoveries in medicine especially in the control of infectious illness has 
provided the leverage for the approach to dominate and impose rules and pattern to 
abnormal behaviour. Also the breakthrough focused on the ability of the medical 
model to subdue abnormal behaviour such as madness and present a pattern for 
treatment. Notwithstanding, the medical model has avoided engaging with the 
underlying characteristic of an abnormal behaviour rather, there is intense focus on 
the biological causes.278 
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Iheanacho notes that one of the criticisms against the medical model is the use of the 
term “illness”.279 Critics argue that defining illness conceptually would strip people 
with abnormal behaviour of responsibility for their actions. To the critics, it is 
improper to absolve people with abnormal behaviour from responsibility for creating 
such a situation or experience for him or herself.280 The second criticism is that there 
are a variety of abnormal behaviours that lack traceable organic origin and the 
possibility of creating “social roles” that are forced on people when they are 
hospitalised. Such a situation provides a “sick role” people expect them to play. 
281The next criticism is on the appropriate centres for treating mental disorders 
because proponents of the medical model tend to regard hospitals and mental health 
clinics as the only appropriate centres for treating these disorders.282 However, there 
are several other forms of mental disorders that can be treated with several other 
forms of therapy without utilising medical treatment. Examples include anxiety, 
alcoholism, and anorexia nervosa. However, labelling a mental disorder as illness 
may have an advantage as it reinforces the ideology that relieves the individual from 
responsibility for the condition and as such reduces the physical trauma the individual 
may face when perceived as abnormal. Such people are likely to receive humane 
treatment.  
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2.1.2.  Psychoanalytic Model  
 
Erdelelyi notes that Sigmund Freud developed the psychoanalytic model of analysis 
on human behaviour.283 Freud established an interface between thoughtful conscious 
and unconscious decisions as a model of increasing ones perspective and attaining 
mind and body dualism.284 However, separating the mental structure from body will 
resonate with conflicts that represent the outer reality and create the subjective 
environment to understudy voluntary actions of individuals within a controlled 
experience.285  These experiences underline the meaning an individual identifies 
within a structure that can provide function and a structure that alters repression. 
Understandably, Freud noted that the root of abnormal disorder is traceable to 
childhood conflicts or experiences with wishes relating to sex and aggression. Freud 
believes that it is the frustration of the basic biological instincts that can be regarded 
as the root of all psychopathology.286 The psychic factors and conscious motives are 
therefore paramount in the development of mental disorders and the tendency to 
search for organic diseases underserved. Freud believes that children pass through 
series of stages that involve the impulses of sex and aggression. These ages adopt 
different forms and stimulate conflicts. Failure to resolve these conflicts successfully 
causes them to remain buried in the unconscious and eventually leads to behaviour 
disorders during childhood. Onyejiaku and Onyejiaku view Freud as a strict 
biological determinist. 287 Freud’s psychoanalytic theory considers sexuality as 
influencing human behaviour. Sex and sexual behaviour become an adaptive tool in 
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the development of the mental and physical structure. This gradual process happens as 
the individual develops from infancy through several psychosexual stages before 
arriving adulthood.288 Human infant will therefore be evaluated as consisting of a 
bundle of sexual drives.289 This model faces with the problem of linking childhood 
experiences with the abnormal disorder an adult manifests. Iheanacho explains that 
such consistent underlying unresolved issues make it impossible for the individuals to 
control their behaviour.290 Another problem concerns the possibility of predicting the 
future behaviour and outcome of childhood experiences. This is very difficult since 
the concepts of psychoanalytic model emanated from subjective reports and clinical 
observations that were not controlled. Invariably, reports and observations cannot be 
quantified, however, one needs to bear in mind that the primary function of a model 
lays within its predictive power. The model is also criticized for overemphasising 
sexual motivation and ignoring the impact and significance of culture within an 
experience. Psychoanalytic approach to behaviour disorder is very significant as it 
probes into people’s inner life, showing how rich people’s inner life involvement can 
be, and the extent such involvement can significantly influence the individual’s later 
functioning. One advantage of this model is its contribution to the enlargement of 
ideas about behaviour disorder, and because it is the first alternative to the medical 
model.291 
 
2.1.3 Behavioural Model 
 
The behavioural model rejects the approach of both the medical and the 
psychoanalytic models. It frowns at the idea that behavioural disorder manifests some 																																																								
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underlying problem (diseases) as propounded by the medical model or some 
unconscious conflicts, as proposed by the psychoanalytic model. Sarason and Sarason 
observe that many psychologists viewed Freud’s ideas concerning the mind as vague 
and complicated without the possibility of being tested.292 The theorists consider a 
better approach of studying the same behaviours with simpler explanation and think 
of the possibility of embarking on an experimental study of behavioural disorders.293 
Sarason and Sarason explain that learning theorists reject the idea that behaviour is of 
intrapsychic events, but believe it is a product of stimulus-response (S-R) 
relationship.294 Invariably, to change behaviour, the behaviourists believe in changing 
the relevant aspects of the environment, especially the sources from which 
reinforcement could be derived. 295  Customarily, behaviourists would utilise the 
service of reinforcement and punishment. Reinforcement is the procedure that ensures 
that a response it follows has a high probability of being repeated if it is pleasant or 
appetitive, or the response is repeated when the procedure is removed or withdrawn if 
aversive (negative reinforcement). Punishment becomes the procedure that prevents a 
response from being repeated when it follows the response (presented topic) as it is 
painful (positive punishment) and increases the tendency to repeat the response when 
it is withdrawn (omission) when the procedure is pleasant.296 The behavioural model 
is noted as mechanistic and interested in specific behaviours and unfocused on the 
total person. In addition, the behavioural model ignores the rich subjective 
experiences since it is interested only in observable behaviours. Such rich subjective 
experiences include attitudes, emotions, thoughts, self-awareness and personal values. 
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2.1.4 Cognitive Model  
 
The cognitive model rejects the ideas or the submission of the medical, 
psychoanalytic, and behavioural models and states that people’s behavioural disorders 
cannot be seen to be a circumstance beyond their immediate comprehension or 
control. The model supports the belief that the causes of behaviour disorder are 
extended; however, they are not factors beyond the control or dominance of the 
individual. It recognises the cognitive ability of the individual to dissect emotions and 
comprehend realities (the beliefs and thoughts of the individual). Iheanacho reports 
that faulty thinking habit is what is responsible for behaviour disorders. 297 When a 
person becomes highly pessimistic or catastrophic in thinking, behaviour disorder 
may be the eventual outcome.298  Sarason and Sarason explain that the model views 
the human being as an information processor and problem solver by studying and 
analysing the way the individual attends, interprets and uses the information at his 
disposal. 299The model is interested in how people interact with their environment, 
acquire and interpret information, which they utilise in problem solving. It ignores 
hidden motivation, feeling and conflicts but focuses on mental processes people are 
aware of, including the ones they can easily be made aware of. As information 
processors, people are engaging in continuous gathering, storing, modifying, 
interpreting and understanding internally generated information as well as information 
from the environment.300 The cognitive theorists view mental life as consisting of 
schemata that contain how people process information to enable them select strategies 																																																								
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to help them solve problems or attain a particular goal. Self-schemata contain relevant 
information to the individual and such information includes emotions that can 
possibly distort perceptions of what constitutes reality.301 One problem with the 
cognitive model is its dependence on inferences, which is not scientific and therefore 
difficult to qualify the strength of interactions and outcomes.302 Secondly, cognitive 
model has the history of changing what it hypothesised to be central to its theory 
continuously. A major criticism concerning their therapy is whether it is central and 
balanced for individual expectations. Critics believe that changing a person’s way of 
thinking about the world does not always provide all the answers and may not be 
appropriate. 303 
 
2.1.5 Socio-Cultural Model  	
Socio-cultural model is concerned with how behaviour is influenced by several 
factors. Consideration is therefore given to the product of broad social forces. 
Indicative patterns reveal that the starting place for socio-cultural model lies in the 
social determinants of behaviour or how the social environment and other people 
influence behaviour.304 Powerful situational forces, such as social pressure on people 
to conform to social rules can cause unsuspecting people to believe in extreme ways 
others might label as “mentally ill”, or “immoral”.305 It is possible to induce many 
normal people to cause unimaginable injury to others once directed by an approved 
authority. Alloy, et al further asserts that individuals should not be totally blamed for 
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their extreme behaviours, but on powerful situational forces.306 Problems within the 
individual cannot account for all the individual’s behaviour. Powerful situational 
forces such as racism, poverty, as well as being labelled mentally ill can induce one 
into intense social adversity and stress and can lead to behavioural disorder. 
Iheanacho adds that the type of family group, society, shapes behavioural disorder 
and culture the individual finds himself.307 The pattern of relationships existing 
between an individual and others could support or cause behavioural disorder such as 
anorexia nervosa. This means that the kinds of stresses and conflicts people 
experience in their daily interactions with their neighbours in their environment can 
promote behavioural disorders. The position has statistical support. The number of 
people with a particular type of disorder found in a particular socio-economic class 
out-numbers the others. Observations also show that periods of poor economy tend to 
be associated with declining psychological functioning and social problems. 308 
According to Sarason and Sarason, individuals with anorexia nervosa tend to be 
increasing in numbers probably because of socio-cultural pressures.309 For instance, 
the body weight the society regards as ideal for women has recently decreased. 
Researchers have found the average hip and bust measurements of models in 
“playboy” magazine centrefolds have decreased for the past 20 years.310 However, 
there is a discrepancy between the ideal and reality, which increased as the average 
weight of American women decreased by 5 pounds for those who are under 30. Such 
cultural pressure is also noticeable among occupational groups that tend to desire 
thinness a great deal. So anorexia nervosa is more likely to be found among female 																																																								
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ballet dancers and models when compared with other women of their age. When the 
competition in ballet schools increases, the probability of these ballet dancers 
becoming anorexic increases.311 
 
The class system is more aligned with western ideals of thinness.312 Internalisation of 
the ideal thinness is established as a potent factor in western development of anorexia; 
however further analysis reveals a core influence of socio-cultural factors in eating 
attitudes especially in developing countries.313 The reason for these differences can be 
traced to the lifestyle, expectations and opportunities among the classes. People’s 
cultural biases may be the reason why they ascribe disorders to different social 
classes. What people might observe among the wealthy and term as amusing could be 
labelled a disorder when observed among the poor. Understandably, class and culture 
play a significant role and to a great extent determine what constitutes mental illness. 
Janda and Klenke-Hamel explain that behavioural disorder can only be determined 
within a societal context. 314 The rules stipulating the norms for appropriate and 
inappropriate types of behaviour abound in every society, with their appropriate 
sanctions for violation. Therefore, behaviours that adhere to societal norms are normal 
while the others are disorders.                                                                                                                     
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2.2   Body Image and Self-Satisfaction  
 
Research reveals that people attribute the quest for self-satisfaction and positive body 
image to various reasons. It is well pronounced within the study that the fear of 
weight gain is a predominant factor in individuals with unusual eating patterns. 
However, consideration should be given to the thought that desires to lose weight, 
become thin or remain thin constitute the outcome of the process of redefining body 
image criteria and satisfaction. Santrock explains that it is the fear of becoming fat 
that leads to the adolescents’ desire to become thin or lose weight. The fear does not 
decrease even when there is weight loss, which should fulfil the end result of 
developing anorexia nervosa. Considering that anorexia nervosa is the outcome of a 
weight loss that is less than 95 percent of the individual’s normal weight, there is the 
tendency for the person to have a distorted image of the body and shape. The 
perception of the individual as not being thin enough, especially in the abdomen, 
buttocks and thigh and the tendency to weigh the body regularly and take critical 
observation of their body in the mirror becomes actions that signify dissatisfaction. 
Other indicative actions include tape measurements and critical observation of body 
in the mirror as a form of evaluation of body through the purview of being 
satisfactory or not.315 The tendency to include body image in self-evaluation is 
virtually non-existent when maturing youths start evaluating themselves in terms of 
personal abilities achievement and contributions in their areas of specialisation. It is 
virtually impossible to overlook the importance of body image in the self-concept of a 
person at any point in their life. However, it is during adolescence that self-concept 
assumes the greatest pre-eminence.  
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Clinicians through the lens of what constitutes body image disturbances, evaluate the 
manifestation of anorexia nervosa.316 Body dissatisfaction is therefore ultimately 
aligned with abnormality and neurological impairment conforming to the medical 
model.317 Body image is conceived “as the neutral representation determining bodily 
experience, the mental image that one has of his body, as the feeling one has about his 
body and a personality construct.”318 Onyejiaku and Onyejiaku note that body image 
concerns are more evident in female especially as they transition from puberty to 
adolescent.319 Body modification is therefore common and precipitates self-concept in 
terms of exerting control on who they are and how they are perceived.320 For instance, 
the marital value of a lady in Nigeria accrues not only as a self-construct, but also the 
body image construction of suitors often base their choice of a girl on her height, 
weight and facial appearance, complexion, and body proportion.321 Such emphasis is 
lacking amongst the male gender. The female body becomes the object and subject of 
both negative and positive construction by conforming to socio-cultural narratives of 
self-construction. At this stage, the control of female body is dissected into three parts 
– principally, the version the individual identifies with, the part the society can 
acknowledge and dominant male gendered perspective. Body image disturbances can 
only become apparent to self-constructed individual when there is a disparity in 
bodily objectives or a compromise in bodily integrity. Adolescents believe the 
satisfactory body size and shape is evaluated by physical characteristics and hence 
that determines how they value themselves.322 The general body build, height in 
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particular, is what influences how the adolescents perceive themselves. These 
adolescents evaluate their bodies in comparison to some ideal concepts that prevail in 
a particular society. Some stereotypes are prevalent in some societies, the age, sex or 
ethnic background notwithstanding. One would not be surprised to learn that most 
adolescents spend much of their time in front of mirrors examining their physique. 
The reason for this kind of self-examination could be to identify some stereotypes to 
help them recognise how they look in reality and the ideal they wish to attain. The 
self-evaluation is in terms of weight, height, and general body configuration and how 
they appear facially. Consequently, the physical appearance becomes of great 
importance to these adolescents and young women.  
However, the details of gendered gratification are gradually fading due to the 
changing social and economic realities; men are becoming more concerned with the 
abilities and achievement of women. Regardless, the value placed on the way the 
female body changes and develops is still sustained across all background. 
Understandably, with the emergence of body positive movements, there is obvious or 
pronounced consideration to dissecting the female physique in terms of facial 
appearance, height, weight and body proportions which contribute to the girl’s 
personal attractiveness. Prominence is given to the lesser antagonising narrative of 
presenting a well-grounded girl whose intellectual excellence combines with her 
attractive physique and such a girl is assured not only of marriage prospects but also 
of economic independence. External pressures to conform to particular body type are 
ever present and can lead to distorted self-perception, which may lead young women 
to make decisions to constantly alter or modify their bodies as they develop. This may 
happen even when she is growing normally and may achieve a physical body 
considered above average in the society. At this stage, behavioural changes may be 
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observed and emotional instability prominent as feelings of dejection; alienation, 
isolation and emotional disturbance begin to emerge. Self-doubt resonates as part of 
their experience and may be aggravated by existing prevalent socio-personal 
problems, such as relationship with others, particularly the opposite sex. Every aspect 
of the experience is crucial to self-evaluation and body image construction. 
Individualised perspectives are dominant and often play a significant role in sorting 
out both aspects of physical and mental impact and invariably there would be 
significant differences in perspectives and outcomes.  
Onyejiaku and Onyejiaku view self-concept as an on-going process, involving the 
totality of a person’s transactions with the world. It is the embodiment of their 
collective experiences from childhood, adolescence and then adulthood. 323At every 
stage, an action creates either negative or positive impacts in the person’s self-esteem 
or value and the new meaning the person assigns to the body and self will slowly 
emerge. In the adolescence stage, negative and positives are assigned meaning and 
therefore able to interpret any physical factors that might be negative as adequate. 
Such an interpretation will be tempered by the person’s concept of herself.324 This 
implies that when a person enters adolescence with a feeling of inadequacy, they are 
more than likely to view their body as not what he or she desired it to be, even though 
others may view them as adequate. 325 Santrock reports the common problem both 
boys and girls experience in adolescence which is the core of where their identity is 
first developed. Adolescents develop individual images of their bodies in puberty and 
are preoccupied with body perceptions.326 The adolescents’ preoccupation with the 
image of their bodies is very strong at this particular period of development. This 																																																								
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concern is most acute during puberty.327 The adolescent is observed to be examining 
him or herself to possibly detect any thing not acceptable on his or her body. 
However, there are differences between the boys and the girls in their perception of 
their bodies.328 The reason for this is traceable to the increases in body fat. However, 
the opposite is the case with the boys, who become more satisfied in their movement 
through puberty.329 This is probably because of the increase of their muscle mass. 
Women appear to be less happy with their bodies generally; however, there is 
tendency to have more negative impression of their body images throughout 
puberty.330 What tends to be of immediate concern to the adolescent girls is their 
motivation to be very thin. In the western society, the motivation to be thin is seen as 
mainly because of the media equating beauty with extremely thin figure. Media 
impact has become dominant within the narratives of body constructs although not 
accepted as part of the reasoning underlining body constructs. This type of image 
projections contribute to body image concerns and, to other extents, the development 
of disordered behaviour.331 The media acceptance of the thin image as desirable 
extends beyond the confines of the fashion industry and can be viewed within social 
contexts where eating disorders can be evaluated within the reoccurring normative 
body discontent. Accordingly, Spettigue and Henderson note that “magazines, 
articles, television shows and advertisement have also created a social context that 
may contribute to body dissatisfaction and disordered eating in girls.”332 Multiple 
evidence of media exposure of adolescent girls reveals social pressure to adhere to 
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social comparison of body dimensions. A finite line is however drawn when these 
women develop a framework for interpreting media induced messages. 333 
Comparatively, the male gender exhibits a different behavioural pattern regardless of 
media impression. To show how adolescents value their body images, boys tend to 
say to each other in conversation, the characteristics of their physical features. 
Regarding the adolescent girls, in any introduction, what follow after their names 
were their description of their hair, such as having long blond hair, their height such 
as being 5 feet 5 inches tall, and their weight such as being 110 pounds. The 
adolescent boys tend to follow this trend by stating their names followed by 
description of their physical features without necessarily displaying either negative or 
positive body dissatisfaction. This is an extreme standard of thinness too difficult a 
body weight ideal for most of the people to achieve, if not impossible.334 However, 
some women report they have a body weight ideal that are lower than both the 
average weight and what is even lower than can attract men. Both male and female 
models tend to be moving towards unrealistically thin images in the fashion pages.335 
Both genders exist within the same mass media impression, yet they produce different 
outcomes in behavioural patterns and in the development of body dissatisfaction. Can 
we then rely on media imprints as justification for behavioural changes, body image 
distortion or self-starvation? Although Spettigue and Henderson project an 
indisputable presence and influence of social cultural pressures,336 however underling 
this message is the portrayal of the female gender as easily influenced, disempowered 
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and lacking in control and personal will power consistent with prevalent gender role 
endorsement gratifying masculinity over femininity in eating behaviours.337 
 
Deliens, et al examine the factors, which influence Belgian university students’ eating 
behaviour. Their preferred design was the qualitative research design.338 The purpose 
of their research was to collect ideas and recommendations that would aid their 
development of effective intervention programmes aimed at improving healthy eating 
behaviours in the study participants. Semi-structured questionnaires and focus group 
discussion were employed in obtaining data. Data collected were analysed and result 
of analysis revealed different reasons for students’ choices of healthful foods.339 
Reasons put forth by the subjects among others included self-discipline, time aid 
convenience. In the researchers view, one of the factors that determine or promote 
self-discipline is the desire of the individual to maintain a beautiful body structure in 
the eyes of those who are conscious of their body size (such as the anorexics) and 
define good body size as thinness.340 Eating healthful foods means taking a bite of the 
food and maintaining high degree of starvation; taking control of what to eat, what not 
to eat and the quantity to ingest at any point in time. 341This is done irrespective of the 
nutritional needs of the body to promote growth, development and general wellbeing. 
Further research equally reveals that individuals with or without eating disorders 
differ notably in terms of their perceived causes of body dissatisfaction. 342The study 																																																								
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by Salafia, et al on the differences between the perceptions of the cause of disordered 
eating in individuals with eating disorders and those without,343 reveal that individuals 
without eating disorders tended to overly attribute the problem of eating disorders to 
media.344 The overall impression by non-disordered individuals is that the media 
create false impressions on perfect physical looks and beauty which gives rise to the 
negative cognitions that leads the anorexics to self-starve and subsequently develop 
mental health issues.345 On the part of those with eating disorders, the researchers 
observe that they emphasised less on media as a factor in eating disorders. Rather, 
they evenly attribute the underlying cause to psychological, emotional and social 
problems.346  Equally played down are the roles of genetics/biology as well as 
media/culture ideals in causing eating disorders. Downplaying the media’s role may 
arise from not being fully aware of the influence of media on developing cognitions 
that lead to manifesting anorexia nervosa overtime. The acknowledgement by Salafia 
et al that individuals begin to form their perceptions of body attractiveness, health 
acceptability and functionality during childhood give credence to possible code for 
the underlying substructures of eating disorder.347 Furthermore, the authors note that 
the view about body image is reinforced as individual’s age through feedbacks from 
peers, family members and other significant persons in their lives. Feedbacks such as 
this encourage the anorexics to indulge in self-starvation and the maintenance of the 
anorexic body. The situation explained here is prominent in western societies where 
extreme thinness is seen as a yardstick for measuring beauty.348 Given the stages of 																																																								
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physical transformation to adulthood, positive body image indication may not be 
immediately apparent. Santrock reports that if girls feel negative about their bodies 
when they were in their early adolescence, they were more likely to develop eating 
disorders two years earlier than the adolescents who had no negative feeling 
concerning their bodies.349 When girls have positive relationships with their parents, 
such girls tend to have healthier eating habits than the girls who have negative 
relationship with one or both parents. Adolescents who have negative relationship 
with their parents tend to be involved in increased dieting for a period of one year, for 
the girls.350 The girls that were sexually active in pubertal transition and with their 
boyfriends tend to be involved in dieting or engaging in disordered eating pattern.  
Shaffer and Kipp explain the effects of body image on identity formation.351 As the 
body of adolescents begin to mature into adult men and women, the way they feel 
about this development is noted as contributing to their identity development.352 
When an adolescent has positive feeling concerning his or her body, especially the 
appearance of that body, he or she tends to have high self-esteem and positive peer 
relationship.353 Conversely, when an adolescent is dissatisfied with his or her body 
and decides to focus on its shortcoming, in comparison to unrealistic culture as well 
as social ideals of attractiveness, he or she may experience depression and may also 
engage in unhealthy weight control behaviour. Body image dissatisfaction arising 
from the discrepancy between how a teen assessed his or her physical appearance and 
that teen’s internal picture of what is considered ideal body has emerged as what 
strongly predicts the adolescent’s depression. Measurements of how the body image 																																																								
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dissatisfaction is derived are subjective. This adolescent’s individualised body image 
refers to what the adolescent believes he or she looks like, while the ideal body image 
refers to what the adolescent conceptualised as the perfect body.  
These two types of body image are derived from the belief of the adolescent 
concerning appearance and how important it is to his or her life. Adolescent girls are 
more unified in their goals regarding what to feel concerning their body image 
dissatisfaction especially a voluntary choice of becoming thin. Many girls become 
dissatisfied with their body image as their weight increases. It is only very few 
adolescent girls that express satisfaction with their bodies. Eating behaviours are 
gradually readjusted, as the individual gets older. Most critically, the way the 
individual evaluates himself or herself in terms of physical characteristics decreases, 
as the person gets older. Actions that address body image dissatisfaction become less 
of an impression but a voluntary action requiring careful planning and execution. The 
actions that fulfil the fear of weight gain also fulfil the individual’s ideology of what 
constitutes their bodily integrity.  
 
2.3 Underlying Substructures  
 
Underlying substructures of anorexics reveal the reasoning behind self-starvation. The 
desired weight loss is achieved through self-induced voluntary actions of food refusal, 
restriction, starvation and exercise. Ordinarily embarking on physical and strenuous 
activities to burn calories can be seen as voluntary action as they are premeditated and 
carefully planned out so a certain level of competence are present. Clinicians, 
however, argue otherwise stating that activities burning calories and maintaining the 
anorexic body of extreme thinness is a major priority for the anorexic and due to an 
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already compromised mental state, fulfilling their mission is inevitable. Invariably the 
actions of the anorexic body with regards to eating habits and excessive exercise can 
be viewed as unhealthy and carrying weighty consequences. In other words, the 
consequences of attaining the anorexic body are grave and cannot be accounted for by 
mentally stable individuals. As previously noted, exhaustion which results from poor 
intake and excessive activities, irregularities such as loss of menstruation, 
constipation, abdominal pain, acid reflux, irregular heart rhythm, low blood pressure, 
dehydration and inability to sleep also referred to as amnesia are all consequences that 
might arise from anorexia nervosa. 354  Furthermore, anorexia nervosa has been 
associated with serious emotional and physical problems which impact on the 
anorexics ability to function effectively. The anorexics’ determination to maintain a 
thin body, which leads to self-starvation and extreme exercise, is linked to childhood 
experiences, which are either emotionally or physically traumatising. Clinicians argue 
that these childhood experiences often go unaccounted for and later resurface during 
the preliminary year of the development of anorexia. Underlying mental imbalance is 
also recognisable in the inability of the patient to effectively carry out their day-to-day 
activities as well as function maximally using their full potentials. This condition in 
the end may result in the anorexic becoming miserable which subsequently would 
lead to the manifestation other mental health issues such as obsessive-compulsive 
behaviour, borderline personality disorder as well as anxiety  
 Davenport, et al posit that those who suffer from anorexia nervosa exhibit 
dysfunctional cognitive processes.355 The research revealed that both typical and 
atypical anorexics differed in their expression and manifestation of dysfunctional 																																																								
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metacognition and drive for thinness.356  Their study reveals that as both the typical 
and atypical anorexics engage more and more in self-starvation, food refusal and 
excessive exercise, so do they develop distorted and complex metacognitions and 
destructive emotions. Subsequently, they begin to act in ways that may be harmful to 
them as well as others around them, relating dysfunctional metacognition personality 
disorder.357 Sun, et al support the view that dysfunctional metacognition are common 
processes across pathologies. They however point out that certain dimensions of these 
dysfunctions were more prevalent in particular disorders than others.358 The literature 
reveal that as individuals’ cognitions become distorted, so would they become unable 
to act rationally and indulge in behaviours or take actions that could harm them 
further psychologically and physically.359  
The commonalties of other noted mental disorders in women with full-blown eating 
disorders is a direct indication that they could be precipitating factors which are not 
consequences of food refusal. Genetic predisposition to anorexia nervosa is hardly 
acknowledged even though it is now known that it could run within families.360 The 
treatment of anorexia nervosa and anorexia itself may be complicated due to the 
psychopathological aspects of obsessive-compulsive disorder that also implicates 
neuroendocrine mechanism. Personality characteristics and family interaction patterns 
are seen as contributing to the development of anorexia nervosa. Some other 
characteristics of the girls with anorexia include that they feel a lack of control, and at 
the same time have a need for approval361. Anorexics also have a need to exhibit a 
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behaviour that is contentious and perfectionistic because of the experience of body 
image distortions, even though it is not clear whether this distortion is a cause of the 
disorder or its consequence. This could be noticed whether these girls still feel they 
are overweight when they have actually lost a great deal of their weight. Not to 
mention that family patterns are embedded as women with anorexia nervosa tend to 
come from families where psychopathology or alcoholism or even from families that 
is very close to each other but lack good means of communication in terms of 
emotion, or in conflict resolution. 362  Behavioural adjustments are emulated by 
mothers who tend to have eating disorders themselves, as well as being dissatisfied 
with their daughters’ appearance and also dissatisfied with their families dynamics. 
Therefore, in such cases, there is a possible link between the disordered eating and the 
mother and daughter relationship. Issues of personal identity and autonomy can lead 
to anorexia nervosa when they are introduced during puberty. Direct confrontation is 
not as important as with the conflicts of need to separate from family and the need to 
assert oneself in social situations precipitating anorexia, a self- destructive response. 
Gleitman however opines that there is no known organic pathology that produces 
anorexia nervosa; notwithstanding, there are some psychological factors that can 
present an underlying substructure.363 Apart from strenuous exercise that lasts for 
several hours a day, many authors believe that anorexia is primarily caused by 
psychological factors and the concern on food, not eating the food due to modern 
obsession with becoming slim. In another dimension, anorexia nervosa is viewed as 
caused in some cases by the person’s fear of becoming sexually unattractive or even 
of sex. Some people may focus mainly on rebellion against their parents. To some 
others, the focus may be strongly on desire to have some degree of autonomy and 																																																								
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control over their body. From the reports so far reviewed, it is obvious that both 
biological and psychological factors could be responsible for eating disorder. 
There is no single thermostat for hunger; however there is need to consider the 
function of the hypothalamus in the brain as an important factor because it regulates 
such motives as the sex, thirst and hunger drive.364 From the signals from the sugar 
level in the blood and neural messages from the liver and the stomach, one is able to 
determine when there is hunger. There is a part of the hypothalamus that acts as a 
feeding system, which is responsible for initiating eating. 365  When this lateral 
hypothalamus is deactivated with the services of an electrified probe, any animal that 
is involved will start eating immediately, whether it is fully fed or not. Unfortunately, 
when this side of the hypothalamus is destroyed, it may cause the animal never to eat 
again in life. There are several ways to “turn on” this lateral hypothalamus.366 During 
hunger strikes, the stomach lining produces ghrelin, which is a hormone responsible 
for activating the lateral hypothalamus. There is second part of the hypothalamus 
associated with the satiety system, otherwise known as the “stop mechanism” for 
eating. Coon and Mitterer further report that when this ventromedial hypothalamus 
becomes damaged, what follows is dramatic overacting. Another means to stop eating 
is through the intervention of the chemical called glucagon like peptide I (GLP-I), 
which is increased by the intestine when food is eaten.367 The arrival of enough of this 
GLP-I from the intestine causes desire for food to cease. It should be noted that the 
GLP-I travels to the brain from the intestine, through the bloodstream. It should also 
be noted that the hypothalamus takes at least 10 minutes to respond after eating has 
started. This becomes advantageous for those who eat slowly as the brain gets alerted 																																																								
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that you have eaten enough before you overeat.368 Another part of the hypothalamus 
that affects hunger is the periventricular nucleus. It controls the blood sugar level 
ensuring it is steady. It does so as it starts and stops eating. The periventricular 
nucleus is sensitive to another substance by name the neuropeptide (NPV), large 
amount of which causes the animal to keep eating until it becomes impossible to hold 
another bite.369 In addition, it is known that hypothalamus can also respond to a 
chemical in marijuana. This substance is capable of producing intense hunger. 
Another function of the brain is to control the weight over a long period, beside 
regulating when to start and stop eating.370  
Defining anorexia as a diet or fad creates the narrative of myth and invalidates the 
long-term goal, reasoning and meaning underlying weight loss, thus removing 
accountability and responsibility from both the clinician and the individual. Although 
there is a significant obsession with weight loss, individuals who engage with 
disordered patterns of eating commonly admit the much-needed interest in losing 
weight goes beyond temporary gratification. This is evident in most cases of female 
adolescents who are still constantly obsessed with their desire to lose weight 
regardless of how emaciated and thin they are. Researchers and clinical experts 
explore complex biological, environmental and societal reasons whilst adhering to the 
strict guidelines provided by the Eating Disorder American Psychiatric Association. 
Understanding these biosocial cultural factors are relevant but clinicians treat each 
underlying reason and cause as the same. The biological, genetic and environment 
factors are analysed within a specific spectrum; however, it has noted that every case 
is different and the factors that are relevant in one case might be irrelevant in another. 																																																								
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Clinical criteria frame the anorexic body as emaciated, frail and severely underweight 
females, lose significantly their weight below normal, which may be about 15 percent 
or more.371 This is also substantiated by media portrayal, however it has been noted 
that most individuals with eating disorders are not physically thin or underweight.  
 
2.4 Disordered Eating and Obesity  	
There are variations of feeding disturbances, which may include severe forms of 
eating or overeating. Coon and Mitterer therefore notes that “…eating and over eating 
are related to internal and external influences, diet, emotions, genetics, exercise and 
many other factors.”372 Volkow et al notes that persons who are more than 20 percent 
beyond the ideal body weight, as various mortality studies have indicated, are 
classified as obese.373 An obese status is validity using the body mass index system to 
calculate the ratio of body weight to height. Obesity, “body mass index ≥ 30”, 
represents the other end of weight spectrum in disordered eating and abnormal 
feeding behaviours. 374  Life expectancy is greatly reduced, as the individual is 
susceptible to cancer, heart diseases and diabetes. 375   Like other disordered 
behaviours, obesity presents a multifaceted problem that requires a multilevel 
approach to understand the reasoning and meaning. Methods implored can extend to 
examining behaviour, cognition (how one thinks about food and obesity), underlying 
biology and the societal context where cheap and tasty food is always available. It is 
necessary to note that there is a linkage among genetic predispositions, feelings, 																																																								
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thoughts and behaviour including the loop through which these variables cycle, which 
is continuous. Body dissatisfaction and body image distortion is a common 
occurrence as the individual moves from adolescent to adulthood. Voluntary and 
uncontrolled patterns of binge eating are connected to emotional and psychological 
factors. According to Leme, et al: 
 “….disordered eating behaviours and attitudes are part of the 
eating disorders continuum and include obsessively thinking 
about food and calories, becoming angry when hungry, being 
unable to select what to eat, seeking food to compensate for 
psychological problems….” 376 
Psychological problems encountered because of the extreme stigma which obesity 
attracts are rather prominent; however medical issues remain prioritised. The obese 
are seen as being less attractive, less intelligent, less productive and less socially 
adept, when compared with those who are not overweight. Equally notable is the fact 
that a linkage exists between self-perception as overweight and the problems of 
anxiety, low self-esteem and depression. There is also a socio economic implication 
and understanding that once a person becomes fat, less food is required to maintain 
that weight than was needed to attain it. This is because fat has a lower metabolic rate 
as it takes less food energy to maintain, when compared with other tissues. The body 
of an obese tends to maintain body weight within a higher-than-average range. If the 
weight drops below this range, which is called the “set point or settling point”, hunger 
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increases for the person while the metabolism decreases.377 The body, therefore, 
adapts to starvation as it now burns off fewer calories and reduces extra calories by 
burning off more.378 Furthermore, this could explain why the quantity of food that 
was enough to maintain weight before a diet started may even increase at the end of 
the diet. The body may still be conserving energy. Obesity can be socially toxic, as it 
could affect how one is treated and how one feels about oneself. People know the 
stereotype, which include being sloppy, lazy and slow. The stereotype of the obese 
also extends to their personality, as people tend to rate them as being very mean, more 
obnoxious, less friendly and insincere. Body image concern is heightened by societal 
negative attitude towards the obese, which furthers stigmatization. This attitude forms 
part of the motivation for prejudiced and discriminatory attitude against the obese.  
Pingitore, et al reveal the extent of weight discrimination in a videotaped mock job 
interview involving professional actors who acted as normal weight or overweight (by 
wearing some gadgets that made them look 50 pounds heavier). Body image 
stereotype was consistent throughout the experiment process.379 The talent of the 
actors were less significant and focus was their body proportion and how less 
attractive they were. When an overweight individual appeared for the interview using 
same lines, intonations and gestures, he was rated as being less worthy to be hired. 
Such weight bias was very pronounced against women applicants. 380  Weight 
discrimination, which is not usually discussed, is greater than gender and race 
discrimination, occurring at every stage in the cycle of employment. It could be at the 
stage of hiring, placement, promoting or compensating the person, and even 
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disciplining or discharging the employee.381 Pingitore, et al note that “the stereotype 
that the obese are emotionally impaired, lazy, selfish might be expected to lead to 
employment discrimination. Myers also adds that bias also exists in families where 
children whose parents are overweight prefer to conceal the identity of their parents 
and not engage with them in public.382 
Gazzaniga, et al report that being overweight is associated with lower socio-economic 
status in industrialized countries, notwithstanding the abundance of food especially in 
the case of women.383 However, some cultures do not stigmatize obesity. Many in 
some developing countries, particularly Africa, regard those who are obese as 
belonging to the upper socio-economic class. 384 Obesity can equally be seen as a 
status symbol in these developing countries, which is an indication, that such people 
have enough income to feed luxuriously. 385 In western culture, emphasis on food 
restriction is less pronounced although there is emphasis on both the cultural and 
physical circumstances surrounding feeding. The role of the law in managing and 
treating obesity is different. The “law has the power to control commercial food 
practices, to regulate physical and economic environments, to regulate media 
practices, and support informed consent by requiring the provision of information”.386 
The law here does not seek to coerce or force the obese to stop eating as a life-saving 
treatment. However, there is an element of indirectly regulating obese behaviour by 
overseeing “influences on food choices, and using law in support of strategies to 
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redirect food choices towards healthy food products”.387 This approach enables the 
obese to retain their freedom, autonomy and right to continue food consumption or 
not. Structural similarities between anorexia nervosa and obesity are far in-between. 
Interestingly, suggested solutions to the management of obesity involve food 
restriction and lower calorific intake, actively supported by encouragements of active 
exercise and self-controlled food consumption. Drugs are administered not as cure for 
mental disorder or mental illness but as part of weight management to aid weight loss. 
Drug administrations and weight management, programmes can only be introduced 
with the informed participation of the individual. At every stage, the individual should 
have the freedom to either accept or reject any medical discourse unaligned with their 
choices and values. The implication is that regardless of ever-pressing health issues, 
individual autonomy and freedom should remain uncontained or unrestricted. If 
anorexia is because of less food consumption and obesity because of excessive eating, 
it becomes difficult to understand why obesity is not classified as a mental disorder. 
 
2.5  Non-Western Cultural Context  	
Gray insists that anorexia nervosa is one of the culture related syndromes gradually 
emerging in non-western societies. It is also being registered that the challenge 
between “culture and the treatment of anorexia is that of gender”.388 Anorexia nervosa 
in western cultures reinterprets body disturbances through biological transformation 
and is customarily considered extinct outside Europe and North America.389 The 
emerging knowledge of cultural significance of self-starvation is not entirely new, as 
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shared belief of indigenous values has become sustained outside western 
biomedicine.390 Distinctive engagement of the added perspective of the individual is 
often constructed outside diagnostic prejudice that idealises human suffering as a 
significant aspect of self-starvation. Although sufficient evidence reveals the presence 
of anorexia in non-western countries, Keel and Klump, however, suggest that 
anorexia may not be a culture bound syndrome as real weight loss concerns are not 
significantly evidenced in non-western regions.391  Furthermore, self-starvation and 
issues of weight loss might be confined only to “social historical contexts that idealise 
thinness and denigrate fatness”.392  According to Lee, fatness has come to represent 
“ugliness, shame and sin” in western culture whereas thinness represents self-control, 
desirability and beauty.393 
Anorexia nervosa appeared in North America and Western Europe in the 1970s for 
the first time. Its prevalence has increased through the closing part of the twentieth 
century, when it emerged it was mostly among adolescent girls and young women 
who belong to the middle and upper classes. At this time, dieting became the order of 
the day and thinness became the ideal female shape or size. It was also noted that 
weight control became difficult as there was availability of high fat food at an 
increased level. About 1 and 2 percent of women in these western industrialized 
cultures could be regarded as suffering from anorexia nervosa. This is not the case in 
non-western cultures where the western habits and cultures are still at their low level.  
Besides affecting the type of behaviours and syndromes manifested by people, culture 
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also affects clinicians’ decision to label a behaviour as a disorder. An example is the 
case of homosexuality.  
In the unlikely case subjective meaning to food refusal is engaged outside the 
biomedical discourse and assumption, the end process is to enable clinicians treat or 
manage the anorexic body more efficiently.394 Analysing other non-western pattern 
outside the premise of redressing self-starvation is not a formality readily 
implemented within the biomedical discourse.395 The role of the DSM is to facilitate 
the detection of the underlying substructures of mental illness and then proffer 
treatment thus unintentionally excluding native metaphors thereby disenfranchising 
culture-bound narratives.396 The standard set by the DSM criteria will then require a 
universal feeling of fatness across all cultures to achieve the fat phobia requirement 
regardless of physical emaciation. Multiple rationales for food refusal already support 
the monocratic classification in western discourse, which highlights the characteristics 
of each factor, as they exist uniformly fulfilling biomedical DSM criteria. 397 
While western societies have science-backed theories on the intense fear of weight 
gain occasioning body image disturbance, this is not the obvious case in some non-
western countries. Simpson asserts that multiple evidence reveal that ‘anorexia can 
exist without the fear of fatness”.398 The reason for food refusal varies and is often 
simplified by its association with other somatic symptoms, which include abdominal 
bloating and fullness. Regardless of the physical deterioration of the individual, 
medical diagnosis of anorexia nervosa is very unlikely. The symptoms the individual 																																																								
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exhibits are classified and treated as the disease rather than an illness.  In constructing 
food analogies in non-western culture, the issue of food restriction is commonly 
discussed in relation to weight management rather than in understanding medical 
meanings underlying food consumption. Weight deviants are accepted within these 
non-cultures and therefore the western categorised abnormal feeding patterns are 
considered non-definitional practices. Invariably, stigmatization and criticism of the 
body whether fat or thin diminishes as there are no polarised dichotomy.                                                                                                                                                                             
For example, fasting may be a culturally sanctioned expression of religious prayer in 
the Middle Eastern countries but a symptom of an underlying disorder in some other 
cultures. Fasting however occurs for only short periods and usually symbolises self-
denial to receive blessings from God and it is unrealistic to assume religious fasters 
within disordered eating. Therefore, individuals who do not fit into the model medical 
spectrum, even though they may be showing cultural diversity in the expression of a 
psychiatric disorder, will not receive appropriate attention. It therefore presents 
questions for individuals who do not fit into the DSM approach of regarding “fat 
phobia” as the core of anorexia nervosa. Understandably, “fat phobia” has become the 
constructed and constricted template that should conveniently discard anyone who 
does not fit in. This has rendered the detection of reliable cross-cultural differences 
almost impossible.  In addition to the cultural differences in eating patterns, Coon and 
Mitterer point out that cultural values affect the incentive value of foods consumption. 
Categorising some foods as tasteful and others as distasteful influences the way an 
individual views and relates with food.399 For instance, goat head and cow tongue are 
considered delicacies in Nigeria. China hosts the popular annual Yulin dog festival 
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where thousands of dogs are slaughtered and presented for consumption.400 This is 
similar to Cross River state Nigeria where dog meat is consumed daily and represent a 
viable million-naira business.401 There is also the culture bound myth of dog meat as 
offering protection against evil spirits and harmful charms, offering strength, 
enhancing sex life and even a cure for malaria.402 Cultural bias is evident as including 
dog meat as part of a traditional delicacy does not form part of other cultures and 
often viewed as barbaric and cruel.  
On culture, ethnicity and dieting, Coon and Mitterer opine that women in western 
countries see themselves as “objects” that others seem to be evaluating.403 This 
perspective conditions the body as an object of desire to the male gender thus 
restrictive food consumption is a mantle of ownership and regulation. Western 
cultural ideals of fat phobia are such that women succumb to dieting to ensure they 
shape their body to slimness. The role of culture makes them anxious of adding 
weight. Nevertheless, this is not the case with women from some other cultural 
settings. Such other women tend to be less concerned about thinness and so have no 
business glorifying it. This is what happens with Asian American College students 
who are less likely to diet when compared with other college women. A fuller and 
shapelier figure is what African American and Pacific Islander women generally 
prefer. These communities view their larger body size as a reflection of beauty, health 
and high social status. Thus, people’s opinions determine what should be considered 
as an attractive body style.  																																																								
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Critical analysis of reasons why people elect self-starvation has undergone multi-
varied dissection. At the core of this analysis is biomedical evidence of anorexia 
affecting only the female influenced by media culture, which dominantly extends to 
the fashion and advertising industries. Cultural ideal of female attractiveness has 
apparently been determined by magazine advertisements for some decades and 
women anxiety over weight gain leads to the emergence of anorexia nervosa. Alloy, 
et al recall major contributor is the fact that girls in America tend to base their notion 
of beauty on the fashion models who are mostly extremely thin.404 Fat phobia appears 
to be spreading from pre-teenage groups, as many as 9-year-old girls fear becoming 
fat, and so appear to be dieting to control their weight.405 Those who meet some of the 
criteria for anorexia, otherwise called “partial syndromes” (usually not enough to 
receive the diagnosis) are included in the definition of fat phobic girls at risk of 
developing the anorexic body.  The implication is that the entire biomedical discourse 
builds on the fat phobia premise and has not extended to include cultural patterns not 
peculiar in western culture. Lee therefore argues that western construction of anorexia 
based only on fat phobia has “neglected the full metaphorical significance of self-
starvation and when applied across cultural context, may constitute a category 
fallacy”.406Biomedical conceptualisation is on the premise that intense fear of food is 
the underlying factor precipitating anorexia. However, the newly emerging non-
western consideration in both Asian and African countries has questioned analysis of 
anorexia as a western syndrome. Historical trace reveals that the fear of weight gain 
did not constitute the reason for self-starvation and clinical approach only showed 
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more engagement with lived experience rather than fulfilling scientific diagnostic 
criteria.407  
Gray is concerned with cultural variations in disorders and believes that cultural 
constructs is involved in determining disorders. 408 There is great variation among 
cultures on what determines disorder. These include the kinds of distress the person is 
experiencing, the way these people express the distress, and even the way observers 
respond to the person that is distressed. Apart from changing from culture to culture, 
these constructs also vary from time to time in any particular culture. Whether any 
particular syndromes are considered disorders or behavioural variations from the 
normal is determined by cultural beliefs and values. According to Gray, the most 
striking evidence of cultural variations that exist is possibly found in  by observing 
the individual within the environment where these values, beliefs and experiences are 
formed 409. Some cultures tend to admit some syndromes as exaggerated forms of 
behaviour acceptable in modern times by some culture. 410  An example of the 
syndrome is one of the most common disorders diagnosed in Japan called “taijin 
kyofusho”, which is not known in other parts of the world. The disorder is found more 
in males than females. It involves an incapacitating fear of offending or harming 
another person by means of the person’s awkward social behaviour or an imagined 
physical defect. The person may believe he or she is offending others in various ways 
– including blushing, eye contact, or imagined physical defect or by emitting 
offensive or foul odour.411 The conscious fear associated with “taijin kyofusho” 
focuses on the possibility of harming others instead of the possible harm one could 
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get from others, like being ridiculed or rejected. Could this be a pathological 
exaggeration of the modesty and sensitive regard accorded people especially those at 
lower levels, as some Japanese psychiatrists seem to believe.412 Taking the role of 
culture into consideration highlights the individual meaning of food refusal and 
establishes a synergy to engage the ever-altering biomedical discourse. The non-
western culture dimension authenticates the presence of non-fat phobic self-
starvation. Notwithstanding the physical changes in body proportions, individuals 
within these cultures can communicate subjective meanings outside the fear of weight 
gain. This new pathway of validating life experience and engaging subjective 
meanings presents a binary medium to revaluating food refusal from a non-western 
perspective.413 Unification across other cultures is impossible; therefore, a cultural 
sensitive analysis of anorexia would include meaningful individual values and life 
experiences outside the intense fear of weight gain.414 Normative discontent in non-
western cultures is placed on fat phobia rather than on direct experiences and how 
such experiences affect individual identities. Western ideals therefore do not represent 
the uniform presentation of anorexia nervosa neither does the diagnostic criteria 
furnished by DSM-5415 
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Chapter two concluded by examining anorexia within a non-western context, which 
establishes the background for further discussions of the meaning centred approach in 
the next chapters. Identifying the non-cultural contexts that reflects the values of 
experiences and choices highlights an alternative narrative and meaning to self-
starvation thereby questioning the medical model of anorexia as exclusively a 
psychiatric illness. It therefore presents an erroneous conclusion for clinicians to rely 
solely on a dimension that does not distinguish attributes from actions.  The premise 
is that if clinicians can acknowledge an alternative dimension, a meaning centred 
positive perspective can emerge. It therefore follows that although anorexia is one of 
behavioural disorders associated with abnormality, there is however more reliance on 
the negative feeling and functioning of self-starvation. Approaching self-starvation 
from a positive perspective rather than solely pathology removes the complexity of 
abnormally. There is an overt dependence on a single concept or conceptual 
consensus on the clinical manifestation of anorexia as a disease presenting an 
alternative approach presents the freedom to implement other social values within the 
meaningful normalities which enhance individual autonomy.  This present chapter 
starts with a brief discussion of gender subjectivity of self-starvation. The aim is to 
establish anorexia nervosa as affecting mostly the female gender and the ethical 
dilemmas of the female anorexic body seeking autonomy and self-determination 
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outside the traditional psychiatric and biological conception of eating disorder. The 
outcome opens up a broader discussion of body image perception; self-expressions 
and liberation, which is core in the discussion of the meaning centred anorexic body 
in chapter four.  The second part of this chapter examines the nature and ranges of the 
meaning centred approach, which recognises the interplay of the multifaceted nature 
of anorexia. 
 
 
3.1 Critical Perspective 
 
Eating disorders are well noted as affecting mostly the female gender.416 Shaffer and 
Kipp report that a number of psychological factors affect puberty and those dramatic 
physical changes encountered by young girls are bothersome.417 Young girls therefore 
become very concerned with perception and analysis of others to their body changes. 
418 Generally, it is the desire of the adolescent girls to be perceived as attractive and 
therefore anticipate bodily changes to be congruent with the feminine ideal of 
slimness.419 Negative body perceptions are observed from early to late adolescence. 
For instance, well-proportioned adolescent girls tend to compensate for any physical 
fault by slouching.420 It is therefore not unusual for adolescent girls that have their 
bodies developing at a pace different from average are very prone to internalising 
negative body image.421 Shaffer and Kipps further report that body dissatisfaction has 
become so predominant for women especially adolescent girls and adult women 
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groups to the extent that it is considered as a normative component of how they live in 
Western societies.422 Generally, girls choose a weight control measure based on the 
type of body image dissatisfaction the adolescent girl is experiencing. The desire to 
become thin and reduce weight is what prompts girls to diet. The period of growth in 
adolescence is very critical to the extent the adult normal stature and reproductive 
capacity is achieved. Unhealthy weight control obviously has physical consequences 
on nutrition and growth. There is much risk for adolescent females who continually 
diet. Such girls are known to consume lower quantities of grains, vegetables and fruits 
when compared with the girls that do not diet. Some of these adolescents progress to a 
point of disorder, from simple dieting. Anorexia nervosa is seen as feminine disorder 
predominant when adolescent girls and young women become obsessively concerned 
about their possible weight gain. Understandably, the explanation for the prevalence 
of anorexia in female can be as a result of the dominant cultural stereotype, which 
exploits the ideologies of feminine beauty.423 Various writers have identified anorexia 
as not only gender specific but also prevalent within a class system. Taylor asserts 
that anorexia is most prevalent among the adolescent females from the upper class.424 
Gazzaniga, et al also note that anorexia nervosa is predominant amongst adolescent 
girls of these socio-economic classes.425 Santrock also notes that most anorexics are 
white adolescents or young adult females from well educated, middle and upper 
income families that are competitive and over-achieving.426 Gross views anorexia 
nervosa as the controlled lack of appetite that usually begins in adolescents aged 16 to 
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17 years, 90 to 95 percent of whom are females and advances to adulthood.427 Alloy 
et al also add that anorexia is mostly found among adolescent girls and young 
women.428 Majority of people with anorexia nervosa (85 percent to 95 percent) are 
females having an on-set that ranges from 12 to 18 years of age. It is equally possible 
to find females diagnosed before puberty, and even females who are up to 30 years of 
age being diagnosed.429 Gleitman, et al note that the disorder is more common in 
societies that have plenty of food but the most acceptable feature is thinness and 
identified the gender that is more involved and the period of onset.430 Anorexia 
nervosa therefore starts in mid-adolescence and is prevalent among females mostly in 
industrialized societies where the disorder afflicts up to one percent of young people 
who embark on the relentless pursuit of food refusal or self-starvation.431  
Reoccurring feminine interaction with anorexia begins as young as the body goes 
through the puberty phase. The process of arriving at the anorexic body is gradual as 
the individual strategically restricts food intake and in some cases embraces 
vegetarianism before progressing to become a person with an abnormally low body 
weight.432 Vasta, et al also note that anorexia nervosa is an eating disorder associated 
mostly with young women.433 These young females voluntarily choose to embark on 
very severe dietary restrictions and by so doing embrace self-starvation until their 
desired body weight is accomplished.434 The female body has therefore remained the 
focal point of feminist discussions and dissections especially on critical issues of 
womanhood and individualised projections of the body. In most cases, the transition 																																																								
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from pubescent to adulthood creates self-doubts and conflicts bothering on identity 
and normalisation. Weight loss and gain at every stage of the development of the 
female body remain within the interest and dialogue of the male gender. In retrospect, 
the female body, which is subject of male dominance and control, becomes 
intertwined with conversations of freedom and independence without control and 
coercion.  Resistance to the innate female gender subjectivity is embraced as part of 
feminine liberation from patriarchy and misogyny. In today’s digital media world, 
prominence has been drawn to self-narratives of women seeking to regulate the 
meanings underlying the anorexic body whilst interacting with established traditional 
medical and media dialogues. 435  Feminist narratives emerge in broader terms 
engaging gendered power-liberation from gendered oppression, self-expression and 
autonomy.436 Feminists analyses of the anorexic body, therefore, extend beyond self-
starvation to subjective identity construction through self-representation. 437 
Mainstream accounts of anorexia only reference the physical emaciation of the 
anorexic body as central for analysis, disregarding the body proper as the core of 
expression and power.438 Western feminist approaches therefore encourages women 
to harness their authentic self, which sometimes involves body transformation to 
correspond with their inner truth or meaning.439 Invariably, for an individual’s 
authentic self to emerge, self-identity is strengthened by autonomous actions that 
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fulfil a greater purpose.440 Feminism in this instance “emerges here as appropriate and 
sanctioned in terms of women having rights”.441   
 
Critical feminist theories challenging treatment mechanisms, which do not 
incorporate the experiences, values and voices of the anorexic body emerged in the 
1980s.442 The extent of scrutiny surrounding the female body rituals seems to 
increase, specifically the way their body transitions without conforming to medical or 
psychiatric concepts.443 Central to feminist approach is a distinctive “emphasis on the 
medical and psychiatric discourses as historically contingent constructions” which 
enables the detachment of an individual from their autonomy.444 The challenge is that 
the anorexic body is only explored metaphorically rather than seeking an in-depth 
meaning to the anorexic experience.445 The problem lies in the way clinicians 
constantly attempt to draw a clear demarcation between the body proper (object) and 
the constructed body (subject) especially as the lines are blurred by the physical 
manifestation of the effects of the resistance categorised as diagnostic symptoms. The 
object exhibits the symptoms, however the subject embodies the reality, remaining 
unbiased and self-determined. According to Holmes, emerging feminist objectives are 
centred on contesting the way a woman’s self-expression is subdued especially 
regarding the “..interpretation of their starving, treatment and construction”.446 The 
female body is therefore well acknowledged as a feminist issue, especially as the 																																																								
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body transitions from a physical organism into a concept that truly validates their 
identity.447 The existing medical discourses are “historically specific”, dissuading any 
conceptualisation of theories that attributes individualised meaning to self-
starvation. 448  However, it is noteworthy that feminist perspectives championing 
liberation autonomy of the anorexic body has suffered accusations of promoting false 
consciousness. 449 The argument is based on existing psychiatric and medical 
discourse, which insists that the systematic practices of the anorexic reflecting social 
and political understanding, is made involuntarily.450  
 
Bordo451 and Orbach452 however present a united analysis of the starving body as a 
form of corporal resistance and escape from patriarchal manipulation. Bal and 
Dikencik note that, “in the case of anorexia, women were always in the focus, because 
statistically they were ten times more likely to suffer from anorexia”.453 Shared 
interests of body feminists over the years have become broadened to explore body 
image and self-starvation outside confined generating critical dialogues on the 
conception of the feminine body as a cultural and political model.454 In the western 
world, Bruch notes that the primary cause of anorexia in women is the wide spread of 
pressure and scrutiny imposed on them to stay thin.455 There is also the contributed 
factor of aspiring to fit into the societal standard of beauty and perfection, which 																																																								
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historically is identifiable with the media-portrayed thin body. The increasing number 
of individuals who adapt to this slender, thin and willowy aesthetics stimulates a 
broadened understanding and interpretation through in-depth analysis, 456  which 
redefines the body anatomy through control as a symbol of self-accomplishment. 
Foucauldian literature has influenced contemporary thinkers to objectify the influence 
of unwanted action over the body. The interpretation of terms of subjective 
experience created a movement against own oppression by ensuring an alignment to 
the development of themes that reflect a greater autonomy.457  A study conducted at 
the Cornell Medical College, New York, on eating disturbance in Eastern and 
Western societies detected a cultural pattern of food starvation as a tool for 
“negotiating the transition, disconnection, and oppression that they uniformly 
endure.”458 Katzman and Lee share the perspective that sole focus on body image and 
starvation will only bypass the superior acknowledgement surrounding the 
conceptualised structure of the anorexic body.459 The quest for body perfection 
becomes symbolic with actions of staying in control. According to Izzy, “eating has 
come to represent much more than simply food. Their emotions, fears and sense of 
identity are wrapped up in food/weight”.460 It is not a mere strategic uncontrolled 
expression reoccurring intermittently. Appropriate representations will require 
believing in the attitude of worth and integrity a person accepts and in many ways the 
body is a temple, a place of self-worship and service. Voluntary starvation enables 																																																								
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conscious gratification and satisfaction in the feeling of hunger, an achievement 
equated to making a critical statement reinforcing the underlying connotation to food 
refusal. The resistance of the normalised body weight, therefore, becomes a mantle of 
self-conservancy and protection. In that sense, there is an overwhelming 
empowerment in having that type of control and expressing autonomy with no 
inhibitions.461 
 
 
3.2 Understanding the Meaning Centred Approach  
 
Numerous approaches have been developed over the years to aid the analysis of 
scientifically elusive disorders such as anorexia nervosa. Clinician’s focus on the 
disease aspect of the anorexic behaviour therefore treatment models are initiated to 
only tackle the extreme desire to be thin as the sole reason for self starvation. Patient 
centred approaches are not designed to include the values, morals and decisions of the 
individual. Anorexics are therefore intensely and continually in pursuit of recognition 
and self-actualisation through thinness. Low calorific intake explains not just the 
anorexics attitude to food but a sign of a desire to control and assert authority over 
how their body develops. In other words, to produce a rounded study on behavioural 
and eating patterns that signify anorexia, meaning within social-cultural contexts must 
emerge. Culture bound research outcomes have highlighted the need for more focus 
on “addressing meaning” in clinical practice and treatment of mental disorders in 
general.462  Connecting the subjective meaning behind self-starvation has not being of 
medical relevance especially in the treatment and management of anorexia nervosa. 
The multifaceted nature of anorexia is such that to accurately engage with the 																																																								
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interplay of the multiple sub-structured variables, the culture and life experience of 
the individual must be aligned. Accounts of the individual choices are never given 
prominence, rather in-depth psycho-legal analysis of other external factors triumphs 
an individualistic view. The overarching question remains how best can meaning be 
deduced and in what context? The challenge with attempting a meaning centred 
analysis of anorexia nervosa rests on the uphill tasks of finding a balance between the 
over-emphasised medical alarms of impeding death and severe health consequence 
should individual refuse medical treatment. The universal application of mental health 
law in western societies does not declassify or provide different levels of approach 
depending on individual profile. Once the overall diagnostic criteria are met, the 
individual would invariably fit the profile for detention and treatment without 
consent. This western bound extant system cannot solely thrive under the new 
emerging social-cultural realities. Especially considering that the biomedical systems 
have relaxed the strict diagnostic criteria to recognise the current existence of mild 
types of anorexia.463  
Frankl also identifies a new variety of mental disorder, disassociated from established 
biological symptoms.464 Individuals within this spectrum exhibit unique characteristic 
that do not fully correspond with the established medical diagnostic criteria; therefore 
the validity of enforcing same treatment or management procedures should be 
questioned.465 The issue here is that clinicians are specifically equipped to tackle the 
general clinical symptoms but unprepared when confronted with unfamiliar and 
uncharacterised behaviour.466 Identifying mild types of anorexia may not be sufficient 
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as theoretical and practical limitations still exist, reinforced by mental health laws and 
legislation. Understandably, an argument for the recognition of the existence of mild 
forms of anorexia will require revaluating clinical observation and diagnostic criteria. 
It is, however, difficult for treatment practitioners to engage with the ideology that 
mentally stable and conscious individuals would voluntarily choose self-starvation 
and restricted food consumption regardless of the absence or presence of mental 
illness. Moreover, treatment professionals are reluctant to utilise non-biomedical 
approaches and in some countries have progressed a step further to suggest the 
criminalisation of any behaviour that indicates mental illness.467 Cultural trends have 
revealed that self-starvation develops and is preserved through adolescence to 
adulthood. Understandably, within those core stages, meaningful moments are 
registered and are found to form part of the individual’s identity.468  According to 
Shaffer and Kipp’s report, many adolescents experience eating disorders between 12 
and 20 years, for the first time. But the peak is said to be between 14 and 18 years. 
Reports equally indicate the observation of the symptoms among children aged 3 to 6 
years.469                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
Current research does not reveal the application of the meaning centred approach in 
the analysis of eating disorders. Schles discusses the application of an individualized 
meaning-centred approach to braille learning applied to individuals with multiple 
disabilities.470 Meaning Centred Approach was utilised to develop a method of 																																																								
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communication unique to the individual, which enabled the inclusion of his or her 
own stories and experiences. Multiple outcomes of the study revealed that individual 
decisions to participate and learn to read by touching instead of sight (braille) were 
stimulated by consent and ability to denote meaning.471 The key instrument to the 
success of the meaning-centred approach (MCA) above other approaches, therefore, 
was the individualised appeal to the personal relevance and intricate values of the 
student.472 It is therefore particularly striking that individual assessment which places 
the individual as the lead in his or her own life decisions has shown more success 
potential than when they are excluded from these decisions. Wormsley notes that 
changing from the pre-established traditional approach to the nascent MCA was 
instrumental to underscoring progress.473 In palliative care, for instance, there was key 
focus on reinforcing and strengthening the meaning behind their experience. 
According to Rosenfeld et al, MCA to psychotherapy for palliative care involved 
sessions, which “addressed the person’s own understanding of meaning and 
experience of meaning in his or her life.”474 Critical accounts of meaningful and 
historically significant capabilities that formed part of the individual’s identity was 
crucial in improving quality of life.475 Wong places the survival of humanistic 
psychology to an adaption of a MCA. Revisiting suppressed themes of “personal 
growth, self-actualization, authentic happiness, optimal function and human 
flourishing” is essential to reserve the diminished aspects of humanistic 
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psychology.476 Wong’s MCA account highlights inherent themes for individuals to 
lead a dignified and valued life without fear of inhuman or degrading treatment, 
which can suppress their experience.477  
 
In a way, there is a conscious reminder that for an individual to achieve optimal levels 
of success, a level of autonomy and liberty is pertinent. However, clinicians argue that 
authentic happiness will never be fully achieved neither can an individual reach their 
full potential when the body is suffering from self-starvation. Dubois asserts that 
anorexia nervosa signify a body and mind convergence which indicates a 
psychosomatic disorder.478 However, without conclusive data, suggestions of anorexia 
conformity to compulsion neurosis have not been scientifically established.479 Thus, 
the presence of mental illness means that most actions of anorexics are made 
involuntarily and such decisions cannot be classified fulfilling and rational. This 
might be true if anorexia has been proven to exist on the compulsion neurosis 
spectrum where biological sufferings of the anorexic is fully unconsciously and 
compulsorily made and determined. Clinicians constantly have attempted to link 
anorexia to obsessions and compulsion neurosis by comparative analysis of the 
contributing factors between symptoms of anorexia and obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD).480 No identical symmetry was found because the latter exists in a 
frequency bothering on neurosis. 481 Relatively, in the absence of neurosis, the 																																																								
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anorexic body embodies a certain level of awareness and is motivated by the quest for 
self-satisfaction and acquisition, which often translates to happiness, contentment and 
self-satisfaction. Bank asserts that although there maybe parts of the anorexics 
biological dysfunctions that are not consciously determined, however, it is pertinent to 
note that: “the anorectic consciously understands and gives meaning to her symptoms 
using culturally explicit and objective symbols, beliefs and language.”482 Every 
disorder is unique and significantly resonates with the individual;483 meaning can be 
forged in an environment where individuals can excel as autonomous beings, 
retaining their experiences as part of their identity. A balanced analysis of 
contributing factors will include meaningful analysis of the meaning underlying an 
individual’s unconventional eating patterns. 
 
Frankl, a former long-time Nazi prisoner, describes human beings as very complex, 
multi-dimensional souls, made up of very detailed intricate pieces (combination of a 
life time of experience) that can only be woven together to form meaning.484  One 
cannot therefore disassociate present being from the past. Having suffered the worst 
fate in concentration camps (violence, assault, hunger, and cold), the crucial aspect of 
Frankl’s writing suggests that in finding meaning, there must be pain and suffering. In 
essence, the gentle approach towards human suffering, indicating that pain and 
suffering whether physical, mental or emotional was an essential part of the human 
existential experience.  																																																																																																																																																														
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According to Frankl: 
 
“The way in which a man accepts his fate and all the suffering 
it entails, the way in which he takes up his cross, gives him 
ample opportunity – even under the most difficult 
circumstances – to add deeper meaning to life. It may remain 
brave, dignified and unselfish. Or in the bitter fight for self-
preservation he may forget his human dignity and become no 
more than an animal. Here lies the chance for a man either to 
make use of or to forgo the opportunities of attaining the moral 
values that a difficult situation may afford him. And this 
decides whether he is worthy of his sufferings or not.”485 
 
Wong explains; “meaning is both personally construed and socially constructed, 
meaning is highly sensitive to individuals and cultural difference”.486 Invariably, in 
many ways, the perspective of the life experiences of an individual connects to their 
core mental form.487  Meaning Centred Approach is not regarded as formal theory488 
and is unique or exclusive to a particular discipline although it has been applied in 
other areas of psychiatric models. Holmes considered the MCA as “comprehensive 
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and multidimensional”.489 A MCA, therefore, enables the evaluation of multifaceted 
factors that occur in biomedical bound discourses by including the individuals lived 
experiences, choices and values in decision-making. This approach supports the 
fluidity of all aspects of a person’s experience which is manifested in the way the 
individual chooses to self-express, self-control or self-determine. The outcome should 
aid the realization that the underlying meaning behind the physical decline of an 
individual has been long overlooked. 
 
Wallang argues that meaning has often been relegated to the background as focus is 
placed on fulfilling the systematic process of medical diagnosis. It might be essential 
to fulfil medical diagnostic criteria; however, it is also critical that the patient’s 
meaning is not forgone or relinquished.490 Wong notes that human beings are “by 
nature, meaning-seeking and meaning-making creatures who constantly make sense 
of their experiences in real life”.491 The autonomous meaning behind a woman’s 
decision to redefine the body proper by creating a meaning-centred variation depicts 
an internal struggle against both medical and societal preferred identity. Invariably, 
the MCA to the anorexic body should be centred on personal experiences, which 
informs the autonomous choices and motivations of the individual to control the body 
through food resistance. The MCA appreciates the voice of the individual as central to 
dignifying their experiences, morals and choices. The individual is acknowledged and 
valued as a self-determining agent, adverse and resistant to the established 
stereotypical boundaries and impositions of psychology, law and psychiatry. The idea 
that there is significance to every thought, action and emotion exhibited by the 																																																								
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anorexic body highlights the conscious elements in engaging the multiple dimensions 
that may arise within and outside the boundaries of autonomous expressions. In 
perspective, an individual’s search for meaning or making sense of every minute 
element of their behaviours and relationships with other individuals in general 
demonstrates a significant degree of capacity. The interpretations of the individual 
actions in a way that provides logical meaning and understanding focuses on the role 
of the individual to provide in-depth perspective which reinforces the morals, belief 
and principle. Wong embraces the notion that the impact of recognising the meaning-
centred nature of humans essentially captures the interface between their personhood 
and the desire to constantly self-regulate.492 
 
Frankl insists that, “meaning must be found and not given. And it must be found by 
oneself, by one’s own conscience”.493 The implication is that clinicians can only 
attempt to illustrate the substructures of a disorder but cannot uncover the true 
meaning as every individual possesses their own values, which are applied to 
individual situations.494 Thompson notes that a huge void is created when the efforts 
of an individual to create a “personally meaningful life” is disregarded and relegated 
to the background.495  In treating alcoholism, for instance, incorporating the MCA 
was effective because alcohol abusers were primarily treated as individuals in control 
of their choices and not addicts lacking in consciousness and direction.496 The key 
component in managing the alcoholic’s experience was based on acknowledging that 
there is a central meaning propelling substance abuse and which is determined first by 
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acknowledging and understanding their subjective experience and secondly placing 
the human being in the centre stage.  For Wong, there is an intrinsic meaning obtained 
by condensing transit experiences into a belief system which an individual can 
identify with and can lend an explanation to human behaviour and life itself.497  
Researchers have long identified the significance of meaning as they engage and 
integrate with the process of living. The high view is that a person resides within their 
environment with challenges and problems that affect their everyday life whether 
mental, physical or otherwise. Those challenges invariably impacts their everyday 
experience as they begin to bond, withdraw or embrace the outcome by finding a 
system to internalise and understand those problems.  Noteworthy outcome is also the 
capacity inherent in the individual to synthesise successfully and process multitudes 
of transit information acquired throughout their experiences to reflect their state of 
being. More specifically, engaging meaning also illustrates that the process of arriving 
at a conclusive outcome is valid and valuable and because of a well thought through 
consideration – not an immediate instantaneous, spontaneous abnormal mental 
trigger. Frankl identifies three core ways of finding meaning: firstly, through the 
conceptions that are impacted and impactful to the world; secondly, impressionable 
lived experiences and encounters; and finally, the act of determination and 
perseverance when confronted in situations beyond their control.”498 Frankl insists 
that meaning could be found in all circumstance and humans can therefore embrace 
the freedom of choice and they need to fulfill meaning and realise value”.499 If a 
person’s behavior can only be fully understood by taking into account his independent 
choices centred on meaning and values, it follows that it will be counterproductive to 
separate a person from the meaning informing their choice. In this context, evaluating 																																																								
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the state of a person’s being must be done in terms of their meaning and values.500  
There are experiences, which transcend the physical being and are at multiple levels 
intertwined with the human existence.501   
 
In a distinctive way, human beings are in constant search for a unique meaning, which 
defines them and portrays both their positives and negatives in a way that validates 
their own story and essence.502 Meaning making have been regarded as an adaptive 
mechanism utilised by individuals in finding their identity and purpose to justify the 
outcome of their actions.503 Lichtenthal and Breitbart note the emergence of a 
redefined identity in parents mourning the death of a child as an outcome of making 
sense of the child’s demise. Cultural and religious beliefs will play a part in sustaining 
and shaping the redefined identity after a traumatic experience as boundaries of belief 
systems are constantly tested by new experiences. It becomes appropriate that making 
sense would involve processing and integrating existing beliefs or trigger a change in 
beliefs by forming new ones. Whichever pathway the individual adopts, it seems 
necessary that the past beliefs, morals and values are reconciled with the present in 
other to forge a true identity and sense of self. Aligned in finding and acknowledging 
meaning is the route that takes into consideration all the negative and positive aspects 
of an individual, enhancing direction to self-determination and autonomous 
expressions. Consequently, the power to shape their experience is not delegated to a 
third party, as there is a clear development of an individualised undiluted identity. The 
individual’s voice is prioritised in every decision-making. Unbiased interpretation of 
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their experience is fundamental to bringing a conscious and consensual patient-doctor 
relationship previously, which previously eluded the biomedical system.504 This 
narrative identifies and interprets what an individual’s voice represents, presenting a 
non-layered perspective devoid of speculative accounts.505  According to Holmes, 
applying a MCA:  
 
“…would better reflect the complex aetiology of mental illness 
and surely help create a humane working method which would 
promote a deeper understanding of our patients. It would also 
lead to the realization that our patients are equal participants 
and allow us move into the next phase of psychiatry, the 
overdue liberation of the patient’s own voice, freeing them 
from any single interpretative or explanatory authority and 
allowing further recognition and hopefully alleviation of their 
suffering”.506 
 
Treatment professionals have described the process of dealing with anorexics as 
“humbling”.507 Interactions between clinicians and anorexics are as strenuous and 
combative particularly when the patients do not consent to involuntary treatments. 
Personal narratives are important as they relate the account of the individual in a way 
that unifies complex systems and signs highlighting both past and new viewpoints on 
events, expressing their beliefs and offering insights into perceptions and impressions 
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otherwise hidden to the external world.508 Clinicians continue to struggle to embrace a 
conceptual modification that includes individualised meanings of the anorexic body, 
which is totally different from established medical knowledge.509 Clinicians attribute 
the lack of acceptance and commitment to treatment to the values the individual 
places on self-starvation as a means of fulfilling their disorder. The clinical narratives 
presents the anorexics as irrational and unwilling to accept treatment options geared 
towards treating their mental disorder and relieving their physical symptoms.510 
Medical solutions are therefore solely focused on prevailing on the anorexic body to 
gain weight thereby creating a wide gap where the anorexic’s complaints about 
treatment procedures are not constantly reviewed to ensure they are within ethical 
principles.511 Clinicians argue that their overall knowledge and scientific awareness of 
the detrimental effect of self-starvation to brain functions makes it impossible to 
consider principles of autonomy in the instance an emaciated individual refuses 
treatment.512 Invariably, interpreting their experiences and the meaning underlying 
their behaviour is valuable. Russell notes that because the anorexic body is in constant 
struggle to find balance and “secure sense of self”, it means that clinicians must 
extend adequate support to accommodate their perspectives and views rather than 
contribute destructively.513 On one hand, granted the MCA can be equally utilised by 
clinicians as personal narratives, which unearth the meaning underlying a behavioural 
pattern, it is critical to interpret mental process and can lead to independent 
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recovery.514Conversely, the mental element is significantly deemphasized as sole 
reliance on meaning and reasoning emerges as a pathway to verify the mental state 
much to the scepticism of mental health practitioners.  
  
There would always be uncertainty on the possibilities or odds of relying on meaning 
alone to daily deconstruct and understand the intricate nature of the human mind. 
Wallang however argues that the complex and changing nature of human minds, 
human relationship and the environment warrants a deeper meaningful interpretation 
although not to the total discard of scientific diagnostic processes.515 In reality, it 
might appear logical to find a non-biased medium between Wallang (compounded 
doubts on how the MCA can stand alone in practice or reality) and Frankl’s subjective 
emphasis on substantiating meaning at all cost. Wallang however goes a step further 
to deconstruct the interpretation of the meaning of the experience as an equal 
significant aspect of understanding the way an individual attaches to those 
experiences. 516  Improper interpretation of the experience as presented by the 
individual will cause a distortive understanding of their truth. It becomes evident that 
relying on the perspective of an individual’s conscious account is the only valid 
interpretation of their experience rather than third party insights regardless of the 
commonality of their disorder.517 
 
When underlying and circumstantial factors are excluded and not acknowledged, 
‘meaning’ is never explored. The body proper is not significant but the psychological 
or mental element is emphasised, well engaged and presented as the root of 																																																								
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disordered behaviours. The body – physical component becomes merely an outcome 
or manifestation of the processes that occur within the mental experience. 
Understandably, the evolution of science is dependent on a comprehensive 
classification system; therefore alternate models that do not correlate with the 
scientific diagnostic and treatment catalogues are excluded by clinicians, effectively 
restricting the flexibility of applying models, which are not reflected in the 
standardised classification system. In considering the general approach in tackling 
mental diseases, little attention is given to instances where not only treatment fails 
either as a result of a factor beyond the control of the clinician or more significantly in 
the instance of deliberate decision of the patient to refuse treatment and assert their 
rights to liberty, autonomy and dignity. In the instance a changing perspective results 
in treatment refusal, such scenario immediately locks the clinician in an ethical and 
practical quagmire, which neither the clinician nor the statistical manuals had 
anticipated. Wallang expresses that certain behavioural patterns have become 
automated in a way that individuals loose conscious awareness.518 This is impossible 
as every behaviour has an established origin processed through multitudes of 
thoughts, actions both negatives and positives, continuously dissected and 
reintegrated to establish the reality that forms the behaviour exhibited. For the 
medical model, it is easier to trivialize or reduce behavioural patterns to non-
locomotive motions of unconscious behaviour and awareness, which projects the 
individual as unable to make decisions that can inform their choices and free will. The 
way an individual expresses their informed choices forms part of their narratives, the 
interpretation they choose to project whether through their physical body (resistant 
body) or otherwise represents a conscious awareness and acceptance of their 
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experience. Higher reasoning whether negative or positive, which uncovers a deeper 
meaning, cannot be achieved by a subconscious mind or body. Granted, some 
experiences are not prominent as others, however the history of all experiences are 
not vague neither is the significant impact of each experience. Critical consideration 
should therefore be given to established historical trace of experiences through 
constant references throughout a person’s lifetime. However, exploring those lived 
experiences are fundamental to establishing a pathway of tracing future actions which 
are unique to the individual thereby creating a significant link between the past and 
the present.519 Invariably, a person’s overall impression in life is reliant on the total 
composition of their narratives, therefore, only through individualised assessment of 
the accrued accounts can there be a full comprehension of “emotional component of 
that individual and develop a significant degree of meaning”.520 
 
The above analysis of the meaning centred approach leads to the question of why the 
significance of understanding, acknowledging and accepting the narrative of an 
individual is important in medico-legal system. First, there is established precedence 
where the reasoning behind an individual’s disorder, conscious or not are not taken 
into account in treatment and commitment proceedings. Acknowledging that an 
individual can comprehensively give account of their reality through a narrative, 
which explains how they arrived at the behavioural pattern exhibited, is adverse to the 
standard medical and mental health practice. It could then be deduced that regardless 
of the physical or adjudged mental state of the individual, a conscious account 
considered or at best prioritized may bridge the gap between involuntary and 
voluntary treatment. Accepting that no decision or choice can exist without a 																																																								
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compressive and comprehensive synthesis of thoughts and experience validates the 
competence and capacity of the individual to refuse involuntary treatment and 
exercise their rights to autonomy.  
 
Developing a framework that extends to the inclusion of individualised meaning 
within the medical framework of diagnosis is rare and unusual. Boughtwood and 
Halse, however, suggest the medical departure from the sole characterisation of 
anorexic by their behaviours and symptoms.521 A meaningful dimension would rather 
foster the understanding of anorexia by utilising their vision and values by identifying 
that every anorexic is dissimilar and  “... respecting the meanings they attached to 
their illness…”522 The challenge for medicine is that accepting a new pathway that 
includes individualised meaning would represent an acknowledgement that the 
medical field do not have all the solutions for the underlying reasons why young 
women relentlessly succumb to self-starvation, thereby admitting the inadequacies of 
the present treatment route.523 Arguments in support of the MCA focus on the 
effective structure that allows for the emergence of personal narratives in interpreting 
a person’s experienc in other clarify the underlining meaning. 524  Examining a 
practical example, Wallang notes that regardless of the questionable mental state, 
compounded by physical deterioration, the individual was able to engage effectively 
with their experiences through a personal narrative, which reflected his motivation 
and informed choices.525 The relevance of the MCA can become universal across 
genres with its application and meaning continuously evolving as it continuously 
adapts to multiple discourse.  Banks therefore insists that in other to remove all 																																																								
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ambiguity and gain clarity on the underlying meaning of thinness and self-starvation 
“a meaning-centered studies of anorectics especially those in non-clinical settings-are 
needed to clarify the cultural contexts of the disorder”.526 
 
Medical and science-based definitions and understanding of anorexia have always 
been prominent and dominant in any field of studies regarding eating disorders. The 
model by which individuals are accessed and evaluated is solely reliant on the 
understanding and meaning furnished through strict diagnostic criteria recognised by 
treatment professionals. In the case of anorexia, it is a straight-lined classification, 
diagnostic and treatment outcomes narratives with no scope to extend beyond the 
established practice or seek in-depth meaning. For decades, critics have alluded to 
other factors that contribute to the definition of many mental disorders. These 
highlighted factors such as experiences, culture, moral and values which are not 
acknowledged as core or integral in the development of any form of mental disorder. 
Wong notes that human beings are “by nature, meaning-seeking and meaning-making 
creatures who constantly make sense of their experiences in real life”.527 It, therefore, 
follows that in other to understand an unusual (abnormal) behaviour in an individual 
the meaning underlying such behaviour is critical in obtaining a well-rounded 
perspective. The individual’s voice becomes the first noted authority in their 
management and care. To secure an ideal portrait in the understanding of self-
starvation, for instance, examining the intersection between extended frames in 
disciplines, amongst other factors, which recognises a person’s consistent attempt to 
validate their choices and affirm personal control. This process of inclusion and 
affirmation of personal control and choices underlines the doctrine of informed 
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consent. There is however no accurate or uniform portrait representative of the 
meaning-centred anorexic body experience. A broader individualised intersection of 
their immediate values and the next choices can be conceptually analysed within 
societal contexts to obtain a productive outcome. These cross-sections of 
multifactorial experiences or occurrences vary from isolated food restriction, 
distinctive weight calculation, and desperation to stay within a controlled scale size.528 
The meaning-centred ideals transcend cultural metaphors directly manifested through 
self-starvation as a pathway to creating a socio-cultural or political revolution. For 
example, incorporating the values drawn from experiences would validate the free 
will and choice of the individual in the conscious restraint of the body without undue 
influence or coercion. Exploring the meaning anorexics give to their condition, 
Marzola, et al carried out a qualitative investigation into the condition anorexia 
nervosa. Their sample was made up of 34 anorexic patients.529 To achieve their goal, 
the researchers asked the participants to write a letter to their condition in which they 
should describe what the condition (anorexia nervosa) means to them. The outcome of 
their investigation revealed that the participants differed in the meanings they ascribed 
to their condition.530 Some of the participants felt protected by their condition, while 
others felt negatively towards it. For the latter, their lives were being wasted because 
of the condition. 531 They expressed anger, dependence, and hate towards their 
condition. Also expressed by this category were feelings of betrayal and being 
cheated by their condition. Those who claimed they felt protected by their condition 
seem to have false confidence and may starve themselves to the point of becoming 																																																								
528 Hans-Christoph Steinhausen, ‘The Outcome of Anorexia Nervosa in the 20th Century’ (2002) 159(8) 
American Journal of Psychiatry, p. 1284. 
529 Enrica Marzola, Giovanni Abbate-Daga, Carla Gramagha, Federico Amianto and Secondo Fassiono, 
‘A Qualitative Investigation into Anorexia Nervosa: The Inner Perspective’ (2015) available at 
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311908.2015.1032493   [accessed 5th April 2018].   
530 Ibid. 
531	Ibid	
	 139	
physically ill and even fatality. 532  The expression of hate, anger, anxiety, 
despondence, depression, betrayal and even the false confidence of feeling protected 
by the anorexic condition are reflective of mental health problems. 533 
 
Historically, advocacy for freedom of choice, autonomy and consent of the anorexic 
body have been flawed by clinical impositions of treatment options to ease recovery. 
Regardless of the invasive treatment options to facilitate recovery, there is still a 
record of constant high mortality rate, low recovery, and distinctive treatment 
resistance.534  A resistant body is registered as non-consenting, therefore, lacking the 
capacity to contribute to the decision making process. The resistant body, therefore, 
has little or no say in treatment decisions and is not required to furnish their consent 
before treatment.535 Implementing a meaning-centred identification will enable an 
adaptive provision of personalised care and management for persons normalised in 
those actual patterns of abnormal or unusual behaviour regardless of the stiff labels 
dictated by the Mental Health Act. MCA to the studies of anorexia removes the rigid 
clinical approach and interpretation of thinness and self-starvation and amplifies both 
the social and cultural context. Within the meaning-centred variation, a clear 
demarcation can be made between the “resistant body” also known as the “meaning-
centered anorexic body' and the classic “patient-centred anorexic body”. The patient-
centred anorexic body is the overtly labelled individual created by the DSM to fit the 
mental disorder/insanity stereotype. The stereotyped body ceases to be an individual 
with any sense of self but a patient form fitted into the mould created by clinicians to 																																																								
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produce a specific outcome. A useful distinction between the meaning-centred 
anorexic body and the patient-centred anorexic body will address the compound 
debate of autonomy, consent, and capacity.  
 
The meaning-centred anorexic body has precise knowledge and direction on choices 
evidenced in a clear, concise immediate or advanced decision and once presumptuous 
incapacity is eliminated, cannot be adjudged to lack capacity solely based on the 
general principles under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. There is a marked history of 
self-starvation, food refusal and extreme thinness transcending western 
clinical/medical ideologies. An in-depth cross-cultural analysis engages the cultural 
contexts of anorexia exclusively, embedded in their experiences and sustained 
through self-discipline, self-determination and assertion of bodily integrity and 
autonomy. Engaging the personal and underlying meaning of the anorexic body 
ensures that the choices, norms, values and decisions (meaning-centred) of the 
individual are hierarchical to the established presumptions surrounding mental 
disorder. It is, therefore, essential to analyse anorexia outside western bound 
syndromes and within cultures where anorexia nervosa is not recognised as a mental 
illness. Classic symptoms of anorexia (fear of weight gain, extreme thinness, self-
starvation and food refusal) are symbolic to self-discipline and self-rule thereby 
breaking gender barriers, religious or cultural oppression. For instance, the established 
western beauty-ideal tall, thin and straight through hips is not appealing to men of 
African heritage. An analysis of the favoured body type of African-American men 
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and Caucasian revealed that African American men show preference and are "more 
accepting of larger sizes for women than Caucasian men”.536  
 
Lamb concludes that "being fat is a beauty ideal for much of Africa" and the fattened 
woman presents a way into the love, respect and heart of the man.537 The ideal West 
African woman is well endowed; the fuller and curvy woman is considered the apple 
of the man's eye and their bodies, possessions or assets of their husbands.538 Channel 
4 unreported world documentary focused on West African nation of Mauritania 
revealed that the fat or chubby woman was regarded as the epitome standard of 
beauty every young girl must adhere to.539 Young Mauritania girls were then forced to 
eat 16000 calories a day in other to attain this standard of beauty set by the 
community. Girls with normal ranged BMI are this often-dangerous force-feeding 
process. 540 The consumption of up to 16000 calories a day will not only enable these 
young girl gain the desired amount of weight but also prepare them to be more 
pleasing to male suitors. The feeding lasts for s minimum of two months at a time 
within which these young women are forced against their will to consume litres of 
camel milk, kilos of couscous and porridge.541 The significance of fattening these 
young women is not only associated with the notion of beauty but also positive body 
image as desired by men and also a sign of wealth and affluence. Refusal to conform 
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to the feeding regimen will attract detention, physical restriction, physical abuse and 
force-feeding.542 According to Ghosh, "most women of Ghana shun the emaciated 
figures of fashion models and believe that being "full figured" denotes not only 
attractiveness but as good health and prosperity".543 In Nigeria, the Urhobo woman is 
the standard of beauty, fat, fleshy, big, curvy and voluptuous. Cultural practices in 
Calabar (Southern Nigeria) mandates girls as young women to be "fattened up" before 
they are married.544 The long-standing tradition of the Efik tribe guarantees that a 
woman is sent to the fattening room where she is isolated from her village, removed 
from any physical activity and made to eat as much as she can against her will. The 
fattening process also includes ensuring her hips are broadened for reproduction. The 
female body, therefore, implies desirability; her value is in being a suitable pick for a 
wife, vessel for reproduction and catering to the needs of the man. When the body is 
objectified, weight loss or weight gain remains adapted to the self-serving interests 
and control of the male gender. Self-starvation, food refusal or adopting the resistant 
meaning-centred anorexic body for these women within a repressive cultural 
environment is regarded as a sign of rebellion against established and entrenched 
misogyny. New feminine ideal of beauty is created by consciously and voluntarily 
adopting the meaning-centred body as a feminist symbol of liberation, emancipation 
and control. In many ways, the meaning-centred anorexic body therefore consciously 
and voluntarily engages self-starvation and thinness as a symbol of self-
determination, autonomy and control over their body and self. The distinctive feature 
of the meaning centred anorexic body is embedded within the cultural contexts of 																																																								
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meaning, morals, and experience but also in the cognitive acknowledgement and 
recognition that there is no desire to starve to death or commit suicide as established 
and recorded in cases such as A NHS Foundation v Ms X.545 It is impossible not to 
acknowledge that the demographic of the patient-centred anorexics do not embrace 
self starvation as a symbol of resistance rather they are not only suicidal but 
preoccupied with the mere physical aesthetics of thinness and physical emaciation as 
highlighted in Re (E (Medical Treatment Anorexia).546  
 
The patient-centred anorexic body engages in food refusal, self-starvation and body 
weight management with no clear, precise meaning or concept to their self-starvation. 
The meaning-centred anorexic body is subjectively dissimilar; the standard pattern of 
behaviour addresses an individualised norm, symbolic to self, culture, morals and 
experience.547 It is, however, critical to investigate further if the meaning-centred 
anorexic body can lead a conceptually normal life within a controlled weight devoid 
of any attempt to end their life. All behavioural aspects must reveal distinguishable 
traits from a non-meaning centred anorexic. Hence, the author’s disagreement with 
Crisp's insistence that all anorexic bodies possess diminished rights of independence 
and exhibit immaturity in leading a normalised life. 548  Lending to a better 
understanding of the meaning-centred anorexic body, a cross-cultural analysis reveals 
that the Mental Health Act and policies in Nigeria do not recognise anorexia nervosa 
as a mental illness. In-depth information or knowledge linking anorexia nervosa to 
mental illness is therefore non-existent comparative to the reinforced stereotype of the 
UK Mental Health Act 1983 which classifies anorexia nervosa as a mental illness, 																																																								
545 A NHS Foundation Trust v Ms X [2014] EWCOP 35.  
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which must be treated involuntarily. Such justification of paternalistic intervention is 
without consideration to the perils of involuntary treatment as a direct violation of 
personal autonomy, removing their rights to make informed choices without being 
unduly influenced or coerced.549 
 
Suggestions that the traditional settings of human rights do not apply in non-western 
cultures are adrift. Largely, it acknowledges that the disparities in human rights 
obligations are prominent. Other cultures may seek to embrace their values of human 
rights in a less theoretical way different from western understanding of rights as 
programmed by a charter, legislation or -byelaws. In Nigeria, for instance, it is 
repeatedly observed that human rights are personal; the value attached to autonomy is 
non-conformist to universal expectation. The language in rural, non-industrial towns 
reflects the individualism and autonomy they embrace while resisting own oppressive 
system. This research looks at anorexia nervosa from a meaning-centred perspective 
highlighting the meaning and reasoning behind the experience of self-starvation, 
which excludes mental illness. Most women one way or the other go through the 
course of exerting control over their body concerned about weight gain at some point 
during their lifetime.550 The meaning or reason behind adopting a meaning-centred 
anorexic body is dependent on a variety of factors, which includes the individual’s 
current situation, projected future encounters, and experiences, which supersede 
traditional medical concepts. Take for instance a prospective bride who in addition to 
excessive exercise is also self-starving for weeks to fit into a wedding dress. The 
calorific restriction at that point is symbolic and meaning-centred on achieving the 																																																								
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smaller body size for the wedding day. This behaviour permits the bride the freedom 
to influence her body in a manner confined with a scale limit. The specific knowledge 
that food restriction is limited to a few months or years is sufficient to create a 
consciousness dissimilar to the patient-centred anorexic body as postulated under the 
Mental Health Act. A meaning-centred anorexic body is unambiguously assumed to 
reflect a particular or series of experiences and personal identity of the individual. 
Excessive exercising, dieting, calorie counting and restrictive eating play fundamental 
roles, which lead to the desired physical emaciation and thinness. In retrospect, the 
meaning-centred anorexic body exhibits competence and is knowledgeable of the way 
their body develops and thereby formulates a criterion that moderates and manages 
this construction. This body manifests in a restricted construction dependent on the 
essential and exclusive presentation of the body as having choice and direction. The 
Nigerian dimension is critical and timely as no laws classify anorexia nervosa as a 
mental illness. Therefore, individuals can exercise the freedom and autonomy over 
their body and subject it to control without the stereotype of mental illness or fear of 
subjection to involuntary treatment. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
 
Meaning-Centred Anorexic Body 
 
 
4.  
The previous chapter introduced the application of the meaning-centred approach as 
significant in broadening the obligation to recognise other independent settings and 
alternative concepts that recognise the experiences, values, morals and decisions of 
the anorexic body. Within the meaning-centred framework, an extended conceptual 
analysis will ensure that several unusual characteristics of a mentally ill person are 
shared across cross-cultural borders of meaningful illness. Standard of rationality in 
cross-cultural meaning establishes that the level of competency is distributed within 
an existing autonomy enhancing setting, so the individual’s right is in place regardless 
of the scientific or medical diagnosis. This present chapter introduces the theoretical 
analysis of the meaning centred anorexic body by introducing a legal dimension to 
identifying a voluntary creation, resistant to paternalistic control as the body moves 
away from the universal attraction and acknowledgement as a docile object that needs 
to be institutionally regulated, disciplined, and subjected to punishment.551 Drawing 
upon the evolving legal and ethical norms, this chapter addresses the need for 
recognition of the values of autonomy, which the anorexic body clings to for self-
determination and expression.   
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4.1 Critical Analysis  
 
Laségue and Gull facilitated the earliest glimpse into the nature and complexities of 
anorexia nervosa. 552  Anorexia nervosa has become extensively researched and 
literature in this area reveals association among the variables – self-starvation, food 
refusal, excessive exercise and mental illness.553 Accordingly, medical analysis of 
anorexia points out that individuals with eating disorders have extreme weight 
concerns and considers food as the enemy. For clinicians, the anorexics food phobic 
nature is regarded as a reflection of their overall mental state. Food denial therefore 
represents not only an altered mental and cognitive function but also physical 
disability as the anorexic body succumbs to the side effects of self-starvation. Glover-
Thomas, a treatment gastroenterologist, conventionally labelled the patient centred 
anorexia as severe, misinterpreted, extraordinarily rare, relentless in nature and 
destructive.554 Research reveals that despite various clinical impositions to facilitate 
the recovery of anorexic patients; there is still a record of constant high mortality rate, 
low recovery, and consistent treatment resistance.555 In Glover-Thomas’ opinion, 
anorexia nervosa symptoms are buried deep, unusual, and not subject to traditional 
medical detection.556The various highlighted symptoms of anorexia nervosa are 
constructed on the premise that the standard functionality of the body is dependent on 
food consumption. Thus restricting the human body from indulging in what it craves 
disrupts that part of the brain hypothalamus,557 thereby creating a sense of anxiety, 																																																								
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guilt, and self-loathing and in most cases depression. Consequently, radical 
deterioration is thought to be inevitable due to the chemical imbalance of the body 
and brain as a whole.558   
 
Section 307.1 of the DSM-5 defines anorexia nervosa as a mental disorder.559 
Anorexia nervosa is a form of eating disorder characterised by a refusal “to maintain a 
minimally normal body weight”, extreme fear of weight gain and a significant 
distortion of the true nature and perception of the body or size of their body.560 The 
DSM-IV further explains that anorexia nervosa is reinforced through “dieting, fasting 
and excessive exercise as a means of weight control or weight loss”.561 The guideline 
established for clinicians to detect anorexia suggests a benchmark based on 17.5% 
body mass index or “less than 85% of the weight that is considered normal for that 
person’s age and height”.562 The anorexic restrictive feeding pattern differs from other 
forms of eating disorders characterised by frequent episodes of binge eating and 
purging (bulimia) to stimulate weight loss. William Gull facilitated the earliest 
glimpse into diversified and alternate models of evaluating and analysing the 
complexities of anorexia nervosa.563 Suffice it to say, the typical response to anorexia 
nervosa before Gull was insouciant and nonchalant. In a presentation before the 
annual meeting of the British Medical Association in Oxford, Gull, a medical 
physician, referred to the condition as Apepsia Hysterica later amended to Anorexia 
Nervosa in a report to the clinical society and the medical Gazette in 1873.564 Gull 
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characterised anorexia nervosa by physical emaciation, which occurs without any 
apparent or visible cause – excluding the mental element.565 The various highlighted 
symptoms of anorexia nervosa was then constructed on the premise that the standard 
functionality of the body is dependent on food consumption, restricting the human 
body from indulging in what it craves, disrupting that part of the brain 
hypothalamus,566 thereby creating a sense of anxiety, guilt, self-loathing and in most 
cases depression. Consequently, radical deterioration is thought to be inevitable due to 
the chemical imbalance of the body and brain as a whole.567   
 
A significant research document published by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
on the International Classification of Diseases reveals obvious symptoms of anorexia. 
For most people, the key indicator is a refusal to maintain a healthy body weight ratio 
because of the morbid fear of weight gain.568 Many adopt a pattern of full starvation 
as a coping mechanism.569 These symptoms include a drastic reduction in body mass 
index (BMI), retaining an unhealthy BMI, which leads to at least 15% below the 
normal or expected weight for age and height. Notable symptoms according to the 
WHO's document include suppression of food intake, morbid fear of weight gain by 
systematic avoidance of high-fat content foods, presumed to enable any form of 
weight gain and the limitation of the quantity of food intake. There is also the 
elimination of food already consumed by resorting to the overuse of diuretics and 
laxatives to maintain the already low BMI already achieved by starvation, over-
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exercising, and limitation of food intake.570 Understandably, clinical interpretations of 
anorexia nervosa focus on physical emaciation and the biological patterns of the 
individuals suffering. There is also a primary reference to unique key additive 
personality traits such as perfectionism and obsessive compulsory behaviour. Medical 
and psychiatric intervention, therefore, laid radical emphasis on the negative impact 
of this deterioration to the brain, which causes an imbalance in hormones, impelling 
the individual to develop more abnormal behavioural obsessiveness in both pattern 
and practice.571 Predominantly, establishing any of these symptoms or behavioural 
trends in full or part leads to a presumptuous involuntary treatment entirely focused 
on normalising eating patterns and preservation of life. With the diagnosis of anorexia 
nervosa established, medical intervention is initiated to impose treatment that aids 
physical recovery. To medical practitioners, this critically low body weight 
necessitates involuntary re-feeding in the hospital to reverse biological consequences 
of starvation.572 Medical treatments are, therefore, administered towards curing the 
biological or physical conditions that develop because of self-starvation rather than 
tackling the psychological aspects.573  
 
At first glance, anorexia nervosa discourse appears to be a matter for the clinical 
entity with its distinct features scientifically documented over an extended period.574 
However, most recently, interest in anorexia has transcended cultural borders, 																																																								
570 World Health Organization (WHO),  ICD- 10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders: 
Diagnostic Criteria for Research available at 
http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/GRNBOOK.pdfp135 [Accessed 4th Dec. 2013] p.135. 
 
 
572 Rosalyn Griffiths and Janice Russell, ‘Compulsory Treatment of Anorexia Nervosa Patients’ in 
Walter Vandereycken, Pierre J.V. Beumont (eds.) Treating Eating Disorders: Ethical, Legal and 
Personal Issues (London, Athlone Press 1998) p. 139. 
573 Ibid. 
574 Daniel L. Grange, ‘Anorexia Nervosa in Adults: The Urgent Need for Novel Outpatient Treatments 
that Work’ (2016) 53(2) Psychotherapy Journal p. 251. 
	 151	
expanding to non-clinical genres and offering a multidisciplinary approach to the 
understanding and interpreting the disorder. Intense research across multiple genres 
has spearheaded a unique unstructured engagement and understanding of the multiple 
facets of anorexia outside the strict discipline of medicine and psychiatry. Largely, the 
newly found interest is mainly attributed to the heightened objective to engage in a 
conceptually liberal analysis of the disorder beyond the biological symptoms. Crisp 
argues that anorexia only exists as a biological illness and considering any underlying 
psychodynamic actors will offer nothing new to the discourse. 575  Contrariwise, 
biological analysis of anorexia has produced no new knowledge despite the constant 
publication of thousands of repetitive texts dissecting the biological structure and 
emaciation of the anorexic body. New studies in areas such as culture, media and 
feminism have offered a fresh perspective in understanding aspects of anorexia 
previously untouched. MacSween notes that it is insufficient only to acknowledge the 
biological aspects of anorexia nervosa.576 Extending the understanding beyond the 
biological symptoms provides the clarity to engage the anorexic body beyond the 
visible body functions but as an active participant in that creation.577 The significance 
of the emerging dimensions of the multifaceted nature of anorexia is often overlooked 
and downplayed. By all accounts, as the practical dynamics of understanding the 
natural outcome of anorexia change, so do the social, ethical, and contextual 
implications. There is, however, a reluctance by experts in the field of medicine and 
psychology to engage a broader perspective that recognises the controlled and 
voluntary patterns of the anorexic behaviour. As a voluntary participant, the meaning 
and core experiences of the anorexic body are acknowledged and interpreted in ways 																																																								
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that transcend psychological or biological statistics. 578  The meaning-centred 
construction extends beyond the boundaries of the strict definitions of mental disorder 
stipulated in the DSM-IV and International Classification of Diseases (ICD), 
especially concerning intentional self-harm and starving to death. In the absence of 
intentional self-harm, pain or death, the values of the anorexic experience become 
prominent thus enabling the recognition of the individualised meaning and further 
acceptance of the autonomous rights of the individual. 
 
The pathway to the modern construction of the anorexic woman is one marked with 
increased loneliness as the body transitions from a physical organism into a 
concept.579 In this transition, many individuals recount stories of incorrect labelling, 
isolation, and ostracising by society, family, and friends. Thus, the complex 
psychological world of anorexia is riddled by defects in information and belief, with 
no actual evidence to support them. Searching for ethical answers, which support the 
many stereotypes will occasion a chain of moral doubts. There is no question that 
misconceptions and prejudices dominate the overall understanding of anorexia with 
no significant relevance or awareness of the several layers of the disorder. Treatment 
practitioners often embraced myopic views of predominantly relying on the 
manifestation of a set of physical symptoms’ to shape or define the capacity and 
treatment response. Adopting the stereotypical stance, therefore, prevents any 
engagement in variations of concepts outside the confines of medicine and psychiatry.  
 
Current treatment and care approaches do not present personalised views reflective of 
the experiences and values of the anorexic person. Historically, arguments for 																																																								
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individuality, freedom of choice, autonomy, and consent of the anorexic body have 
been flawed by stereotypical misconceptions. The anorexic body is therefore already 
disadvantaged, as initial assessments for treatment are profoundly dependent on 
predetermined factors, without considering the unique values, morals and choices of 
the individual. In fact, Crisp once noted that: “ immediate and striking clinical feature 
is usually emaciation. The anorexic is just thinnish person, small boned but fully 
formed; she is skeletal in appearance ….”580 Crisp, unsurprisingly, also fails to look 
beyond the biological elements to engage a more conceptual analysis. The conclusion 
that anorexia nervosa is an illness that can be identified “often at a glance” at the 
individual’s diminishing physical appearance581 strengthens the medical criteria for 
justifying a patient-centred psychodynamic treatment where the person makes little or 
no contribution in arriving at their treatment or care decisions.582 Resistance to 
therapies meant to cure the associated physical ailments only enhanced the psychiatric 
justification for such involuntary intervention.583 Crisp further refers to anorexia as a 
“disorder of the affluent and westernised society”.584 Like several other writers, Crisp, 
a psychiatrist, derived his conclusion from a small pool of anorexic individuals under 
his care rather than the wider variation of individuals who do not fit the status quo. 
Crisp’s perceptions are limited in this regard. It is apparent that there are more 
concrete values to be interpreted in the reasoning behind voluntary self-starvation, 
which transcends the confines of the middle class and affluent. Cynthia Bulik 
enunciates that the anorexic body is not mutually exclusive as ‘they cut across lines’, 
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from upper to middle and low middle class and from teenage girls to adults alike. It 
affects all ages, races, and social classes.585   
 
Unchecked assumptions, prejudices, and stereotypes contribute to social ostracism, 
which can violate or constitute part of the rights violations faced by the anorexic 
body.586  Take for instance William Gull’s views on anorexia as an ‘occurrence with 
no visible cause’ places emphasis on the involuntary nature associated with mental 
disorder especially the generalised presumption that mentally disordered individuals 
lack consciousness and awareness of the disorder and are unable to consent voluntary 
actions. Using Gull’s definition will denote that there is no fundamental meaning to 
the element of physical emaciation, resistance to maintaining an average body weight 
and the intensive pursuit of thinness. It furthers the generalised assertion that the 
anorexic body is severely impaired and such impairment are sufficient to alter a 
person’s better judgment in making treatment decisions. According to Glover-
Thomas, the nature of the psychiatric illness has impaired the way the brain and mind 
function, leaving the sufferer with an exaggeration of her exact body proportion or 
shape.587 This portrayal of having diminished competence weakens the grandstanding 
to assert the right to refuse or accept medical treatment as it ultimately questions ‘the 
ability of the patient to make reasonable decision’. 588  Diminished competence, 
therefore, automatically disqualifies an individual from utilising the information 
presented to them in other to make the best clinical decision. This representation 
depicts the person as non-functional, irrational, devoid of normalcy and, therefore, 																																																								
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unable to fulfil their day-to-day roles.589 To the contrary, overwhelming evidence 
identifies most anorexic individuals as bright, functional and intelligent even at the 
most critical stages of diminished physical or mental state.590 In various instances, the 
anorexic body has proven to be intellectual, rational in understanding, able to retain 
the information presented to them and often very skilled. Charles Scott notes that if an 
individual is deemed incompetent in one area of life does not mean competence is 
lacking in all spheres.591 Scott notes that even if mental disorder is established, that 
does not prove incompetence. Invariably “even a severely mentally ill individual may 
be competent; in so far as the symptoms of their illness do not impact the areas of 
mental functioning required to be competent”.592 Giordano insists that the general 
principle of autonomy under the United Kingdom laws does not support the 
conception of the assumption that the diagnosis of a mental illness in any way equates 
or projects incompetence; however, it should provide the basis to “investigate further 
her capacity to consent”.593 It becomes very problematic to assume that once a person 
is diagnosed with an eating disorder and refuses treatment, she is automatically 
incompetent to make medical decisions. A logical protest reaction will finger the 
eagerness of clinicians to perpetuate the impression of helplessness, vulnerability, and 
incompetence of the anorexic body to further their agency and justify unconsented 
paternalistic intervention. One may assess competence-relative degree of functionality 
regardless of the physical state of emaciation – for instance, holding a job, excelling 
academically, making advanced decisions and plans for the future and most 
importantly the lack of desire or plan to die or inflict self-harm intentionally.  
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One might argue the relevance of conducting the task of understanding and engaging 
the little intricacies of an anorexic body. Why elucidate the little details surrounding 
anorexia? One must understand that there is a wealth of information provided by the 
‘smallest fragments of life and the body’.594 Vintage and modern structuralism allude 
to the notion that greater meaning lies in the connections of the element underneath 
the surface. It is an autonomous system, which reveals the reason behind a person’s 
action, an essence that transcends its appearance. 595  Those little experiences, 
emotions, and feelings exhibited by the anorexic body count towards the bigger 
picture of understanding their values, who they are, why they behave a certain way, 
and, most importantly, the motives behind every action.596 It will become evident 
throughout this work that the author deliberately refrains from referring to a meaning 
centred anorexic body as a patient. The analysis is consistent with the voluntary 
actions of the anorexic body in maintaining a controlled weight without the intention 
of death, suicide or intentional self-harm. For instance, the blurred line between the 
meaning centred anorexia and the patient focused anorexia compounds the debate on 
consent and capacity.  
 
Traditionally, women are more body objectified than the male counterparts. It is well 
documented that the female gender is susceptible to maintaining a thorough caloric 
restrictions, constant exercise and purging. Woodward notes that the size and shape of 
the body have progressively become “a symbol for the emotional, moral or spiritual 
state of the individual”.597 The newfound feminine projection of personal freedom and 																																																								
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public empowerment is, therefore, valued as the result of the nascent connection 
between self-management and thinness.598 Considering that excess body weight has 
become synonymous with lack of strong will and personal inadequacy.599 If therefore 
it is important that the anorexic body involuntarily feeds, is it not as important to 
enforce involuntary mechanisms that can stop an overweight or obese person from 
constant eating? Particularly since most obese individuals do not conform to the 
practice of self-mastery, control and moderation and are susceptible to death or 
permanent impairment. The standard definition of anorexia accepted in medicine, 
psychiatry and law acknowledges the morbid fear of weight gain and restrictive eating 
as essential components of the disorder. However, restrictive eating, exercising and 
various forms of dieting form part of the day-to-day experience of most women in 
today’s modern society. These behavioural patterns are easily identifiable in a 
demography of women conscious and willing to exist in a restrictive body weight. 
Statistics show that most women have a conscious fear of gaining weight and thereby 
devote a considerable amount of time on diets, exercising and particular controlled 
feeding patterns. There are numerous reasons every year for the female body to 
succumb to food restriction. The rest of the female body in today’s modern society 
exists within the personal choices and autonomy constructed with meaning, choice 
and voluntary action. The most common consciousness or voluntary action is often in 
preparation for a memorable day such as birthdays, anniversaries, weddings or the 
millennial well-publicised summer body goals. The common connotation of anorexia 
is reflective and relevant in the choices of these women who exist outside the 
confinement and strict criteria of both medical and psychological disciplines. To 
generalise the definition of anorexia will imply that most women exist with some 																																																								
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form of anorexia, which is not interpreted or recognised within the domains of 
medicine, psychiatry or law. Establishing the characteristics of anorexia, the DSM-IV 
noted that: 
 
“Usually weight loss is accomplished primarily through 
reduction in total food intake. Although individuals may begin 
by excluding from their diet what they perceive to be highly 
caloric foods, most eventually end up with a very restricted diet 
that is sometimes limited to only foods. Additional methods of 
weight loss include purging (i.e., self-induced vomiting or the 
misuse of laxatives or diuretics) and increased or excessive 
exercise.”600 
 
Generally, emaciation is the aftermath of the various processes, which are considered 
anorexic behaviour. Most women in one way or the other go through the course of 
exerting control over their body concerned about weight gain at some point during 
their lifetime. The meaning or reason behind adopting a meaning centred anorexic 
body depends on varying factors which include the individual’s current situation, 
projected future encounters and experiences which supersede traditional conventions.     
A critical analysis of the judgment delivered by Mrs Justice King in NHS Foundation 
Trust v L implied that L a 29-year old woman exhibited traits of a meaning-centred 
anorexic body having not given the courts any cause to doubt her desire to continue to 
live and has progressively continued to make plans towards her future.601 Bridget 
Dolan who represented the NHS Trust noted that despite the premonitions and 																																																								
600 DSM –IV, op. cit. 
601 NHS Trust v L [2012] EWHC 2741 (COP). 
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labelling of L as ready to die, she has continued to live a balanced, controlled life in a 
lower weight.602 It has also become evident that L can function within a cognitive 
state of dignity and autonomy without the reinforcements of clinical interference as 
such reasonable steps must, therefore, be taken to gain voluntary cooperation without 
force.  It is clear that L’s decision to remain at that weight is more significant in ways 
that exclude suicide and death. Otherwise, clinical adherence to continuously pursue 
the involuntary treatment route, motivated by the need to keep the person alive, will 
remain relevant and capacity to refuse treatment will continue to be prejudiced. The 
distinctive feature of the meaning centred anorexic body expresses autonomy within 
an individualised conception of purpose, morals, values and experience, in addition to 
admitting and proving that there is no intention to starve to death or commit suicide. 
In direct contrast to the position in X vs. NHS, X attempted suicide multiple times and 
exhibited no desire to continue to live.603 The non-meaning centred anorexic body 
engages in dieting and body weight management with no clear, precise meaning or 
concept to their self-starvation. The meaning centred anorexic body is subjectively 
dissimilar; their standard pattern addresses an individualised norm, symbolic to self, 
culture, morals and experience.604 
 
It is therefore impossible to deny that a particular demography of anorexics are not 
only preoccupied with the mere physical aesthetics of thinness and physical 
emaciation without recognising the cognitive purpose or value. The severity of the 
consequences of food refusal in cases such as NHS Trust v X and A Local Authority v 
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E605 are the extreme outcomes for patient centred anorexia. For instance, in NHS Trust 
v X, the physical symptoms that developed alongside X’s anorexia were critical. X 
suffered from acute renal failure, liver failure (relating to alcohol abuse), multiple 
organ failures (which made her unconscious), jaundice, abnormal clotting of blood, 
encephalopathy, and variceal haemorrhage606. In addition, in A Local Authority v E,607 
the anorexic patient developed an impaired liver, a compromised bone marrow that 
drastically reduced her resistance to infection, aspiration pneumonia, tuberculosis, and 
muscle/renal malfunction due to end-stage organ damage.608 These biological and 
physical outcomes are not comprehensive reflection of the experiences of the average 
patient centred anorexia. The professional obligation of clinicians means they cannot 
ignore the presence of critical physical symptoms that develop alongside a patient’s 
illness. It is, therefore, understandable as to why medical professionals are more 
concerned about dealing with the physical consequences of starvation, which are 
severe, rather than focusing on the patient’s rights or choices. Although anorexia can 
be chronic and threatening for some; however, some can live day-to-day without 
experiencing the life shortening severity of the illness.609 The one glove fits all 
treatment approach employed by clinicians is, therefore, problematic, especially as the 
disorder is such that every individual’s experience is different, and so is the outcome. 
To be misguided in the interpretation and understanding of the illness will only 
enhance the psychiatric agenda of continuous implementation of involuntary and 
unconsented procedures. Clinicians are inclined to believe that treating the underlying 
cause of the anorexia (which, in this case, can involve multiple reasons) will relieve 
the physical conditions developed, however arriving at a balanced treatment option 																																																								
605 A Local Authority v E, [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP) WL 
606 NHS  Trust v Ms X [2014] EWCOP 35. para .23. 
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608 Supra. 
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that incorporates the choices and values of the individual have proven problematic.610  
 
As expected, the experiences of one anorexic body are very different from the other. 
Clinicians are yet to implement a flexible framework angled towards projecting an 
individualised view of the experience. Ideally, individualised variations to an illness 
are most likely not up for further consideration. Logically, clinicians are trained to 
accurately identify traits of an illness and broadly classify them into very specific 
categories. However, this approach consistently fails to cater for the multiple facets 
not recognised or accounted for by clinicians. Considering the complexity and 
multifaceted nature of anorexia, it is not far-fetched to raise very poignant 
deliberation on deconstructing the meaning-centred anorexic body as a ‘distinct 
entity’,611 excluded from the general Mental Health Act ceremonious classification of 
mental disorders. Legitimate consolidation comes from the absence of scientific proof 
of the presence of an underlying biological abnormality in the brain as recorded in 
other types of mental illness. There is also the scientific understanding, which reveals 
that anorexia nervosa has no similarity with extreme psychiatric conditions, such as 
schizophrenia, characterised by psychotic disturbances such as hallucinations and 
delusions.612  
 
Brunch notes that individuals have demonstrated several variations of self-  control by 
food restriction over centuries. The most prominent are religious traditions that equate 
self-starvation as symbolising the cleansing of the body and mind from worldly 
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desires.613 Bordo considered self-starvation was a significant aspect of the Christian 
faith in the middle ages. The ritual of fasting primarily emphasises renouncing the 
demands of the flesh (physical body) whilst offering spiritual cleansing to select elites 
and aristocrats considered privileged of such spiritual distinction. Variations of diet 
was seen as an instrument of self-development and uplifting of the inside being in 
other to achieve excellence.614 There are also biblical references to self-starvation as a 
means to atone for sins or receive a fulfilment of a promise or blessing from God. 
When faced with adversity, Queen Esther commanded her uncle Mordecai and his 
fellow Jews to deprive themselves of food and drink for three days and three nights.615 
For Queen Esther, self-starvation was not only an expression of selfhood but also a 
religious symbol of courage, strength, and determination before approaching King 
Ahasuerus to demand redemption and pardon for her people.616 Shared interests of 
body feminists over the years have broadened to explore body image and self-
starvation outside confined disciplines generating critical dialogues on the conception 
of the feminine body as a cultural and political model.617 Bordo regarded the feminine 
body as the slender body, “it is what we eat, how we dress, the daily ritual through 
which we attend to the body is a medium of culture”.618 Empirical researchers rely on 
outcomes based on case studies involving young women and female children, thus 
allowing access at first hand to feminists to pursue theories that link the role of the 
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female gender and the relationship in triggering eating disorders.619 The acceptance of 
the thin body in this millennium is a significant contrast and departure from the 
Victorian era trend, which embraced curvy women. The typical Victorian female was 
ostentatiously unapologetic of the aesthetical body ideals they embraced. Redefining 
the body anatomy through self-motivation and control became a symbolic self-
accomplishment. It becomes gradually apparent that the body cannot be controlled 
and directed in ways unconsented to by the host. The increasing number of 
individuals who adapt to this slender, thin and willowy aesthetics stimulates a 
broadened understanding and interpretation through in-depth analysis.620 A study at 
the Cornell Medical College, New York, on eating disturbance in Eastern and 
Western societies showed a cultural pattern of food starvation as a tool for 
“negotiating the transition, disconnection, and oppression that they uniformly 
endure.”621 Katzman and Lee share the perspective that sole focus on body image and 
starvation will only bypass the superior acknowledgement surrounding the 
conceptualised structure of the anorexic body. 622  There is no true portrait 
representative of the meaning-centred anorexic body experience. To secure an ideal 
portrait in understanding self-starvation will identify a confined intersection between 
extended frames in disciplines amongst other factors, which recognises a person’s 
consistent attempt to defend and affirm personal control.623 A broader individualised 
intersection of their values and immediate choices are conceptually analysed within 
societal contexts. These cross sections of multifactorial experiences or occurrences 
vary from isolated food restriction, distinctive weight calculation, and desperation to 
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stay within a controlled scale size.624 The meaning-centred ideals transcend cultural 
metaphors directly manifested through self-starvation. These experiences reflect the 
free will, values and choices of the individual in restraining the body without undue 
influence or coercion. The quest for body perfection becomes symbolic with being in 
control. It is not a mere strategic uncontrolled expression reoccurring intermittently. 
Appropriate representations will require believing in the attitude of worth and 
integrity a person accepts and in many ways the body is a temple, a place of self-
worship and service. Voluntary starvation enables conscious gratification and 
satisfaction in the feeling of hunger, an achievement equated to making a critical 
statement reinforcing the underlying connotation to food refusal. The resistance of the 
normalised body weight, therefore, becomes a mantle of self-conservancy and 
protection. In that sense, there is an overwhelming empowerment in having that type 
of control and expressing autonomy with no inhibitions.625 
 
Writers such as Susan Bordo626 and MacSween627 both referenced the ‘anorexic body’ 
as a cohesive concept, a strategic expression of a reoccurring will to resist 
normalisation. As prior stated, there is a more in-depth significance and connotation 
to the ‘anorexic body’ than just the generic reference to a low body weight or BMI. 
Anti-normalisation and Western liberation advocates engaged the anorexic body not 
just because of an anomaly in the brain but also as an independent non-conformist 
cultural force. The meaning-centred anorexic body is symbolic in ways that 
transcends bodily perfection, and withholding food serves as a means of controlling 
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and exercising authority, moral, or otherwise on the way her body shapes, forms, and 
develops in today’s society. The symbolism of the values and pattern of behaviours 
exhibited by the anorexic body is often lost or downgraded by psychiatrists, clinicians 
and mental health professionals. It is practical to recognise that basic care and 
treatment of anorexic nervosa in general is problematic on the surface level and a very 
complex issue in theory regardless of the variations they exist. A functional structure 
that places the rights and freedom of the anorexic body at the centre of its decision-
making is unexplored in regards to the complications and illogicality associated with 
involuntary treatments necessitates better protection and safeguards of their rights. 
The focus is on the impact of autonomous actions and how to effectively interpret 
legal concepts within meaning in the way that brings resolution to the way law and 
medicine respond to the individual diagnosed with anorexia.628 Keywood therefore 
notes that reconstructing anorexia will first involve dissecting the rather uneasy 
engagement or relationship between the mode of application and interpretation of the 
legal standpoint in medical or psychiatric conditions.629 Attention is therefore drawn 
to the “somewhat crude, biomedical explanation of the condition” with no 
consideration to the complex nature of the “condition and the range of disagreements 
over its appropriate treatment and other issues of such as mental incapacity and “ 
endorsement of legal compulsion by means of involuntary medical treatment and 
detention”.630 Justifiably before autonomous and right-based perspective to anorexia 
can be established, there is need to destruct the legal landscapes surrounding the 
interaction of law and medicine.631 The projected rights-based approach will present 
greater freedom and autonomy for individuals to make critical treatment decisions 																																																								
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concerning their bodies. It is, therefore, not extraordinary for one to advocate for a 
consideration and balance that respects choices, and upholds individual rights to 
autonomy. The challenge here is not to obliquely create an analogy of the meaning-
centred anorexic body as an overzealous, rebellious being in a frantic quest for self-
rule. The conception of the meaning-centred anorexic body is very personal and 
private to the individual. It is, by all means, a personal statement to self against 
interference and subjectivity. Their individualities are evident particularly in the way 
they function efficiently in contrast to the bulk of other mentally ill patients. The 
meaning-centred anorexic body is competent, can lead productive lives and most 
significantly, voluntarily and consciously consents to self-starvation with absolute 
determination to stay alive. These enumerated meaning-centred characteristics are 
adversative to the core features and functionality of mental disorder. Critical 
consideration should be given reasoning behind the development of the anorexic body 
with the aim of attaining a better perspective. Accordingly, uncovering the cause 
behind a conception plays a very significant part in understanding the dynamics of 
this enigmatic disorder. Such deliberation might seem mundane at first, but prior 
activities in the field reveal an outcome that might provide answers and clarity to 
legitimate questions without conforming to the obvious societal or psychiatric 
modality. Section 1.3 therefore draws attention to an in-depth understanding of the 
conceptual construction of the meaning-centred anorexic body through further 
analysis of contemporary themes linked to culture, media and feminism. 
 
 4.1.1 Constructing the Meaning-Centred Anorexic Body Ideal 
 
The reoccurring obsession of the contemporary western society focuses on the ideals 
and metamorphosis of the physical human body. Presumably, the way people eat 
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(feeding pattern), semi-eat, or just succumb to various forms of starvation or food 
deprival has become one of the uppermost interests of today’s society. Emphases are 
towards the changes the human body undergoes over time, from weight gain to 
weight loss, overweight to thinness and vice versa. The National Health Service 
(NHS) explained that anorexia nervosa is not triggered by a particular cause, rather it 
is because of a complex mixture of psychological, environmental and biological 
factors.632  Many clinicians working in the field agree with this assertion. However, 
numerous sources have provided multiple dimensions behind the core construction of 
the anorexic body with predominant texts alluding to media and cultural influences. 
Establishing contextual influences in the development of the anorexic body unmasks 
the systematic and organised process from which the body voluntarily migrates from 
the natural state to a concept. The implication is that only a voluntary and conscious 
body can be influenced to adopt a subjective construction of the body preferred. One 
will be reluctant to accept that individuals who understand, examine, engage and 
internalise thin body ideals are doing so involuntarily. The process of planning, 
studying and adapting will require a certain amount of voluntary action, skill and 
capability. 
 
The complexity of the anorexic body makes it problematic and complicated to paint a 
universal picture.633 It is nevertheless apparent that the changing patterns, shapes, and 
physicality of people are at the centre of social scrutiny, criticism, and intense media 
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glare.634 Bruch’s theory expresses that the anorexic woman is influenced by the 
widespread pressure and scrutiny imposed on them to stay thin.635 The technological 
advancement in this millennial age has created powerful media platforms utilised as 
tools to market extreme fitness cultures. Goodyear rightly notes that “this is truly the 
age of social media”.636 A handful of studies have shown that the combined impact of 
social media force (Twitter, Instagram, Facebook) has a significant implication on the 
self-image of the body. According to Perloff: 
 
“Social media are filled with pictures of an individual, her 
online friends, and multitudes of thin-idealised images that an 
adolescent girl or young woman may have located and pinned 
to a page. Social networking sites are available for viewing, 
content-creating and editing 24/7, on mobile devices, 
anywhere, anytime, allowing for exponentially more 
opportunities for social comparison and dysfunctional 
surveillance of pictures of disliked body parts than were 
available with the conventional mass media.”637 
 
																																																								
634 Michael P. Levine and Sarah K.  Murnen, ‘Everybody Knows that Mass Media Are/Are Not [pick 
one] A Cause of Eating Disorders: A Critical Review of Evidence for a Causal Link Between Media, 
Negative Body Image, and Disordered Eating in Females’ (2009) 28(1) Journal of Social and Clinical 
Psychology. 
635 Brunch, op. cit., pp. 98–69. 
636  S. Goodyear, “The Power of Social Media” (2004) available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/samantha-goodyear/the-power-of-social-media_3_b_5161138.html  
(accessed 5th December 2018). 
637 R. M. Perloff, ‘Social Media Effects on Young Women’s Body Image Concerns: Theoretical 
Perspectives and an Agenda for Research’ (2014) available at 
https://is.muni.cz/el/1423/podzim2014/PSY221P121/um/Perloff2014.SocialMediaEffectsBodyImage.B
ID.pdf  [accessed 8th October 2018]. 
	 169	
Most recently, the ‘fit fam’ trend across social media platforms encouraged self- 
imposed ‘obsessive exercise and diet habits’.638 This cult movement embraces the 
principles of ‘fat freedom’ supporting fat controlled regimes as a long-term lifestyle 
choice.639 The link between the body, media influence, and eating disorders has 
therefore taken centre stage in subjective and fiery debates in the fields of 
psychology, medicine, and social-cultural studies.  In most scenarios, criticisms target 
the widespread media portrayal of what is acceptable or normal. The skeletal being 
becomes representative of the ideal body image as spread across magazines, 
televisions, and billboards.640 Suggestions for social comparison research indicate that 
sustainability of what the media presents to consumers offers no viability for optional 
downward comparison. The obvious thing is to compare oneself against unrealistic 
body shapes.641 The intensely and compelling anti-normalised body initiates the first 
response to societal and media standards. With every depiction of what perfection 
represents, there is a draw to undertake extreme forms of food restriction and 
avoiding further calorific intake.642 Achieving these body image goals would involve 
a voluntary action of control manifested through a lifetime of dieting and embarking 
on extreme weight loss regimes and food deprivation.643  
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Unsurprisingly, there is no data on the exact moment the patient-centred anorexic 
body is triggered. The lack of traceable period supports the narrative that mental 
disorders are involuntary and can occur without any rational and logical cause. This 
notion aligns with the way treatment professionals approach treatment and care 
mechanically without due consideration of the narrative behind the anorexic body. It 
is logical that certain environmental and social factors can command a degree of 
influence on how an individual engages and responds to what they believe and 
consider ideal. The medical model does not engage or explore this line of thought. 
Documented research outcomes primarily point to societal pressure and the influence 
of mass media as the significant stimulant to the development of anorexia. For 
instance, Brunch notes that the primary cause of anorexia in women is wide spread 
pressure and scrutiny imposed on them to stay thin.644 There is also the contributed 
factor of aspiring to fit into the societal standard of beauty and perfection, which 
serves as a powerful propeller for the anorexic body to explore a particular voluntary 
pattern. To such individuals, achieving the self-serving body image would involve a 
period of dieting and extreme weight loss regimes and food deprivation.645 Treasure 
also attributed the cultural phenomenon of size zero, which has become an acceptable 
trend in modern society, as a powerful trigger among young women especially and 
adults who aspire to emulate the media and societal standard of beauty.646 Despite 
widespread social and environmental influences, it is also a matter of choice to pursue 
the ideal to fit into the size zero profile. Since food deprivation is a voluntary action in 
the intensive pursuit of thinness, the period for conceptualisation and implementation 
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is traceable and therefore can be documented. What is significant in the present to 
Treasure and similar writers is the overwhelming implication placed on societal 
pressure and scrutiny of the human body. 647  In the face of competing claims 
surrounding the same issue, for the anorexic body to conform to this societal 
expectation and existence would require a voluntary action and determination to self-
starve or restrict food intake.648  
 
Until most recently, making connections between altered image advertisements, for 
instance, and the development of eating disorder are usually secluded from public 
discourse and restricted to the private domains.649  Making the connection between 
the cause and reasoning will demystify the paranormal notions associated with mental 
disorders.  Regardless, more studies show that the continuous media projection of 
unattainable body perfection aesthetics while consciously concealing the use of digital 
alterations, such as Photoshop and retouching, lead to negative perception of one’s 
body and amplifies the need to create a perfect body. Hesse-Biber suggests that 
women are more susceptible to learning from media outlets that promote a less than 
ideal body weight, rather than from outlets that promote a positive body image.650  
Extreme dieting and exercise to achieve the idolised thin body projected by media 
becomes synonymous with identity and body image.651 It is safe to assume in that 
scenario that the make-believe world created by the media is misrepresented as real, 
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thereby raising negative body image.652 According to Bordo, eating disorders were 
unheard of in countries such as China, South Korea, and Japan before Western 
influence. Fiji Island also had no record of eating disorder prior to accessing 
television in 1995. 653  Through the continuous projection of unattainable body 
perfection aesthetics, there is also a consciousness in concealing the use of digital 
alterations such as Photoshop and retouching. The unattainability of the perfect body, 
combined with the negative perception of one’s body, amplifies body 
consciousness.654 A report published in experimental study amongst 123 female 
college youths overwhelmingly indicated that media exposure had a dominant effect 
on body image. Media promotion of ‘unrealistic thin ideals are associated with 
detrimental effects on women and girls’ moods, body image, and eating pattern’.655 
Most surprising, Alexandra Shulman, former editor in chief of the UK’s most iconic 
fashion bible, British Vogue, disagree. According to ITV lunchtime news, Shulman 
stated that it was unfair to allude to the media culture in promoting size zero models 
as instrumental to the development of eating disorders or body image issues. For her, 
internalising those ideals depicted in the magazine was a result of other underlying 
issues outside the influence of mass media. Disagreeing with Shulman, Grabe insists 
that there is a demonstrated link between internalising these projected standards 
popularised by the media with both physical and mental illness issues relating to 
developing various forms of eating disorder.656 Hildesheimer and Gur-Arie accuse the 
modelling industry as the overriding factor in developing various forms of eating 																																																								
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disorder through the constant media publicity of photo-shopped images and false 
advertising of ultra-thin models.657 It therefore, seems that largely, the anorexic body 
is susceptible to the manifestation of the pressures of modern life and society. 658  
 
According to Lopez-Guimera, the “mass media are an extremely important source, if 
not the principal source”659 of thin body internalisation. Evidence shows that young 
girls familiarised with magazines that promote appearance-based beauty ideals show 
the ultimate body discontent.660 In many instances, evidence demonstrates that the 
exposure level to internalising the thin body ideal can and has triggered disordered 
eating, body dissatisfaction, and displeasure.661  Similarly, there is also a link between 
idolisation and attraction to thin media personalities and eating disorder.662 Actually, 
the postmodern body is increasingly nurtured on fantasies of rearranging, 
transforming, and correcting limitless improvement and change, defying the very 
historical antecedents. Take, for instance, the historic switch from the curvy woman to 
the thin woman idolisation in Nigeria, a country notorious for the appreciation of a 
‘well rounded’, curvy woman. The author has been told that she was too skinny to 
make an honest woman for an African man. Then the 2003 media frenzy when the 
thinnest woman ever to grace the world stage took home the most coveted Miss 
World title.663 Agbani Derego, a Nigerian, was the opposite of the body norm 
celebrated by Africans. Following Agbani’s win, Nigeria’s Oluchi became the biggest 																																																								
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model export from Africa to grace the world stage after winning the M-net Face of 
Africa competition.664 Like Agbani, Oluchi, a size zero, represented the thin body 
ideal. The new wave of media frenzy ushered in the new standard of beauty. The 
‘Lepa’665  thin woman status took centre stage,666  dethroning the old ‘orobo’667 
standard of beauty.  Although Nigerians previously opposed to the post-modern thin 
woman accepted the modern ascetic body ideal, it became apparent that the new 
culture has also furthered social division. The consequences were a wave of 
genetically endowed women struggling to fit into media and societal interpretation of 
body perfection. To construct the thin body would involve a conscious system of 
extreme dieting, excessive exercise, and starvation, which is an established outcome 
of the thin ideal internalisation.668 
 
Another dimension exposes that the media parade of skinny models will continuously 
have a tremendous impact on the body image of the consumer.669 It is, therefore, 
impossible to argue with the reasoning that suggests the contrary as portrayed by 
British Vogue Editor, Shulman. Murray suggests the importance of treatment 
programs for managing and treating eating disorders to confront and tackle head-on 
the media presentation of body image and ideals.670 The attitudes of the media 
prognostications of the thin body ideals are so compelling and forceful that there is a 
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clear, definitive message and dissemination of information.671 The nature of anorexia 
exposes the depth of the individual’s positive or negative feelings, convictions, and 
behavioural responses.672 For an anorexic body, there is a consensus of equating self-
starvation (physicality and appearance of thinness) with identity, self-worth, and body 
integrity.  The concept of the ‘anorexic body’ is an individualistic self-statement 
against interference and body subjectivity and a direct reaction to a person’s personal 
or social movement.673 Individualised actions would, therefore, align with resistance 
to the oppression of the normalised body image in the quest to self-determine.674 The 
ascetic body therefore transcends mere cultural metaphors and manifests through self-
starvation and extreme dieting.675 The challenge here is to avoid creating an analogy 
of the anorexic body as riveting in this quest to self-rule at all cost. Although, this 
might be the only choice left for the meaning-centred anorexia bodies subjected to 
involuntary treatments.   
 
Analysing the anorexic body in the context of protection, dignity, bodily integrity, 
rights, and freedoms is complicated and challenging. Ordinarily, everyone should 
possess the right to take control of the choices regarding their body, wellbeing, and 
means of reproductions ‘without fear, coercion, violence and discrimination’.676 
Ideally, incorporating certain aspects of that, a person's values and choices are 
fundamental to rights protection and should not be relegated to the background. 
MacSween asserts that at the core of self-rule is a dimension within the social context 
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in which an anorexic body can exhibit meaningful existential strategy resurrecting a 
new wave of female aspiration to patriarchal individualism.677 For Orbach, research 
has shown that food refusal is a symbolic attempt to self-assert. She explains that a 
woman’s body is the place where she objects or protests a wrong.678 In a Local 
Authority v E, E, had a relative awareness of exceptionally happy childhood, with 
parents and siblings who loved and supported her. At the tender ages of eleven and 
fourteen, E experienced the worst type of sexual abuse.679 Victims of sexual assault 
often establish that there is the element of violation not just of the body but the mind, 
soul and essence of being. Distinctive traits also reveal that the variable patterns 
adopted by the perpetrators effectively lack consent, deprivation of freedom and 
disregard for the individual’s choice. The sexual assault triggered a sense of deprived 
control of her body occasioning self-starvation and food refusal as a mechanism to 
reclaim the body. E's body invariably becomes the ground where the battle for control 
is fought and maintained. 
 
The rise of the liberal feminist movement in the 1970s played a dominant role in 
advancing female identification with the body. The move engineered the notion that 
the critical analysis and understanding of the intricacies of gender will reveal 
repressed aspects of culture and history.680 Before this, issues associated with the 
body were downplayed, ‘considered too vulgar trivial or risqué to merit serious 
scholarly attention’. 681  In every sense, anorexia nervosa reflects the female 
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experiences in a gender conformist society dominated by the physicality of the 
institutions that influence it rather than mentally driven. Female bodies show more 
obvious traits to influence and control. There is a constant awareness on every corner 
mainly targeted at female consumers. Historically, there have been gender-specific 
oppressions in all facets of life. For decades, women have fought hard to overcome 
inequality, sexism, and gender-based repression. Women empowerment movement 
initiatives often focus on furthering the female agenda regarding empowerment and 
social acceptance. The need to be independent and autonomous in managing their 
affairs has always been an essential part of that movement. Despite the common 
emphasis on conformity to assigned roles and functions in the home or society, the 
broader modern woman is emerging from obscurity to assert her independence in 
ways outside the traditionally accepted framework. For instance, the memoirs of 
African women account for cultural relegation to the backgrounds as cooks, home 
keepers, and child bearers. Their physical body, reproductive organs, and mental 
health are dominated by the male influence discarding their values, wishes, and 
aspirations. In that society, tradition demands the female fulfil and adhere to those 
roles for the continuous protection of the cultures of their forefathers, which 
ultimately furthers the ‘supremacy of men’.682 The female body parts become a 
mutually exclusive mechanism for labour—the hands to pound cocoyam, the breasts 
to feed the child, the womb to carry the foetus, and the vagina as a device of birth and 
pleasure. These roles and functions are created and imposed by existence as the 
female gender. Overpowered, they retreat in silence and intimidation. Foucault 
however focused on the positive nature of power, disagreeing with the notion that 
men are capable of holding power over women. To Foucault, people can only exercise 																																																								
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a degree of power and expressions of male oppression should only be recognised in a 
wider context rather than tailored to a specific group. Foucault’s view fails to offer 
answers to the oppressive elements in the experiences of women.683 According to 
Ramazanoglu:  
 
Knowledge of domestic violence cannot then be produced 
without taking account of women’s experience, but such 
knowledge is not confined to that experience, it is 
simultaneously always embodied and 
conceptualized…feminists need to go beyond Foucault’s 
analysis of power, by hanging on the radical feminism’s sense 
of moral outrage while modifying this with the recognition of 
the diversity of women’s condition in life.684 
 
The effects and influence of male dominance of the female body has been a constant 
feature on the templates of gender-based issues. Many feminists are beginning to 
expand on the connection between the female negative experiences and understanding 
power in relation to men and vice versa. Feminist constructions will draw on the 
overwhelming presence of male dominance and sexual oppression of women as tied 
in with their body experiences and attitudes. It symbolises a revolution against the 
customary norm whereby men in the traditional society shape women’s perception of 
their body. Foucault’s theories have not often thrived within the radical feminist 
movements. Nevertheless, it possesses key beneficial components in incorporating 																																																								
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gender, sex, and bodies as a social construction. The body has exceeded pure 
biological entity and every attribute it undergoes as a medium of social control sums 
up its experience. These accounts of women’s experience can be dysfunctional or 
functional, negative-positive but also unique to each person. Engaging in a social 
construction, highlighting the struggle around women bodies and sexuality devoid of 
Foucault’s masculinity driven agenda is a discourse not readily dismissed. Value is 
placed on unseating a cultural phenomenon as vehicle of social change and the 
ultimate response to the predicaments of self-rule.685 Establishing this connection is 
essential to ‘preserving some understanding of the women’s agency and possibilities 
of empowerment.’686  
 
Fallon insists that the emaciated thin body is a form of escapism from the typical 
portrayal of a woman as a sexual object and their quest to return to their child-like 
state.687 Crisp also considers this child-like body reversion as a form of expression of 
freedom and control on the body.688 Accordingly, feminine individuality can only be 
attained through the resistance of weight gain by embracing the freedom of regressing 
back to a child-like development state to avoid the overwhelming prospects of 
embracing sexuality.689 Avoiding engaging in sexuality or sexual behaviours can then 
be valued as an appropriate response against male dominance of the female body and 
the way they view the body as an object for exploration and, in some cases, 
exploitation.  On this account, desexualising the body in a way that prevents the 
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further development of the rather attractive parts of the body adds a blanket of 
protection and control. Suggestions about the link between anorexia nervosa and the 
response to the crises about autonomy and independence in women have become 
dominant. This crisis can occur at any stage of a person’s celebration of self-
determination690 struggle for independence and assertion of the right to make their 
own decisions. For an anorexic woman, her body is the ground where her protest 
occurs and where she battles against control and domination.691 There is always a 
paradigm shift from just a desire to stay thin to also a desire to be in control and exert 
influence on her body. It is the thought of losing that right to self-rule or 
independence that creates the need to maintain a low body weight or BMI.  
 
For MacSween, 692  delegating power to medical practitioners over women with 
anorexia is counter-productive and denotes a form of feminist oppression.693 One 
must also note that the clinical pressure placed on an anorexic woman to put on 
weight and, in essence, ‘recover’, offers little or no relief for the anorexic and the 
medical practitioner. L v NHS694 demonstrated that, despite evidence that it was 
impossible to extend L's life by involuntary artificial nutrition. 695 Treatment 
professionals continued to subject L to the best medical care by experts in the field. 
L’s weight continued to decrease drastically. There was no surprise when treatment 
professionals tentatively arrived at the opinion that involuntarily treating L by force-
feeding would have little or no impact on her recovery or life preservation.696  In most 
cases of anorexia, enforcing further compulsory treatment would only reinforce her 																																																								
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disability and worsen her eating disorder.697 Then again, the clinical justification for 
involuntary treatment of anorexia nervosa fails to consider the aftereffect of their 
action including the positive and negative experiences. Contrary to psychiatric and 
medical assertions, immense amounts of third party pressure and scrutiny do not 
favour the individual and are often detrimental to the long-term recovery process. For 
Giordano, there exists no evidence to show that involuntary hospitalisation for the 
treatment of the mental disorder of anorexia patients leads to long-term recovery.698 
Clinicians involved in treating and managing the anorexic body often struggle to 
accept the above, although overwhelming treatment outcomes reveal relapse 
immediately after release from unconsented treatment. 
 
Every crystallised layer of anorexia nervosa provokes a debate at some level. 
Contextualising post-modern theories provide a better understanding of the many 
significant layers that contribute to the uniqueness of the anorexic body. The woman’s 
paramount interest is in taking control of her body as a way of self-expression, 
especially when she feels vulnerable and defenceless.699 To stay in control means 
resorting to strict dieting, calorie counting, excessive exercising, missing meals 
(fasting), conscious and deliberate starvation, and taking appetite suppressants and 
slimming pills. Feminist contribution to understanding eating disorder, in general, has 
somewhat challenged the standardised medical model.700 Food refusal has become an 
essential part in creating a new person separate from herself. A woman trying to assert 
her position in this world will first attempt to kerb the emotional aspects of her being. 
The discipline accompanying food refusal is therefore an essential part of her journey 																																																								
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to draw a line between her needs and self.701  Orbach therefore asserts that the daily 
routine of the anorexic is fundamental to fulfilling her wishes and needs and 
significantly includes controlling their wishes and desires by muting the existence of 
other bodily demands, which do cater to the fulfilment of their goals. Invariably, 
“demanding a super human submission to the denial provides a self-contained and 
reliable way of being”.702 
 
Within the feminist narrative, the female anorexic body has gradually progressed to a 
stage of acknowledgement as more than a mere biological essentialism to be 
profoundly recognised as a symbolic representation of ‘the enactment of women’s 
struggles for independence’ 703  and female emancipation. The unflattering and 
incorrect portrayal of the anorexic body in academia and popular culture as 
unsuccessful and disingenuous solidifies the stereotypes and progresses the 
continuous stifling and suppression of her voice, opinions, thoughts, reasons, and 
motive.704 Rethinking the way we view eating disorders can spearhead an acceptance 
of its background within ancient moral values, which has now become an integral part 
of the ordinary morality in western societies. In light of this logical moral sequence, 
re-thinking the understanding of eating disorders, such as anorexia, will realign 
autonomous arguments and adjust the prima facie behaviour of clinicians towards 
anorexic patients.705 The limitations of the medical model can be micro-managed 
within a framework that is devoid of the body politic and tolerant of the cultural 
metaphors of self-determination, will, and autonomy. Joana Whiteman explains that 
																																																								
701 Orbach, op. cit., p.xvii. 
702 Ibid.  
703 Stephanie H. Grey, ‘A Perfect Loathing: The Feminist Expulsion of the Eating Disorder’ (2011) 7(2) 
The Journal of Kenneth Burke Society p. 63. 
704 Grey, op. cit. 
705 Gordano, op. cit., pp. 254–257. 
	 183	
cases, such as Re E,706 are a reflection of the struggle to balance safeguarding best 
interest through the preservation of life while also respecting individual freedom and 
autonomy to make decisions. 707  Most anorexia nervosa case law reveal strong 
indication that when courts are faced with the complexities of anorexia, the courts are 
predisposed to take the side of preserving life. There would always be a struggle 
between respecting the liberty, ideals, and best wishes of the anorexic body, 
especially if those choices do not aid the clinical driven ‘recovery’ in any way. In this 
regard, the question of what is in the  best interest of the anorexic body would salways 
emerge. Should the best interests of the anorexic body not include their choices, 
consented decisions, values, morals, and expectations?  
 
There is a process for engaging in in-depth fact finding which reflects the diverse 
perspective and experience of the individual whilst incorporating the community of 
relationships including family members and friends. Ensuring personal responsibility 
and transparency will eliminate the friction of forcing the person to partake in actions 
against their wishes, embracing their unbiased values and promoting personal 
autonomy.  According to Matusek and Wright, an integrative, collaborative and 
culturally sensitive approach may include accepting the person’s decision to exist in 
her ideal body weight.708 Regardless of the diminishing BMI level, consideration is 
given to extending care and treatment within the comfort of their homes rather than 
being detained in a hospital against their will.709 There are also situations that may 
warrant inclusive negotiation to arrive at a decision on the quantity of food, which the 
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anorexic body feels comfortable to consume within a given period. Regardless of the 
approach involved in assessing, treating and managing the body, current trend shows 
that it is important that future complications are mitigated.  Creating meaning-centred 
anorexic body preserves the individual’s voluntary and autonomous actions in their 
best interest. 
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                                                   CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
Cross Cultural Dimensions in Nigeria 
5.  
 
Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4 examines the core themes in redefining anorexia nervosa as not 
exclusively a mental illness and by identifying individualised contemporary socio-
cultural factors and values. There is therefore, multi-layered contributing factors not 
accounted for by solely adopting a medical or psychiatric narrative. The previous 
chapters examined the meaning centred anorexic body within a rational, voluntary 
and logical narrative freestanding of psychiatric modalities.  The previous chapters 
therefore provide the theoretical context to the fundamental aspects of this thesis and 
provided the background for the empirical study in this chapter. The first part of this 
chapter briefly offers an overview of a cross-cultural dimension of Anorexia as a non-
western bound syndrome. Across non-western patterns there is a masked history of 
self -starvation and extreme thinness embedded in experiences that results to 
individuals challenging and resisting the socio-cultural and political bodily 
oppression. The empirical study in this chapter will explore themes of self-
determination, autonomy and bodily integrity by examining the underlying meaning 
of thinness as a result of self starvation in a none western culture. Nigeria has no 
institutionalised mental health law or practice, which further the narrative of anorexia 
as solely a psychiatric condition. Individuals who exist with the anorexic body 
spectrum (BMI – under 17) do so willingly, voluntarily and within meaning.  Nigeria 
therefore possesses a unique system and structure, which allows unbiased empirical 
investigation about likely behavioural patterns and categories in analysing anorexia as 
a non-western bound syndrome.  
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5.1 Background of Study  
 
Anorexia nervosa is a mental health condition and overtime has gained wide attention 
within medical circles around the world. However, regardless of its new status and the 
attention given to it in the developed world, this condition and other eating disorders 
have not attained the same status outside the western world. Similar to other 
developing countries, Nigeria presents a unique environment to explore the cross-
cultural themes in the discourse. Clark suggests it is “reasonable to look for helpful 
analogies in alien culture of present.”710 The narrative of anorexic nervosa and other 
eating disorders as a complex medical and psychiatric illness is rarely acknowledged 
in Nigeria hence very few medical professionals in Nigeria have carried out studies 
into the conditions. Hoeken, et al note that very few cases of eating disorders were 
found however, anorexia nervosa have not been reported in literature.711 These 
researchers examined literature on the epidemiology of eating disorders in the African 
continent using the DSM-IV criteria and found that none of the 1476 cases of young 
females that they studied showed the condition.712 The result of the study concluded 
that epidemiological studies of eating disorders in Africa are still in its infancy. 
However, Unuhu, et al observed from their research that few cases of the condition 
have been reported in Africa.713 They noted that four (4) cases were reported in 
Nigeria and one (1) in Zimbabwe. Their result led them to suggest that anorexia 
nervosa may not be uncommon in Africa as previously assumed and stressed that 																																																								
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these calls for concern and a need to pay more attention to the condition.714 
Understandably, the low number of anorexics found in the African female population 
is not surprising and may be connected with the African conception of beauty.  
 
It is long established that eating disorders are grounded in western cultural models of 
feminine beauty.715  In the first instance, the standard practice of medicine regarding 
mental illness focuses on the way the individual presents their views about themselves 
and the external world.716 These perceptions often differ from the standard norms as 
judged by a third party observer. The observer in turn makes a judgement decision on 
the mental state of the individual through a direct analysis of whether their values and 
beliefs is in conformity with the external views of the society.717 The identity of the 
individual to the observer systematically develops from there however treatment 
judgment is formulated by identifying by behaviours indicative of mental illness. It is 
established that the complexity, experiences and strains of modern life play intricate 
role in the social interaction and behaviours an individual is accustomed to. The 
challenge is identifying receptive indicators of mental disorder, which reflects the 
conscious struggle for biological survival.  The difficulty lies in separating bodily 
illness – a transition of the body wilfully – and mental illness – unconscious 
transition. Bodily transitions, which may or may not be accompanied by physical 
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illness, can then be evaluated by the “structural and functional integrity of the human 
body”. 718  
Non-western culture bound classifications rely on the peculiarity of conditions or lack 
thereof to explain disordered behaviour. For instance, the most remarkable 
explanation exists in environments where the standard diagnostic criteria do not apply 
and individuals exhibiting certain symptoms consistent with the DSM-5 classification 
of mental disorder are removed from the standardised coherent and comprehensive 
ordering of mental illness. In the absence of the standardised analysis mechanisms by 
the DSM, meaning can be sought within cultures reflective of the person’s values and 
to a larger extent, social and familial norm.719 The task will be on how best to engage 
both the cultural, ethnic and social cultural background of the individual to extract 
meaning underlying their convictions and values as influenced by their choices 
arbitrarily or otherwise. Brody suggests an introduction of bio-cultural clinicians from 
the same or similar background as the individual and can engage with the reasoning 
behind any decision. This approach means that the clinician must work out his/her 
own identity within a strange culture in relation to the patient”.720 
 
There is a consensus across social disciplines that the cultures and the way of lives of 
individuals vary across cross-cultural borders. An individual is therefore an 
embodiment of their immediate environment, which reflects their experience, 
personhood and reality. Saravan et al note “in a basic way, the self is a by-product of 
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cultural meaning system”.721 In defining cultures, it is imperative to contend the 
peculiarity to an individual, which is interconnected to moulding their perception, 
meaning, behaviour and characteristic. 722  It is therefore inappropriate to 
comparatively analyse an individual within different cultural settings not peculiar to 
their experience – outside the setting where their ideologies and meanings form.723 
There are clear-cut differences across cultures, which might be impractical in the 
overall experience of the individual.724 However, there are strong indicators that 
social and cultural factors are important determinants in conceptualizing illness and 
seeking help. It is therefore imperative that accounts of personal experiences of non-
western people are explored within their prevalent culture and way of life. 
Understandably, analysing different personal perspectives and lived experiences can 
provide multiple meanings that can reveal the true nature of the individual.725  
Saravan et al therefore contend that the challenge concerns the outcome of adopting 
“different systems of meaning, individuals perceive the world differently, 
conceptualise differently and emote differently. In a basic way, the self is a by-
product of a cultural meaning system”.726 
 
Historically, advocacy for freedom of choice, autonomy and consent of the anorexic 
body has been flawed by clinical impositions of treatment options to facilitate 
recovery. Regardless of the invasive treatment options to facilitate recovery, there is 
still a record of chronic high mortality rate, low recovery, and a distinctive treatment 
																																																								
721 B. Saravan, C. Manigandan, A. Macaden, G. Tharion, and S. Bhattacharji, ‘Re-examining the 
Psychology of Spinal Cord Injury: A Meaning Centered Approach from a Cultural Perspective’ (2001) 
39 (6) Spinal Cord pp. 323 – 326. 
722 Ibid. 
723 Ibid. 
724 Ibid. 
725 Ibid. 
726 Saravanan, op. cit. pp. 323-234. 
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resistance.727 This stringent clinical criterion based on physical emaciation firmly and 
instantaneously bans a cross border of individuals within a patient-centred spectrum 
without providing alternative range for others to embrace the autonomy to self-
determine. The patient centred approach solely favour immediate detention for the 
treatment and care of their mental disorder with no consideration for the choices, 
decisions (advanced or not) of the individual thereby stripping the individual of the 
liberty to self-determine in favour of immediate detention for treatment and care.  
 
Masked history of self-starvation, food refusal and extreme thinness transcend 
western clinical/medical ideologies. An in-depth cross-cultural analysis engages the 
cultural contexts of anorexia exclusively, embedded in their experiences and within 
self-discipline, self-determination and assertion of bodily integrity and autonomy. 
Engaging the personal and underlying meaning of the anorexic body ensures that the 
choices, norms, values and decisions (meaning-centered) of the individual are 
hierarchical to the established presumptions of mental illness.  It is, therefore, relevant 
to analyse anorexia outside western bound syndromes and within cultures where 
anorexia nervosa is not recognised as a mental illness and classic symptoms of 
anorexia (fear of weight gain, extreme thinness, self-starvation and food refusal) are 
symbolic to self-discipline, religious or cultural rituals.  For instance, the established 
western beauty ideal – tall, thin and straight through hips – does not appeal to men of 
African heritage. An analysis of the favoured body type of African-American and 
Caucasian men revealed that African American men prefer and are "more accepting 
of larger sizes for women than Caucasian men."728  
 																																																								
727 Tan, et al, op. cit., pp. 267–272. 
728 Freedman, et al, op. cit., p.319.  
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Lamb concludes that “being fat is a beauty ideal for much of Africa” and the fattened 
woman presents a way into the love, respect and heart of the man.729 The ideal West 
African woman is well endowed; the fuller and curvier woman is considered the apple 
of the man's eye and their bodies’ possessions or assets of their husbands.730 
According to Ghosh, “most women of Ghana shun the emaciated figures of fashion 
models and believe that being “full figured” denotes not only attractiveness, but as 
good health and prosperity”.731 In Nigeria, the Orobo woman is the standard of 
beauty, fat, fleshy, big, curvy and voluptuous. Cultural practices in Calabar (Southern 
Nigeria) mandates girls as young as six years old to be “fattened up” before they get 
married.732 Long-standing tradition of the Efik tribe guarantees that a woman is sent 
to the fattening room where she is isolated from her village, removed from any 
physical activity and made to eat as much as she can against her will.733 The process 
is also associated with ensuring her hips are broadened for reproduction.  The female 
body therefore implies desirability; her value is in being a suitable pick for a wife, 
vessel for reproduction and catering to the needs of the man. The body then becomes 
objectified; weight loss or weight gain remains adapted to the self-serving interests 
and control of the male gender. Self-starvation, food refusal or adopting the resistant 
meaning centred anorexic body for these women within a cultural repressive 
environment is regarded as a sign of rebellion against established misogyny. New 
feminine ideal of beauty is created by consciously and voluntarily adapting the thin 
body as a feminist symbol of liberation, emancipation and control. The meaning 
centred anorexic body consciously and voluntarily engages self- starvation and 
																																																								
729 Lamb, op. cit., p.28. 
730 Sunday Standard, op. cit. 
731 Ghosh, op. cit. 
732 British Broadcasting Corporation, op. cit. 
733 Ibid.  
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thinness as a symbol of self-determination, autonomy and control over their body and 
self. 
 
Offsetting socio-cultural pressure to be thin can be done by autonomous regulations 
of eating patterns.734 In the UK, the idea that individuals are given the freedom to 
regulate the way their body changes and develops through controlled eating can 
intensify thin body internalisation however the negative end of this perceived pressure 
can be evaluated on both end of the spectrum - impose a resistance not to conform to 
the pressure to stay thin or increase the dissatisfaction with the scrutiny and control of 
what the ideal female body should be. The disparity reveals an underlying patient 
centred thin body ideals conformation, which can only manifest in a meaning centred 
resistant body only when the individual is involuntarily force-fed to address the 
physical emaciation. Nigeria, on the other hand, reveals a remarkable case of 
increased dissatisfaction with the socio-cultural pressure on women to reveal more 
curves rather than thinness. Banks insists that anorectics should utilize precise cultural 
symbols and belief system in other to offer meaning to their underlying conscious 
choice of self-starvation.735Directly engaging cultural symbols and belief systems is 
one way to reveal meaning. However, a second pathway will involve the anorexic 
body acknowledging the existence of these cultural patterns and beliefs then resisting 
societal or medical control imposed by the existing culturally engraved behaviour to 
provide more explicit meaning centred sense.736 A productive approach will ensure 
the conscious elements necessary to sustain the meaning centred anorexic body are 
present. The best way is to guarantee consciousness of their self-starvation ideals to 
ensure a clear version and interpretation of the symptoms of self-starvation, which are 																																																								
 
735 Banks, op. cit., pp.868-869. 
736 Ibid. 
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exclusively different from accounts of medical practitioners and diagnosticians.737 
Epner and Baile insist that the dynamic nature of culture includes fundamental themes 
such as attitudes, beliefs and behavioural pattern to engage the underlying meaning 
behind the symptoms.738 There is also the notion that most women’s understanding of 
their self-starvation and thinness excludes mental illness, thus there is an outright 
rejection of medical diagnosis and intervention to further treatment. 739  Banks 
therefore believes the apparent lack of triumph by clinicians in treating anorexics 
might be because of clinical failure of including “the anorectics own subjective 
meanings – and the role of culture in those meanings – into account”.740  
 
Pushkar recalls that the insensitivity towards the role of culture on the experience of 
illness meant that clinicians will have no knowledge of the nature of patients value.741 
On the other hand, Kirmayer notes that focus on culture has not evolved the dominant 
patterns in clinical practice, which disregards the impact of culture, and traditions in 
framing human problems742 whether negatively or positively. Wachtel agrees with 
Kleinman’s view that the limitations imposed by narrow-minded theories and 
practices offer no significant pathway in resolving the complexities of human nature. 
Perhaps further questions should be raised “about how much our own practices are 
based on science and how much are on unexamined cultural values”.743 Gorski, on the 
other hand, insists that the main perspectives of Kleinman unmasked the use of 																																																								
737 Ibid. 
738 Daniel E. Epner and Walter F. Baile, ‘Patient-Centered Care: The Key to Cultural Competence’ 
(2012) 3(23) Annals of Oncology p.33. 
739 Banks, op. cit. pp.868-869. 
740 Ibid. 
741 Piyush Pushkar, ‘Rethinking Psychiatry: From Cultural Category to Personal Experience by Arthur 
Kleinman’ (2011). 342 (7810) British Medical Journal p.1315. 
742 Lawrence J. Kirmayer, ‘Rethinking Cultural Competence’ (2012) 49(2) Sage Journal p.151. 
743 Paul L. Wachtel, ‘Around the World in a Couch: Rethinking Psychiatry from Cultural Category to 
Personal Experience’ New York Times 4th September 1988 p.237.   
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medicalization as a form of social system. Secondly, by applying evidence derived 
from non-western cultures, recognition of the universality of disorders will emerge 
deposing established western bias of limiting symptoms to a particular culture. Lastly, 
although there was lack of specific gender (feminist) focus, there are still illuminating 
conceptions on culture and its impact on individual experience.744 
 
Kleinman recognised the importance of social norms and cultural meaning as an 
integral interpretation of an individual’s experience. 745  Ignoring these vital 
experiences whilst focusing on clinical diagnostic features remarkably undervalues 
their historic individualized cultural history and discontinues the opportunity for 
future narratives on their state of being.746 The biological and physical elements are 
intertwined and connected with daily experience and cannot be separated in 
practice. 747  Clinicians working with ethnic diverse patients would have to 
acknowledge the value of cultural influence on their experience and as a result such 
values should form part or whole in analysing underlying symptoms. Regardless of 
existing counterfactual options, individual experiences are significant in accounting 
for diagnostic symptoms however the reason these experiences are not relied upon to 
reveal the underlying meaning raises serious questions. The first step is to recognise 
the individual, which fundamentally work against the medical mechanism of broad 
categorisation or labelling. Under this umbrella, should all individual who exhibit 
cross-demographic symptoms of anorexia be categorised as mentally ill? If not, can 
recognizing a cross-cultural meaning centred- variation enable clinicians to 
																																																								
744 Victoria Gorski, ‘Review of Thinking Psychiatry: From Cultural Category to Personal Experience’ 
(1991) 9(2) Families, Systems and Health Journal pp.193-195. 
745 Arthur Kleinman, Rethinking Psychiatry: From Cultural Category to Personal Experience (New 
York, Simon and Schuster 1970) p.23. 
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acknowledge a set of post-modern narrative which exist outside the diagnostic manual 
where if A is labelled A, it then must be A. Good and Good point out the biomedical 
models are overwhelmed by “epistemological and practical difficulties” given the 
restrictive approach which does not include a “cultural patterning of symptoms” in 
clinical practice.748 Invariably the problem with the biomedical approach is that 
complaints are not received and heard as part of the experiences neither are they 
converted into evidence for solutions rather there is an antagonism to maintain a 
status-quo befitting the existing medical model. In Re X, R, E, the underlying issue 
was a clear demonstration of overdependence on the strict criteria of clinical practice 
and reliance on clinical practice and clinical models to gain insights on the 
experiences of the anorexic. The limitations of the clinical foresight also became a 
burden for courts as they often fail to include relative cultural data or acknowledge 
that social cultural realities are evidenced in the symptoms.   
 
The common feature in the writings of Banks and Schwartz et al749 identified that the 
issues in understanding contemporary anorexia nervosa extends beyond identifying 
cultural attributes in culture bound syndromes but also the understanding and 
application of the individual’s values and norms. Identifying the values and norms 
proffers the eroded subjective meaning underlying self-starvation. One must also 
digress from predominant clinical approach to contemporary anorexia focus on self-
starvation and physical emaciation, offering no intricate clarifications with cross-
cultural bound contexts. Arguably suggestions of increasing legal rights and 
																																																								
748 Byron J. Good and Mary-Jo D. Good, ‘The Meaning of Symptoms: A Cultural Hermeneutic Model 
for Clinical Practice’ L. J. in Eisenberg and A. Klewman (eds.) The relevance of Social Science for 
Medicine, Culture, Illness and Healing: Studies in Comparative Cross-Cultural Research  (Dordrech, 
Reidel Publishing Company) p.165.    
749 D. M. Schwartz, M.G. Thompson, and C.L. Johnson, ‘Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia: The Socio-
Cultural Context’ (1982) 1(3) International Journal of Eating Disorders pp. 20-22. 
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acknowledging the intricate meaning underneath the veiled mystifying disorder has 
not gained any substantial development. Perhaps a synchronised evaluation of the 
physical behaviour and the inner underlying behaviour will provide an illuminating 
significant demystifying and uncover new rationale of thinking and approach. The 
missing dimension will co-relate subjective experiences of the body with the 
reactionary outcome (extreme thinness) which provides the clarity to what thinness 
means to the anorexic body. Kleinman suggests a rethink of the way individuals were 
examined by linking cultural ideals with experience, limiting biological explanation 
and rearranging western psychiatric bias where “psychosocial and cultural factors are 
considered merely epiphenomenal”.750 Therefore, accepting Kleinman’s theoretical 
concession which insists that there are varying misguided assumptions which offer no 
meaning or interpretation to the natural state of the individual will require a genuine 
adaptation to viewing “psychiatric diagnosis as fundamentally an interpretative act” 
conceived from experiences, moral and norms and translated into “theoretical model 
of pathology and disease”.751 Likewise, the experiences of an individual cannot be 
separated from their way of life, the society they dwell in and their immediate nuclear 
family.752 Thus with the idea that there is a link between a person’s relationships and 
the mental state and recognising that self-expression are key components of 
experiences thereby demanding an empathic comprehension of an individual live as 
well as the diagnosed symptoms.753 Advancing towards a broader cultural inclusion of 
experience tied to culture and society, clinicians would have to admit a certain level 
of conscious decisions and competence to an experience. Acknowledging a cultural 
significant meaning centred experience as a core feature in self-starvation implicitly 																																																								
750 Kleinman, op. cit. 
751 Ibid. 
752 Meredith F. Small, The Culture of our Discontent: Beyond the Medical Model of Mental Illness 
(Washington D.C, Joseph Henry Press 2006) p.149. 
753 Ibid. 
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establishes a moral symbolism absent in clinical practice and validates that notion that 
“cultural norms all have a huge impact on individuals’ mental health”.754 Weight loss 
therefore becomes a secondary outcome. 
 
Social, religious and political contexts to eating disorders are undervalued and 
predominately not examined within neutral cultures unaffected by western ideals.755 
Multiple research outside non-western cultures reveal departure from the standardised 
criteria of western anorexic ideals based on the fear of weight gain and body image 
distortion. Remarkably, it has been established that non-western cultures are also 
unfamiliar with the concept of anorexia, as it exists in biomedicine. Therefore, 
analysing anorexia under a particular culture would not be based on the typical 
western features of fear of weight gain or fat phobia instead there would be need to 
explore beyond set boundaries as anorexia may present a different outlook even if not 
diagnosable. The challenge is to present anorexia nervosa within a non-medical 
platform unfulfilling of the singular criterion of extraordinary fear of weight gain. In 
other words, to obtain significant meaning, it is imperative to explore cultures where 
self-starvation is voluntary and self-induced and the fear of weight gain is not a 
fundamental attribute of anorexia.756 Barring the western features, focus would be 
redirected to how dramatic weight loss is sustained through other elements such as 
“…social protests and spiritual purification, which are defining features of other 
contexts in which fasting and self-starvation occur…”. 757 Weiss therefore asserts: 
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“Self-starvation may provide a means to exercise power and 
control in families and society. Anorexia represents a subset of 
broader range of self-starvation behaviors that include 
expressions of social and political protests, self-purification and 
religious piety.”758 
 
Anorexia will continue to present critical challenges for treatment professionals 
especially given the rise of multicultural groups identifying distinctive features within 
local meaning, thus necessitating the inclusion of a “diagnostic criteria suitable for 
cross-comparisons”. 759  Nicholas therefore points out that actions outside the 
psychiatric discourse can therefore be better understood as a political act, “a space of 
action where one grapples with discourses and structures of notions of starvation 
among women”.760 In establishing a meaning centred approach to self-starvation, 
there is a normative dieting implication subjectively associated with the experiences 
of the anorectic.761  The meaning centred anorexic body consciously elects to self-
starve, restrict eating and exercise excessively (all stereotypical symptoms of 
anorexia) with the following aim: (1) to fully manage the way their body changes and 
develops without any external interference or control; (2) as defence mechanism over 
previous negative physical, psychological and mental experience; (3) assert the rights 
to autonomy and bodily integrity; (4) rebellion against the misogyny of African men 
towards the skinny woman as they rather embrace the curvy and well-rounded 
woman. Weiss therefore suggests a cultural clarification of the illness using research 																																																								
758 Ibid., p.13. 
759 Ibid., p.15. 
760 Jane Nicholas, ‘Hunger Politics: Towards Seeing Voluntary Self-Starvation as an Act of Resistance’ 
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instruments to analyse local meanings to provide insights, highlight experiences and 
explain traditional epidemiology. Empirical work carried out will therefore centre on 
individuals within the local communities who engage in self-starvation or extreme 
fasting without the fear of weight gain or body distortion.762  
 
5.1.1 Objectives of the Study Carried out in Nigeria 
 
The study seeks to verify the meaning centred theory of the anorexic body and 
specifically focuses on:  
1. Examining the relationship between self-starvation, food refusal and mental 
illness; 
2. Examining the role food restriction plays in the individuals’ perception of their 
body and freedom of choice; 
3. Determining meaning non-western culture attribute to their anorexic body; 
4. Establishing that self-starvation and extreme thinness can be done consciously 
and with reason. Hence, there is a meaning centred variation to this experience; 
5. Establishing that self-starvation and fat phobia is not ordinarily linked to 
mental illness except when reinforced by the law; 
6. Devaluing the universal stereotype that extreme thin body signifies mental 
illness; and 
7. Establishing that typical features of anorexia can be identified within local 
meaning. 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
762 Ibid. 
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5.1.2   Research Methodology  
 
The study examines the relationship between anorexic body and mental illness in 
Cross River State, Nigeria. The possible causes and the extent of satisfaction derived 
from the anorexic body were also examined. The research design, research area, 
population of the study, sample and sampling technique are all set out below. This 
chapter also discusses the instrumentation including validity and reliability of the 
instruments, and data collection procedure.  
 
5.1.2.1 Research Design  
 
The design adopted for this study is the survey design. It involved gathering data from 
the whole of Cross River State in Nigeria on the relationship between two variables. 
The variables are the anorexic body and mental illness. The researcher does not have 
direct control over the manifestation of the variable as they have already occurred 
prior to her investigation and therefore manifestation cannot be altered. Therefore, the 
empirical work seeks to find out the kind or extent of relationship that exists between 
them. Young females aged 18 years and above were selected from the whole of Cross 
River State, in Nigeria. Cross River State covers a very large area and the population 
of females with anorexic body is equally large. Only a small percentage of these 
females were selected for this study.  
 
5.1.2.2 Research Area  
 
The research area for this study is Cross River State. Cross River State is one of the 
36 states in Nigeria. It is located in the South-South geo-political zone of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria with the capital in Calabar. Cross River State is located within 
latitudes 5032” and 4027” North of the Equator as well as longitudes 7050” and 9028” 
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East of the Greenwich meridian. The state covers a land mass of 23,074,425 square 
kilometres. The state has a population of 2,888,966763 people comprising 1,492,465 
males and 1,396,036 females. 764  Cross River State shares boundaries with the 
Republic of Cameroon in the East; Ebonyi and Abia States in the West, Benue State 
in the North, as well as Akwa Ibom State and the Bight of Bonny in the South. 
Several tertiary institutions are situated in Cross River State. These include the 
University of Calabar, Calabar; Cross River University of Technology (CRUTECH) 
with multi-campuses; Arthur Jarvis University, Akpabuyo; College of Education, 
Akamkpa; Federal College of Education, Obudu; College of Health Technology, 
Calabar; Management Development Institute, Calabar; Institute of Management 
Technology, Ugep; School of Nursing, Calabar; and School of Midwifery, Calabar. 
All these tertiary institutions have large population of females. Many of these females 
have extremely thin bodies. Hence, this area is suitable for this study. Customarily, 
the majority of women from this area are fat and well rounded. The fattening room is 
a core tradition in this area and originated from the age-long traditions of secluding 
women in huts for fattening and preparation for a successful marriage and 
motherhood.765 One of such ceremonies was keeping brides in fattening rooms where 
the brides are provided with special diets and care. The aim of this confinement was 
to develop curvy bodies which should make them very attractive to their suitors.  
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5.1.2.3 Population of the Study  
 
The population of the study includes all female students in tertiary institutions in 
Cross River State, Nigeria who are extremely thin. This study was restricted to only 
students who are aged 18 years and above.  
 
5.1.2.4 Sample  
 
The sample was made up of one thousand (1000) students from the tertiary 
institutions aged 18 years and above. It also includes only the students who are 
physically extremely thin.  
 
5.1.2.5 Sampling Technique                                       
   
Simple random and purposive sampling techniques were adopted for the selection of 
the respondents.  Out of the ten (10) tertiary institutions in Cross River State, Nigeria, 
five (5) were randomly selected. These include University of Calabar, Calabar; Cross 
River University of Technology (with multi-campus); College of Education, 
Akamkpa; Federal College of Education, Obudu; and College of Health Technology, 
Calabar. Since it was not possible to know the exact population of the extremely thin 
females in each institution, 5% of the female students were selected, using the 
purposive sampling technique. This purposive sampling technique was to ensure that 
only the extremely thin female students were selected.  
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5.1.2.6 Instrumentation  
 
The researcher constructed the instrument used for this study. It was titled “Meaning 
Centered Anorexic Body Questionnaire” (MCABQ). Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory (MMPI) format was adopted for the construction of the 
instrument.  The respondents were required to answer “YES” or “NO” to the 
statements in the questionnaire. The items were extracted from the literature and 
experience with characteristics of people with anorexic body. The questionnaire 
consists of four sections – A, B, C and D. Section A elicited responses from the 
respondents concerning their demographic data, such as institution, age and body size 
while Section B consisted of 11 items and sought to find out the relationship between 
the anorexic body and mental illness (items 1-11). Section C was to know how 
contented the respondents were, with their anorexic body. It was made up of 8 items 
(items 12-19). Section D, which was made up of 13 items, was to elicit responses 
concerning reasons for assuming the anorexic body (items 20-32).  For each item, the 
“YES” answers were scored 1 while the “NO” answers were scored 0. The instrument 
contained instruction that the questionnaire was for research purpose and so, there 
were no wrong answers. They were equally instructed not to write their names.  They 
were to remain anonymous, and independent.   
 
5.1.2.7 Validity of the Instrument  
 
 
The researcher made effort to ascertain the ability of the research instrument to 
determine what it was supposed to measure at any given time. The developed research 
instrument was presented to two experts in Measurement and Evaluation and three 
experts in psychology for validation. Each of these experts received a copy of the 
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MCABQ. The experts were to critically examine the content of the study and the 
extent to which the statement was appropriate for the study. After examining the 
instrument, the experts identified some minor errors, which were corrected.  
 
5.1.2.8 Reliability of the Study 
 
To ensure the instrument was consistent, dependable and predictable, it was trial-
tested to determine its internal consistency. Copies of the MCABQ were administered 
on 30 female students with anorexic body, in one of the tertiary institutions that was 
not included in the actual study, for the trial-testing. The Cronbach alpha technique 
was used to determine the reliability coefficient. The results are as presented in Table 
1.  
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TABLE 1 
Cronbach alpha reliability coefficient of the research instrument (n = 30) 
Variable No. of items Mean SD Α 
Anorexic body association with 
mental illness 
11 3.54 2.75 0.78 
Contentment with the anorexic 
body 
8 2.86 2.21 0.75 
Reasons for assuming the 
anorexic body 
13 8.48 3.40 0.83 
                           
                        
 
The results on Table 1 show that the reliability coefficient ranged from 0.78 for the 
anorexic body association with mental illness through 0.75 for contentment with the 
anorexic body to 0.83 regarding reasons for assuming the anorexic body. Since all the 
coefficients are very high, it means the instrument is very reliable.  
 
5.1.2.9  Data Collection Procedure  
 
The researcher wrote a letter to the selected institutions seeking permission to use 
their students for the study and asked for their written response (Appendix 1). 
Research assistants were used to collect the data. These research assistants were 
trained on courtesy, ethics of administration and knowledge of terms and phrases 
involved in the study. The research assistants were sent to institutions far from the 
researcher while the researcher administered the copies of the MCABQ on the 
respondents for the institutions close to the researcher. The researcher and the 
research assistants urged the respondents to work independently. Copies of the 
completed MCABQ were collected immediately. 
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5.1.2.10 Procedure for data analysis 
 
The data from all the 1000 female students with anorexic body (BMI 17.5 and below) 
were collected and analysed. Each research question was analysed using frequencies 
and percentages for the statements, as they required “Yes” or “No” responses. “Yes” 
was weighted 1 while “No” was weighted 0.                                      
 
 
 
5.2     Results and Discussion   
      
 In this chapter, the results of the data analysis carried out on the data gathered from 
the field for the study were presented and interpreted. The findings that emerged were 
discussed. The presentation in this chapter is done under the following sub-headings: 
5.2.1 Presentation of findings per research question  
5.2.2 Summary of findings  
5.2.3 Discussion of findings              
 
5.2.1 Presentation of Findings per Research Question  
 
This research question was answered using frequencies and percentages. Respondents 
were grouped into two (yes and no) based on their responses to items 1-11 of Section 
B of the research instrument. The results are presented in Table 2. 
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TABLE 2 
Extremely thin body (anorexic body) association with mental illness 
SN    
S/No 
        
Statement        
     Yes 
(%) 
   No  
   (%) 
Mean 
1.2       
22      1 
Do you associate your extreme thin body with 
mental illness? 
88 
(8.8) 
912  
(91.2) 
0.09 
2.  
    2 Do you associate your self-starvation to mental 
illness? 
1     191 
 
(19.1) 
809  
(80.9) 
0.19 
3. 
 
    3 
Are you able to function well (work, carry on 
everyday life) while assuming this extremely thin 
body? 
848 
(84.8) 
152  
(15.2) 
0.85 
4. 
    4 
Do you believe this is a form of exercising your 
freedom or autonomous right? 
746 
(74.6) 
254  
(25.4) 
0.75 
5.      
 66     5 
Do you exercise regularly to retain this thin body? 613 
(61.3) 
387  
(38.7) 
0.61 
6. 
    6 
Do you associate the expression of freedom to 
preserve your bodily integrity with mental illness? 
399 
(39.9) 
601  
(60.1) 
0.40 
7.8 
    7 
Are you conscious or aware of your choice to 
become thin? 
649 
(64.9) 
 351  
(35.1) 
0.65 
8. 
    8 Are you conscious or aware of your choice to 
remain thin? 
635 
(63.5) 
365  
(36.5) 
0.64 
 
   9 
Have you been involuntarily treated? 179 
(17.9) 
821  
(82.1) 
0.18 
     
    10 
Do Do your friends laugh at you because of your thin 
body? 
295 
(29.5) 
705 
 (70.5) 
0.30 
11 Do Does any of your family members consider you 
ill? 
270 
(27.0) 
730  
(73.0) 
0.27 
 
The results as presented in Table 2 show the respondents’ responses to whether their 
thin body (anorexic body) associates with mental illness. The result revealed that 88 
of the respondents representing 8.8% agreed that they associate their extreme thin 
body with mental illness while 912 of them representing 91.2% disagreed to that and 
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the result produced a mean of 0.09. It was also observed that 191 of the respondents 
representing 19.1% agreed that they associate their self-starvation to mental illness 
while 809 of them representing 80.9% disagreed to that and the result produced a 
mean of 0.19. It was further observed that 848 of the respondents representing 84.8% 
agreed that they are able to function well (work, carry on everyday life) while 
assuming this extremely thin body while 152 of them representing 15.2% disagreed to 
that and the result produced a mean of 0.85. Further examination of the result 
revealed that 746 of the respondents representing 74.6% agreed that they believed that 
this is a form of exercising their freedom or autonomous right while 254 of them 
representing 25.4% disagreed to that and the result produced a mean of 0.75. It was 
also observed that 613 of the respondents representing 61.3% agreed that they 
exercise regularly to retain their slim body while 387 of them representing 38.7% 
disagreed to that and the result produced a mean of 0.61. It was further observed that 
399 of the respondents representing 39.9% agreed that they associate the expression 
of freedom to preserve their bodily integrity with mental illness while 601 of them 
representing 60.1% disagreed to that and the result produced a mean of 0.40. 
Furthermore, the result revealed that 649 of the respondents representing 64.9% 
agreed that they are conscious or aware of their choice to become thin while 351 of 
them representing 35.1% disagreed to that and the result produced a mean of 0.65. It 
was also observed that 635 of the respondents representing 63.5% agreed that they are 
conscious or aware of their choice to remain thin while 365 of them representing 
36.5% disagreed to that and the result produced a mean of 0.64. It was further 
observed that 179 of the respondents representing 17.9% agreed that they have been 
involuntarily treated while 821 of them representing 82.1% disagreed to that and the 
result produced a mean of 0.18. It was further observed that 295 of the respondents 
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representing 29.5% agreed that their friends laugh at them because of their thin body 
while 705 of them representing 70.5% disagreed to that and the result produced a 
mean of 0.30. The result finally revealed that 270 of the respondents representing 
27.0% agreed that their family members consider them ill while 730 of them 
representing 73.0% disagreed to that and the result produced a mean of 0.27. 
 
Table 3 
This research question was answered using frequency and percentages. Respondents 
were grouped into two (yes and no) based on their responses to items 12-19 of Section 
B of the research instrument. The results are presented in Table 3. 
TABLE 3 
Contentment with the Anorexic Body 
SN Statement Yes 
(%) 
No  
(%) 
Mean 
12. Has anyone advised you to go for medical 
treatment because of your thin body? 
215  
(21.5) 
785  
(78.5) 
0.22 
13. If possible, would you like to become 
thinner? 
170  
(17.0) 
830  
(83.0) 
0.17 
14. If advised by a clinician, would you change your 
body size? 
368  
(36.8) 
632  
(63.2) 
0.37 
15. Are there occasions you regret the anorexic body? 307  
(30.7) 
693  
(69.3) 
0.31 
16. Would you change your extremely thin body to a 
normalized body in the future? 
421  
(42.1) 
579 
(57.9) 
0.42 
17. Would you advise your plump friends to become 
extremely thin within meaning? 
620  
(62.0) 
380  
(38.0) 
0.62 
18. Do you feel any physical weakness as a result of 
being extremely thin? 
197  
(19.7) 
803  
(80.3) 
0.20 
19. Do you ever feel the urge to cover up part of your 
body out of embarrassment? 
339  
(33.9) 
661  
(66.1) 
0.34 
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The results as presented in Table 3 show the respondents’ responses on how 
comfortable they are about their thin body (anorexic body). The result revealed that 
215 of the respondents representing 21.5% agreed that someone has advised them to 
go for medical treatment because of their thin body while 785 of them representing 
78.5% disagreed to that and the result produced a mean of 0.22. It was also observed 
that 170 of the respondents representing 17.0% agreed that if possible, they would 
like to become thinner while 830 of them representing 83.0% disagreed to that and the 
result produced a mean of 0.17. It was further observed that 368 of the respondents 
representing 36.8% agreed that if they were advised by a clinician, they would change 
their body size while 632 of them representing 63.2% disagreed to that and the result 
produced a mean of 0.37. 
Further examination of the result revealed that 307 of the respondents representing 
30.7% agreed that occasionally they regret their anorexic body while 693 of them 
representing 69.3% disagreed to that and the result produced a mean of 0.31. It was 
also observed that 421 of the respondents representing 42.1% agreed that they would 
change their extremely thin body to a normalized body in future while 579 of them 
representing 57.9%o disagreed to that and the result produced a mean of 0.42. It was 
further observed that 620 of the respondents representing 62.0% agreed that they 
would advise their plump friends to become extremely thin within meaning while 380 
of them representing 38.0% disagreed to that and the result produced a mean of 0.62. 
 
Furthermore, the result revealed that 197 of the respondents representing 19.7% 
agreed that they feel some physical weakness as a result of being extremely thin while 
803 of them representing 80.3% disagreed to that and the result produced a mean of 
0.20. It was finally observed that 339 of the respondents representing 33.9% agreed 
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that most times they feel the urge to cover up part of their body out of embarrassment 
while 661 of them representing 66.1% disagreed to that and the result produced a 
mean of 0.34. 
 
TABLE 4 
This research question was answered using frequency and percentages. Respondents 
were grouped into two (yes and no) based on their responses to items 20-32 of Section 
D of the research instrument. The results are presented in Table 4. 
TABLE 4 
S/N Statement Yes  
(%) 
No 
(%) 
Mean 
20. Take control of my body? 823  
(82.3) 
177 
(17.7) 
0.82 
21. Resistance against cultural oppressive regime? 578  
(57.8) 
422 
(42.2) 
0.58 
22. Expression of freedom (autonomy) over my body? 739  
(73.9) 
261 
(26.1) 
0.74 
23. Mental illness? 119 
(11.9) 
881 
(88.1) 
0.12 
24. Previous experience of a non-thin body? 614 
(61.4) 
386 
(38.6) 
0.61 
25. Experience of others with non-thin body? 582  
(58.2) 
418 
(41.8) 
0.58 
26. I have been involuntarily treated because of my 
extreme thin body.  
244 
(24.6) 
756 
(75.6) 
0.25 
27. The   Nigerian   environment   provides the 
freedom to express my autonomous right without 
the stereotype of mental illness. 
670  
(67.0) 
330 
(33.0) 
0.67 
28. 
The   Nigerian   environment   provides the 
freedom for control over my body without the 
stigma of mental illness. 
695 
(69.5) 
305 
(30.5) 
0.70 
29. 
To resist the cultural ideal beauty (regarding fat 
body as a sign of beauty) 
618  
(61.8) 
382 
(38.2) 
0.62 
30. 
 
To be admired more by the opposite sex? 
392  
(39.2) 
608 
(60.8) 
0.39 
31. 
 
Physiological/Medical ground 
337 
 (33.7) 
663 
(66.3) 
0.34 
32. 
Because being extremely thin is not a mental 
illness. 
720 
 (72.0) 
280 
(28.0) 
0.72 
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The results as presented in Table 4 show the respondents’ response about their choice 
to become thin or assume the anorexic body. The result revealed that 823 of the 
respondents representing 82.3% agreed that it is to take control of their body while 
177 of them representing 17.7% disagreed to that and the result produced a mean of 
0.82. It was also observed that 578 of the respondents representing 57.8% agreed that 
it was because of resistance against cultural oppressive regime while 422 of them 
representing 42.2% disagreed to that and the result produced a mean of 0.58. It was 
further observed that 739 of the respondents representing 73.9% agreed that it was 
expression of freedom (autonomy) over their body while 261 of them representing 
26.1% disagreed to that and the result produced a mean of 0.74. 
 
Further examination of the result revealed that 119 of the respondents representing 
11.9% agreed that it was as a result of mental illness while 881 of them representing 
88.1% disagreed to that and the result produced a mean of 12. It was also observed 
that 614 of the respondents representing 61.4% agreed that it was because of previous 
experience of a non-thin body while 386 of them representing 38.6% disagreed to that 
and the result produced a mean of 0.61. It was further observed that 582 of the 
respondents representing 58.2% agreed that it was as a result of experience of others 
with non-thin body while 418 of them representing 41.8% disagreed to that and the 
result produced a mean of 0.58. Furthermore, the result revealed that 244 of the 
respondents representing 24.4% agreed that they have been involuntarily treated 
because of their extreme slim body while 756 of them representing 75.6% disagreed 
to that and the result produced a mean of 0.25. It was also observed that 670 of the 
respondents representing 67.0%> agreed that the Nigerian environment provides the 
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freedom to express their autonomous right without the stereotype of mental illness 
while 330 of them representing 33.0% disagreed to that and the result produced a 
mean of 0.67. It was further observed that 695 of the respondents representing 69.5% 
agreed that the Nigerian environment provides the freedom for control over their body 
without the stigma of mental illness while 305 of them representing 30.5% disagreed 
to that and the result produced a mean of 0.70. It was further observed that 618 of the 
respondents representing 61.8% agreed that it was to resist the cultural ideal beauty 
(regarding plump body as a sign of beauty) while 382 of them representing 38.2% 
disagreed to that and the result produced a mean of 0.62. The result also revealed that 
392 of the respondents representing 39.2% agreed that it was to be admired more by 
the opposite sex while 608 of them representing 60.8% disagreed to that and the result 
produced a mean of 0.39. The result further revealed that 337 of the respondents 
representing 33.7% agreed that it was on the basis of physiological/medical ground 
while 663 of them representing 66.3% disagreed to that and the result produced a 
mean of 0.34. The result finally revealed that 720 of the respondents representing 
72.0% agreed that it was because being extremely thin is not a mental illness while 
280 of them representing 28.0% disagreed to that and the result produced a mean of 
0.72. 
 
5.3 Discussion of Findings              
 
5.3.1 Table 2 
 
The finding reveal how the anorexic body interprets disordered behaviour without 
establishing or accepting the constructions of mental illness. Majority of the 
respondents (91.2%) did not associate their extreme thin body (anorexic body) with 
mental illness as against only 8.8% who did so. This finding is supported by other 
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results indicating that 80.9% of the respondents did not associate their self-starvation 
and food refusal with mental illness, 84.8% are able to function well; 74.6% believed 
in their autonomous right; 61.3% continued to exercise regularly to retain their 
anorexic body. These findings show that Nigerian young women who self-starve, 
exercise excessively to retain their anorexic body do not feel any sign of ill health to 
compel them to change their habit. Their life activities are not hindered by any 
physical or psychological factors to disrupt their daily function as they said they 
function well.  Since these young women are functioning well without any sign of ill 
health or psychological and physical factors that could hinder their life activities, it 
means they were qualified to be seen as being healthy. Illness conditions of chemical 
and cellular experiences or observation of any underlying psychochemical processes 
are lacking. Udin and Lewis had state that one could only be described as being ill if 
such a person manifests some physical and psychological symptoms.766The person is 
likely to manifest the symptoms of disease, which is defined in chemical and cellular 
terms, with the hope that the observable symptoms could also be related to some 
underlying physiochemical processes.767 
 
Udin and Lewis also point out that conditions of illness goes beyond physical defects 
or the physiochemical processes to include behavioural problems triggered by 
environmental factors surrounding and influencing the individual. Since the 
respondents in this study did not experience any such environmental problems, it 
should be acceptable if they say they do not associate their anorexic body (thin body) 
with mental illness. In addition, if one accepts the definition of mental health as 
propounded by Gottesfeld, it would further strengthen the position of the respondents 																																																								
766 Gene Usdin and Lewis J. Lewis, Psychiatry in General Medical Practice (New York: McGraw-Hill 
1979). p.47.  
767 Ibid. 
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in this study. Gottesfeld explains that mental health can be viewed as the positive 
striving as a person grows, matures and accepts responsibilities, including coping 
successfully and finding fulfilment.768 Invariably, it could be inferred that majority of 
the respondents were growing, maturing and accepting responsibility through their 
positive striving. 769This becomes even more acceptable as they claimed they were 
functioning well. That means the respondents can be seen as being mentally healthy, 
even as Gottesfeld added that mentally healthy people should develop intellectual 
abilities, work skills and social sensitivity. The respondents could have possessed the 
three fundamental aspects of mental health.770 The identified three fundamental 
aspects of mental health include active adjustment involving attempts to master their 
environment; unity of their personality and stable integration of experiences; as well 
as the correct perception of the world and self, irrespective of personal needs.771 
 
Vasta, et al noted some of the effects of anorexia nervosa patients’ experience which 
include dry skin, dry and battle hair, and dehydration.772 The individuals involved in 
this study were not observed to be experiencing these problems. The hair of each of 
them was observed to be normal. The same applies to their skin. Their skins were 
fresh and well nourished. None of the persons involved in the study was observed to 
be dehydrating. Since these illness conditions were not observed among the 
respondents, it will be wrong to evaluate them within the standard medical definition 
of anorexia nervosa which will reinforce the mentally ill narrative. These include 
depression, problem with the mood, social withdrawal and low self-esteem, which 
become more prevalent for groups that value their weight and appearance highly, such 																																																								
768 Gottesfeld, op. cit.  p.11. 
769	Ibid.	
770 Ibid. 
771 Ibid. 
772 Vasta, et al, op. cit..  
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as the fashion models. Even though it was not possible to know if any of the people 
involved in this study were fashion models, the fact is that none of them was observed 
to be experiencing these problems stated here. They all looked bright, cheerful and 
cooperative. They did not display signs to suspect any of them was depressed and 
involved in low self-esteem as they appeared to value themselves highly, at least, 
judging from their pattern of dressing.  
 
The finding that majority of the respondents did not associate self-starvation and food 
refused with mental illness shows that Nigerian young women who self-starve could 
be undergoing one of such periods they pass through in the course of exerting control 
over their body to avoid weight gain, especially as 74.6% of them believe it is their 
autonomous rights. Gleitman believes that some women are interested in controlling 
their weight in order to show they have some degree of autonomy and control over 
their body. 773 The freedom to preserve their body in the way they choose cannot then 
be conceived as mental illness. Self-starving, therefore does not automatically 
translate to mental illness. This becomes clear if one is aware of the differences 
between voluntary starvation and anorexia nervosa. Sarason and Sarason point out 
that there are psychological and behavioural differences.774 On the mood or feeling 
state, there is lack of initiative on the part of the person that is starving. Such a person 
is quarrelsome, indecisive, loses concern about physical appearance while it is not so 
for the person suffering from anorexia nervosa. The anorexic is characterized by high 
initiative, strong will, frequent period of feeling exuberant and proud in personal 
appearance. On the issue of mental content, the person who voluntarily starves is 
characterized by thinking, dreaming and day-dreaming concerning eating food, while 																																																								
773 Gleitman,  op., cit. 
774 Sarason and Sarason, op. cit. 
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in anorexia nervosa the person has all the listed characterises for starvation, but is not 
preoccupied with the thought of gaining weight which continues after the person 
resumes eating. Finally, sexual activity is characterized by decrease in sexual 
fantasies, feeling of disinterest, inability to maintain erection for the males, and 
cessation of menstruation for the females. The finding that 61.3% of the respondents 
did not stop to exercise regularly shows the respondents did not actually perceive any 
form of mental illness. They were really functioning well and enjoyed the process. 
People exercise to become healthier and physical health educators do not relent in 
their emphasis on maintaining good health through regular physical exercises. 
Therefore, these respondents were aiming at becoming healthier rather than falling ill.      
 
The findings further showed that majority of the respondents do not associate their 
freedom to preserve their body integrity with mental illness (60.1%); are aware or 
conscious of their desire to become thin (64.9%); are conscious of their choice to 
remain thin (63.5%); have never been involuntarily treated (82.1%); friends do not 
laugh at them (70%); and family members do not consider them ill  (73%). Many of 
the fashion models prefer thin body to fat one as their employers and sponsors would 
want them to be. This also applies to beauty pageant contestants, ballet dancers, etc. 
that are very passionate about their weight and physical appearance.775 Such females 
in these groups are often from the middle and upper socio-economic class of the 
society. They have been made to accept thinness as the attractive feminine physique. 
It could have been this belief that made them pursue thinness, as the ideal feature so 
maintaining this feature of thinness would be to maintain the respondents’ thin body 
integrity.  They would not want to deviate from what they consider the societal norm 
																																																								
775 Gross, op. cit. 
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for their class as they might be treated with contempt, if they do. It therefore becomes 
obvious that they approach the loss of weight with consciousness to exercise their 
freedom to preserve their body integrity and would consciously remain so.  
 
That friends do not laugh at them (70%) and family members do not consider them 
mentally ill (73%) explain why they should not consider themselves mentally ill. This 
could be attributed to the fact that they are getting on well with their friends and 
family members. It would be irrational for these friends and family members to 
consider them mentally ill for losing weight. For the respondents to be declared 
mentally ill or anorexic, it is necessary to find out if their body weight is not within 
the normal range.776 The person’s body weight must not be less than 85 percent which 
is considered normal for that person’s height and age. Therefore, it is not all the 
young females that lose weight or possess the anorexic body that are mentally ill. This 
is further supported by the fact that only a small percentage of such people actually 
meet the criteria for anorexia nervosa.  
 
Alloy, et al also add that for anybody to be diagnosed as anorexic, that person must 
possess the following indicators: weight loss, a cut-off line of a body weight that is 
less than 85 recent of what is normal for that particular person’s age and height. 777 
This condition may be because of the person’s weight or when the person is simply 
growing without gaining weight in the process.778 They also added intense fear of 
becoming fat, an unrealistic body image, and amenorrhea which means suspension of 
menstrual period, as other criteria. They insist that no one should be regarded as 
possessing anorexia nervosa if any of these is absent. Since the respondents were not 																																																								
776 Coon and Mitterer, op. cit. 
777 Alloy, et al, op. cit.  
778 Ibid. 
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subjected to these tests, it is wrong to regard any of them as mentally ill.779 Gleitman, 
et al also note the incidence of anorexia nervosa among adolescents and young 
women.780 They put it at 1 percent of these young females from industrialized 
countries. This is the case even though many of them are involved in relentless pursuit 
of food refusal or self-starvation. This study finds that majority of the respondents 
with anorexic body (thin body) did not consider themselves mentally ill. It should also 
be noted that more weight loss attracts the approval of close friends and family 
members. They even go ahead to commend them for a new attractive look. This could 
have made them appreciate their new look without seeing it as a mental illness. That 
82.1 percent of the respondents stated they have never been involuntarily treated 
could have resulted from the provision of Nigerian laws. Unlike in the United 
Kingdom where anorexia nervosa is a mental illness (Mental Health Act, 1983), 
Nigerian Mental Health Act 1991 and policies do not recognize it as a mental illness. 
So Nigerian young women do not associate their freedom to preserve their body 
integrity with mental illness. Thus, they remain conscious of their actions. Being 
conscious of their actions suggests they construct their body image and would know 
when to stop. Observing many Nigerian women shows that they do not continue 
excessive exercise and self-starvation after their childbirth. Since the Nigerian 
Medical Health Act 1991 and policies do not recognise anorexia nervosa as a mental 
illness, people with the anorexic body cannot be treated without their consent. 
Invariably any act to coerce the anorexic body to stop starving would amount to an 
invasion of their right to private life and violation of their bodily integrity. Iheanacho 
reports that the legal profession can only accept that someone is mentally ill or insane 
																																																								
779 Ibid. 
780 Gleitman, et al, op. cit.  
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if the person can be so adjudged by a court of law. 781  Invariably it has to be 
established that the individual lacks the capacity to understand their actions and how 
those actions impact their lives in general. There is also the premise that the 
individual is unable to differentiate between what is right and wrong at the time and 
therefore mentally unstable to choose wisely.782 It must therefore be demonstrated 
that the person was labouring under a defect of reason, from the disease of the mind at 
the time the act was committed which made him or her to fail to understand the nature 
and quality of the illness committed and therefore cannot act rationally. Citing 
Schwitzgebel and Schwitzgebel, Iheanacho states the general conditions in law a 
person must satisfy to be seen as mentally ill. These include: one being dangerous to 
oneself when left at liberty; being gravely disabled to such an extent of not being able 
to provide for the one’s basic physical needs; when a person lacks sufficient insight or 
capacity to take responsible decision, regarding hospitalization; and when an 
individual is in need of care and treatment in a hospital.783 
 
First, the presence of anorexia here is different from the typical cases often reported 
within the medical model. The women evaluated share the same bodily features 
(severe emaciation, thinness) and BMI as western anorexic however that is where the 
comparison ends. The typical features of western anorexia are based on the fear of 
weight and body distortion. Another valuable criterion is that the BMI of the 
individuals must be below 17.5 to constitute an anorexic body. Western ideals of 
beauty standards have fuelled this disorder as women view the thin body as the 
ultimate standard of beauty unlike the non-western countries. A cross-cultural 
analysis of the other factors that may constitute anorexia has never been used to 																																																								
781 Iheanacho, op. cit.  
782 Ibid. 
783	Iheanacho, op. cit.	
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engage other variables that might be significant in connection with anorexia and 
mental illness. The experiences of the majority of Nigerian women in Calabar 
presents a viable cross-cultural analysis especially as the environment where their 
lived experience is created are bias towards the thin western ideals. Like other parts of 
Africa, Calabar is where the fat and curvy woman thrives. The ideal standard of 
beauty revolves around the desirability of the fat woman as the ultimate symbol of 
beauty. For women in those communities to elect voluntarily to assume the anorexic 
body reflects the departure from core western medical narratives of what constitutes 
anorexia and most importantly how it develops. The implication is that not only is 
their self-starvation not associated with mental illness, it also reveals that voluntary 
acts of self-starvation can occur within non-western cultures. Lacking the strict 
confines of mental health laws and a stereotyped environment, the self-starving 
individual attains the freedom to live with integrity and dignity without medical 
coercion or control. DiNicola asserts that cultural connections must be incorporated 
into analysing anorexia nervosa.784 Therefore, anorexia must be seen as beyond mere 
self-starvation “without reference to context or meaning”.785 The cultural identity of 
the individual is established through the meaning they associate with staying thin as a 
retributive action to the dominant patriarchal stance of the fat is better society they 
live in. The meaning underling the behavioural approach of the women in Calabar 
resonates from defining their body image and in so doing challenges the patriarchal 
ideals dominant in that society. Feminist movements argue that anorexia nervosa 
represents “a form of political defying against patriarchy. Their fasting is portrayed as 
																																																								
784 Vincenzo F. DiNicola, ‘Anorexia Multiforme: Self-Starvation in Historical and Cultural Context: II. 
Anorexia Nervosa as a Culture-reactive Syndrome’ (1990) 27 Transcultural Psychiatric Research 
Review pp.165-166. 
785  Ibid. 
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disruptive to the family and society as they disobey norms and distort beauty 
ideals”.786 
 
DiNicola states that overtime it has been established that anorexia nervosa take 
different forms and in many ways has proven to have “special meaning in modern 
western cultures”787 Note, however, that the standardized difference between hunger 
strikers and the anorexic body is the legal attitude or framework used to justify force-
feeding. In the absence of using mental health law, and justification for security 
threats (hunger strike), the question is, where does the meaning-centred anorexic body 
stand outside western culture. The challenge is to determine if like hunger strikers, 
does the meaning centred anorexic body end once their goal is fulfilled. In the case of 
the Nigerian woman, this is rather unlikely as their anorexic body is stimulated 
through experience as a cultural symbol of body discipline and control, which 
reinforces their autonomy in a patriarchal system.  Nicolas considered if the act of 
resistance is merely concealed as a hunger strike although anorexia remains within the 
domain of psychiatry. Findings in Calabar reveal that although there is a non-violent 
protestation through self-starvation, there is no contemporary politically mandated 
oppression, which is a typical feature of hunger strikers. The issues of preservation of 
bodily integrity and autonomy do not also arise in the agenda of hunger strikers, as 
their sole motivation is to fulfil a political agenda and bring awareness to the cause. 
Hunger strikers therefore fit in within a specific narrative of the political realm. 
Nicolas however points out that hunger strikers are furnished with legitimacy, which 
																																																								
786 Bill of Health, ‘What’s the Difference Between Anorexia Nervosa and Hunger Strike?’ (2015) 
available at http://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2015/09/23/whats-between-anorexia-nervosa-and-
hunger-strike/ [accessed 12th December 2018]. 
787 DiNicola, op. cit. p.165. 
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is not accorded the anorexic body.788 Invariably, “the difference lies in audience 
participation beyond a medical regime of surveillance”.789 Perhaps legitimacy comes 
by adopting a continuum dialogue which present a variation of meanings away from 
strict clinical monologue. Only then can the meaning-centred anorexic body thrive 
within their conceptions of beauty, body image and womanhood.  
 
5.3.2 Table 3 
 
The findings revealed that majority of the respondents have not been advised to go for 
medical treatment because of their thin body (78.5%); would not want to become 
thinner (83%); would not want to change their body size (63.2%); do not regret 
having anorexic body (69.3%); would not change their extremely thin body to a 
normalized body in future (57.9%); would advise their plump friends to become 
extremely thin within meaning (62%); do not feel any physical weakness as a result of 
being extremely thin (80.3%); and do not feel the urge to cover up part of their body 
out of embarrassment (66.1%).                                                          
 
The finding that these respondents with anorexic body have not been advised to go for 
medical treatment because of their thin body (78.5%) should not be surprising. They 
have earlier indicated in their responses that they do not associate their anorexic body 
with mental illness. This applies to their self-starvation. Since they do not associate 
their anorexic body with mental illness and function very well, it would not be proper 
to mandate an individual showing no sign of mental illness to go for medical 
treatment. The findings that they would not want to be thinner (83%), nor would they 
																																																								
788 DiNicolas, op. cit. p.177. 
789 Ibid. 
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want to change their body size (63.2%) show the extent of their satisfaction with their 
anorexic body. They have earlier indicated they chose their anorexic body 
consciously. They have equally consciously chosen to remain thin and so have gone 
further to declare the choice not to change their anorexic body in future (57%). These 
demonstrate their consistency in their responses that they have resolved to retain this 
anorexic body.  
 
In western cultures, the motivation to become extremely thin is often placed on the 
media tendency to equate beauty with thinness. So the adolescent becomes very 
motivated to attain that standard. Attaining that standard, therefore, is a source of 
satisfaction. These girls could have compared their size or weight with the ideal 
weight to become satisfied. The ideal weight, obviously, is the weight of the fashion 
models, ballet dancers and such others. These are the extreme thin girls the western 
societies portray as beautiful. The Nigerian adolescents and young women are not 
influenced by the same western ideals portrayed in media advertisements. Normalised 
or curvy body types dominate the read magazines. Extremely thin women do not also 
dominate the catwalks or beauty pageants. The winners’ body size or weight becomes 
the standard for these adolescents and young Nigerian women. Onyejiaku and 
Onyejiaku report that Nigerian adolescents and young women spend several hours 
before a mirror every day on body examination.790 The purpose for this examination 
is usually to detect any unusual feature that would not add to their beauty. Consistent 
body examination however does not portray body dissatisfaction or disturbance. The 
respondents in this study show body satisfaction by stating that they would not change 
their current thin body in the future, that they do not regret assuming the thin body, 
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nor do they feel the urge to cover parts of their body to avoid embarrassment. These 
are signs of contentment and satisfaction with the thin body created through self-
starvation. Moreover, the confirmation that they would not change their thin body to 
the normalised body affirms their body contentment. This confirms that they are 
conscious of their actions and therefore aware of the limit of their food restriction or 
weight control measures. May be they are conscious of the medical implications of 
exceeding certain limits. That suggests they would not go below the cut-off line or 
point for body weight of less than 85 percent of what is normal for the person’s age 
and height.791 It should be observed that even though majority of the respondents 
would not like to change their anorexic body to a normalised one in future (57.9%), 
many of them (42.1%) would do so. This also tends to confirm that they are conscious 
of their actions. The finding that the respondents do not feel any physical weaknesses 
as a result of being extremely thin (80.3%) again shows they are comfortable with the 
anorexic body and do not show the medical diagnostic consequences of self-
starvation. It is known that people who assume this extremely thin body are likely to 
suffer from anorexia nervosa, which leads to some discomfort. These include 
obsessive fear of becoming fat, suspension of menstrual periods and unrealistic body 
image.792 
 
Body dissatisfaction is a key feature of the anorexic body in western culture. The way 
the individual identifies or interacts with the body is important; however, in many 
ways consideration is also given to the way the body is perceived by the outside 
world. Contrary to the western cultures where the family usually reports the 
individual for treatment and involuntary commitment, the analysis of women in 																																																								
791 Alloy, et al, op. cit. 
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Calabar reveals a different outcome. 78.5% of individuals noted that they have not 
been advised by family or friends to seek medical treatment and would not consider 
treatment even if recommended. 62% was clear that they would not influence their 
friends to assume the anorexic body even if it is within meaning. The meaning centred 
anorexic body ideal is established on the bases of individualised experiences and 
autonomous choices therefore directly influencing another individual to assume the 
anorexic body defeats the principle.  Interestingly, results also show that an 
overwhelming 80.3% do not experience any side effects of anorexia as evidenced in 
western society. Medical diagnostic of physical characterisation of the anorexic body 
include: weakness, fragility, tiredness and inability to lead a normal life. The women 
analysed in Calabar proved completely similar and showed no evidence of frailty or 
inability to fulfil their normal obligations.   
 
 
5.3.3 Table 4                                                                 
 
The findings showed that majority of the respondents assume the anorexic body to 
take control of their body (82.3%); resist cultural oppressive regime (57.8%); express 
freedom (autonomy) over their body (73.9%); refute mental illness theory (88.1%); 
guide against previous experience of a non-thin body (61.4%); Nigerian environment 
support for freedom to control one’s body without stigma of mental illness (69.5%); 
resist the cultural ideal (regarding the plump body as a sign of beauty) (61.8%); not 
for the attraction of the opposite sex (60.8%); not for physiological and medical 
grounds (66.3%); show that anorexic body is not  mental illness (72%). That majority 
of the respondents assume the anorexic body to take control of their body (82.3%) 
suggests that some adolescents and young women are advised on the acceptable body 
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weight in their culture often imposed by cultural ideals prevalent in their 
communities. Traditionally, the African woman is defined as being beautiful when fat 
or curvy. It is customary in most African culture for a maiden or young girl to uphold 
the ideal plump body so that she can be attractive, and acceptable and presentable for 
marriage. The notion of thinness in Africa even in contemporary times is affected by 
these African understanding of a beautiful body and the traditional African perception 
of a beautiful woman. This may be the reason why anorexia nervosa manifestation is 
less pronounced in Nigeria.  
 
Marriage in these communities signifies attaining womanhood and is accepted as a 
core aspect of the culture and tradition. Nigerian mothers would therefore desire their 
daughters to marry as early as possible, especially among the lower socio-economic 
class. The fat or fleshy woman will therefore be more appealing to the suitors rather 
than the thin woman. It is therefore understandable why 82.3% of the young women 
analysed would elect to take control of their body through self-starvation as an act of 
resistance. That majority of the respondents assume the anorexic body to resist 
cultural oppressive regime (87.8%) is partially explained by their desire to control 
their body. Nevertheless, in some cultural settings in Nigeria, especially among the 
lower socio-economic class, the cultural practice demands that a young girl attains 
certain body weight specifications before marriage. An example is the fattening room 
for some adolescents among the Efiks in Cross River State in Nigeria where young 
women are forced to remain in fattening room over a period. 793  Under very 
controlling circumstances, these women are subjected to hourly consumption of food. 
Food here assumes the mantle of suppression and the body stripped of its strength.  
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The determination of women within these communities to control their body and 
resist cultural oppressive regime would be signified by food denial. Corrington asserts 
that food refusal signifies self-denial and a refusal to be dominated hence it is self-
empowering, “a triumph of the will over bodily limitations, and the forging of a new 
identity”.794 
 
As previously stated, there is no association between anorexia (extreme thinness) and 
mental illness in Nigeria. The analysis of the empirical data from Calabar confirms 
this theory. Interestingly, the sampled women do not associate anorexia nervosa with 
any other eating disorder related illness. The study in Calabar revealed that 88% of 
females refute the mental illness theory established in western medical discourse; this 
is unsurprising, as extreme thinness through self-starvation is not recognised as a 
mental illness. Although these women fulfil the criteria of anorexia in weight and size 
(BMI), other prevalent diagnostic indications of mental illness are also absent. The 
decisions to self-starve is also made voluntarily and consciously and there has been no 
record of death due to self-starvation as a resistance. Exerting self-control transcends 
bodily appetite but also extends to sexual restraints and reproductive rights. 
Controlling their body through self-starvation is a method of liberation and discipline 
enabling individualised resistance of the “prevailing values of societies which they do 
not control”.795  The desirability of the woman to the male gender is part of the 
culturally acceptable reason to uphold the fat beauty standard in Calabar. One would 
have expected women in these communities would assume the ideal standard of 
beauty to attract the opposite sex; however the outcome reveals that 61.8 percent 
reject the cultural ideal standard of beauty whereas 60.8 percent do not want to be the 																																																								
794 Gail  Corrington, ‘Anorexia, Asceticism and Autonomy: Self Control as Liberation and 
Transcendence’ (1986) 2(2) Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion pp. 60-61. 
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subject of male admiration. Invariably, assuming the anorexic body is a resistance to 
masculine dominance in determining the ideal beauty for the females. They believe 
the female body is objectified, implying desirability, thus her value is being a suitable 
pick for wife, vessel of reproduction and catering to the needs of the man.  
 
76% of the participants affirmed that they have not been subjected to any form of 
involuntary treatment for their thin body. 24.6 percent of the participants who 
recorded involuntary treatment were most likely treated without formal legal orders 
compelling them to undertake treatment against their wish. Tan et al have however 
noted that there are other ways to achieve compulsion, which might exclude legal 
means.796 In the absence a formal enforcement mechanism, involuntary treatment can 
also be achieved by compelling the individual to accept voluntary treatment without 
the clinical use of legal powers. Although there no data to suggest a record of death or 
chronic illness from self-starvation in Nigeria, general justification to implementing 
involuntary treatment is to preserve life. That majority of the respondents (61.4%) 
said they assume anorexic body to guide against previous experience of a non-thin 
body reveal that their lived experience was not favourable.  Aside from societal 
cultural imposition, there is also the negative stigmatization of fat individuals as it 
could be that these respondents might have been fat before, or observed the plight of 
such people in the society. Fat or obese people often encounter many negative 
attitudes in Nigeria and other parts of the world as lazy, weak and unproductive. They 
are seen as lazy, weak and sickly in Nigeria. Lack of body satisfaction prior to 
assuming the anorexic body could also be because of the lack of control they 
experienced whilst preserving their body in line with the womanhood ideals of their 																																																								
796 Jacinta O.A. Tan , Anne Stewart, Raymond Fitzpatrick, R. and Tony Hope, ‘Attitudes of Patients 
with Anorexia Nervosa to Compulsory Treatment and Coercion’ (2010). 33(1) International Journal of 
Law and Psychiatry pp.13-16. 
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culture. Although the ideal beauty is the curvy woman, prolonged overindulgence on 
food leads to binge eating disorder and obesity.  
 
That the Nigerian environment supports freedom for one to control her body without 
stigma of mental illness (69.5%) and freedom to express autonomous right without 
stereotype of mental illness (67%) suggest the legal and cultural differences between 
Nigeria and some other societies. Given that the Nigeria environment does not 
consider abnormal eating pattern as a mental illness should definitely motivate 
women to voluntarily assume the anorexic body, in view of the fact that self-
starvation and excessive exercise are a measure taken by the anorexic person to 
become very or extremely thin.  Nigerians in particular do not appear to fit into the 
typical profile of western bound anorexic bodies. Typically, those who try to maintain 
thin bodies through self-starvation intend to fulfil a role not imposed by patriarchal 
demands.  There is no reflection of fear of weight gain or fat phobia rather there is 
conscious engagement with their bodies within meaning and reasoning. The idea of 
body perfection does not form part of their journey, rather control and autonomous 
actions that fulfil bodily integrity resonates within the individual’s journey, which 
includes past and present experiences.  
 
Given that anorexia is not a mental illness in Nigeria’s mental health laws, it is very 
easy for clinicians to argue that anorexia is non-existent in Nigeria but mostly a 
western culture bound syndrome. However, modern anorexia is becoming more 
diversified in features and within socio-cultural and political discourses which lend 
more meaning to its multifactorial nature. The definition of anorexia around the globe 
is dependent on one crucial criterion: the BMI must be below 17.5. Once this criterion 
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is fulfilled, the individual is considered anorexic; however, western pattern adds a 
more conflicting narrative which includes fear of weight gain and body distortion. 
This fat phobia criterion is definitely a western bound feature as they have not been 
found to be a factor constituting anorexia in non-western culture. The most credible 
way to identify anorexia within non-western culture is to go with communities were 
the ideal standards of beauty are parallel to western beauty, where media influence is 
non-existent and fat phobia is not a factor to justify beauty ideals. Calabar in Nigeria 
fulfils all criteria because of its ancient tradition of the fatter, the more appealing to 
the society. Women sampled who have a BM1 of 17.5> and below voluntarily 
embark on self-starvation. It is uncommon to encounter an adverse health issues 
associated with their eating patterns and their behaviour pattern is normalised as they 
are functioning members of the society. Their anorexia is meaningful and productive 
in establishing boundaries of consent, choice and autonomy. Anorexia is centred on 
self-image, identity and the ability to function autonomously without any control or 
coercion. Accommodating the expectations of culture would fulfil the woman’s 
expected traditional roles thereby denying them control over the way their body 
changes and develops.797 Traditional (bio-medical) explanations of anorexia might be 
applicable here as the body here is analysed in a way that projects self-liberation as a 
worthy cause regardless of the entrapments of future lack of fulfilment should the 
symbol of power and control be removed.  The outcome of the studies presented a 
cultural explanation that clarified the values, which these women associate with 
anorexia nervosa. Self-denial here transcends mere ascetic purpose and individual 
identities are created to avoid the traditional roles, which a particular body shape 
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signifies.798  When the needs of autonomy are unsatisfied, the individual harbours the 
“feelings of ineffectiveness and fears of losing control”.799 Understandably, these 
women are immersed within a culture were women are considered subservient to men 
hence the need to be independent and self-defined.800 Response to curtailment of their 
liberty would attract resistance.801 Corrington therefore notes that “eating and non-
eating thus becomes a symbol of power and control; a refusal to eat is a refusal of any 
authority over the body other than one’s own”.802 
 
 
 
5. 4   Conclusive Findings   
 
From the findings of the study, the following conclusions are drawn; 
 
1. Meaning-centred anorexia exists in non-western cultures.  
2. The factors underlying self-starvation in non-western cultures do not include 
fear of weight gain and body distortion. 
3. There is no relationship between self-starvation and mental illness. The same 
applies to excessive exercise and mental illness. Invariably, self-starvation and 
excessive exercise to become thin may not lead to mental illness.        
4. Self-starvation and food refusal are regarded as means to exercise freedom of 
choice within a patriarchal society.  
5. Individualised autonomy is applicable in the absence of coercive mental health 
laws imposing involuntary treatment for the purposes of restoring weight gain.  																																																								
798 Ibid., p.52.  
799 Franzisca V. Froreich, , Lenny R. Vartanian, Matthew J. Zawadzki, Jessica R. Grisham and Stephen 
W. Touyz, ‘Psychological Need Satisfaction, Control and Disordered Eating’ (2017) 56(1) British 
Journal of Clinical Psychology pp.53-64. 
800 Corrington, op. cit., pp.52-53. 
801 Ibid. 
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6. Multiple culture bound meanings were attributed to the reasoning underlying 
the assumption of the meaning-centred anorexic body. They include, freedom 
to control their body; resisting cultural oppressive regime and expression of 
autonomy.  
7. Self-starvation and extreme thinness are not ordinarily linked to mental illness 
except when reinforced by the law  
8. The universal stereotype that extreme thin body signifies mental illness is 
devalued in non-western cultures.  
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                                      CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
                                      Involuntary Interventions  
 
 
6.  
 
The previous chapter showed that the meaning centred anorexia body can be 
voluntarily and consciously achieved through self-starvation. Hence, a meaning 
centred variation to this experience can be established. The purpose of this chapter is 
to examine the implication of treatment refusal and will address the role of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 in establishing the capacity or incapacity of the individual to 
consent to treatment. First in determination of what represents the best interest this 
chapter considers the implementation of the values and choices of the anorexic body 
during decision-making. The second part of this chapter critically examines the legal 
and ethical implications of involuntary treatment and the impact on individualised 
freedoms of expression and autonomy.  
 
 
 
6.1   Mental Capacity Act 2005 
 
The best interest principle test derives from the doctrine of necessity by the House of 
Lord in 1989.803 The codified best interest test applicable today does not consider the 
direct participation of the wishes of persons who lack capacity.804 The Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 provides the legal framework for determining the best interests for 
persons adjudged to lack capacity to make treatment decisions. The concept of best 
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interest was enhanced to safeguard the interests of people who do not have the 
capacity to make decisions regarding their medical treatment or social care. Section 4 
(6) (a) provides that in determining best interest careful consideration should be firstly 
accorded to the patient’s feelings and wishes, which includes written statement during 
periods of established capacity.805 In addition, “the beliefs and values that would be 
likely to influence his decision if he had capacity and the other factors that would be 
likely to consider if he were able to do so”.806 Theoretically, the MCA 2005 presents a 
structure to ensure that decisions made in the best interest of disordered persons must 
be efficiently implemented in a way that is less constricting on the person’s rights, 
liberty, autonomy and self-determination. The principle of best interest is very central 
in the way persons adjudged to have mental disorder are treated and managed. Section 
4(3) of the MCA 2005 provides that in determining the best interest of a patient, 
consideration must be given to the likelihood of the person regaining capacity 
regarding the issues in question and if there is a probability, then the chances are that 
capacity would be regained. 807 In retrospect, medical treatments carried out on behalf 
of these patients should not be “restrictive of the person's rights and freedom of 
action”.808 Section 4(1) of the MCA 2005 disallows any person from depriving others 
of their liberty except authorized by schedule A1 (deprivation of liberty in a hospital 
setting).809 Section 4B (1-5) however points out that the deprivation of liberty may be 
a vital act necessary for giving patients life sustaining treatment. 810  
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The provisions of MCA 2005 also engage with the implications of consent and 
advanced decision making in cases involving the treatment of persons who lack the 
capacity to consent under the act. Once incapacity has been recorded by the clinicians, 
other underlining factors are not explored further to establish a better relationship 
between the person and the courts. It then becomes the duty of the courts after 
evaluating the facts of the case to determine whether and to what extent a person’s 
capacity to consent has been compromised by their mental illness. When a person is 
adjudged to lack the capacity to consent to being force-fed, then the decision on what 
is in her best interest will arise.  Ordinarily, the courts are more concerned with 
circumstances in which it might be lawful to withhold from a patient’s medical 
treatment or care by what means of which his or her life may be prolonged. One of 
the founding principles of medical law is that consent must be given prior to treating 
any competent adult. The sole aim of consent under medical law is not to act as a 
defense in itself but as a vital component in administering medical treatment.811 
Maclean notes that medical treatment cannot be legitimized unless consent is 
voluntarily given,812 however in practice adult persons established to be incompetent 
can be treated without obtaining the prerequisite consent under the MCA 2005.813 For 
consent to be given by the anorexic body, the individuals must first possess the 
capacity to consent; the individuals must also offer her consent voluntarily and must 
have a great understanding of the medical treatment for which they intend to consent 
to.814 Consent under the MCA 2005 can be applied in a legal, moral and clinical 
capacity. 815 Jackson asserts that legally unlawful practices can become lawful once 
																																																								
811 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1994] 1 AC 212. 
812 Maclean, op. cit., pp .45. 
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consent is obtained. As a moral obligation, obtaining consent ensures the respect for 
the right to self-determination and clinically “a patient will make it easier to treat her, 
her cooperation may contribute towards the treatment success”.816 
 
Overtime, the MCA 2005 established a structure for considering the capacity of a 
person to participate in his or her own decision-making.  Section 3 of the MCA 2005 
provides a guideline to assess the decision-making capacity of an individual. Section 
3 (1) of the MCA 2005 states that an individual is unable to make decisions for 
themselves when they are unable to show understanding, retain or  “use or weigh that 
information as part of decision, or to communicate his decision (whether by talking, 
using sign language or any other means)”.817 In Re T (Adult Refusal of Medical 
Treatment), Lord Donaldson affirmed that: “the right to decide one’s own fate 
presupposes a capacity to do so. Every adult is presumed to have that capacity but it is 
presumption that can be rebutted.”818 The MCA 2005 however presumes that all 
people have the capacity to make their own treatment decisions except incapacity is 
otherwise established.819 Incapacity can therefore be established if at the time of 
decision-making the person is unable to make decisions for themselves because of an 
existing impairment of the mind or brains or a disorder in the way the mind or brain 
functions notwithstanding the temporal or permanent nature of the disorder. 820  
Implementing the provisions of the MCA 2005 ensures that individuals lacking the 
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prerequisite capacity to make their own decision are safeguarded during the process 
of implementing decisions on their behalf.821 
S.3.14 (1) of the 1995 Mental Incapacity Law Commission report identifies incapacity 
as present when the person suffering from any form of disorder of the mind and brain 
results to an impairment in their ability to understand a decision made on their behalf 
or reason rationally so as to make a balanced decision based on the information 
provided to them.822 S.3.14(2) notes that incapacity can also be shown when the 
person is “unable to communicate a decision on that matter because he or she is 
unconscious or for any other reason”.823 To establish an inability for a person to make 
critical decisions, section 3 (a-d) of the MCA 2005 stipulates that it must be 
established that the person is unable to evaluate, utilize, comprehend, recall or 
remember the necessary information required during decision making.  The patient 
must also be able to efficiently convey his decisions through speech, sign language or 
through any other medium. 824   A patient cannot also be treated as having 
incompetence except all these necessary steps have been fulfilled without any 
progress or success.825 Section 24-25 of the MCA 2005826 lays down the general 
principles, validity and applicability for accessing an advance decision. The 
assessment should always begin and include respect for the person’s autonomy and 
over all wishes.  
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The provisions of the MCA 2005 reveal emerging outlines in the way the principles 
of autonomous rights are viewed in line with current mental health of the person. 
Although the emerging status of the disordered individual under the MCA 2005 
presents a structural balance in treatment enforcement however the medical motive in 
applying the capacity test is subjected to a new lens of debate. Section 1 of the MCA 
2005 captures its purpose or relevance. The MCA 2005 protects people who lack the 
capacity. Theoretically, individuals who lack capacity are to be allowed to participate 
in decision making which affect them. Clinicians are therefore directed to provide the 
enabling environment to offer the needed protection by ensuring achievable goals are 
met.827  For the purposes of fulfilling the MCA 2005, section 1(2) of act removes the 
stereotypical presumptions of incapacity except otherwise established. Invariably, in 
acknowledging the assumed capacity of all persons,828 the individual is therefore 
within their right to make decisions regarding their treatment.829 Realistic steps must 
therefore be implemented to ensure that they are not regarded as lacking the ability to 
fulfill their obligation.830 A bad or irresponsible decision does not equate incapacity 
and therefore cannot be treated as lacking the capacity to make decision.831 Third 
party decision on behalf of a person adjudged to lack capacity must then be within 
their best interest. 832  In all situations, unconsented treatment procedures must 
therefore be made “in a way that is less restrictive of the person’s rights and freedom 
of action”.833  The intention of the MCA 2005 is to offer some level of protection for 
individuals who lack capacity, however the challenge is not in the theoretical 
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understanding but practical implication especially within the framework that 
accommodates the provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983. The Mental Health Act 
1983 already established that individuals adjudged to lack capacity have no 
competence or ability to participate in their own decision-making. Whereas on the 
other hand, the MCA 2005 recognises capacity and provides an assessment to 
actualizing those autonomous goals regardless of the adjudged incapacity. There is 
therefore a dissention in the trajectories of implementing both frameworks.  
 
The approach of the English courts in assessing the capacity or incapacity of a 
person suffering from anorexia to make treatment decisions is not simple or 
straightforward. Mental capacity cases involving the anorexic person are difficult 
because of the complexity that arises in assessing what is in their best interest on 
one end and their capacity or incapacity to make a balanced decision that reflects 
their best interest on the other. The diagnosis of anorexia nervosa, which is a form 
of mental illness automatically, places assessment for treatment of this illness in the 
hands of a third party (usually a treatment practitioner or the courts for the purposes 
of enforcing clinical decision). Invariably these third parties may only enforce 
treatments deemed to be in the patient's best interests, which may or may not 
include the values, wishes and expectations of the patient.  Moreover, in cases 
where the patient withholds their consent to receive any form of treatment stipulated 
by treatment professional, the patient is viewed as lacking the mental capacity to 
make the decision ab initio. At the critical stages of their physical deterioration, 
patient’s denial of the illness, or ambivalence regarding the severity of the eating 
disorder, is frequently taken as a demonstration of a lack of capacity required in 
giving valid consent. This automatically strips them of their rights to participate in 
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treatment decisions and diminishes their chances of having their wishes put in 
consideration during capacity assessments. John Coggon points out that the 
provisions of the MCA 2005, the common law and other substitutes aim to include 
the standards and morals of the patient in decision making on their capacity834  
however in the event this rule is disregarded as in the case of A Local Authority v E, 
the courts has to furnish a balanced reason for exercising their discretion in this 
manner.835  
In A Local Authority v E, a 32-year old intelligent woman grew up in an 
exceptionally happy and loving home with parents and siblings who cared about her 
and protected her welfare.836 However, at the tender ages of eleven and fourteen, E 
experienced sexual abuse which triggered her to start a pattern of eating little, 
inducing herself to vomit after a meal and alcohol abuse.837 This resulted to serious 
health complications and the danger of sudden death having refused to eat or drink 
large quantity of water. The issues for determination before the court were not to 
establish if E lacked mental capacity prior to the hearing of the case but E’s capacity 
at the instant the case was presented to the court.838 There is an underlying 
implication that the anorexic will give their informed consent to treatment or accept 
treatment wholeheartedly. If informed consent to start re-feeding willingly is given, 
self-starvation would not have been resorted to in the first instance and hence there 
would be no need for the intervention of the law.839 Another dimension presented by 
the clinicians involved E’s capacity to make advanced decision to reject any 																																																								
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treatment intended to preserve life. Advanced decisions are usually made when a 
person possesses the capacity to make those decisions. The circumstances under 
consideration at that point during the advanced decision making are usually specific 
and are intended to be extended to the periods of their incapacity. However, S.24 (b) 
states that treatment should be discontinued once the person “lacks capacity to 
consent to the carrying out of the treatment”.840  
To obtain consent, the MCA 2005 provides that consideration must also be given to 
the persons “past and present wishes and feelings”, “beliefs and values” and other 
external factors such as advanced decisions and written statements.841  Advanced 
decisions enable people with capacity who anticipate any form of incapacitation in 
the future to make decisions refusing involuntary intervention. 842  Section 24 
provides that an advanced decision is applicable when it is made by a person who is 
18 years and above when he “has capacity to do so”.  Thus advanced decisions may 
affect future “specified” treatments proposed to be carried out or continued by a 
person providing health care for him. Advanced decisions can also be “withdrawn 
or changed” so far the person still has the capacity to do so.843 An advanced 
decision has to also be valid and “applicable” to the treatment in question and such 
decision cannot be withdrawn the time he had the capacity to do so.844 For an 
advanced decision to be valid, it must be signed by the patient and witnessed by 
another person in his presence. The witness must also sign and acknowledge his 
signature in the presence of the patient.845 An advanced decision is therefore not 
applicable during life sustaining treatments unless the patient can reiterate that the 																																																								
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treatment in their advanced decision must be applied even if they are in danger of 
losing their life.846 A person who believes and is contented that an advance decision 
exists and is valid and therefore withdraws or discontinues treatment of a patient as 
written in their advanced decision would not be held liable.847  It is however at the 
discretion of the court to make a declaration on the validity, existence and 
applicability of an advanced treatment decision.848  
The advanced decision must have been made when the individual was adjudged to 
have the mental capacity however if those advanced decision to refuse treatment is 
made within periods of incapacity, then enforcing unconsented feeding would be 
within their best interest.  The implementation of a person’s advanced decision is 
very potent in addressing and ascertaining the mental capacity of the individual. 
Advanced decisions reflect the conscious wishes, values, morals and choices of the 
individual, which ought to be enforceable at the time they lack capacity to continue 
to make those decisions. The decision of the court in A Local Authority v E to 
disregard E’s advanced decision and direct for continual force-feeding has raised 
ethical questions.849 E’s advanced decision declining resuscitation or administering 
any more therapy to preserve life was a subject of deliberation, E having been 
admitted under the Mental Health Act, was continuously force-fed and subjected to 
unbearable pain. Although the medical team established that the advanced decision 
of E was made within the periods she possessed capacity.850  
The judge decided that E lacked the capacity to make the July 2011 advanced 
decision evidenced by E’s conscious attempt to place herself in a position that made 																																																								
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such decision valid.851 Although the judge accepted that the October 2011 written 
directive was legally valid however the subsequent detention of E under the Mental 
Health Act on the same day as the directive was made throws a balance of uncertainty 
on her capability to have made such advanced decision. In rejecting the enforceability 
of E’s advanced decision, Mr Justice Jackson stated:   
 
“In the light of prior conclusion that E did not have capacity to 
make the October advance decision, it is unnecessary to decide 
whether she has done something clearly inconsistent with 
remaining fixed decision. E’s actual behaviour in refusing food 
has been entirely inconsistent with her decision and I would 
have been reluctant to conclude that her decision was 
undermined by trusting statements about what are bound to be 
deeply mixed feelings.”852           
                                                               
The judge questioned this decision on the grounds that although E showed 
competency at the time the advanced decision was made however E’s behavior 
afterwards showed inconsistency and therefore incompatible with section 25(2) of 
the MCA 2005.853  In reality if the advanced decision of the individual, which 
contains their conscious wishes, values and choices, cannot be upheld, then finding 
a balance that can protect the autonomous decision of the individual is crucial for 
advancing rights. The denial of E’s rights to refuse further medical treatment as 
evidenced in her advanced decision reflects the courts dual failure to guarantee 																																																								
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autonomous actions and individual freedom at the point of capacity and incapacity. 
Coggon notes that the case of E reveals the lack of clarity and concrete directive 
from the courts on how decisions of incapacity are reached.854 It is critical that in 
denying a persons advanced decision made within the periods of their capacity that 
there is “clear and rational basis” for how decisions of incapacity and capacity are 
reached.855 The focus often ends with a debate if autonomy should supersede 
welfare in the sense that in the fulfilment of their autonomous rights, one has to 
forgo the right to safeguard her life even with the decision arrived at. 
Notwithstanding, it is evident that the finding of incapacities relating to anorexia 
nervosa has become “inexplicable, incoherent or inconsistent”.856 If the anorexic 
body is deemed vulnerable, the potential for exploiting their vulnerability by the 
public institutions are very high.857 A good and balanced judgment will reflect 
flexibility by ensuring core participation, show a meaning centered thinking in 
analyzing actions and understanding the values and morals underlying every 
decision.   
Sokol points out that capacity and best interests are “slippery concepts” and remains 
undefined.858 The balance between establishing best interests of E in this instant was 
weighed on the intuition or intuitive thinking of the judge.859 Reference to intuition 
may simply allude to the open ending nature of defining what actually constitutes 
best interests and in the case of E, it was balanced on the judge’s views at the 
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time.860 For a person who made their conscious decision to refuse treatment that 
advanced decision reflects their best interest in many ways. Regardless of the 
capacity E has shown by having the ability to retain and process information at the 
time of making the advanced decision, it appears that paternalistic intervention to 
preserve life will always precede autonomous choices. Emphatically E did not make 
a choice to die or ask to exercise her right to die, rather E sought to implement her 
right to refuse the involuntary force-feeding which was causing her unbearable pain. 
The right to die represents seeking euthanasia through means of voluntary or 
assisted death whereas the right to refuse involuntary medical treatment tilts the 
balance of decision making towards respecting the values and autonomous choices 
of the individual regardless of the final outcome. Sokol notes that scale of 
determination of best interest falls in the route of enforcing palliative, however “the 
violence, duration and trauma of force feeding, the grim prognosis, and E’s clearly 
articulated wishes (even without legal capacity) trump, in my view, the preservation 
of life and other factors in the list.”861 
The accumulated reasoning for E’s self-starvation was embedded in her childhood 
experiences of sexual violence. The necessity to resort to food restriction cannot be 
validly ascribed to the presence of a mental disorder. Invariably, resorting to self-
starvation was evidenced after a traumatic experience. In an attempt to separate the 
mental disorder evidenced by self-starvation, it will also mean that clinicians have to 
evidence that sexual violence resulted in E’s development of anorexia. The 
experience in itself shaped E’s values, and choices in regaining the control of her 
body in a way that is inconsistent with the medical acceptance. For a meaningful 
																																																								
860 Ibid. 
861 Ibid. 
	 247	
disease to occur, there must be causative action guided by an experience that 
necessities the reasoning behind self-starvation and the reactive outcome of the 
physically anorexic body. Ideally assessing the mental capacity or incapacity of the 
anorexic body should include or reflect their ideals, values, choices, wishes, morals 
and expectations however to fulfill or incorporate such ideals during capacity 
assessment or critical treatment decision-making is very problematic from clinicians 
and the court. This is because the diagnosis of anorexia nervosa is already presented 
within the label of severe mental disorder and therefore places assessment for 
treatment of this illness in the hands of a third party (usually a treatment practitioner 
or the courts for the purposes of enforcing clinical decision). Invariably these third 
parties may only enforce treatment deemed to be in the patient's best interests, which 
may or may not include the values, wishes and expectations of the patient.  Moreover, 
in cases where the patient withholds their consent to receive any form of treatment 
stipulated by treatment professional, the patient is invariably viewed as lacking the 
mental capacity to make the decision ab initio. At the critical stages of this illness, 
patient’s denial of the illness, or ambivalence regarding the severity of the eating 
disorder, is frequently taken as a demonstration of lack of capacity required for valid 
consent.862  This automatically strips them of their rights to participate in treatment 
decisions and diminishes their chances of having their wishes put in consideration 
during capacity assessments. Coggon points out that if the provisions of the MCA 
2005, the common law and other substitutes all aim to include the standards and 
morals of the patient in decision making on their capacity. In the event this rule is 
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disregarded as in the case of A Local Authority v E, the courts have to furnish a 
balanced reason for exercising their discretiom in this manner.863 
In answering the question of whether E at the time of judgement had the mental 
capacity to make such decision, Mr Justice Jackson Peter noted that E could fully 
communicate, understand, process information and retain as stipulated under section 
3(1) of the Mental Capacity Act.864 However, E’s eating disorder has left her brain 
impaired and unable to make the appropriate decision for herself as her fear of weight 
gain supersedes her better judgement. Against this background, Mr Justice Jackson 
Peter made the decision that E lacked the capacity under sections 2 and 3 of the MCA 
2005 to make life sustaining decision in her current state 865 However, the exact 
criteria for assessing E’s mental capacity seemed to be based on the mental disorder 
classification rather than if she was capable of assuming those roles.   Declaring E as 
lacking capacity to make treatment decision seemed to doubt her beliefs and 
undermine her values. Glover-Thomas  tentatively viewed anyone suffering from 
anorexia nervosa as having no capacity therefore unable to make those decisions.  E’s 
parents questioned Glover-Thomas’s conclusion stating that:  
“It seems strange to us that only people who don’t seem to have 
a right to die when there is no longer appropriate treatment 
available are those with an eating disorder. This is based on the 
assumption that they can never have capacity around any issues 
connected to food. There is a logic to this, but not from the 
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perspective of a sufferer who is not extended the same rights as 
any other person”.866  
Glover-Thomas points out that administering medical treatment is only unlawful and 
may be classified as a crime of battery if the individual has the capacity or is adjudged 
as being conscious and having sound mind”.867 With anorexia classified as a mental 
disorder, for the purposes of administering the MCA 2005, the anorexic body is 
classed as disabled. The Equality Act 2010 identifies a person with disability as 
having “a physical or mental impairment, and the impairment has a substantial and 
long-term adverse effect on P’s ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities”.868 It 
has been long established that the standard anorexic body is able to carry out her daily 
functions and presents no intention to die. Glover-Thomas explains that the freedom 
to make autonomous decisions regarding our bodies and the right to bodily integrity is 
accepted in all democratic societies. A presumption exists that all adults of sound 
mind may accept and reject medical treatment irrespective of the foreseeable 
consequences. The law however is not absolute in this instance as the courts have the 
discretion to make a decision based on factual information from third parties who 
offer a different viewpoint from the patient’s. Hence, once the individual is 
considered to lack the required mental capacity to make a balanced physical treatment 
choice, such right of decision-making can be withdrawn from the individual869 by 
relying on the evidence brought by E’s parents, consultant psychiatrists, medical, 
social workers and legal professionals.  
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Kong, et al note that the MCA 2005 is formulated with a “best interests model 
decision making”, it is yet to fully actualize the rights conferred on it.870  Failing to 
fully realize empowering ethos setting, there is continuous deliberations on applying 
capacity and best interest under the MCA 2005 especially concerning the level of 
participation or value that should be accorded to an individual in decision making.871 
However, Kong, et al interpreted the MCA 2005 within a value-based setting 
designed to empower persons who are the subject of proceedings.872 Adapting the 
MCA 2005  with the intention of adding value will mean that the principles of 
autonomy are protected as the subjective wishes and feelings are taken into 
consideration during decision-making.  The feelings and wishes of the individuals are 
however grounded by their experiences, whether meaningful interactions or traumatic 
endeavour. Each experience lends a contribution to the individualized goals, 
aspirations and choices that reflect their decisions.  Clinicians and the courts evaluate 
person actions without identifying the underlining meanings behind their action. For 
instance, food refusal in itself is an action, values precede the actions but the meaning 
presents the motive to engage further and sustain the reaction or outcome in anorexic 
body were detention and force-feeding do not equal recovery or present a solution to 
self-starvation. Administering a meaning centred participation will enable clinicians 
protect the principles of autonomy by making the experiences that sustain the 
anorexic body’s action as part of fulfilling their values and wishes. Although in 
theory, the value-based approach seeks to ensure that the wishes and feeling of the 
persons are included in the decisions of best interests however in reality “the strict 
interpretation typically evokes a problematic separation between ascertaining a 																																																								
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person’s values (however conceptualized) from her actual participation, based on a 
literal interpretation of discrete and separable obligation”.873 The inconsistency in the 
practical implementation of the MCA  2005 has prompted considerations on how best 
to ensure that the normative guidelines that appeal to the individual’s best interest are 
adhered to. Kong et al suggested a value-based approach which interlinks with the 
objectives of the CRPD. According to Kong et al: 
 
“The normative shift in the MCA and CRPD resides in the 
importance of protecting and promoting the decision-making 
autonomy of individuals with disabilities through the provision 
of necessary participatory mechanisms and supports that 
encourage their active involvement in deliberations regarding 
their care and treatment”.874 
 
Invariably, with the emergence of the CRPD, attention is drawn to best pathway for 
the MCA 2005 to compliment the CRPD. Article 1 of the CRPD identifies disabled 
persons as having difficulty integrating fully into the society due to their long-
standing “physical, mental, and intellectual or sensory impairment”.875  The preamble 
of the CRPD reaffirms the “need for persons with disabilities to be guaranteed their 
full enjoyment without discrimination”. Discrimination based on impairment 
therefore violates their “inherent dignity and worth”.876 Craigie asserts that the CRPD 
“forces a reconsideration of the principle of respect for a patients autonomy” by 
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extending decision making capacity to mentally disabled persons who are subjected to 
third party decision makers and by highlighting the need for support by actualizing 
the patient’s autonomy thereby confronting the conceptual interpretation of 
capacity.877 The CRPD recognizes the urgency in safeguarding and promoting human 
rights including “the importance for the persons with disabilities of their individual 
autonomy and independence, including the freedom to make their own choices.”878 
Article 1 notes that the purpose of the CRPD is to ensure that the inherent dignity of 
the disabled are respected, guaranteeing that they have “full equal enjoyment of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms”.879 Concerning the CRPD, the reoccurring 
deliberations regarding the influence of the MCA 2005 presents a narrative of the 
empowerment of disabled individuals.880 Decided cases post MCA 2005 has not 
particularly demonstrated a clear evolution of the judicial framework in enforcing 
treatment without engaging the wishes, values and decisions of the person.881 
 
 In NHS v L,882 Ms L was severely malnourished weighing a little over three stones at 
the time the declaration before the courts was pursued. L, a bright intelligent 29-years 
old, suffered from the most severe form of anorexia and was receiving treatment in an 
NHS Trust operated university hospital from March 2012. Despite being subjected to 
the best medical treatment by Anorexia Nervosa experts, Ms L’s body weight 
continued to reduce drastically to as little as three stones. Given the severity of Ms 
L’s malnourished state, treatment professionals were of the opinion that forcibly re-
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feeding L would have little or no impact in her recovery or preserving her life.883 
There was also an indication that Ms L’s life cannot be prolonged by artificial 
nutrition, which is a necessary form of treatment for these purposes. Therefore 
reversing Ms L’s malnourished state by forcibly re-feeding her provides the only faint 
possibility of reversing her weight loss and preserving her life.884 The NHS Trust 
applied for a declaration at the court for protection regarding the mental capacity of L 
to engage in treatment decisions and that force-feeding was in her best interest. NHS 
Trust also raised the issue of the capacity of L to consent to involuntary treatment. 
The judge relying on the facts and evidence of Glover-Thomas concluded that L 
lacked the capacity to make any decision that relates to her nutrition, hydration and 
general medical treatment.885  Ms Justice King noted that in order to determine what 
is in the best interest of anorexic patient, such determination must be carried out in 
pursuance of section 4 of the MCA 2005. All the relevant circumstances surrounding 
the illness of the patient must also be taken into consideration.886 Ms Justice King 
ruled that it would be in the best interests of L to be provided with both medical 
treatment, nutrition and hydration which might include nasogastric tube feeding 
however such treatment should not be administered using physical force or without 
her consent. The judge also ruled that should L’s illness deteriorate any further to the 
extent of it being terminal, protective steps should be followed to preserve her dignity 
whilst committing her to palliative care until at such time her life ends.887 
 
The medical narrative in NHS Trust v L insists that once an impairment is established, 
enforced treatment is within the person’s best interest, in order to save life or ensure 																																																								
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an improvement/ prevent deterioration in health. In severe anorexia nervosa, capacity 
can be compromised in all areas due to the lack of or fluctuating insight, or 
occasionally organically - impaired cognitive function.  In severe chronic cases, 
capacity becomes central as clinicians; patients and carers face difficult questions 
over treatability and what is in the patient’s best interest. This also begs the question 
whether a diagnosis of a mental disorder such as anorexia nervosa is sufficient to 
justify the use of compulsory powers.  Clough notes that in practice a presumption 
already exists that the anorexic body lacks the capacity to reject involuntary 
intervention.888 Lack of capacity cannot therefore be established by the way a person 
looks, presents himself or by placing significance on a behavioural defect of a person, 
which raises unjustifiable and unfair suppositions about his capacity.889 Case law 
demonstrates little by the way of developing legal understanding of the complexity of 
anorexia and the impact on the abilities of those with the condition. Constantly 
establishing the incapacity of the anorexic body demonstrates the incompatibility of 
the MCA 2005 with the provisions of the CRPD.890 Kong et al notes that there are still 
no uniform arrangement in the implementation of the empowering tenets of the MCA 
2005 with relevance to Article 12 of the CRPD which affirms “equal recognition 
before the law”.891 Article 12 (2) recognizes that “persons with disabilities enjoy legal 
capacity on equal basis with others in all aspects of life”.892  To fully realise the 
objective and intention of the MCA 2005, priority should shift to the restrictions on 
the anorexic body to express their autonomy to refuse intervention. A more balanced 
mechanism for judicial proceeding would focus on their best interest being inclusive 
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of their experiences, values, decisions and wishes, which should take precedence in 
judicial decision-making.  
 
Since the introduction of the CRPD, there have been intensified demands for 
supported decision-making, which align with the notion of autonomy. 893  The 
interpretation of the CRPD enabled a change from the strict legal narratives towards 
extending greater freedom by validating their ability to make their own decisions thus 
removing the sole decision making from substituted authority. If the provisions of the 
CRPD is intended to support decisions of individuals deemed unable to do so then the 
question will arise regarding how best can the best interest of the individual be 
supported during interventions. 894  One way of validated support is by medical 
professionals accepting and allowing the decision and choices of the person regardless 
of how rational or irrational they appear. By relinquishing decision-making authority, 
medical practitioners will transfer control to the individual as sole decision-makers in 
the invasion of their bodily integrity.895  However, support by medical practitioners 
will be administered in form of supervised influence in the way the person’s decisions 
are formulated and implemented. Craigie recognises that a balanced medico-legal 
approach would encourage self-expression not at the expense of suppressing 
freedom.896 Interpreting how best to support the wishes and values of the person is not 
easily arrived at and in practice, it might entail extending the liberty to fulfill their 
wishes and choices by influencing a person to make better choices and decision, 
however there is still the likelihood the person’s autonomy might be undermined.897 
Huxtable however recognises that not only are the current medical terrain complex 																																																								
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but so are emerging persons with mental disorders, it will therefore be unrealistic to 
uphold strict value systems with a compromise that can reintroduce the wishes, 
choices and decisions of the persons at the center stage.898 In fulfilling the question of 
autonomy, medical narrative would first establish if the patient wants the intervention. 
Once autonomy is established, there is then the question of whether the supposed 
intervention is in her best interest and then further implication of public interest is 
taken into full account.899  Autonomy should therefore not be regarded as non-existent 
where welfare is significant. The welfare of the individual should be a reflection of 
how well their autonomous values are determined.900 
 
The intention of the CRPD should not be over-stretched beyond recognizing that 
disabled individuals do possesses equal rights, though there is a huge reliance on the 
state to implement and actualize these rights.901 CRPD is therefore not intended to 
force the compliance of the courts to permit the values and wishes of the individual. 
The meaningful nature of their self-starvation establishes value and choice, which 
provides solid bases to establish mental capacity. The CRPD therefore only offers a 
reinforcement of established pathways that the court would adhere to in other to 
ensure the safe guard of human rights. Current judicial decisions only further strict 
paternalistic enhancing procedures, which focus on granting permissions for self-
expression rather than building on the inherent freedoms of the individual regardless 
of their psycho-social or mental status. For the application of best interests to reflect a 
balance between the MCA 2005 and the CRPD, the question is not on how the courts 
can grant the wishes of the person to be included in their own decision-making and 																																																								
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the impact of such decisions on the court process. Rather a meaning centered 
approach, which ensures that decision-making is decentralized in a way that allows 
the anorexic body to be the key participant determination of treatment option and 
declining intervention does not result to the conclusion of incapacity.  In securing the 
best interest of anorexic body adjudged to lack capacity, focus should be placed on 
individualized voice of the person, which validates their choice of refusing 
involuntary intervention. Coggon recognizes the need for the law to evolve in practice 
by attributing the same weight to those who have capacity and those deemed to lack 
the capacity to make decisions.902 Revision of the law in totality may be a far stretch 
however correctly interpreting the law to reflect a balance between the intertwined 
medical and legal control alongside the subjective directive of what represents the 
person’s best interest.903 Whether capacity is established or not, implementing a 
mechanism that ensures that their meaningful preferences are adhered to, only then 
can the presumed incapacity of the anorexic body be silenced.904 
 
6.2  Involuntary Treatments 
 
The DSM-5 is predominantly viewed as a clinical tool,905 intended to establish 
medical guidelines by stipulating the psychiatric diagnostic criteria for clinicians to 
identify, evaluate and proffer treatment for distinct mental disorders.906  The revised 
5th edition (2013) created a classification of mental disorder907 and is currently the 																																																								
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“dominant psychiatric system used around the world”.908  The DSM categorical 
classification system is in line with the official coding system of the World Health 
Organisation’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD) 909 . In addition to 
providing for a diagnostic criterion for anorexia nervosa, the DSM-5 also sets 
guidelines for clinical evaluation of body weight margins to assist clinical evaluation 
and ultimate differentiation between a healthy body and the ‘sick’ body.910 Treatment 
professionals therefore rely on the factors identified in the DSM-5 and by extension 
the ICD for identifying the behavioural patterns or symptoms needed to deconstruct 
both what consists of the mental elements and the physical indicators as a result of 
starvation. The DSM’s careful corresponding with the ICD reconciles the attitude for 
clinical approach in involuntary treatment of persons whose diagnosis fulfil the 
highlighted behavioural patterns or diagnostic symptoms of anorexia. However only 
the most obvious symptoms are recognized during clinical diagnosis thereby 
understating the cluster of less prominent symptoms, which in retrospect should form 
the core basis of symptoms that fulfil the diagnostic criteria. In this regard, the DSM 
classification reveals a variation of structural problems most related to the lack of 
recognition of other multiple indicators which might be present due to a person 
suffering from multiple illness at once. Questions arise on the best approach to 
effectively dissect a cluster of disorders to “maximize their validity and clinical 
utility”. 911  
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Assessing the competence of an individual to make their own treatment decision has 
both ethical and legal implications.912 Douzenis and Michopoulos recognise that the 
controversy around the care and management of individuals with eating disorder 
revolves around their refusal of psychiatric treatment and hospitalisation.913 Research 
outcome reveals the impact of coercing an individual to accept treatment against their 
will. The impact of voluntary treatment often occasioned with the use of force when 
necessary is severe and individuals do not sustain any long benefits.914 In NHS v X, 
Dr. A considered involuntary treatments as “clinically inappropriate, 
counterproductive and increasingly unethical.”915 Involuntary treatments were shown 
not to be effective in addressing the underlying anorexia of Ms. X. The treatment 
professionals unanimously agreed that involuntarily treating X would include 916 
“painful, invasive and wholly unwelcomed procedures for X, but would be pointless 
in terms of achieving long-term treatment”.917 Involuntarily feeding X would only 
provide a very faint possibility of reversing her weight loss and preserving her life.918 
At that stage, it has become evident that the involuntary treatment mechanism relied 
upon by medical practitioners and the law lacked the overall ability to necessitate full 
recovery or protect the best interest of the individual.   
 
Douzenis and Michopoulous therefore argue that although there exists a possibility 
for preservation of life, however there is a greater likelihood of abandoned treatment. 
Lack of clarity surrounding diagnostic boundaries provides the unhinged paternalistic 
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913 Athanasios Douzenis, and Loannis. Michopoulous ‘Involuntary Admission: The Case of Anorexia 
Nervosa’ (2015) 39 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry pp.31-35. 
914 Ibid. 
915 NHS v X [2014] EWCOP 35, para 3. 
916 NHS v X para 4. 
917 Ibid. 
918 Ibid. 
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freedom for treatment practitioners to explore depths of mental deterioration with 
ethical significance. It is acknowledged that it is unlawful to impose treatment on 
competent individuals. Acts of involuntary treatment on individuals considered 
competent may result in criminal charges of battery and “tort of trespass”.919 The use 
of force and restraint is traditionally connected with crime and criminal handling; it 
poses a legal wrong to apply such force on individuals or adults outside the confines 
of statutes and common law. Section 64 a(b) of the Mental Health Act 1983 provides 
that medical treatment should be solely for “the mental disorder from which the 
patient is suffering”.920 There is therefore no clarification for imposing treatment to 
correct the physical disorder. Bridgman notes that the undefined boundaries between 
what constitutes a physical disorder and mental disorder have enabled ”the courts to 
utilise this section and declare that some treatments (including reasonable restraint) 
would be lawful despite the patient’s refusal”.921     
 
The mental health laws already provide the free hand for clinicians to approach 
decision making with no overwhelming need to engage with the multifactorial 
meanings underling the anorexic body. When decision-making capacity is not 
established, paternalistic intervention is eminent.  Dworkin describes paternalism as 
the use of personal coercion and interference with a person’s freedom of action 
“justified by reason referring exclusively to welfare”.922 Brain Mckinstry points out 
that majority of proponents of paternalism describes paternalism as a situation when 
the doctor does not undertake the consent of the patient; believing consent was given 
																																																								
919 Bridgman, op. cit. 
920 Mental Capacity Act 1983, S 64(a-b). 
921 Bridgman, op. cit. 
922 Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge, Cambridge Press 1988) p. 2. 
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automatically and therefore sees no need to seek consent from the patient. 923 
Mckinstry explains that a doctor however acts paternalistically when he or she comes 
to the realization that consent would not be given by the patient but progresses to treat 
the patient to fulfil the welfare interest. Medical treatment decisions in anorexic cases 
are a matter of clinical judgement and judicial proceeding has shown to be tilted in 
favour of clinical judge thus furthering stereotypes and assumptions. Medical 
practitioners were solely vested with the duty to make the delicate decision on 
whether to impose treatment methods such as nasogastric feeding, and other invasive 
approaches, which in retrospect do not include the values, wishes or consent of the 
person. The challenge is to establish a balanced decision which values a patient’s best 
interest on one hand and prevents any form of damages arising from lack of nutrition 
on the other.924 
 
Medical treatment of the anorexic body involves compulsory hospitalization, use of 
physical restraint and force-feeding.925 In Riverdale Mental Health NHS Trust v Fox, 
an ex parte order was granted allowing the force-feeding of the anorexic person in 
accordance with section 145 of the Mental Health Act.  Force-feeding was considered 
a treatment for mental disorder although section 145 (F33) of the act provides that 
medical treatment should only include “nursing, psychological intervention and 
specialist mental health habilitation, rehabilitation and care”.926  In NHS v L, Ms L 
was subjected to nasogastric tube feeding as part of the medical treatment for her 
																																																								
923 Brian Mckinstry, ‘Paternalism and the Doctor-Patient Relationship in Practice’ (1992) 42(361) 
British Journal of General Practice pp. 340-341. 
924 Tomas J. Silber ‘Treating of Anorexia Nervosa against the Patient’s Will: Ethical Considerations’ 
(2011) 22 Adolesc Medical State Article Review pp. 283-288. 
925 Re C (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 F.L.R. 
926 Riverdale Mental Health NHS Trust v Fox 1994]1 FLR 614, 619). 
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eating disorder.927 Force-feeding L via a nasogastric or PEG tube was achieved using 
chemical sedation against L’s wishes. Re-feeding and forceful detention was 
authorised and considered a valid medical treatment in Re C (Detention: Medical 
Treatment).928  The complexities involved in treating and managing an anorexic 
patient are gradually emerging from obscurity to better understanding in the fields of 
medicine, psychiatry and law.929  Clinicians have also established that most critical 
stages of anorexia nervosa have severe impact on the psychological, emotional, social 
and economic wellbeing of a sufferer. There is however no misconception that this 
form of mental illness has been proclaimed by clinicians as severe, relentless930 and 
can invariably result to very significant medical impairment, disability and death.931 
The medical consequences are grave and in severe cases can lead to death. In cases 
where a person succumbs to this disorder, it is difficult to determine what method of 
treatment could aid recovery and restore the sufferer to their previous healthy state. 
Prolific cases of persons who voluntarily succumb to starvation and how they are 
treated or cared for against their will has been one of the core reason of research into 
anorexia nervosa.  
 
Treating or managing this form of mental illness is therefore by no means a 
straightforward process and in most cases involves a multiple approach from diverse 
fields. For a person diagnosed with anorexia, life would never be the same as 
restrictive methods imposed during the treatment and care of anorexia nervosa 
patients are often unconsented to. Plagued with unconsented interference, detentions 
and involuntary treatments, it becomes a critical struggle for an anorexia nervosa 																																																								
927 The NHS Trust v L and Others [2012] EWHC 2741 (COP). 
928 Re C (Detention: Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 180. 
929 Crisp, op. cit., pp. 3-8. 
930 NHS Trust v L [2012] EWHC 2741 (COP) para.1. 
931 Brunch, op. cit. 
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patient to have any control in making treatment decisions over her mental and 
physical health. It therefore follows that no matter how liberal a diagnosis may 
appear, paternalistic intervention is immediately initiated to impose involuntary 
treatments in an effort to manage the ailment and understandably aid physical 
recovery. Setting their autonomous rights to the side, clinicians step in on the basis 
that relieving the symptoms of the illness will amount to relieving the cause of the 
illness. The next step would involve the decision on whether to detain the sufferer for 
assessment before treatment is approved. Then there is the determination on the 
appropriateness or to some extent the legality of imposing involuntary feeding or 
force-feeding which is always the main treatment choice in severe cases of anorexia 
nervosa.  The anorexic body have little or no say in making their treatment decisions 
and are therefore treated against their will.932  
 
Glover-Thomas in NHS v L argued that the nature of anorexia nervosa is more 
complex than a mere pursuit of thinness as this psychiatric illness impairs the way the 
brain and mind functions leaving the sufferer with an exaggeration of what her actual 
body proportion or shape is.933 In W (A minor), it was argued that the presence of a 
mental illness is an impairment that distorts a person’s better judgement in making 
treatment decisions and renders them incompetent. 934  The first phase after 
establishing incompetence is the critical decision aimed at aiding the patient’s 
recovery by relieving the physical symptoms. Attention is not given to whether 
treatment such as re-feeding addresses the mental disorder, which is the underlying 
cause of the illness. Giordano emphasises that the abnormalities of a person’s feeding 
pattern is not a symptom associated with their mental illness as clinicians often argue. 																																																								
932 Kluge, op. cit. 
933 NHL v L, op. cit.  
934 Re W (A minor) (Medical Treatment Courts Jurisdiction) [1992) 4 All E.R. 
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Therefore, there is “no ethical justification for the different treatment that the law 
reserves for people who have received a psychiatric diagnosis”.935 There is therefore a 
considerable dissimilarity between applying ethics in regulating the disease agents 
and in controlling the behaviour of the host. 936 The several critiques of paternalistic 
approach to treating anorexic patients reveals that doctors assumes the power to make 
decisions for people thereby preventing the person from fulfilling what they set out to 
do by attempting to substitute one’s judgment for theirs, expressly for the purpose of 
promoting their welfare”.937 According to Warren, the critiques of paternalism shares 
same view point as Mill’s principle of libertarianism which emphasizes that the only 
reason to use force or coercion over another member of a civilized community 
without his consent should be only for the purpose of preventing harm on another 
human being “his good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant”.938   
 
Warren recognizes that Mill was against the paternalistic defense of acting in the best 
interest of a patient when such interest excludes the patient’s beliefs, values, decisions 
and expectations on the issue.939  There is also the criticism of a likelihood of abuse or 
negligence when exclusive powers are given to doctors or treatment practitioners to 
administer whatever treatment they deem fit without an accountability mechanism.940 
The fundamental principles of the sanctity of life are however not absolute although 
engraved in many factors. One of these factors extends to the duties of treatment 
professionals to care for and take delicate decisions on behalf of an anorexic patient. 																																																								
935 Giordano, op. cit., p.6. 
936 David R. Buchanan, ‘Autonomy, Paternalism and Justice: Ethical Priorities in Public Health’  (2008) 
98(1) American Journal of Public Health pp.15-21. 
937 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
938 R. Warren, Dialectic Paternalism in Medical Ethics: A Critique  (2011) available at 
http://dialecticonline.wordpress.com/issue-06-summer-10/paternalism-in-medical-ethics-a-critique/ 
[accessed 5th May 2019].  
939 Ibid. 
940 Ibid. 
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This duty of care for a patient’s life is however not an absolute obligation of the 
doctor as the principle of sanctity of life does not compel a doctor to treat a patient of 
sound mind who refuses treatment and would die as a result of such refusal. It does 
not authorise similarly forcible feeding of patients of sound mind who are on, for 
whatever reason decide to self-starve.941 To make the delicate decision on whether to 
feed or not feed someone who refuses food always raises reasonable conflict and 
significant concern on how to preserve their sanctity of life and at the same time 
honour the inherent rights of the anorexic patient to self-determination.  
                      
Medico-legal discourses on the involuntary treatment of the anorexic body are 
established on the incompetence and incapacity of the anorexic body to voluntarily 
consent to treatment given their mental imbalance. Clinicians insist that involuntary 
treatment methods are not only essential to rectify physical emaciation but intended to 
correct other non-normalized behavioural patterns categorised as mental disorder or 
illness. Standard medical approach towards individuals diagnosed as mentally ill is 
involuntary treatment mechanisms to prevent further mental deterioration and in most 
cases ultimately correct pre-determined mental disorder. The legal references for 
administering involuntary treatments on persons diagnosed with various forms of 
mental disorders are sections 2 and 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983 .942 Section 63 of 
the Mental Health Act 1983 removes the requirement of consent before treatments.943 
																																																								
941 Richard S. Harper, Medical Treatment and the Law: Issues of Consent The Protection of Vulnerable: 
Children and Adults Lacking Capacity (Bristol: Jordan Publishing 2014) p.16. 
942 Rethink Mental Illness, Mental Health Act 1983 available at http://www.rethink.org/living-with-
mental-illness/mental-health-laws/mental-health-act-1983/sections-2-3-4-5#section3 [accessed 11th 
June 2019]. 
943 Care Quality Commission, Guidance on the Treatment of Anorexia Nervosa under the Mental 
Health Act 1983 available at 
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The medical treatment for anorexia nervosa often requires compulsory hospitalisation, 
use of physical restraint, and force-feeding.944  Giordano points out that: 
 
“Many of these stories narrate episodes of hospitalisation and 
tube feeding. People tell of how they were forced to stay in 
hospital and of how they did their best to resist any medical 
intervention. Exercising in the shower, drinking lots of water 
and not going to the toilet before being weighed, or eating the 
way out getting fat enough to be discharged and then, once 
released starting idiom with anorexia the circle seems 
endless”.945 
 
The approach of judges in anorexic cases has been criticised as ‘seeking by the means 
of law to bring about the results which the doctor seeks”.946 In interacting with self-
starving persons, judicial proceedings only recognise the one-dimensional narrative of 
anorexia. Anorexia nervosa is complex; clinicians fail to take into consideration the 
disorder, which can affect individual outcomes. Norfolk & Norwich Healthcare 
(NHS) Trust v W reveal a departure from the confines of prescribed detention under 
the Mental Health Act by identifying and acknowledging a set of individuals who do 
not possess any form of mental disorder but are still considered to lack the capacity to 
make their own treatment decision. One can therefore be considered incapable of 
making decision regardless of the absence of mental disorder. Mental disorder is 
																																																								
944 Re C (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) op. cit. 
945 Giordano, op. cit., p. 180 
946 Andrew Downie, ‘A Metropolitan Borough Council v DB and Re C (Detention: Medical Treatment) 
- Extra-Statutory Confinement - Detention and Treatment under the Inherent Jurisdiction’ (1998) 10(1) 
Child and Family Law Quarterly p.106. 
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therefore not a prerequisite to be denied the right to refuse involuntary treatment. The 
implication is that individuals can exhibit behaviours similar to identified mental 
disordered symptoms but may not be suffering from any mental disorder that is 
recognizable as the empirical research demonstrated in Calabar Nigeria. It is notable 
that both competent and incompetent anorexics present similar physical attributes of 
thinness, weakness and emaciation lending to the vulnerability stereotype.  A prior 
behavioural pattern of an individual, although accounted for at a particular time, 
should not lend credence for future behaviour. The evidence for compelling 
involuntary intervention before them are not informed on case-by-case analysis rather 
it is formed by stereotypical presumptions complied to by the psychiatrist and medical 
doctors.  The courts are not entirely misled as few cases of anorexia fulfil the criteria 
of inability to retain information, showing signs of aggression and suicide. In very 
few cases, they show sign of being able to harm themselves and others.  In the 
patient-centered anorexic body, the law fails to recognise that the application of 
involuntary treatment, especially using any form of force or coercion, is not deemed 
as part of the act of life preservation rather it strips their dignity.  Then again the legal 
proceedings do not favour the meaning centred anorexics who have demonstrated 
capacity to understand and retain information. The meaning centred anorexic also 
have not shown any evidence of suicide or ability to harm others. The goal is not seek 
an enforcement of their right to die but an acknowledgement of their right to refuse 
involuntary treatment thereby preserving their values, wishes and decision. In NHS 
Foundation Trust v X, Mr Justice Cobb acknowledged that he reached the decision 
not to enforce treatment for X’s anorexia based on the values and choices of X’s 
decision.947 Involuntary intervention neglects one cardinal rule of medical law and 
																																																								
947 NHS Foundation Trust v X [2014] EWCOP 35. 
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ethics – “patients have rights”. It is more challenging for those rights to be realised 
when forging dignity and curtailing liberty is viewed as an essential part of 
recovery.948 Bridgman acknowledged that the law courts are mostly silent on the use 
of any form of restraint in situations where individuals refuse treatment; the courts 
instead indirectly evaluate if providing care and treatment for individuals who are 
adjourned mentally ill is lawful.949 The two questions are separate and distinct. The 
cases where the use of restraint is noted often involve and imply an urgency of death 
or implied suicide; thus any act of refusal will “suggest” an impaired decision making 
capacity.950The position of the law therefore excludes individuals who show abnormal 
behavioural pattern from the list of people who can assert their rights to refuse 
medical treatment. Their right to make their own decision is not recognised or 
respected once involuntary treatment procedures are to be implemented.  
 
Blurred boundaries between clinical pre-determined assumption of the outcome of 
individual anorexic cases are remarkably unmonitored in practice and in theory. 
Critical legal and ethical consideration arises within involuntary treatment discourses 
border on consent, best interest, respect of autonomy and ultimately the implication 
on human rights. Further ethical issues arise based on the justifiability of paternalist 
intervention where the person refuses to be treated involuntarily. Autonomy to grant 
or refuse medical treatment has raised significant question “especially in relation to 
the use of detention and reasonable force to effect life-saving treatment for adults”.951 
English court’s jurisdiction at common law to improve involuntary medical treatment 
is somewhat straight forward in matters relating to children however a few decisions 																																																								
948 Peter De Cruz, ‘Adolescent Autonomy, Detention for Medical Treatment and Re C’ (2003) 62 (4) 
The Modern Law Review pp.555-604. 
949 Bridgman, op. cit. 
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have been implemented outside the confined spaces of the Mental Health Act 1983. 
Preliminary examination of core decided cases reveals unconventional and 
controversial methods of involuntary treatment of patients diagnosed with anorexia 
nervosa. An in-depth analysis reveals a pattern where the intervention of medical 
practitioners supersedes the patient’s rights to autonomy and consent prior to any 
medical treatment. In these situations, the right of a person to refuse treatment is 
second-tiered, trumped by paternalistic considerations, which might involve coercive 
patterns.952  
 
Bridgman argues that there is no possibility of providing care to patients who resist 
them without exerting some control over their behaviour in some way.953 The impact 
of using restraint or other invasive treatment methods as part of the treatment for 
mental disorders trumps psychiatric justification. The implication is that the rights of 
the sufferer are trampled upon in this process. Hence, embracing a broader framework 
of a symbolic reasoning begins with revolutionary objections to the justification for 
the enforceability of such treatments, which give priority to the physical recovery of 
the patient rather than their choice to live as they please. Only a handful of authors 
echo Rosalyn Griffith’s strong convictions that there is no stipulation that forced 
feeding or nasogastric therapy represents a form of treatment enforceable under the 
Mental Health Act 1983.954 This anti-involuntary treatment echo is yet to establish an 
enforceable structured rights framework. Accordingly, clinicians are not reluctant to 
																																																								
952 Stephen Touyz and Terry Carney, ‘Compulsory (Involuntary) Treatment for Anorexia Nervosa’ 
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test the boundaries of rights violation with certain paternalistic reasoning and 
validation. Siostrand et al recognise that involuntary treatments are any unwanted 
psychiatric or non-psychiatric actions, which go against the informed consent, or free 
will, of an individual.955According to Griffiths, et al decades ago, clinicians such as 
Lasagne, Charcot, and Gull deliberated over same issues surrounding the justification 
for involuntary treatment of mentally ill patients.956 For individuals clear of any form 
of disordered behaviour, the requirement of consent is mandatory before any 
treatment. However, the lines between involuntarily treating mentally ill and non-
mentally ill individuals remain blurred in practice. Mainstream research show that in 
this modern and theoretically liberal society, issues surrounding involuntary or 
compulsory treatments persist and remain unresolved.957 Reviewing the research 
conducted by Salize, et al on the ‘compulsory admission and involuntary treatment of 
mentally ill patients-legislation and practice in EU-member states’,958 it is apparent 
that involuntary treatments are contentious because of the enormous effect it has on 
the personal autonomy, self-determination, and freedom of choice of the human 
body.959 Most arguments about eating disorder point out that the sole purpose of 
involuntary treatments (by means including psychotherapy and re-feeding) is to 
preserve life and ensure the individual does not succumb to death. However, such 
treatments carried out without a person’s consent has also been proven not to be the 																																																								
955 Manne Sjostrand, Lars Sandman, Petter Karlsson, Gert Helgesson, Stefan Eriksson and Niklas Juth 
(eds.),  ‘Ethical Deliberations about Involuntary Treatment: Interviews with Swedish Psychiatrists’ 
(2015) 16(1) BMC Medical Ethics available at 
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2019]. 
956Griffiths, et al. op. cit. p. 129. 
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Nervosa and Related Eating Disorders in Childhood and Adolescence (London, Psychology Press 
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958 Hans Joachim Salize, Harald Dreßing and Monika Peitz, (2002) ‘Compulsory Admission and 
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available at 
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most effective in tackling any significant mental and physical aspects of the anorexic 
body.  
Coercive and forceful involuntary treatment methods, such as force-feeding, on 
anorexic patients are questionable basic human rights issues. First we can consider the 
mundane routine of living in an institutionalized system. Noteworthy is the day-to-
day activities of involuntarily treated patients who are embedded in disciplinary, 
coercive, regimented and controlling routines which border on undermining the 
fundamental rights and freedoms entrenched under the ECHR. These institutionalized 
rituals very much infringe on the freedom and liberty and to a significant extent, the 
self-image, bodily integrity, identity and dignity. The use of force or coercion during 
involuntary treatments for mental illness is, therefore, contestable. Nevertheless, 
devoid of a legitimate enforcement mechanism, this argument will remain a mere 
theoretical perspective.960 Generally, to force-feed or detain someone when they 
refuse it can give rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.961 It is also a violation of 
their fundamental rights to privacy and personal autonomy entrenched under Articles 
3 and 8 of the ECHR.962 It is fair to establish that the complexity of this illness places 
anorexia nervosa sufferers at the lower end of vulnerability needing greater rights 
protection under the law.963  
 
The uprising in liberties objections questioning the impact of involuntary treatment 
mechanisms during medical interventions964 furthers the conviction that involuntary 
																																																								
960 Griffiths, et al op. cit., p. 178. 
961 Kluge, op. cit. 
962 ECHR, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom available at 
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treatment presents a major emblematic challenge for both ethics and human rights.965 
Scientific research and empirical studies in this field are far from complete, the 
underlying paternalistic framework present only fuel-unsettled debates on the legal 
standards and procedures that authorise involuntary treatment and hospitalisation of 
mentally ill patients, with particular reference to the anorexic body.966 The outcomes 
of these debates show no tangible or practical evidence of furthering the autonomous 
rights of these patients as they still appear to be massively restrained. As such, 
drawing on legal rules, which fuel ad hoc paternalism without any consideration for 
the moral, social, and political concepts relating to anorexic body is unrealistic and 
impractical in today’s millennial age.967 Following the writings of Giordano, Bordo, 
Dresser, and Dolan, clinicians may still justify the preservation of life above anything 
else. It is important that the anorexic body be first recognised, as a cultural metaphor 
for self-determination.968 Therefore, anorexics should be treated with their informed 
consent, participation, and liberty, which forms the bedrock for expressing their 
autonomous rights.969 It is, therefore, necessary to constantly review the way people 
consciously living with anorexia nervosa are treated to ensure that the ethical 
doctrines of “beneficence, autonomy, non-maleficence, justice and utility are 
balanced and aligned”.970The law should therefore respond fundamentally to the 
meaning-centred anorexic body and align with an ethical decision-making model 
which emphasises the extensive features of the person’s principles, culture and gender 																																																								
965 Terry Carney, ‘Anorexia: A Role for Law Therapy?’ (2010) 10(5) Social Science Research Network 
Electronic Library available at file:///Users/cynthia/Downloads/SSRN-id1531975%20(1).pdf 
 [Accessed 12th September 2019]  
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role. Matusek and Wright suggested adopting an “integrative, collaborative and 
culturally sensitive ethical decision making model,” 971  which incorporates an 
agreement of facts through interactive negotiation and inclusion. The essence ensures 
that there are multi-level systems that can coordinate diverse viewpoints, 
accommodate a wider spectrum of anorexia nervosa and proffer resolution when 
conflicts arise. The meaning centred approach can ultimately assist compulsory 
persons to become voluntary persons through inclusion as stakeholders and 
participants in decision-making.972 
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                                         CHAPTER 7 
 
 
                           Towards A Human Rights Based Approach  
 
 
7.  
The core aspect of the thesis rests on answering four leading questions: a). What is a 
meaning-centred anorexic body and can this approach to self-starvation redefine 
anorexia as not exclusively a psychiatric condition? b). Are involuntary treatments in 
the best interests of the anorexic body and can the Mental Health Laws in the UK 
recognise the autonomous rights of the anorexic body? c). Can a meaning-centred 
anorexic body be identified in non-western cultures and is there significance in 
addressing medical and psychiatric stereotypes and labelling? d) Are there human 
rights implications in the enforcement of involuntary treatments on the meaning 
centred anorexic body under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)?  
 Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 comprehensively explores the first three questions through the 
conceptual analysis of the meaning centred anorexic body as a bearer of rights by 
ensuring that their valued choices and experiences within health care are recognised. 
These are fundamental socio-legal analysis that precedes the analysis in Chapter 7. 
Sensitivity and respect for individualised ways of life and reasoning have not always 
been well received, thereby making third party imposition of choices the norm. 
Invariably, different factors are in consideration within the width of the discretion of 
those in authority, especially concerning individual liberty. The previous chapter 
explores the impact of involuntary treatment and the challenges for ethics and human 
rights. This chapter recognises that human rights based approaches are often contested 
when the medical capacity to treat the disorder is challenged by the awareness of the 
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rights to refuse care. The conflicts then peak when the paternalistic approach of 
responsible society clashes with the autonomous rights of the individuals. Involuntary 
decisions without the consent or approval of the individual are considered adverse to 
rights advocacy for freedom and autonomy.  Reviewing clinical and medical care 
pattern from a human rights angle and fostering while analysing the inherent rights of 
freedom of choice, decision-making and autonomy is the core of this research.973 
Chapter 7 explores the notion that human rights considerations should precede 
involuntary medical intervention by inclusion of individuals as active or sole 
participants in the decision-making process. This chapter, therefore, attempts to 
establish the underpinnings for a right-based approach grounded by the inclusion of 
their instinct values and personhood, thereby creating the bases for autonomous 
choices. The aim is to analyse the extent of rights protected or fulfilled under the 
ECHR, enabling the individual to implement self-starvation independently without 
the fear of control and coercion.   
 
 
a. Human Rights-based Approach  
 
The human rights-based approach places the respect, protection, and fulfilment of the 
human rights of a person at the center in all decision-making processes.974 A human 
rights-based approach, therefore, establishes that greater freedom should be given to 
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individuals,975 to partake in any critical decision-making that can affect their human 
rights.976 Dominant paternalistic approach in medicine engages rights fulfilment and 
protection as secondary to enforcing life-saving treatments regardless of the 
implication and overall outcome. Clinicians rely on fulfilling diagnostic criteria 
furnished in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders to establish 
diminished cognitive function, which prevents an individual from making voluntary 
decision to feed.977 For the anorexic body, administration of treatment does not only 
involve the application of drugs for the treatment of the mental disorder, further 
cohesive approaches are taken during treatment process. First, there is involuntary 
detention, which might include the use of physical force, and then force-feeding 
(intravenous feeding, gastrostomy and tube feeding) which constitutes part of the 
treatment regimen. Weingarten and Hebert note that re-feeding and administering 
food “remains the drug of choice”.978 Aside from the unethical implications of force-
feeding, there are strong indication that the act of forcefully re-feeding an emaciated 
body in itself can be life threatening.979 Understudied are the side effects of force-
feeding, which include anxiety, “deepening of psychological illness and curtailment 
of liberty”.980 The application of forced nutrition and hydration on the anorexic body 
is based on medical analysis of competence rather than appropriateness of imposing 
nutrition. At all times, the appropriateness of granting autonomy or allowing 
participation in decision-making is mainly dependent on clinical evaluation of mental 																																																								
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competence rather than the best interest of the individual. Once mental competence is 
established, the individual’s wishes, decisions (advanced or present) do not form part 
of the final medical decision on treatment. Patient-centred rights advocacy in the field 
are emerging and slowly engaging with the ethical challenges of consent, freedom of 
choice and autonomy.981 A right-based approach can be effectively applied prior to 
any medical consideration; only then can a meaningful engagement with the 
individual successfully occur. This approach is very crucial for the anorexic body 
because of the treatment approach employed by clinicians to obtain results. A rights-
based approach therefore offers the flexibility for advocacy that fulfils the individuals 
value, best interests while highlighting their voices and incorporating their experience 
to fulfil their actions. Understandably, it becomes imperative that accountability from 
persons or institutions responsible for making treatment decisions on behalf of an 
anorexic body would be assessed within the human rights framework to ensure the 
fulfilment of their rights.982 The ECHR provides for freedom from inhumane and 
degrading treatment (Article 3), the entitlement to liberty and personal autonomy 
(Article 5) and the entitlement and respect for private life (Article 8).983 Actions by 
authorities, individuals or institutions that do not fulfil a person’s rights are regarded 
as acts of violation and challenge to their rights to life, liberty and autonomy.984 A 
rights-based approach will be used to analyse the experiences of the anorexic body 
including the causes, progression and outcome. Emphasis is, therefore, placed on 
recognising personal freedom, which includes the liberty to make critical 
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decisions985of which other people do or do not approve.986 Critical opposition to 
curtailing individual liberty or freedom has undergone various philosophical 
transformations, drawing on arguments of philosophers, such as Mill, Lao Tzu, and 
Locke, whose views remain monumental and are still relevant in this 21st century. 
John Stuart Mill poses the question regarding what extent the society has the right to 
control and impose limitations on the thoughts, beliefs and actions of individuals.987 
Mill points out that the society has no right to intervene in ‘self-regarding actions’ 
which only affect the individuals so far those actions do not harm or encroach on the 
basic rights of another person.988 According to Mill, “the individual is not accountable 
to society for his actions in so far as these concern the interests of no person but 
himself”.989 Chinese philosopher Lao-tzu advocates for the recognition of the rights of 
personal autonomy and individual liberties.990 In retrospect, libertarianism opposes 
the use of coercive methods on anyone.991 Wells describes coercion as any action 
taken concerning the body or property of another human being without their 
consent.992 Drawing from John Locke’s classical libertarian theory, Otsuka insists that 
individuals should exercise their right of self-ownership which include firm control 
over their bodies.993 The dignity of an individual becomes non-existent when other 
people are allowed to exert control over their lives and body. The authorities are, 
therefore, urged to abide by the policy of ‘laissez faire’ meaning that the “authorities 
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have no business coercively interfering with the lives of peaceful (non-coercive) 
citizens in their private affair”.994 
 
 
 
7.1 Historical Conception of Human Rights 
 
The conceptual analysis of developing rights-based principles dates back to the 
medieval era, uncovering a history marked by prolonged reluctance to embrace a 
more liberal and fair framework in treating specific sets of individuals. Individuals 
within a society therefore depend on implementing those principles that ensure both 
individualised protection and public safety to advance their liberty. It has however 
been repeatedly articulated that personal preferences and that of the extended society 
are often at the opposite ends of the spectrum. Emerging paradigm shifts first 
acknowledge that the predominant negative attitude towards persons with a different 
skin colour, behaviour and ideologies are well documented. Involving individuals in 
the debates and negotiations of what signifies their values in terms of respecting their 
voice has been far in between. Depersonalised or alternative viewpoint on freedoms 
has always relied on substituted decision making to implement policies that affect an 
individual.   
 
Historically, universal rights were initially unrecognised and inapplicable curtailing 
the support for individualised rights-based actions. Human beings therefore existed 
without directly engaging practical ways to express their freedoms. In context, 
institutionalised constraints result in interpretative statements of exploitations on a 
full-scale adverse to individual personhood. Sectional segregation was evident in the 
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lack of inclusion of a cross section of individuals in decision-making. Similarly, the 
notion that individuals possessed any form of inherent rights raised concerns on the 
semantics of such right and the preferred model of implementation. First concerns 
were how to progressively establish a society, which is capable of recognising that 
expressions of free will were inherent against a background of laws designed to 
regulate the conduct and behaviour of individuals. Pressures to develop human rights 
concepts often met strong resistance as they opposed the accepted way of life, pattern 
of morality and tradition at the time. The prevalent traditional practices of medieval 
rulers encouraged in human and degrading treatment within a select group therefore 
fostering inequality. Medieval patterns of oppressions and restrictions of freedoms 
were the orthodox guide in the institutional practices in the various strata of the 
society. The deficiency of morality enriched ad hoc patterns of rights restrictions and 
curtailment without alternative interpretation. In such systems, when a person 
encountered barbaric and inhuman acts, because remedial platforms were non-
existent, ad hoc discrimination and ill treatment became the status quo. Freedom of 
choice, autonomy and voluntary expression enriched future debates on the best action 
to cater to the evolving needs of man.  
 
In retrospect, human rights progress was first administered in theory and then 
transitioned into legal form.995 Following that was the national and international 
recognition of the need to safeguard human rights.996 Scholarly accounts of the 
historical development of human rights often raise questions regarding lack of 
progression or rights existence during this period. Scholars such as Mbaye firmly 
asserts that it would therefore be erroneous to trace back the existence of human 																																																								
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rights to an era, which had no knowledge or familiarity of the importance of 
upholding and implementing the basic freedoms or solidarity of the people.997  The 
concept of human rights has however progressed from the medieval time where 
primitive doctrines considered systemically opposed to the enjoyment and fulfilment 
of rights were in practice and prevalently expressed globally. Algan asserts that 
positive progression of human rights is now viewed with the aim of “furthering the 
protection of existing rights at all levels” through a cross collaboration to effectively 
implement activities that reinforce human rights development.998  
 
The conquest of Babylon by Cyrus the Great in 539 B.C and abolition of slavery and 
promotion of fairness and impartiality between races were the earliest indications of 
rights potential.999 Popularised ideas of the potency of rights movements amounted to 
debates by various scholars attempting to substantiate their diverse views. Natural law 
scholars such as John Locke considered human rights “as a given”.1000  John Locke in 
his second treatise of government proclaims that “men in a ‘state of nature’ were born 
in a state of equality and inherently possessed ‘natural rights, such as right to life, 
liberty and property”.1001 Natural law was a concept centred on the premise of the 
existence of man in the natural state, assuming that the role of right holders whether 
consciously or unconsciously was certain. The prominent message of naturalists was 
established in how man can freely interact with nature and unconsciously live within 
their rights without third party regulations. In the context, accessing the nature and 																																																								
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subject of rights expression was not justified by conceptual theories but by 
recognizing individualised obligations that emphasised their true state of nature. The 
natural concept centred on the traditional existence of rights in its true natural 
state,1002 which reflected on the freedom to implements individualised choices without 
any restrictions. Prominent in the eighteenth century was the emergence of 
philosophers who revolutionized and cemented equality as a pathway to democratic 
advocacy. Guilhot acknowledges the connection between a democratic dispensation 
and the tenets of human rights. 1003  It therefore followed that the historical 
advancement of democracy interlinked with securing a global entitlement to human 
rights.1004 Wicks recognises that advocacy for democratic values requires reliance on 
securing individual values.1005 Joseph and Castan point out that French philosophers – 
Rousseau, Montesquieu and Voltaire – expressed profoundly that the true nature of 
these rights laid in realising the effectiveness of the virtue man possesses. Essentially, 
understanding effective protection of rights at its core resonates from the imposition 
of ideals emanating from previous eras.1006 Joseph and Castan therefore recognise that 
“such rights stemmed from the inherent rationality and virtue of man, championed 
over the ‘irrational’ scientific and religious dogma which had predominated in the 
middle ages”.1007 Nevertheless, it is generally believed that the theories of rights 
change and adapt with the evolution of human beings and the society. It therefore 
became evident in the seventeenth century that there was a predominant change in the 
intellectual and conceptual discourse of natural law, emphasizing on the natural rights 
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of individuals,1008 founded on the cornerstone of equality and liberty and organized 
around the concepts of “recognized prerogatives”.1009 Del Russo speaks of human 
freedom and happiness as an expression of total control physically, mentally and 
spiritually.1010 According to Pillay, the potency of human rights movement has 
empowered ordinary people to assert their ‘freedom, equality, justice and 
wellbeing’.1011 
 
Human rights were also most importantly viewed as a tool to foster peace, liberty, 
autonomy and fairness for all members of the human race.1012 Frankenberg notes the 
narrative of human rights is presented within a universally relatable vocabulary which 
challenges deplorable living conditions and misuse of powers.1013 Within those rights 
is a world that guarantees that conflict resolutions, fair trials, and full participation of 
disabled individuals in areas of personal interests.1014 Reference is often made to the 
overarching consequences of the denial that human beings possessed rights and could 
express such rights as they deem necessary with no prejudice. It became obvious pre 
World War that people were opposed to unconventional practices of expressions and 
freedoms, which go against the norm. The ideology that individuality of a person’s 
thoughts, choices, morals and goals can be expressed in a framework not closely 
monitored or scrutinized was certainly not an acceptable feature. In reality, there were 
limited choices on the individuals to seek redress and no positive obligation on states 																																																								
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to realise the essential features of rights advancement. Objecting rights supressing 
measures generated sufficient grants to engage conversations of life and liberty. Slave 
mastery and trade, obviously, remained prevalent with limited choices and offered no 
individual protection. The resistance of oppressive regimes had led to temporary 
triumph however there was still the overarching need for rights-based reconciliation 
ensuring the injustice of the past does not reoccur. 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human rights in various published 
articles described human rights as universal, inherent, interdependent, 
independeindivisible and non-discriminatory.1015  “Droits de l’homme”, “derechos 
humanos”, “menscherechte’ all denote “the right of man”. These are the rights a 
person possesses by the reason of being human – ‘homo sapiens’.1016 The emphasis 
on individualised rights reinforces the underlying message of equality and fairness 
regardless of race, gender or religious background. There is a reconciliation of 
experiences that are registered as unkind to human beings as embodying injustice. 
Human beings therefore hardly obscured their quest for other positive elements, 
which right-based actions attract. Understandably, historical reactions to the construct 
of human rights remedies have been resisted; regardless purely logical connections 
have presented a definite pattern of safeguarding rights. The rhetoric of human rights 
therefore introduces the normative conceptualisation of human right in a way that 
justifies individual ideal. Generations of the human race pre Hugo Grotius and other 
philosophers conceptualized the ideals essential to the human existence, identified in 
detail by post-medieval scholars who were opposed to the idea of the existence of 
God and inevitably sought to separate morality from the conceptual ideals of human 																																																								
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rights. The United Nations’ intent under the Declaration of Human Rights 1948 was 
to offer recognition and empowerment to humans to understand, acknowledge and 
demand their right to be treated with fairness and equality, irrespective of their 
nationality, colour of skin, religious beliefs or gender. Human transition into right 
holders inevitably became polarized amongst scholars devoted to theories of freedom. 
The foundation of rights based solely on humanity and what should be rightfully 
bestowed on them became a subject for interpretation within variable concepts. 
Similarly, embedding the search for justice within an unconventional interpretation of 
rights requires a coherent narrative “to lend credence or rationality to the 
counterfactual meaning”.1017 It therefore follows that individual entitlements are 
justifiable across borders and safeguarding individual from institutional bias is more 
credible and easy to fulfil. The crucial element is legitimising individual actions that 
contribute institutional bias. Protecting the interest of the individual, which does not 
correspond with the exact language of the law, is where the need to engage higher 
values of dignity and integrity arise. The spirit of the Declaration of Human Rights 
1948 affirms the inherent dignity and fundamental principles of freedoms to be 
upheld by all human beings; this freedom is devoid of governmental intimidation and 
subjective infringement.1018   
The urgent clarion call to facilitate human rights safeguard within an already fragile 
and fragmented society pre-empted the formation of United Nations whose principal 
purpose was “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth 
of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women”.1019The adoption of the 
United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR) after the 																																																								
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Second World War1020 by its General Assembly in Palais de Chaillot Paris was a 
notable progress in human rights movement.1021 The UDHR encompasses decrees 
from the time of Cyrus the Great, 17th century natural laws and French declaration of 
natural rights. The drafting commission chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt endured hours 
of debates on other key fundamental structures that was inclusive and also exclusive 
to all human beings. The object or receptor of rights was never an issue or a source of 
deliberation. It was evident that only humans can own and enjoy rights.  This 
assertion might be too obvious; however, consideration should first be given to what 
constitutes the human anatomy. The United Nations Charter establishes the principle 
of respect for human rights in a way that can provide adequate protection. This 
recognition by the United Nations became the first global acknowledgment of the 
inherent dignity and equality of all human beings. The UDHR affirms the recognition 
of the fundamental dignity of both men and women around the world. The recognition 
was key to the significant promotion of the greater freedom and social progress of 
mankind. Article 1 of the UDHR reiterates the freedom and equality in dignity and 
rights of all human beings. Human beings are born with freedom to reason with 
integrity and the ability to accord the next person with such integrity.1022 Freedom, 
dignity and equality are therefore prerequisite for the survival of all human beings. To 
encourage the spirit of brotherhood, the UDHR provides that actions towards another 
person must be carried out in good conscience.1023 Article 2 grants to everyone the 
rights and liberties set forth in the UDHR regardless of “race, colour, religion, 
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political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”.1024 
In retrospect, “no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional 
or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it 
be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of 
sovereignty.”1025 Article 3 reinforces the right of all mankind to freedom, sustaining 
life and security.1026 Article 4 prohibits all forms of slavery including holding a 
person against their will, transactional slave trades and servitude.1027  Article 5 
prohibits subjecting anyone to any form of treatment regarded as inhumane or 
degrading including undignified treatments or cruelty.1028 Article 6 acknowledges the 
individualised identity of everyone before the law.1029 Article 7 prohibits all forms of 
discrimination or discriminatory attitude towards another. Discrimination therefore 
breeds inequality and prejudice.1030 Everyone is therefore “entitled to equal protection 
against any discrimination in violation of the UDHR and against any incitement to 
such discrimination”.1031 As such all human beings possess unrestricted safeguard 
against discrimination and other forms of actions that violate the UDHR.1032 Article 8 
gives all individuals access to a competent tribunal when their fundamental rights 
granted by the law or constitution have been violated. Invariably an individual whom 
has suffered injustice of any shape can seek adequate solutions and redress under the 
law. Violating the fundamental right of the individual therefore attracts an effective 
remedy.1033 Article 9 prohibits unlawful arrest for whatever purpose, including the 
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detention of an individual for purposes unknown to the law.1034  Article 12 provides 
for full protection under the law against any external influence or interference. In 
retrospect, “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.”1035 
Article 18 guarantees “freedom of thought, conscience and religion”.1036 Article 19 
assures everyone the freedom of expression, which “includes the right to hold 
opinions without interference.”1037 Everyone is therefore at liberty to seek knowledge 
and transmit the ideas without any encumbrance.1038 
Similarly, the move by the United Nations presented hope for cynics to embrace 
emerging ways of implanting rights in reality. The UDHR presented core definition of 
human rights within constructions of everyday life. Socio-political or cultural settings 
were therefore not regarded as compromising rights but as informing a better way of 
understanding rights implication. Gostin notes that protecting human rights was 
crucial to “prevent the reoccurrence of such egregious affronts to peace and human 
dignity”. 1039  Theoretically, concrete trend amongst other jurisdictions begins to 
emerge in recognising the tenets of freedom and liberty. Acts of violations or non-
violations of human dignity with any experience began to emerge as purely personal. 
The motives for rights engagement becomes recognisable as bound to strong patterns 
of preserving integrity and equality. United Nations envisioned all countries of the 
world would adopt and incorporate its Charter into their domestic laws in a manner 
that enhanced individual freedom and safeguarded dignity. Compliance and fulfilment 
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of the obligations under the UDHR required the force of law to ensure that inhuman 
acts or violations were monitored through a system that can guarantee rights 
protection. The framework of rights existence has undeniably affirmed an implicit 
value of self-determination by the irrefutable recognition by the international 
community that all persons are born with a set of privileges recognized as human 
rights.  
 
The peculiarity of establishing an acceptable framework of human rights advanced the 
quest for more decisive actions in ensuring safeguards. Institutional safeguards may 
be elaborate and distant; however, there are situations necessitating exploring beyond 
the boundaries of third party interests. Quite often, the challenge will be both meeting 
the expectations of the UDHR and personalizing its contents legitimately.  Given the 
central meanings of what constitutes a just and unjust treatment, individuals are at 
liberty to justify their reactions without the fear of  reprimand. Jilani once posed the 
critical question “What are human rights for?”1040 Mooney recognised that human 
rights are in crises due to the urgency of establishing a right based in response to 
critical questions bordering on the importance of rights protection.1041 The emphasis 
will be on standard definitions of what constitutes rights as well as interpreting it in a 
manner that resolves the issues of the human kind. Basic codified rights in reality are 
an assemblage of abstract descriptions that round up the vague ideologies in practice. 
The emphasis in addressing the significance of human rights is on how its application 
can advance freedom, justice and equality. It is therefore impractical to comparatively 
engage in the complex discourse of what human rights signify without connecting 																																																								
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with the utility to human being within the realities of their daily life.1042  In order to 
migrate from the abstract nature of human rights, the everyday life of an individual is 
only meaningful when analysed within their values, morals and choices, which evolve 
with decades of experience. Mooney recognises that the ideologies of individualised 
freedom and equality have progressed in terms of rhetoric; however, practical 
actualisation of rights can no longer remain within a restricted arena without 
multifactorial interactions within legal, political and cultural institutions. Hoffman 
and Rowe however note that there are possibilities of limitation in practice, especially 
concerning issues in direct disagreement with other individuals.1043 In other words, 
consideration must be given to what is in the best interest or benefit of the entire 
community.1044 
 
Based on the core principles of the UDHR, various other charters and declarations on 
human rights protection have emerged. Prominent amongst the charters is the 
European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR). The Council of Europe 
enacted the ECHR in 1949 at the end of the Second World War which was designed 
to protect “human rights of peoples in countries that belong to the Council of 
Europe”.1045 Articles of the ECHR provide for the safeguard of basic human rights 
without the encroachment from institutions, government or persons.1046 Core focus of 
all human conventional language rests on the narrative that all men were created 
equal1047  and therefore should be accorded same opportunities to express their 																																																								
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individualised freedoms without fear of reprimand or oppression. The United 
Kingdom domesticated the ECHR by enacting the HRA.1048 Prior to the HRA, there 
was no conventional method for articulating the apposite human rights protection for 
individuals within the UK jurisdiction.1049  Hoffman and Rowe considered the HRA 
as “one of the most important statute ever passed in the United Kingdom”, as the 
HRA provided a legal framework to ensure the enforceability of fundamental 
freedoms and entitlements.1050 The HRA sets out the European Convention Rights, 
which were ratified and integrated into the UK law,1051 enabling the projection of a 
new viewpoint on the individuality of citizens within the United Kingdom.1052  The 
HRA articulates precisely the basic rights that must be accorded respect by the UK 
Parliament and thus is relevant to past, present and future enactments by the 
Parliament.1053 Human rights are fundamentally based on the moral nature of being 
human hence the intertwined connation of living a well-meaning life of dignity, self-
worth and self-respect.1054 The policy paper on the ‘Human Rights Bill: Rights 
Brought Home’ presented to the Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department explained in detail the underlying significance of ensuring that the 
convention rights where easily obtainable to the people.1055  According to Tony Blair, 
the HRA presents the individuals in the United Kingdom with a speedy and efficient 
method of implementing the ECHR in English courts. 1056The HRA ultimately 
																																																								
1048 Ibid. 
1049 Hoffman and Rowe, op. cit. p.16. 
1050 Ibid., p.1. 
1051 Robert Reed and Jim Murdoch, Reed and Murdoch: Human Rights Law in Scotland (West Sussex, 
Bloomsbury Professional Plc 2017) pp.15-16. 
1052 Hoffman and Rowe, op. cit., p.1. 
1053 David Hoffman and John Rowe, Human Rights in the UK: An Introduction to the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (Harlow, Pearson Education Limited 2013). 
1054 Donnelly, op. cit., p.1. 
1055 Human Rights Bill: Rights Brought Home [Cm 3782] available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263526/rights.pdf  
[accessed 20th June 2019). 
1056 Ibid. 
	 292	
resonates a consciousness thereby ensuring that the human rights of the people are a 
priority in making foreign policy decisions.1057 The HRA therefore represented a 
commitment to the adherence and satisfaction of the rights and fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed under the ECHR.1058 It became imperative that the UK courts and 
tribunals must then take the decisions, judgments and advisory opinions of the 
European court in deciding questions regarding the rights entrenched under the 
ECHR.1059 This development spearheaded the shift of focus from the duties entrusted 
on public authorities to the rights available for individuals to claim under the HRA. 
The implication is that individuals can then exercise liberty in challenging actions that 
constitute a breach of their protected human rights by bringing “proceedings against 
the authority under this act in the appropriate court or tribunal, or rely on the 
convention right or rights concerned in any legal proceedings”.1060 Section 6(1) 
created an accountability mechanism in fulfilling those rights.  Emphasis rested on the 
law courts, tribunal or person vested with public function to “act in a way 
“incompatible with the convention rights”.1061 Court declarations relying on the 
ECHR rights could provide the anticipated clarity or paradigm shift on the practice of 
human rights within healthcare law.1062   
 
However, ratified conventions and domestic law remain static and unreflective to the 
physical, mental and psychological needs of the common man. Although the UDHR 
states that the “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 																																																								
1057 Ibid., p.1. 
1058  HRA 1998, s.1 (1)(5) available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/schedule/1  
[accessed 22th August 2019]. 
1059 HRA 1998, s. 2(a). 
1060 HRA 1998, s. 7 (1) (a-b). 
1061 HRA 1998, s. 6(1). 
1062 Maclean, op. cit., p.185. 
	 293	
peace in the world”,1063 the real existence has failed to reach those “small places, 
close to home - so close and so small that they cannot be seen on any maps of the 
world”.1064 The vision of progress in the existence of mankind is not justified by how 
well the enactments in the conventions and treaties are worded but in the practicality 
of individual situations and the ability to find legal backing in exploring those rights. 
For instance, a homeless child on the street with no food or water, or even basic 
education cannot understand that she has a right to those things. It would then be 
inhuman to deprive of those socio-economic and cultural rights. When rights are 
adjudged abstract, the connection between human existence and suffering is lost. 
Similarly, a person under paternalist control will not embrace her full rights and 
freedom of expression, dignity and worth. The human experiences are constantly 
altered and elaborated by the demands to stay in control. The nature of the institutions 
that control the human environment also advance with them, giving rise to very 
diverse practices. Thus, interpreting treaties, conventions and domestic rules in 
manners that reflect present trends and behavioral evolution of the Homo Sapien is 
inevitable. The complexity and individuality of the human nature coupled with their 
social, economic and cultural challenges have continuously embraced the dynamism 
of human rights to adapt to changes across multi-disciplinary fields. Donnelly 
explains that human rights should not be regarded as timeless, unconditional and non-
changing. He contends that the nature of human rights is consistent with its universal 
nature and would historically evolve,1065 ‘shape and reshape’1066 based on a specific 
era or period. 
																																																								
1063 United Nations, ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ available at 
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7.2 Personhood 
 
The underlying principles of a human rights-based approach recognises the essence 
and distinctiveness of a person and enabling an environment for those tangible rights 
to be claimed. In addition, holding institutions accountable when those rights are not 
respected, fulfilled or protected.1067 In understanding the full autonomy, reasoning of 
what it means to fully characterise an individual as possessing bodily autonomy as a 
person also emerge within the medical field. Whittenberger recognises that although 
there may be a consensus that the understanding of human rights includes the 
acknowledgement that they possess fully all aspects of rights; however, the 
unanswered question remains, who is a person?1068  Whittenberger notes that a person 
within this definition is a human adult “who is conscious, senses, thinks, feels, 
behaves, has preferences and values, remembers, learns, makes decisions, 
communicates and interacts”. 1069  Human beings existing within a preserved 
consciousness are able to undertake their roles by fulfilling obligations and 
maintaining an awareness.1070 Capacity of consciousness is demonstrated through the 
barrages of awareness of experiences past and present, having shown the capability of 
relaying that information to the next person without ambiguity. The optimisation of 
rights in combination with the capacity of consciousness forms the basis for human 
expressions.  
 																																																																																																																																																														
1066 John Witte, God’s Joust, God’s Justice: Law and Religion in the Western Tradition (Cambridge, 
Eerdmans Publishing Co. 2006) p.75. 
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The concept of personhood has remained at the core of legal argument in context of 
right discourses, especially in creating a distinction between a person and a human 
being.1071 Personhood is engraved in the tenets of human rights because “it confers 
status, respect and moral worth”. 1072 Although engaging the personhood of an 
individual is not always appropriate or fitting in every value-centred situation, the 
starting point is to understand a person within a system that predicts their rights and 
responsibilities.1073 Similarly, providing a candid approach to a human being by 
reimagining their purpose as person rather than carefully padded myth is crucial. 
However Ohlin notes that there is no need to completely erase the relevance of 
personhood from legal reasoning especially in connection with human rights. 
However, there is need to seek a deeper and in-depth analyses of the position of 
various components to obtain a better clarity of the human rights implication1074 The 
concept of person is easily implemented in a right-based framework when the dignity 
or bodily integrity of the person is in question. The narrative is in line with the 
numerous drafted conventions, which promote the individuality and liberty of all 
within their most natural of biological state.  Adopting a right-based approach entails 
that the person is given the opportunity to make decisions that impact their rights in a 
way that integrates and upholds their individual conviction. More so, in combining 
the transcending values and morals inherent in the person, an empowering and 
liberating construct of the personhood emerges. Translating this to individuals who 
are medically adjudged to lack capacity due to their mental disorder, the challenges 
are lessened with the realisation that a person is deemed to have capacity to consent or 
decline involuntary treatment because they are conscious beings. The setting and 																																																								
1071 Jens  D. Ohlin, ‘Is the Concept of the Person Necessary for Human Rights?’ (2005) 105(209) 
Columbia Law Review p.211-212 
1072 Ibid., p.211. 
1073 Ibid., p.211. 
1074 Ibid., p.212. 
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formalities of a right-based approach necessitates a background approach in finding 
solutions, which enhance the sensitive shift from ‘needs to rights’ and ‘clarity to 
focus’, consistent with accountability, non-discrimination and participation.1075 The 
core foundations of individualised freedoms with a human rights framework are 
apparent in multiple ratified treaties and conventions over the years. In instituting a 
rights based claim, the concept of an individual as a dignified person who can 
actualise their choices and decisions regardless of the legal discourse in play emerges. 
Invariably for the concept of person to uphold within the tenets of human rights, a 
systematic difference between the person as owning their own identity and the human 
being is made.  
 
An in-depth definition of a person can be examined with consideration to their needs, 
desires and decisions. The challenge is on how to create visibility and interpret these 
values in a ways that can be recognised by third party decision makers. The anorexic 
body is established as multifaceted, diverse and complex and therefore presents 
different facets when faced with other scenarios. A displacement of their control in 
ways that demonstrates incapacity leaves a significant impact on their freedoms.  It is 
therefore a challenge to ordinarily or automatically deconstruct all conscious or 
unconscious reasoning of behaviour without their free will in play. The interplay 
between their choices and decisions enables the individual the freedom to take a 
positive or negative stand in accepting or refusing decisions affecting their dignity or 
integrity. Analysing human beings and the values of freedom, del Russo recognises 
that: 
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Entered Development’ in Andrea Cornwall and Deborah Eade, (eds.) Deconstructing Development 
Discourse: Buzzwords and Fuzz (Warwickshire, Practical Action Publishing 2010)  p.170. 
	 297	
“Man has indeed individual basic needs, inherent to his human 
nature, as a human being he needs to live life in freedom, to 
sustain it, to perpetuate it physically and spiritually. The 
enjoyment of these freedoms is for all human beings the 
essential condition for a life worthy of its name; without them 
man ceases to exist as such. Man’s pursuit of happiness is the 
achievement of self-expression in freedom under the aegis of 
law.”1076 
 
Reflecting on the historical observations of the struggle to embrace individual actions 
of freedom, there is awareness that third party choices do not interfere or restrict the 
freedom of others. Yet, the great negative commandment ‘[t]hou shalt not allow any 
man to interfere with the liberty of any other man” still sits in the abstract corridors of 
reality.1077 Most persons embrace the values and choices they choose and flourish in 
the knowledge and existence of those ideals. However, by normalizing these 
behavioural patterns, legitimate concerns emanate from the claims, which do not fit 
within a legitimised system. There are considerable constraints for granting unlimited 
freedom for the advancement of personhood outside the capacity test. Relatively, an 
incoherent grasp at the chances of securing a threshold of rights whether admissible or 
not gives rise to substantive identity crises The challenge in advancing self-expression 
is created by third party interventions with the objective of monitoring, controlling 
and influencing how a person’s freedom is expressed. Human existence, progression 
and evolution are evaluated by individualised autonomous actions indicative of 																																																								
1076  Alessandra L. Del Russo, International Protection of Human Rights (Washington, Learner Law 
Book Co. 1971) pp.254-255. 
1077  Leonard Huxley, Life and Letters of Thomas Henry Huxley (New York, Cambridge University 
Press 2012) p.53. 
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choices and decision unorthodox to social genre. The purest form of bodily existence 
is a valued autonomous state constructed outside the boundaries of bodily slavery.  
 
Sen using a bike ride example equated the ‘state of being’ to the ability to function 
intentionally and independently without any aid or influence.1078 Sen recognised that 
self-fulfilment and expressing real autonomous emotive capabilities is essential to the 
way a human being lives, acts, be or do.1079  The objection to the margins of third 
party interaction is remarkable and coincides with the underling mental emancipation. 
Significantly translating a wish, choice or moral into a legal claim will demand an 
endless attempt to defer the already established pattern resolving similar issues. In 
asserting personhood, individual entitlement will conflict with structural strategies of 
human rights. Understandably, there are personal interests focused on less practical 
enforcement mechanisms. Those choices can only be valuable if they are autonomous 
choices with the ideals of equality, justice and freedom. Similarly, Nussbaum 
acknowledges the correlation between human rights and human capabilities. The 
intention is to provide an unorthodox method for enjoying human rights within a 
system that can respect the individual differences and preference.1080 Nussbaum 
argues that individual functions can only be communicated in its true human form, 
which entails freedom to exert human powers in self-expressive and creative means. 
Tangible focus should be placed on the individuality of a person including themes and 
patterns that they are evolving.1081 Inability to perform such functions that express 
human individuality freely is inhuman and animalistic and devalues people’s 																																																								
1078 Chad Kleist,  Global Ethics: Capabilities Approach available at  http://www.iep.utm.edu/ge-capab/ 
[accessed 11th February, 2019].  
1079 Amartya Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (India, Oxford University Press 1999) p.17. 
1080 Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 2000) p.96. 
1081 Martha C. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development (Cambridge, The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press 2011) pp.69-72. 
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autonomy. A crucial part to fulfilling these central capabilities encompasses the 
respect for bodily integrity. As pointed out by Nussbaum, bodily integrity is the 
ability to move around freely, along with total dominance and control over their body. 
1082 
 
Prior to acknowledging human rights, people existed as just humans. They were just 
beings with a genetic formula. “Humans have bodies”.1083 The body DNA is the 
unique blueprint of every part of life, comprising of thousands of proteins built and 
organized to function independently. Humans exist because of the integrated body 
inclusive of trillions of cells, organs and collection of compound tissues. Humans 
only function because of the interaction within this body of systems.1084 As humanity 
continuously progresses, it becomes more apparent that human beings portray more 
unconventional individuality to any form of interference or control. It is possible to 
accept that freedom bestowed on the human body is controlled in many forms by the 
government, medical practitioners and, in most instances, the family. Individual 
freedoms are restricted despite individual choices. In the haze of the numerous angles 
for claiming rights, it becomes evident that there is deviance in the subjectivity of 
control and restriction of freedom. In a similar context, feminist resilient fights for the 
protection of reproductive rights as opposed to reproductive control.  
 
The basis for most accounts focuses on sexual reproductive rights overlooking the 
personhood. As such, it is not surprising that abortion rights have drawn mainstream 
debates on themes for pro-life and pro-choice without underpinning the struggle 																																																								
1082 Kleist, op. cit. 
1083 Mooney, op. cit.  p.3. 
1084 Alice  Roberts, Human Anatomy: The Definitive Visual Guide (London, Dorling Kindersley 2014) 
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outside the firm ideology of both legal and social inequalities of reproduction control.  
Restricting or controlling a unique component of the individual undermines the 
boundaries and weakens their autonomy.  It is misleading to center arguments solely 
on women rights as basis to affirm or deny pro-life or pro-choice.  According to 
Bordo, evidence reveals traditional patterns of reproductive control as an assault on 
the woman’s personhood.1085  In some instances, personhood is equated to the 
metaphors of human existence and the highlight of the interaction to the human 
physical body. 1086  This reciprocal action becomes a reflection of their unique 
embodiment and integrity. The way a person feels or interacts with their body equates 
with their values, morals and choices, setting and observing the limits to being an 
actual person.   
 
Personhood has been extensively acknowledged as a valid tool for human rights 
assertion.1087  Existing rights concepts are not totally opposed to the underlying basis 
for expressing a unique consciousness as a person. In most liberal traditions, it defines 
the recognition of the essence of the individual as well as their capability. For 
instance, constructing a functional recognized exercise for the anorexic body will 
produce a standard cognizance unique to the individual.  Experiences are effective 
and efficient criteria in a logical communication of their personhood. Capacity in 
personhood is often stereotyped and held at dual standard, playing both sides of 
encroachment on the values of human existence.  Immanuel Kant presented a critical 
view on rationality and reasoning as a key to personhood. A person must possess the 
ability to make autonomous decisions and present those facts in a manner 																																																								
1085 Bordo, op. cit., p. 73. 
1086 Alzheimer Europe, ‘Personhood: Other Ethical Principles’ available at http://www.alzheimer-
europe.org/Ethics/Definitions-and-approaches/Other-ethical-principles/Personhood [accessed 9th April 
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comprehensible to others. Kantian ethics provided a model between the interception 
of humanity and the reality of self as the essence of cultivating personhood.1088 A 
similar shift suggests that the natural cause of both male and female are dissimilar and 
in order to satisfy humanity, rational capacities must be applied alongside 
autonomous actions.1089 According to Marwah, Kant’s views on the natures of men 
and women (gendered moral agency) in the context of humanity have been regarded 
as ‘inconsistent and morally ambiguous’.1090  More problematic is the understanding 
of character and virtue articulated in systems of gender-based singularities, strictly in 
either empirical or moral sense.1091   For some theorists, Kant’s personhood is 
controversial and ‘essentially a contested concept. 
 
An unambiguous definition of personhood depends on the recognition of moral and 
legal rights a person holds facilitating a background for self-control and free will. 
There is an organic symmetry between the physical appearance of a person and their 
mental aspects without giving into fundamental constituents of theories of 
reductionism or Cartesian dualism. The moral, social and political assumptions on 
personhood have been an active subject of debate in modern history. The vagueness 
surrounding the term ‘person’ and what it means to be a person has fostered 
deliberation amongst philosophers, theorists and political activists. In hindsight, if 
everyone enjoyed the equality of treatment and respect for dignity guaranteed by 
numerous treaties and conventions, the debate on the concept of personhood will not 
existent.   It is difficult to abstract a person from the principles and morals that govern 
the way a person behaves or chooses to conduct themselves or their wellbeing. Merill 																																																								
1088 Ibid. 
1089 Inder S. Marwah, ‘What Nature Makes of Her: Kant’s Gendered Metaphysics’ (2013). 28(3) 
Hypatia Journal pp. 552-554. 
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argues in favor of a new approach from an “actual people” perspective submerged in 
human practices, which excludes arbitrary language. 1092  This means identifying 
exclusively with the “ultimate personalization of reality. Thus, there is recognition of 
the intrinsic features a person identifies and attaches to the reality of their experience 
in all circumstances. There is emphasis on the moral decisions made by third parties 
to be inclusive of  “a person’s ethics, manners, character and what they believe is 
proper behaviour".1093 A rights approach is aligned with the notions that establishes 
the uniqueness of a person’s ethical status and demands respect for a person’s choices 
and actions in clinical and public settings.1094 
 
The rights approach in the treatment and care of the anorexic body has never been 
deeply explored. The critical questions then center on the legal and ethical 
implications of various invasive treatment options as well as a person’s right to bodily 
integrity and freedom from subjection to treatments they consider degrading on any 
level. The human body has become a preoccupation of society, the changes they 
undergo physically, emotionally and mentally are often subjected to dissections, 
speculations and, to great extent, assumptions. Strict interpretation of the right to life 
has fostered and engaged the “doctors knows best” ideologies, to the detriment of 
preserving personal autonomy.  Prolific cases of persons who voluntarily succumb to 
self-starvation as a way of self-rule1095 reveal the critical struggle by healthcare 
practitioners to preserve life while at the same time respect the personhood.1096 Critics 
of involuntary treatments of the anorexic body insist that unconsented treatments 																																																								
1092 Sarah B. Merrill, Defining Personhood: Toward the Ethics of Quality in Clinical Care     
(Amsterdam-Atlanta, Editions Rodopi BV1998) pp. 4. 5. 
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infringe on the dignity,1097 bodily integrity, and autonomy of a person.1098 Applicable 
methods such as forced tube feeding and unconsented detentions necessitate more 
transparency and inclusion by healthcare practitioners in administering their duty of 
care.1099 Medical law expert, Dubrow, rightly points out that the era of ‘the doctor 
knows best’ and absolute paternalism is long gone. 1100 Foucauldian literature now 
influences contemporary thinkers to objectify the effects of unwanted action on the 
body. 1101   Ideally, compulsory patients can become voluntary patients by 
incorporating the decisions, morals, choices and autonomous values into treatment 
decisions. It is, therefore, impossible not to echo the same sentiments of Siber J, who 
insists that transparency and autonomy should trump any ethical considerations. 1102  
 
7.3 The Right to Refuse Involuntary Treatment. 
 
 
The typical anorexic body is predominantly female and unquestionably complex. The 
only means of meaningfully dissecting and understanding the complexity is to 
acknowledge and emphasize their individualised or person-centered view. Western 
literature contends that the biological consequences to assuming the status of an 
anorexic body might be grave for some,1103 however for the meaning centered 
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anorexic body, they can lead a normal life especially as conscious death or suicide is 
never the objective. Food resistance and hostility to ingesting food provide an insight 
into core versatility of the individual experiences existing in different forms. Their 
abnormal behavior and experiences are classically different from the treatment 
professional’s one-dimensional views of anorexia. It is evident that there is margin in 
the pattern of behavior and aspirations of the patient centered anorexic body (suicidal) 
and the meaning centered. The nature of approach by law and medicine is yet to 
reflect this outcome and show sensitivity to a group of individuals who are conscious 
of the way their bodies are historically monitored, micro-managed and involuntarily 
treated.   
Mooney recognises that the body has been forgotten as a vessel of expression, which 
cannot be side stepped.1104 Bordo acknowledges that the problem lies in the way 
western culture identifies the female body as primitive and unrestrained without 
reflecting on the body in terms of responsibility and meaning.1105 The body is 
informed by our history and represents the subjective struggle to maintain dominance 
over its affairs.1106 The implication is the values that represent the female body can 
only advance beyond contemporary situations insofar there is fulfilment of their rights 
and freedom. The universal condition of the human body is therefore a reflection of 
the state of human rights.1107 The interpretation of human nature is fluid and built on 
an ever-changing socio-cultural dynamics that make up their needs. Most human 
needs, wants and desires are complex and on the surface level and do not interact with 
static behavioral constructions of the society. Regardless, in the growing 
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multifactorial demands of human nature, the boundaries of human rights protection 
must be expanded to accommodate unconventional practices and actions of a person.    
The meaning centred anorexic body represents the critical dimensions of a non-static 
construction in provoking a new meaningful way of thinking. Knowing how the 
meaning centred anorexic body interacts with food intensifies the validity of the 
contradictory values of the dominating factors that regulate human behaviors. For the 
anorexic body, the implication of food refusal is more intense and varied than clinical 
pathology. The anorexics disassociations with food are not only inherently built on 
adjacent values but also on the peculiarities of the freedom they express. The body 
therefore goes beyond its association with food or calorific intake but represents a 
broader creation of femininity. The meaningful nature of their resistance to the 
overwhelming knowledge of what food represents as an object of coercion and 
involuntary treatment. Meaningful approach to food consumption is opposed to the 
lauding of food to solely represent substance for preserving life and by extension 
welfare protection for clinicians. Non-meaning approach to food maybe valid for a 
different type of person depending on the direction of analysis and for what purpose 
the outcome represents. Wicks analyses the challenges of a pregnant anorexic woman 
and notes that it has become evident that the UK medical profession and the court of 
law may have inadvertently developed a discriminatory attitude shown in their 
eagerness to establish the incapability of women to make decisions of what to do with 
their body.1108 The danger is that the system is set up to adjudge incompetence based 
on refusal of medical treatment.  
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The general classification of persons who stay away from the general knowledge of 
food and what it represents definitely is problematic whether the issues of 
competency arises or not.  Mental health laws have enabled critical accounts and 
views of the body in a way that equals self-starvation with poor mental health. Suffice 
to say, the biological human being is portrayed as suffering thereby requiring precise 
treatment, which is administered with consent. The narrative of anorexics as mentally 
disordered beings often reveals their vulnerability therefore needing care and 
treatment.1109 However, autonomy and freedom of choice are reduced to a substantive 
degree thereby trampling on their rights. The most critical false dimensions have 
further equated seeking the right to refuse involuntary treatment as same as seeking 
the right to die. The right to refuse to be treated involuntarily does not constitute 
equate seeking to die. Concisely, the tenets of exercising the right to refuse 
involuntary treatment interlink with safeguarding autonomy, preserving dignity and 
conserving bodily integrity. Within a wider margin of claim, there is also the 
interpretation of participation in decision-making and procuring consent. Wick 
therefore states that the right to refuse involuntary treatment is reflected in multiple 
conventions rights.1110 Article 2 of the ECHR provides for the legal protection of the 
right to life. 1111  This position was also reiterated in Re E (medical treatment: 
Anorexia) where the court held that “all human life is of value and so therefore, a 
presumption will always exist in favour of preserving human life.”1112  
 
Ironically, general reference to anorexia existing in different unique variations has 
been alluded to over time. Distinguishable traits included both physical status, 																																																								
1109 Douzenis et al, op. cit. 
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[accessed 5th December 2018]. 
1112 In Re E (medical treatment: Anorexia) [2012] EWHC 1639. 
	 307	
behavioral components and, to a great extent, experience.  The mental health law does 
not specifically acknowledge this type of variation; however through empirical 
analysis and the study of the changing patterns of the anorexic behaviour a meaning 
centred variation emerges. Variations of individuals who embrace the concept of self-
starvation were systematically reviewed in both historical and cultural contexts prior 
to the formal documented medical analysis outcomes published in the 19th century.1113 
There have been prior references to existence of a group of young individuals living 
in a state of emaciation. Clinicians however continue to reject the significant and 
conscious role individuals play in accepting the anorexic experience; instead they 
argued that resistance was part of the psychological mirage to conceal the mental 
illness.1114 The degenerating role of psychiatry became evident, as anorexia assumed 
the symbolic hallmark of extreme disorders interconnected with insanity and 
neurosis. 1115  Crisp also alleges that all anorexics possess diminished rights of 
independence and exhibit immaturity in leading a normalized life.1116 Crisp’s analysis 
also fails to accommodate the conceptual controlled starvation model that does not 
lead to complete shutdown of the human anatomy. Insisting on a physical detection of 
anorexia generates the presumption treatment professionals require to reinforce 
incapacity based on circumstantial evidence. Thus, they tackle the anorexic body as a 
patient without addressing the underlying issues intertwined with their experiences 
and, largely, personal distress Families and close relations are then compelled by 
societal and social pressures to approach clinical or care professionals to aid physical 
recovery. This becomes very challenging to the anorexic body that more often than 
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not they choose to be disengaged from any form of treatment provided by health care 
professionals. Once resistance is registered, the implication on the health care 
practitioners, the anorexic body and their families becomes visible. The reluctance to 
follow through with treatment will also compound the complex capacity test, and so 
not in favor of the anorexic body. This is because the stereotype of treatment refusal 
is a profound indication of incapacity regardless that the person is functional in 
memory, can reasonably communicate and aware of their advanced directive. There 
are far reaching debates on the issue questioning labeling concepts or conditions 
unfamiliar to the understanding of the society. 1117  The nature of care and 
management, if at all necessary, should reflect the sensitivity of individuals to the way 
their bodies have been historically monitored, micro managed and treated 
involuntarily. The only way an anorexic body is denied the right to stay as she is and 
lead an independent life is by imposed involuntary treatment procedures as well as a 
disengagement from the control of her weight. It is important to note that case studies 
indicate that efforts to “disengage the anorectic conceptually from domination of her 
body weight, does not by any means succeed.”1118 
The prominent and progressive feature of a meaning-centered anorexic body reflects a 
person leading or showing intent to lead a conceptually normal life within a controlled 
weight devoid of any attempt to end their life.  In A Local Authority v E.1119 It is 
evident that E a 32-year old displayed no core attributes of the meaning-centered 
anorexic body. This is because E was able to complete her college studies and enrol 
into a university to study medicine and excelled in this highly demanding course 																																																								
1117 Louise M. Murray and Suzzanne Boyd ‘Protecting Personhood and Achieving Quality of Life for 
Older Adults with Dementia in the U.S. Health Care System’ (2009) 21(2) Journal of Aging 
Healthp.350-373. 
1118 Crisp. op. cit, p.147. 
1119  A Local Authority v E. [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP). 
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despite living within a controlled weight. However, although described as ‘highly 
intelligent and articulate’, E had no desire to continue life and attempted suicide 
multiple times. Other issues were cumulative to E’s compulsory admission under the 
Mental Health Act. Dr Tyrone Glover explains that in addition to her eating disorder, 
E also suffers from unstable personality disorder, prescription drugs dependency 
(opiate) and alcoholism.1120  In July 2011, E signed the first advanced decision 
preventing anyone subjecting her to any life sustaining treatment. The advanced 
decision stated, “ I do not want to be resuscitated or given any medical intervention to 
prolong my life.”1121 E’s continuous suicide attempts by hanging and lack of desire to 
live automatically places E as a patient centred anorexic body, which ultimately 
contributed to the court’s decision reinforcing involuntary treatment.  
The case of E in NHS v E can be contrasted with NHS v L. were Ms L, a 29-year old 
intelligent anorexic body1122 who continuously informed her family of her willingness 
to continue to live and not die but preferred to exist on a specific body mass index and 
adhering to a restricted calorific intake.1123The significance of Ms L’s effort to 
continue to live was in her voluntary consent to receiving only 25ml per hour of 
nutrients by nasogastric tube. Judge Eleanor also acknowledged that L, although 
indifferent, was very conscious and rational in making her decisions which included 
accepting the administration of analgesia and antibiotic treatments for the infections 
that would have otherwise led to her demise.1124 In addition to making plans for the 
future, L’s desire to continue to live was also evidenced in her 2012 quest to move to 
																																																								
1120 Ibid., para. 23. 
1121 Ibid., 57. 
1122 NHS v L & Others [2012] EWHC 2741 (COP). 
1123 Ibid. 
1124 Ibid., para.54. 
	 310	
a nursing home but became greatly distressed when her bed was withdrawn.1125 The 
Judge also noted that L was sensible and lucid and is only overwhelmed by the “terror 
of gaining weight and the fear of calorie”.1126 Although L’s desire to continue to live 
was recognized, the Judge failed to acknowledge the possibility that her life might be 
overwhelmed by the protracted invasion of her body without her consent. On 
numerous occasions, she had been involuntarily treated and forcibly fed against her 
wishes. It is also unclear as to why L was deemed rational and possessing capacity to 
accept antibiotic treatment to heal her sore and irrational and lacking capacity to exist 
within the body weight she deems necessary without the prejudice. Recognizing an 
individual as a rational agent justifies their actions and the choices they choose to 
make.1127 It has previously been argued that the right thing to do is what an individual 
chooses to do, the right they have to express themselves freely, which appeals to 
Kantian ideologies of “justice to each persons will”.1128 It sometimes does not hinge 
on good or bad but on what an individual purports to be in their best interest.1129  
Applying human rights-based approach recognizes the free will and individuality of 
the anorexic body ensuring that they are the principal decision makers in outcomes 
that affect their state of existence. This approach will require that individuals be given 
the opportunity to claim whilst holding institutions accountable when those rights are 
not respected, fulfilled and protected. 
 
The behavioural patterns of the anorexic body are at the core meaning centred, 
conceptualised in the realisation that the person can exercise their autonomy as a 
																																																								
1125 Ibid., para. 35. 
1126 Ibid., para 59. 
1127  Garrath A. Williams, ‘Praise and Blame’ available at www.iep.utm.edu/praise/  [Accessed  2nd 
August 2018]. 
1128  Ibid.  
1129  Ibid. 
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rights bearer existing outside the standard medical stereotypical classification. The 
idea that human rights consideration should precede medical treatment, in addition to 
further contemplation of inclusion of individuals as active participants in decision 
making is relatively outside the norm in treating the anorexic body. In some cases, the 
medical practice route only envisions a system where individuals are expected to 
accept all medical directives as far as part or full recovery can be achieved. For 
instance, regardless of the individual’s choices and directive, imposed involuntary 
treatment methods is deemed absolute necessity in managing and treating anorexia 
nervosa. Once anorexia nervosa is established, regardless of whether capacity is 
proven or otherwise, the mental health of the individual is questioned and tested. The 
principle of obtaining informed consent is also second tiered or negated in favor of 
establishing prima facie the incompetence and incapacity of the individual to 
participate and engage in decisions that ultimately affect and alter their life. The 
meaning centred variation introduces a balanced dimension in medical treatment or 
care, which recognizes a level of consciousness of obvious decisions and choices on 
the way the body changes or develops. The right-based approach is therefore 
grounded on the ability of an individual to be autonomous, free from interference and 
respect for the instinct values of their personhood.1130 The obligation for clinicians in 
this instance becomes evident to respect the values of their choices and decisions 
without compulsion or coercion. There are acceptable standards regarding how to 
relate with an individual who is a non-patient at the time of initial evaluation.1131   
Where involuntary treatments are suggested for the meaning centred anorexic body, 
the interest of doctor is aligned the interpretation of Article 2 of the ECHR. 																																																								
1130 Douglas P Olsen, ‘Influence and Coercion: Relational and Right-Based Ethical Approaches to 
Forced Psychiatric Treatment’, (2003) 10(6) Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Nursing pp.16-22. 
1131 Ibid. 
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Preserving the ethics of the medical profession by not assisting a person die and 
lengthening life becomes sinuous. Medical interpretations of Article 2 of the ECHR 
raises arguments within the reasoning that refusing treatment is equivalent to the 
encroachment of the right to life. Equating consent refusal to involuntary treatment 
means that the individual intends to die either through self-harm or by third party 
actions in cases of assisted suicide. The meaning centred anorexic presents no 
intention of self-harm or suicide or any further actions suggesting the need to fulfil 
the requirement of death. In NHS v X, X an anorexic body repeatedly affirmed her 
wish to keep living despite the extreme thinness of the physical body.1132 Wicks was 
also very clear on the implication of seeking active euthanasia (right to die) which 
signifies an on-going will to occasion death.1133 The key dimension is that there is an 
intentional and active pathway to self-harm, which the person is protected against. For 
both active and passive euthanasia, the key element is the third party who hastens the 
process of dying by withholding life-saving treatment. 1134  Without third party 
involvement in occasioning the death of the anorexic body, the ideals of the meaning 
centred anorexic body lends towards having the autonomy to accept or reject any re-
feeding therapeutic relief rather than procuring to die.  
 Salako condensed individual’s rights to autonomy to include “self-determination, the 
right to privacy, liberty right, and the right to be let alone”.1135 Disregard of strict 
autonomous principles and rules of consent are therefore agonized as remarkably 
submerged in paternalism to the detriment of rights protection. Salako asserts that the 
justification for the privileged reasoning of treatment professional should not 																																																								
1132 NHS v X, op. cit. 
1133 Wicks, op. cit. 
1134 Ibid. 
1135 S.E. Salako, ‘Book Review: Medical Law and Ethics’ (2003) available at 
https://academic.oup.com/bja/article/90/3/407/251994/Medical-Law-and-Ethics [accessed 2nd 
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reinforce unconsented approaches, which infringe on the right of autonomy under 
Article 8 of the ECHR.1136 Historically, the expertise of medical practitioners is relied 
on for absolute decision making to determine the type and duration of treatment or 
care an individual receives The UK courts are constantly under scrutiny and are 
accused of being extremely submissive and compliant with the directions and detects 
of the medical profession. 1137 The ‘Doctor knows best’ ideologies’ capture this 
preferential treatment accorded to the medical profession. This medical strong-armed 
approach has often placed sole decision within the restrictive core hand of a few 
without considering the anorexic’s rights. Understandably, the court seem to have 
developed a symbiotic relationship with the medical field relying on its clarity, 
beneficence and expertise. In return, there is a reluctance by the courts to discard this 
sound opinions of esteemed professionals regardless of whether they reflect the 
underlying core values of consent, respect, dignity and autonomy.1138 Consent in 
medical treatment centers on reinforcing individualism and upholding the “ethical 
principles of respect for persons that regard individuals as autonomous agents.”1139  
Gostin argued that the acceptance of informed consent by human rights law and 
international ethical codes is indicative of the crucial importance of upholding 
autonomous rights, as “morally necessary method of demonstrating genuine respect 
for human integrity”.1140 A real recognition that every person possesses inherent 
beliefs and values aligned with asserting their human rights will therefore enhance the 
necessity for treatment professionals to ensure consent is genuinely given without 
third party persuasion, coercion, influence or control. According to Amnesty 																																																								
1136 Ibid. 
1137 Ibid. 
1138 Ibid. 
1139 Lawrence O. Gostin, ‘Informed Consent, Cultural Sensitivity, and Respect for Persons’ (1995) 
274(10) JAMA p.844. 
1140 Ibid. 
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International, it is basic human rights for one to be able to make decisive decisions 
about their health, body without the fear of control by their immediate families, 
medical professionals and the state.1141 
 
The bedrock of modern medicine is built on the foundation that recognizes informed 
consent as a prerequisite to all medical procedures and investigation.1142 The UK 
General Medical Council (GMC) established a general guidance to obtaining consent 
for healthcare professionals.1143 These principles of good practice applied to all both 
minor and major clinical intervention regardless of the magnitude or lack thereof of 
the risks involved.1144 The GMC principles emphasises collaborative decision making 
to ensure the best outcome for the individual.1145 This directive ensures that a health 
care professional prioritize the individual’s views, value their opinion relating to their 
health and respecting their final choice.1146 Obtaining informed consent therefore 
extends to in-depth discussion of the degree of treatment to be administered including 
any medical analysis and projection whilst also maximizing and maintaining the 
autonomy the individual needs to arrive at the right decision at any given time.1147 
Discussions are to focus on ensuring that the person understands all the aspects and 
processes of treatment, taking into account their wishes and ensuring that their rights 
to make adequate choices about their care is valued and respected.1148 Although the 
right of consent is not absolute based on assessing the relevant ethical, legal and 																																																								
1141 Amnesty International, ‘My Body My Rights’ available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/get-
involved/my-body-my-rights/ [accessed 22nd July 2019]. 
1142 Christian P. Selinger, ‘The Right to Consent: Is it Absolute?’ (2009) 2(2) British Journal of 
Medicine pp.50-54. 
1143 General Medical Council, ‘Consent Guidance’ available at http://www.gmc-
uk.org/guidance/ethical_guidance/consent_guidance_part1_principles.asp [accessed 9th May 2019]. 
1144 Ibid., part 1, para 1. 
1145 Ibid., part 1, para 2. 
1146 Ibid., part 1, para 2 (a). 
1147 Ibid., part 1, para 2(b-c). 
1148 Ibid., part 1, para 2 (e). 
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practical frameworks; however initiating practical steps to ensure compliance is 
within an individual’s right to autonomy is essential.1149 Unduly influencing or 
forcing another person to undertake any form of medical treatment that they have 
consciously refused or rejected, in the context of health care, undermines also the 
right to give informed consent. 1150  Objectively, consent cannot be given to a 
procedure which the individual has rejected ab initio and as the prospect of approval 
is already a diminished likelihood. 1151  Selinger points out that applying and 
implementing the process of informed consent should therefore reflect the ethical 
principles of justice and fairness especially in circumstances where the “right to 
demand certain treatments is discussed”.1152 
 
Consent to treatment centers often on individuals who had already assumed the status 
of a patient overlooking the need to obtain permission to conduct the physical 
examination and investigative process of asserting their status. During medical 
treatment, doctors include the freedom and capacity to engage in activities of choice 
to constitute consent.1153 A meaning centered anorexic body does not assume the 
status of a patient voluntarily or otherwise even whilst involuntarily hospitalized; 
hence the prolonged resistance to treatment and low rate of recovery once discharged. 
Consensual collaborations and partnership in managing the anorexic body remains 
essential. Thus, it is the most viable process of maintaining the level of autonomy 
required to ensure an open-ended level of trust and symbiotic rapport as such “each 																																																								
1149 Ibid. 
1150 Annelize Nienaber and Kirsten N. Bailey, ‘The Right to Physical Integrity and Informed Refusal: 
Just How Far Does a Patient’s Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Go?’ (2016) 9 (2) South African 
Journal of Bioethics and Law p.74.  
1151 Selinger, op. cit. 
1152 Ibid. 
1153The Crown Prosecution Service, ‘What is Consent?’ available at  
https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/what_is_consent_v2.pdf [accessed 
19th November 2018]. 
	 316	
person has a role to play in making decisions about treatment and care”.1154 The 
anorexic body exists in a subdued and regimented routine expressed in day-to-day 
“self-surveillance and self-discipline”, 1155 thus the docile body is already created. 
According to Pylypa, “[i]ndividuals thus voluntarily control themselves by self-
imposing conformity to cultural norms through self-surveillance and self-disciplinary 
practices….”1156 It there follows that intrusions or interferences of the daily habitual 
practice without consent forces the body to respond arbitrarily.   
 
Despite criticisms of the inadequacy of rights to find a sustainable solution to ethical 
issues in medical practice, 1157  Pillay notes that the potency of rights based 
implementations has accorded ordinary people with the power to express wellbeing 
boundaries, assert freedom, equality and justice.1158 Right-based approach has since 
dominated conversations in areas of compulsions of individuals into involuntary 
psychiatric treatments. There is an underlying attention to acts of medical 
professionals which undermine the autonomy and liberty of the individual by any 
means including “restraint, speculation, civil commitment and forced medication”.1159  
The outcry against the use of force and coercion to enforce involuntary treatments has 
occasioned the need for less involuntary intervention techniques. Arguments against 
force-feeding, which have been regarded as a form of medical treatment for anorexia 
nervosa, point out that the process incorporates invasive techniques of detention, 																																																								
1154 GMC. op. cit.  
1155 Jen Pylypa, ‘Power and Bodily Practice: Applying the Work of Foucault to an Anthropology of the 
Body’ (1998) Arizona Anthropologist Journal 13 available at  
https://journals.uair.arizona.edu/index.php/arizanthro/article/viewFile/18504/18155 [accessed 7th June 
2019]. 
1156 Ibid. 
1157 D. Benatar, ‘Bioethics and Health and Human Rights: A Critical View’ (2006) 32(1) Journal of 
Medical Science pp.17-20. 
1158 Navanethem Pillay,  ‘What Are Human Rights For? Three Personal Reflections’ in Daniel Moeckli, 
Sangeeta Shah and Sandsh Sivakumaran, (eds.) International Human Rights Law (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 2014) pp.4-6. 
1159Olsen, op.cit  
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restraint and coercion. A rights based perspective in health care therefore embraces 
the notion that “moral defects of medical practice, and human life more generally, are 
rectified through the promotion of human rights.”1160 According to Curtice and 
Exworthy:  
 
“This knowledge deficit has been recognised by government 
bodies and other agencies, which led to the introduction of a 
bottom-up human rights approach that can be used by 
individuals and organizations alike in everyday practice. It 
avoids the need to have technical knowledge of the Human 
Rights Act and associated case law and is based upon concepts 
that underpin all the articles of the Act. The human rights-based 
approach is the process by which human rights can be protected 
by adherence to underlying core values of fairness, respect, 
equality, dignity and autonomy, or FREDA.”1161 
 
The effectiveness of the rights approach identifies within the scope of not merely 
fulfilling the negative obligation of non-interference but a strong emphasis on 
interpreting the convention rights “in the sense which best protects the person.”1162 
This approach highlights a rather liberal stance in analysing and applying the ECHR 
rights in line with current social developments. Positive obligations are therefore 
constructed by placing the right of the individual at the forefront of all polices. 
Arguments in favor of the rights based approach advocated for a ‘person-centered’ 																																																								
1160 Benatar, op. cit., pp.17-20. 
1161 Martin J. Curtice and Tim Exworthy, ‘FREDA: A Human Rights-Based Approach to Healthcare’ 
(2010) 34 The Psychiatrist p.150. 
1162 Ibid., p.150. 
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health care approach built on the core principles, which acknowledge those rights and 
also understands that violations of those rights are unfavorable to recovery, which 
leads to a negative outcome. Dubrow argues that the era of ‘the doctor knows best’ 
are long gone.1163 Thus, sole decision-making based on clinical judgment has become 
synonymous with actions, which are regarded as not in the best interest of individuals.  
The House of Lords in Bolam v Friern Hospital1164 established the Bolam test, which 
requires healthcare professionals to adhere strictly to an appropriate standard and duty 
of care.1165 However, there is the contention that the process of creating a duty of care 
is less problematic than ascertaining the standard of care which again is often left to 
absolute clinical judgment”.1166 Understandably, clinical judgments do not include the 
decisions, desires, morals and choices of an individual. The accounts of individuals 
who decide to live a certain type of way or within a restrictive behavior are not taken 
into consideration in enforcing these life-altering decisions.  
 
Clinical mechanisms for administering therapeutic reliefs on the anorexics are 
discriminatory in nature therefore furthering stereotypes. Since the permission or 
consent is not required to administer therapeutic relief, it therefore becomes irrelevant 
to engage with the underlying meaning of their actions. Suggestions by writers such 
as Crisp that anorexia can be detected by a mere glance lend validation to the 
stereotypical assumptions where generalized conclusions rank higher than 
individuals’ experiences. 1167  Involuntary medical procedure contradicts consent 
																																																								
1163 Dubrow, op. cit. 
1164 Bolam v Frien Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
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requirement prior to treatment thereby diminishing the freedom and autonomy to 
exercise some or absolute control over tangible and impactful decisions. According to 
NHS, consent to treatment is an established principle that validates the requirement 
that an individual must give their approval prior to receiving any type of medical 
treatment.1168 The cogency of consent has often laboriously depended on establishing 
that the individual has capacity to decide the outcome. Solitary reliance on the 
‘capacity test’ means that clinicians do not need to obtain the consent of the 
individual prior to administering medical treatment or care which they believe to be in 
their best interest.1169 This system has often maligned the other aspects of consent, 
which include informed and voluntary actions devoid of any external or third party 
influence. The individual therefore makes sole decision after critically considering the 
negatives and positives of the treatment or care information presented.1170 For the 
meaning centred anorexic body, the issue is not reliant on obtaining consent prior to 
medical treatment; rather it is the requirement for treatment in the first instance. There 
is a difference. Delegating their autonomy to a third party to restore their body to a 
pre-self-starvation stage is not within the meaningful nature of their values. The 
meaning centred anorexic body exists within a belief system that reinforces total 
freedom and bodily integrity. Transferring their right to consent to third parties to 
undergo any type of treatment undermines their values and morals. Black therefore 
recognises that the jurisprudence of the right to refuse medical treatment is gradually 
emerging; however there is difficulty ascertaining the “class of individuals who 
possess the right to refuse life prolonging treatment”.1171 
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1169 Ibid. 
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1171 .Isra Black, ‘Refusing Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment and ECHR’ (2018) 38(2) Oxford 
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Article 3 of the ECHR stipulates that: “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. 1172  Rights-based arguments 
evidently point to the method and patterns of these treatments administered to 
anorexic bodies without their consent. Such treatments constitute an in-depth personal 
invasion, which can be equated as inhuman and degrading. For instance, in Re E, the 
proposed medical treatment involved committing E to intensive care for a year, 
forceful feeding E via nasogastric tubes, physical restraint whilst administering 
treatments and the use of medical sedation when needed until E maintains a stable 
weight. The proposed treatment was also to be administered contrary to E’s wishes or 
consent.1173  According to the Equality and Human Rights Commission, inhuman and 
degrading treatments are acts which are ‘humiliating, undignified and against the 
innate value of all human beings’.1174 The Mental Health Act Commission in 1997 
however argued that involuntarily administering food and nutrient could be regarded 
as a form of medical treatment. Care Quality Commission guidance on the treatment 
of anorexia notes that:  
“In certain situations, patients with severe anorexia whose 
health is seriously threatened by food refusal may be subject to 
detention in hospital and…there are occasions when it is 
necessary to treat the self-imposed starvation to ensure the 
proper care of the patient…..nasogastric feeding can be a 
																																																								
1172 ECHR, Article 3. 
1173 In Re E (medical treatment: Anorexia) op. cit. 
1174 Equality and Human Rights, ‘Article 3: Freedom from Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
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medical process, forming an integral part of the treatment for 
anorexia nervosa.”1175 
 
Dovey, et al recognise that although food refusal is understood as a personal 
preference however professional intervention still occurs although such intervention 
might escalate if not handled properly. 1176 It is very unlikely that involuntary 
treatments can be described as ‘proper’ because of the lack of consent and undignified 
mechanisms of administration. Wicks notes that that “the lowest form of prohibited 
treatment – i.e. that which is degrading – may be of relevance to the imposition of 
medical treatment without consent.”1177  The implication of inhuman and degrading 
treatment is any treatment, which affects the dignity of the individual rather than their 
autonomy.1178 Degrading treatment interlinks, therefore, with subjecting a person to 
humiliation or humiliating experience.1179 The fundamental aspects of dignity require 
consent and freedom of choice.1180 Ensuring that individuals are not subjected to 
humiliating experiences does not exclude the relevance of autonomy.1181 It therefore 
follows that the autonomy and dignity of an individual will be in jeopardy if their 
dignity is threatened. 1182  Cooper further asserts that where ordinarily such 
unconsented treatment could have led to assault charges, the brief note by the Mental 
Health Act Commission without express legal clarification further empowered 
medical practitioners to override the will, choices and bodily goals of the 																																																								
1175 Care Quality Commission, op. cit. 
1176 Terence M. Dovey, Claire V. Farrow, Clarissa I. Martin, Elaine Isherwood and Jason C.G. 
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individual.1183  Critics of the right-based approach to treatment fail to consider the 
natural cycle of the anorexic body when discharged from invasive treatment. It is not 
farfetched to assume that a person who is not a voluntary patient would not adhere to 
a system that they did not consented to ab initio. Draper rightly points out: “once their 
weight is stabilized and they are released into out-patient care, many will begin to 
starve themselves again.”1184 
The compulsory detention and involuntary feeding of anorexics under the Mental 
Health Act 1983 will always be contended as incompatible with the provisions of 
Article 5 of the ECHR.  Article 5 clearly stipulates that: “[e]veryone has the right to 
liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the 
following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.”1185 Wicks 
notes this right correlates to external interferences and protecting autonomy. The 
underlying meaning of Article 5 provided grounds for interpreting protection of 
physical integrity to include expressing the right to refuse medical treatment.1186 It 
therefore follows that detained mentally ill patients who feel their rights to liberty and 
security amongst other rights have been violated can therefore institute a claim 
against a public authority or person who has acted in a way that contravenes Article 5. 
Anorexic patients whose capacity was not fairly assessed under the Mental Capacity 
Act 2005 or patients who feel unjustly detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 can 
bring proceeding under the HRA by relying on  “the convention or rights concerned 
in any legal proceedings but only if he is (or would be) a victim of the unlawful 
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act”.1187  Noteworthy however is that a person’s dependence on a convention right to 
seek redress cannot be restricted in making claims of his rights to freedom under other 
laws in the United Kingdom.1188  Proceedings to make a claim under the HRA must 
be submitted to the court or tribunal before the year ends, which starts from the first 
date the complaint of violation of the patient’s rights occurred.1189  The court also has 
the discretion to allow an application under equitable circumstances after the period 
stated in section 7(a) has expired.1190 It appears there would always be a conflict 
between respecting the liberty, ideals and best wishes of the anorexic body especially 
if those wishes do not aid their recovery in anyway. Joana Whiteman explains that the 
case of E in NHS v E indicates the “conflict that exist between the respect of the 
freedom and autonomy of a person to make their own decision on one hand and the 
perception that there is need to protect the best interest of vulnerable people by 
preserving lives.”1191  
  
However, from anorexia nervosa case laws, there is a strong indication that when the 
courts face such dilemma, they are predisposed to take the side of preserving life.1192 
This raises questions on how violation claims by mentally ill patients are handled and 
if those in authority gloss over these claims because of their level of vulnerability. For 
instance, the delay by the local authority in bringing E’s case before the court ab 
initio should have raised a question on whether such curtailment of liberty constituted 
a violation of E’s rights under Article 5 of the ECHR.1193 Involuntary treatment 
procedures predominantly lack accountability, participation and transparency and are 																																																								
1187 HRA, Article 7 (1)(a)(b). 
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often challenged on grounds of the legality of the administrative mechanisms as well 
as the applicable standards of care. Critical questions surrounding involuntary 
treatments attempt to address what is the right or wrong approach in managing an 
individual’s experience regardless of whether they are in their most powerful or most 
vulnerable state. Understanding the value of individual choices and recognising the 
fundamental requirement of rights in the day-to-day practice is maligned within the 
healthcare sector. The difficulty in integrating human rights in health care becomes 
more pronounced in situations where the mental capacity and competence of the 
individual is in question. The current evolving intersection between health care and 
human rights is because of conflict. The unusual overlap exposes the visible 
difficulties in finding a satisfactory outcome in resolving reoccurring moral dilemmas 
connected with medical practice. Prevalent subjects bordering on human rights 
complaints during medical treatments or care are often not acknowledged and 
questions on the boundaries and limits remain unanswered.  
 
Keywood is of the opinion that medical practitioners seek court enforcement to 
legitimize treatment decisions because of the judiciary’s enthusiasm to contest 
decisions made by experts in that field, the public regression in their faith in the 
medical profession which leads to an increase in medical lawsuits that produce 
unsatisfactory outcomes for the petitioners.1194 Moreso  the more recent development 
in acknowledging the rights of a patient as a significant ideal in legal and ethical 
concepts.1195 However, the English court’s input in this critical decision-making has 
also been plagued with procedural, ethical and legal issues. Re C (A Minor) (Medical 
																																																								
1194	Keywood, op. cit., pp. 697-707.	
1195 Ibid. 
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Treatment: Court Jurisdiction)1196 was the first case where the question of the 
jurisdiction of the English courts to enforce involuntary treatments, which affect the 
liberty and autonomy of the anorexic body, arose. The initial question before the court 
was to determine if the sanction, detention and use of reasonable force to achieve 
treatment were lawful in the case of C. C was a sixteen year-old girl suffering from 
anorexia nervosa who had an established history of escaping from medical treatment 
clinics and was detained involuntarily in a specialist clinic. Although C requested to 
voluntarily submit to the treatment without a mandate from the court, the medical 
director was opposed to this view insisting her detention formed the core part of her 
treatment. The local authority applied to the court requesting that the courts detain C 
for further treatment pending when the treatment for her illness is completed. The 
jurisdiction of the English courts to make such order was challenged. 1197 The grounds 
of challenge was based on medical practitioners’ interference to take critical treatment 
decisions even though such decisions involved invasive and coercive methods that 
impede on the patient’s freedom, liberty and personal privacy. They are therefore at 
conflict to make a decision that can either aid physical recovery by preventing any 
damages arising from the lack of nutrition or just respect the patient’s decision to 
refuse treatment.1198 
 
Jerjes, et al understood there is a current difficulty in striking a balance in law, which 
can reflect the interests of the medical practitioners as well as protect the best interests 
of the individuals who depend on them.1199  The widespread of absolute paternalism 
and solitary reliance on medical practitioners as the decision makers in treatment 																																																								
1196 Re C (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) op. cit. 
1197 Re C (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) op. cit. 
1198 Silber, op. cit. 283-288. 
1199 Jerjes et al, op. cit. 
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situations has become problematic for individuals who value the expression of their 
rights even beyond justifiable legal remedies. In many ways, treatment practitioners 
are seen as performing their duties without knowing the ways to fulfill the human 
rights mandated by these UK acts and the ECHR. It is unproductive for individuals to 
rely only on the abstracts of the ECHR’s articles to decry unlawfulness or 
inconsistency without legal precedence before the European Court of Human 
Rights.1200  Uvin insists that:  
 
“The risk always exists that taking up a right based approach 
amounts to a little more than making nice statements of intent 
regarding that it would be nice to achieve, or duties we would 
like the world to assume one day, without setting out rights or 
methods of avoiding the slow and dirty enterprise of 
politics.”1201 
 
Invasive treatments carried out without the consent of the patient can also be seen as 
an infringement of Article 8 of the ECHR. Article 8 states that “[e]veryone has the 
right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”1202 
A public authority therefore cannot override this right except for reason of “national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.”1203 Article 8 establishes the right to privacy in greater 
terms which inter-alia covers the broader terms of both physical and social identity 																																																								
1200  Code of Practice: Mental Health Act 1983, s. 23 (9). 
1201 Uvin, op. cit, p.171.  
1202  HRA, Article 8(1). 
1203 HRA, Article 8 (2). 
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including the right to personal autonomy and personal development.1204 In Tyraic v 
Poland, the courts reinforced that private life includes to certain degree the respect for 
physical integrity and it becomes the obligation of the state to ensure that this right is 
secured, enforceable and guaranteed.1205 There also exists the problem of presumption 
of the absoluteness of the right to life entrenched in the ECHR which resultantly 
qualifies for strict adherence. In establishing the right to personal freedom for 
anorexic patients, a critical analysis of Article 8 of ECHR reaffirms protection of 
private life against all intrusions into people’s lives in a grass root sense of guarding a 
person’s private space, be it their head or their home. 1206  Autonomy is 
comprehensively advocated for in liberal societies as the right of an individual to self-
rule. The concept and ideals of autonomy provides dominant safeguards allowing 
patients to exercise jurisdiction over their own body; however, the courts on one end 
do not expressly address what these safeguards are and which ones are specifically 
available to adult sufferers who lack capacity. Lawrence explains that there is an 
established link between anorexia nervosa and the response to the crises about their 
autonomy and independence.1207 This crisis can occur at any stage of a person’s 
celebration of self-determination1208 struggle for independence and assertion of the 
right to make their own decisions. For an anorexic woman, for instance, there is 
always a paradigm shift from just a desire to stay thin but also a desire to be in control 
and exert influence on her body. It is the thought of losing that right to self-rule or 
independence that creates that fear – the fear of gaining weight and an obsession with 																																																								
1204 Wicks, op. cit., pp.17-40. 
1205 Tyraic V Poland, Application No.1410/03, Judgement delivered March 2007 p. 107. See also Pretty 
v UK 2002 35 EHRR para.61. 
1206 The ECHR reiterates in Article 8 as follows. 1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority 
with the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in democratic 
society in the interest of national security, public safety or economic wellbeing of the country, for the 
protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others. 
1207 Marilyn Lawrence, The Anorexic Experience (London,  Women’s Press Handbook  1998). pp.37 
1208Keywood, op. cit., pp.604. 
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their body mass index remaining as low as possible. The underlying issue in an 
anorexic behaviour is exerting control and power over their feeding, appearance and 
the way their body develops. Therefore, the value of autonomy is very important for 
an anorexic patient.   
 
Wicks recognises that the essence of individual autonomy is established on their 
ability to exercise the right to refuse treatment. Consideration is therefore placed on 
preserving bodily integrity rather than conserving life or health.1209 Identifying the 
meaning centred anorexic body as possessing the right to refuse involuntary treatment 
is a critical step especially with the emerging needs for more inclusion of the values 
and morals of the individual by reinforcing consent and participation. However, the 
more poignant question will remain on how refusing involuntary treatment can 
succeed within a rights-based framework especially with reference to the ECHR.1210 
First, there is the recognition that self-determination is at the core of rights protection 
under the ECHR; however, this interest when applied in refusing involuntary 
treatment has been weighed against the inviolability of life.  Safeguarding the right to 
stay alive is therefore contrary to other fundamental values, which an individual 
possesses, especially autonomy in rationalizing an achievable framework for rights-
based actions.1211   
 
Secondly, the medical treatment administered must be for the mental disorder the 
patient is suffering. The Mental Health Act 1983 does not give any powers to impose 
treatment for any physical disorders that are unrelated to the patient's mental 
																																																								
1209 Wicks, op. cit. 
1210 Ibid. 
1211 Ibid. 
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disorder.1212 However, the causal link between physical and mental disorder has 
allowed the courts to utilise this section to declare that some treatments (including 
reasonable restraint) would be lawful despite the patient's refusal. The justification 
had been that some physical disorders might be symptomatic of, or may contribute to 
the severity of, or be the cause of, some mental disorders. Treating the physical 
disorder is in effect treating the mental disorder. Section 63 has been stretched to 
include within its scope forced feeding for the treatment of anorexia and the delivery 
of a baby via a caesarean section. Individuals diagnosed of anorexia nervosa may be 
detained forcibly for treatment under section 2 and 3 of the Mental Health Act 
whether they are competent or incompetent. In Riverside NHS Trust v Fox, force-
feeding was established as a legitimate treatment for anorexia nervosa patients under 
the act1213, however Griffiths, et al argue that there is no stipulation forced feeding or 
nasogastric therapy represents a form of treatment enforceable under the Mental 
Health Act 1983.1214 The use of forced-feeding as a treatment for the mental disorder 
is therefore contestable.1215 It is fair to establish that the complexity of this illness 
places anorexia nervosa sufferers at the lower end of vulnerability, needing greater 
rights protection under the law.1216 
 
The prominent view in analysing the right of the meaning centred anorexic body to 
refuse treatment  reveals that in fulfilment of the ECHR, the UK laws choose sanctity 
of life over expressions of individual autonomy.1217  Generally, to force-feed or detain 
someone when they refuse force-feeding can give rise to both criminal and civil 																																																								
1212 Ibid. 
1213 Riverside Mental Health Trust v Fox {1994] 1 F. L. R. 
1214 Griffiths,  et al op. cit., pp. 127-150. 
1215 Ibid., p. 178 
1216 Wicks, op. cit., pp.17-40. 
1216 Ibid. 
1217 Ibid. 
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liabilities.1218 It is also a violation of their fundamental rights to privacy, personal 
autonomy, and personal development entrenched under the ECHR.1219 Diagnosed 
anorexia nervosa sufferers are involuntarily classified under sections 2 and 3 of the 
Mental Health Act 1983 for treating their mental disorders.1220 Section 63 of the 
Mental Health Act 1983 removes the requirement of consent prior to treatments.1221 
Article 9 of the ECHR provides for the freedom to manifest one’s thoughts and belief. 
The thoughts and beliefs of the anorexic body form part of their experience, which 
informs their actions of control, which they are at liberty not to relinquish. Removing 
consent can therefore imply a denial of their rights to thoughts in expressing their 
beliefs and values as provided under Article 9. 
 
The static position of the section 63 of the Mental Health Act 1222  appears 
discriminatory and adverse to complete fulfilment of Article 14 of the ECHR.1223 
Bridgman points out that it is possible to argue that section 63 of the Mental Health 
Act cannot justify restraint under the law; however at first glance there exists an 
underlying connection between the physical and mental aspects of this disorder so it 
therefore seems plausible that the MHA can enforce treatment on physical disorders 
connected to the treatment of a patient’s mental disorder. Bridgman argues that there 
is no possibility of providing care to patients who resist them without exerting some 
control over their behaviour in a way that diminishes their liberty. The effect of using 
these methods of restraint or other invasive treatment methods as part of the treatment 
																																																								
1218 Kluge, op. cit. 
1219 ECHR, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf [accessed 4th May 2019]. 
1220 Rethink Mental Illness, Mental Health Act 1983 available at  https://www.rethink.org/advice-and-
information/rights-restrictions/mental-health-laws/mental-health-act-1983/ [accessed 11th June 2018] 
1221 Mental Health Act 1983.s.63. 
1222 Mental Health Act 1983. s.63. 
1223 Wicks, op. cit. 
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for mental disorders, such anorexia nervosa, goes way beyond mere justification for 
using them as the emotional and physical needs of these sufferers are not included in 
decision-making. The entire medical narrative on involuntary treatment focuses on 
ensuring full recovery of the person; however, all analysed cases reveal little proof 
was shown to the effect of a positive outcome that leads to the person willingly 
consenting to giving up their autonomy in other to achieve full recovery. Invariably, 
there is no guarantee that force-feeding a severely emaciated individual can lead to 
full recovery. The rights to refuse involuntary treatment is not clearly defined in the 
ECHR. It is still very evident that “self-determination requires that the individual is 
able to make a determination about his life”.1224 The combination of Articles 3 and 8 
of the ECHR are relevant to ensure that should treatment be an option, it is 
consensual.1225 The consideration must be on the “right of a patient to determine what 
is done to their bodies, rather than in terms of the professional duty of doctors to treat 
their patients to the best of their ability”.1226 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
1224 Wicks, op. cit. 
1225 Ibid. 
1226 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis has critically examined the interpretation of anorexia nervosa, with the 
core intension of pioneering an alternative approach to the current stringent medical 
and psychiatric narrative on self-starvation. Furthermore, this thesis identified and 
introduced the meaning centred anorexic body which presents a clear demarcation 
between patient- centred anorexic spectrums therefore addressing the questions on 
how to ensure that individuals’ rights, values, morals and advance decisions takes 
precedence and the body proper is not undermined in mental health process and 
practice. In defining lines in mental illness, the meaning centred precision recognised 
a variation of anorexia nervosa, which then can allow a multidisciplinary interaction 
and exchange providing a valid basis for a positive outcome in enforcing their human 
rights.  
 
The aim of this concluding part is to ensure that a cohesive understanding of the entire 
thesis is established by outlining the key areas and research outcomes of preceding 
chapters. This conclusion will be presented in three parts; part A dissects the main 
aspects of the arguments presented in the thesis. Part B reviews the main findings and 
particularly the medical and legal implication for implementation. The third part (C) 
provides a conclusion by presenting the lessons and outcomes from the thesis. 
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PART A  - Overview 
The involuntary treatment of the anorexic person take place to dispense with their 
consent or participation and therefore presenting a contentious issue in the fields of 
health care, medicine, psychiatry, and law.1227 Medical, legal and social changes have 
brought forward deliberations on what treatments are adequate for individuals 
considered to have a mental disorder and to what extent doctors should withhold 
unconsented treatments.1228 Carney recognises that “anorexia nervosa poses particular 
challenges for medicine, for ethics and human rights, and for law”.1229 The pre-
eminence of medical archetypes in analysing and evaluating patterns of eating 
behaviours has pioneered and sustained stringent and presumptuous narratives in the 
way individuals who exhibit classic signs of anorexia nervosa are treated. Extreme 
thinness occasioned by self-starvation remains the foremost inclination in the 
diagnostic isolation of anorexic individuals. Established anorexic body stereotypes 
means that extreme physical thinness or emaciation becomes a deciding factor in the 
overall mental capacity decisions. Understanding that anorexia does not exist in one 
spectrum neither does extreme physical thinness immediately qualify an individual as 
incapacitated and unable to function or participate in his or her own decision making, 
clinicians can then broaden their approach towards granting autonomy and 
participation. Historically, the best convincing arguments about stereotypical anorexia 
build on the premise of exclusivity to western patterns, bonded by media culture and 
exposure to the glitz and glam of westernised thin body obsessions. Essentially, with a 
systematic stereotypical understanding, clinicians enforce involuntary treatment 																																																								
1227 Rebecca S. Dresser, ‘Legal and Policy Consideration in Treatment of Anorexia Nervosa Patients’ 
(1984) 3(4) International Journal of Eating Disorders pp. 43-51. 
1228 Irvin, op. cit., p. 858. 
1229 Carney, op. cit., p.1. 
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procedure. The empirical work in chapter 4 is extremely critical as it establishes the 
behavioural patterns of anorexia as a non-western bound syndrome. In establishing 
the non-Western behavioural patterns, we discover that there are individuals who 
have exactly the same BMI recognised by the DSM of Mental Disorder, however they 
have not been subjected to detention, force-feeding or any other involuntary treatment 
mechanism. Part of the reason for the lack of enforced medical treatment also lies in 
the absence of mental health laws that recognise the anorexic body as mentally ill and 
thus subject of treatment.  
 
Western psychiatric discipline is historically manually monotonous in the way 
standard diagnoses are handled and will seemingly revolt attempts to introduce a post-
modern cultural, meaning-centred dimension to a well-labelled and stereotyped 
disorder. Regardless of western disapproval, accepting a cross-cultural variation 
within a meaning-centred approach highlights indigenous practices, values, morals, 
choices, beliefs and views, which extends beyond biological and medical models. 
With stringent psychiatric dedication to in-depth scientific analysis, research and 
diagnosis for treating the disorder labelled broadly under mental illness, it becomes 
almost impossible for other disciplines not to overtly depend on the one dimensional, 
standardized diagnostic and treatment criteria to resolve every issue arising from the 
disorder. For example, courts of law have become overtly reliant on the testimonies of 
doctors and psychiatrists to enforce involuntary treatment decisions that can curtail an 
individual’s rights and freedoms. It therefore follows that when the core standardized 
diagnostic and treatment criteria are reconsidered, then other disciplines can 
progressively self-regulate to accommodate nascent approaches.  
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The field of psychiatry has remained a dominant genre in the diagnosis, treatment and 
assessment of the anorexic body. It is therefore not surprising that altering the 
established model of practice to incorporate a cultural meaning centred perspective 
will involve including cultural viewpoints, generating new meaning and expanding 
the cultural framework to fit a variation of people. Trying to understand or analyse the 
meaning behind creating a resistant body may appear tedious but it might appear to be 
the best approach in resolving dilemmas of best interest, consent, capacity and, to a 
large extent, human rights. Remarkably, by acknowledging that an individual’s ideals, 
morals and values play a significant part in their conscious experience will also reveal 
there is an informed amount of competence and capacity to refuse involuntary 
treatment. Consent in this case will be non-negotiable and will be placed at the centre 
of all clinical modalities. This is not to say that medical solutions to the secondary 
outcome of self-starvation (weight loss) cannot be considered; however, that is a later 
stage that can be furnished only through consent. In cross-cultural systems where the 
thin body is not ideal, any occurring disease as a result of self-starvation in a 
meaning-centred anorexic body are unintended, somewhat irrelevant in their 
experience and often a by-product of their resistance to the normalized body. Hence, 
it will appear that the disease can only become relevant in their journey if they 
consent to addressing the disease in a way that does not make them relinquish control 
or permanently end the meaning centred resistance. This is not to say that a certain 
aspect of the meaning centered anorexic body may not alter in the process. As 
expected, a certain amount of control will be relinquished if it is deemed necessary; 
but in this instance there is a shift focus from what clinicians want to what the 
individual needs and believes is in her best interest. The problem in generic 
assessments and diagnosis of disorders are compounded by the manner of approach of 
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external vessels. The approach of the Mental Capacity Act and the Mental Health Act 
is to treat the individual as the secondary vessel, rather than the first and therefore 
assume in some manner that a one-day diagnostic opinion trumps life-long 
experiences, beliefs and values. The impatience of clinicians to delve into the 
underlying factors or validate the role culture, beliefs and experience play means that 
treatment options explored do not account for the best interest of the individual and 
most often restrict their self-expression 
 
Unfortunately, most treatment professionals do not agree with Griffith’s strong 
convictions that there is no stipulation that force-feeding or nasogastric therapy 
represents a form of treatment enforceable under the Mental Health Act 1983.1230 
Potent debates surrounding involuntary treatments focus on the absoluteness of the 
provisions of the Mental Health Act and the exclusivity of the powers bestowed on 
treatment professionals to act as they deem fit. The core principle of the Mental 
Health Act 1983 therefore removed the requirement of consent for individuals 
typically categorised as suffering from a mental disorder. Clinicians are therefore still 
adverse to new or further demands for advancing the MCA and the MHA based on 
the new emerging themes embedded in a rights-based approach. There might be 
several problems connected to the focus of finding1231 meaning underlying a self-
starvation. First, associating self-starvation with meaningfulness strengthens the 
autonomous claims of the individual should they decide to refuse involuntary 
treatment to address the unintended physical deteriorative aspect of the disorder. 
Second, in setting great emphasis on the meaning of their experience, which informed 
the ultimate decision to self-starve, will diminish the instituted psycho medical 																																																								
1230 Griffiths et al, op. cit., pp. 127–150. 
1231 Ibid 
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position based strictly on medical standard diagnosis and evaluation. There is 
therefore a shift in the traditional role of the doctor-patient type relationship where the 
doctor assumes the alpha and omega position, handing down treatment and care 
directives to the individual without considering their rights, choices and values. 
Lastly, there is diminished misconception, stereotypes and propaganda highlighting 
the anorexic body’s self-suffering in order to enforce involuntary treatment. 
 
A close analysis of anorexia cases reveals the dilemma to preserve the right of 
autonomy from jeopardy while “applying legal tools to the organic swamp of human 
pathology.”1232 The Court of Protection has in several cases (Re: E, L, X) 1233proved to 
be presumptuous of the lack of capacity of the anorexic body as well as shown to 
utterly disregard advance decisions for preserving life at all cost.  In such situations, 
treatment professionals and, to a large degree, the courts lack the ability to make a 
clear distinction that acknowledges the margin between variations of a conceptual 
non-risk, meaning centred individuals and suicidal patient-centred ones. This 
identification will enable an adaptation provision of personalised care and 
management for persons normalised in those tangible patterns of behaviour regardless 
of the stiff labels required by the Mental Health Act. On the one hand, advocates for 
involuntary treatments argue strongly to justify dispensing medical treatment without 
the individual’s express consent. Such justification of paternalistic intervention is 																																																								
1232 UK Human Rights Blog. ‘Anorexia, Alcoholism and the Right to Autonomy’ available at 
https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2014/10/22/anorexia-alcoholism-and-the-right-to-autonomy/#more-
24678 [accessed 2nd December 2018] 
1233 A Local Authority v E [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP). NHS Trust v L [2012] EWHC 2741 (COP).  
NHS Trust v X [2014] EWCOP 3. 
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without consideration to the perils of involuntary treatment as a direct violation of 
personal autonomy, infringement of their rights to make informed choices without 
being unduly influenced or forced. 1234  Involuntary or compulsory treatments 
emphasise the different unorthodox forms of restriction and deprivation of rights and 
liberty.1235 It is imperative that the personal behaviour, actions, and choices of a 
person be respected regardless of whether that decision is valid, just or 
detrimental.1236 Critics of involuntary treatments argue that respecting individual 
rights and autonomy, which are central parts of medical law and ethics, should be 
ranked as the most important.1237 The reasoning is because involuntary treatment 
breeds anti-rights practices, which may infringe on some fundamental rights of an 
individual.1238 Coggon points out the growing tension on what exactly is involved in 
involuntary psychiatric treatment and where the legitimacy for such interventions 
derives. 1239  The conflict of finding a balance becomes evident as treatment 
professionals attempt to safeguard the lives of the people they deemed dangerous to 
self and in the same vein ensuring that they are given a certain degree of individual 
freedom should they decide to self-determine.1240 The difficulty in reaching a balance 
is understandable given the complexity of anorexia. More so, careful consideration is 
given to the ethical quandaries that arise in relation to people with extensive 
experiences and perspective about the world. The process of inclusion and interaction 
with the anorexic body, for instance, would entail a degree of established capacity, as 
well as “self-awareness, the ability for thinking, the willingness to take personal 
																																																								
1234 Matusek and Wright, op. cit., p.436. 
1235 Brunner, op. cit., p. 9. 
1236 Matusek and Wright, op. cit. 
1237 Lewis, op. cit., p. 23. 
1238 Ibid. 
1239 John Coggon, ‘Alcohol Dependence and Anorexia Nervosa: Individual Autonomy and the 
Jurisdiction of the Court of Protection’ (2015) 20(4) Medical Law Review p. 665. 
1240 Dresser, op. cit. p. 44. 
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responsibility, openness to alternative choices, and the ability to monitor and 
implement feedback subsequent to ethical decision.”1241 
 
Responding to the work of Herbert and Weingarten, Kluge reveals that most 
anorexics have little or no say in making treatment decisions as they are often 
involuntarily committed to various invasive procedures which encroach on their 
dignity, bodily integrity, and autonomy.1242  Giordano supports Kluge’s argument, 
insisting that many accounts of anorexia recount episodes of unconsented tube 
feeding and hospitalisation. There is an overwhelming tale of forceful hospitalisation 
despite relentless resistance.1243 On the other hand, Lawrence contends there is an 
established intersection between anorexia nervosa and the response to the crisis of 
autonomy and independence.1244 This crisis can occur at any stage of a person’s 
assertion of self-determination, bodily integrity, and right to make her decisions. In 
many ways, the anorexic body is relentlessly self-normalizing, reflecting an internal, 
stable management of self, a ‘resistance to the cultural norm,’ regardless of consumer 
culture illogicality.1245 For the anorexic woman, denial of their values and choices 
enhances the body assent as a victim of oppression, enhancing the paradigm shift 
from just a desire to stay thin but also a willingness to be in control and exert 
influence on her body.1246  
Human existence, progression and evolution are indicative of choices and decision 
unconventional to social genre. It is the purest form of existence in a natural state 
constructed outside the boundaries of bodily slavery. We proceed with the historical 																																																								
1241 Matusek & Wright, op. cit., p.448. 
1242 Kluge, op. cit.  
1243 Giordano,  op. cit. p.8. 
1244 Ibid. 
1245 Bardo, op. cit., pp. 201-202. 
1246 Marilyn Lawrence, The Anorexic Mind (London, Kamac Books 2008).  
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observations of the struggle to embrace individual actions of freedom, in this instance 
aware that those choices do not interfere or restrict the freedom of others. Yet, the 
great negative commandment ‘Thou shalt not allow any man to interfere with the 
liberty of any other man” still sits in the abstract corridors of reality.1247 Amartya Sen 
bike-riding example equated the ‘state of being’ to the ability to function intentionally 
and independently.1248 For Sen, self-fulfillment and expressing real autonomous 
emotive capabilities is essential to the way a human being lives, acts, be or do.1249 
Those choices can only be valuable if they are autonomous choices with the ideals of 
equality, justice and freedom. Similarly, Martha Nussbaum acknowledged the 
correlation between human rights and human capabilities. It is intended to provide an 
unorthodox method for enjoyment of human rights within a system that can respect 
the individual differences and preference. 1250  Nussbaum argues that individual 
functions can only be communicated in its true human form, which entails freedom to 
exert human powers in self-expressive and creative means. Tangible focus should be 
placed on the individuality of a person and themes and patterns that they are 
evolving.1251 Inability to perform such functions that express human individuality 
freely is inhuman and animalistic and devalues people’s autonomy. A crucial part to 
fulfilling these central capabilities encompasses the respect for bodily integrity. As 
Nussbaum points out, bodily integrity is the ability to move around freely, along with 
total dominance and control over their body. 1252 
 
PART B – Findings 
																																																								
1247  Huxley, op. cit., p.53. 
1248 Kleist, op. cit.  
1249 Sen, op. cit., p.17. 
1250 Nussbaum,  op. cit., p.96. 
1251 Nussbaum,  op. cit., pp.69-72. 
1252 Kleist, op. cit. 
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The Mental health Act 1983 requirement of posing dangers to others as well as 
oneself has become redundant as self-harm is solely focused on addressing the exact 
mental state of the individual without due consideration to other crucial behavioural 
indicators. In addition, clinical analysis of the competency and capacity of the 
individual to make medical treatment decisions have strict criteria under the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005. Extreme physical thinness or emaciation and low BMI assume the 
mantle for mental illness irrespective of the subjective underlying experiences 
therefore furthering the psychiatric narrative. Chapter 1 of this thesis therefore reveal 
that at the core of the structural complexity in understanding anorexia, there is a lack 
of boundary between individuals who have life-threatening anorexia nervosa (suicidal 
body) and the other spectrums of anorexia.. Although Schreiner agrees that 
succumbing to self-starvation may be relevant in protecting an individual’s sense of 
self; however such approach is fragile and does not represent the totality of the 
individual’s being.1253 Schreiner also points out that changing the body rather than the 
personality through self-starvation may be counterproductive because of the difficulty 
to disconnect the body from the psyche. More so, any form of self-starvation exerts a 
significant strain and pain on the body.1254  Although Schreiner makes some valid 
points, the totality of a person’s makeup is not arrived through self-starvation rather 
through a concise composition of their experiences, which historically reflects their 
values, choices and morals. Self-starvation becomes a decisive and conscious 
outcome of their expressions rather than the totality of their being. Medical discourse 
has long thrived on a one-dimensional approach in assessing, diagnosing and treating 
the anorexic body without understanding the multifactorial nature of the abnormal 
patterns of eating disorders. The one-dimensional ideology of anorexia expressed 																																																								1253	Michael	Schreiner,	‘Anorexia	and	Neurosis’	(2012)	available	at	https://evolutioncounseling.com/anorexia-and-neurosis/	[accessed	12th	April,	2019].	1254	Ibid.	
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within the language of severe forms of psychotic neurosis, which triggers suicides, 
depression and borderline personality disorder not related to just their anorexia alone. 
The outcome of a generalised outlook on all anorexic bodies means that the other 
spectrums of the anorexic body are unrecognised in the process and are classified 
within the suicidal bodies seeking their right to die. The individuals that fall within 
the suicidal anorexic body are then medico-legally generalized and labelled in the 
same category with the meaning-centred, self-preserved individuals who have enough 
competence to make decisions around their bodily integrity. The suicidal body is self-
purged and rejected, thriving on non-existence and the need to escape however 
possible from their reality. Individuals who fall into this category are unable to 
normalize their pattern of behaviour neither can they create a resistant body, which 
incorporates the effects of their negative or positive experiences. Interpreting their 
suicidal body presumes worthlessness and their values and belief are disassociated 
from their reality. Extreme distortion of the existence of experience means that the 
suicidal body is unable to engage thoroughly the essence of their expertise therefore 
impossible to produce a subjective view. The meaning underlying their experience is 
redacted in principle and in reality non-existent. There is therefore logical 
consideration that they are unable to consciously make informed decisions about their 
life and therefore may lose the freedom and autonomy to do so. Consent is therefore 
taken away as they are unable to make competent decisions. Involuntary processes are 
then necessary and initiated to help normalize, self-contain and regulate their conduct 
and behaviour. 
 
The respondents to the questionnaire in this thesis reside within the communities were 
being fat is considered a value and virtue and taunted as the ultimate sign of beauty 
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compared to the western notion of the thin body ideal. The ideal of beauty also 
extends beyond just attracting the opposite sex but seen as enhancing the prospect of 
child bearing and a good family life. Existing within a society that characterises the 
fat woman as beautiful presents the perfect environment to investigate why some 
women become non-conformist and resort to self-starvation or the anorexic body 
devoid of media influence. In this setting, the anorexic body thrives and self-
starvation comes meaningful to actualising autonomy and resistance to engraved 
patriarchy. As revealed in non-western patterns, the motivating factors for assuming 
the anorexic body (extremely thin body) is not automatically placed on the presence 
of mental disorder rather there is an opportunity to investigate further on the 
reasoning underlining their values and choices. It could be a way of ascertaining her 
cultural right, or cultural identity. We therefore wonder if the mental health laws in 
the UK presents a disadvantage to the self-starving bodies. In reviewing anorexia case 
laws, it became apparent that all the involuntarily treated individuals are not isolated 
incidence of only self-starvation but have other advanced medical issues unrelated to 
their eating disorder. In X v NHS Trust, it was noted that X was an alcoholic who had 
developed other chronic issue due to her excessive drinking. The judge also 
recognised that X’s excessive alcohol consumption will lead to mortality and increase 
the likelihood of her demise. This is comparative to the non-western self-starving 
patterns where there were no other active competing factors to be treated. The 
assessment of the behavioural pattern of these individuals present a more realisable 
setting to authentically evaluate the impact of self-starvation.   
 
The distinctive feature of the meaning centred anorexic body is embedded within the 
cultural contexts of meaning, morals, and experience but also in the cognitive 
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acknowledgment that there is no desire to starve to death or commit suicide as 
established in NHS Trust v X. It is impossible to deny that a particular demographic of 
anorexics are not only preoccupied with the mere physical aesthetics of thinness and 
physical emaciation, which excludes cultural ideals (Re E).1255 The non-meaning 
centred anorexic body engages in food refusal, self-starvation and body weight 
management with no clear precise meaning or concept to their self-starvation. The 
meaning centred anorexic body is subjectively dissimilar; their standard pattern 
addresses an individualized norm, symbolic to self, culture, morals and 
experience.1256 It is evident that the meaning centred anorexic body can lead a 
conceptually normal life within a controlled weight devoid of any attempt to end their 
life. All aspects reveal distinguishable traits from other biological and behavioural 
aspects of non-meaning centred anorexics hence the author’s disagreement with 
Crisp’s insistence that all anorexic bodies possess diminished rights of independence 
and exhibit immaturity in leading a normalized life.1257 In hindsight, meaning centred 
anorexic body identifies across cultural borders of allowing a certain degree of 
autonomy and flexibility in subjective expression of behavioural patterns. 
 
The defining pathway of a person’s life is not developed abruptly neither are instincts 
pivotal or definitive, rather there is a strong connection between how the personal 
choices of a person is made and how that pathway is navigated to attain their true 
self.1258 In the span of an individual’s life, various versions are created as they 
navigate the intricacies of life. The behavioural version that the individual stays with 
																																																								
1255  Re E (Medical Treatment Anorexia) op. cit. 
1256 Banks, op.cit. pp.867-884 
1257  Crisp, op. cit. 
1258 David Kissane, ‘The Rediscovery of the Human: Basic Texts of Viktor E. Frankl’ (2007) 5(1) 
Palliative and Supportive Care pp.77-78. 
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the individual embodies all the elements of their story and a reflection of their voice 
chosen with free will, without coercion. The pathway to achieving a definite moment 
of self-determination is a historic build-up of years of internalization of the effects 
and impact of social cultural factors. However, to a greater extent, modern day laws, 
rules and regulation seem to play a significant part and accounts for the modification 
of behaviours and socio-cultural patterns. The reality ignored by clinicians that there 
are consequences of repressing the freedom of an individual to self-express, 
especially by denying free will and personal choices at any stage of decision-making.  
 
The way we view the body is also crucial in the discourse of decision making in 
medical interventions. Every individualised history of anorexics reveals a trend in the 
way their actions are guided by the multitudes of experiences from childhood to 
adulthood. Those experiences are not solitary but constitute a pattern that begets their 
values, choices wishes and moral. Clinicians and courts of law cannot therefore have 
a comprehensive and index knowledge of an anorexic without the formalities of the 
constitute experience. Study across the field for an average anorexic reveals the same 
base line patterns and trigger in abnormal eating behaviour. First, their experiences 
were not intra nuclear but controlled by third parties. Childhood experiences marked 
by oppression, violence or deprivation emanated from factors beyond their control. 
The anorexic body became the object of this impression whether negative or positive 
yet they are denied the right make decisions regarding their bodies. Given the way 
human body exists and functions, the body can be likened to a sponge taking in all the 
essence of the individual, the footprint of tragedies, triumphs, pain and happiness, 
needs and wants, etc. The manifest creation of the individual is a self-contained and 
regulated, self-suffering, preserved and autonomous body. The self-contained and 
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controlled body is balanced and normalised, adhering to societal expectations and 
existing within the social, legal and psychiatric boundaries. This body fits into the 
stereotype and labelling of the medico-legal system. The self-contained and regulated 
body is a passive, unimpressed and suppressed entity within the strict confines of the 
Mental Health Act. Understanding their values, choices and the decision is 
unimportant to the care and management of their behavioural outcomes.   Values 
within the self-contained and organised body are based on pre-established ethics and 
conventions and not by independent decisions. Individuals within this category are 
however aware of the negatives and positives of their experiences but do not find the 
perfect balance that reflects those values. Experiences, therefore, do not form part of 
their meaning and values are regarded as a crafted construct of the present, which 
does not correlate with the past or the future. In contrast, the self-suffering, preserved 
and autonomous body is self-piloted, an individualised creation reflecting their 
values, choices, belief and conscious present and advanced decisions. There is an 
awareness of experiences and the meaning underlying the nature of that body, a 
tribute body that embodies the totality of their being. The self-suffering, preserved 
and autonomous body is aware of their reality, both the past, present and the future. 
Making autonomous choices, self-determination and protecting their bodily integrity 
and autonomy preserve values. The body is accepted and becomes a sanctuary that 
embodies all those experiences, an individualized creation perfected and presented to 
the outside world. This body is meaning-centred in reality, elaborate to make a 
statement and conscious enough to create boundaries against involuntary interference. 
 
PART C  - Conclusion and Recommendation 
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A recent study at Kings College London focused on finding the reason there is a high 
rate of unsuccessful outcomes in treating anorexia nervosa analysed the DNA of 
17,000 people with anorexia nervosa.1259Scientists who led the study recommended 
finding new and alternative approaches, which recognised that anorexia was not 
solely a psychiatric illness.1260 It has, therefore, become critical that other contributing 
factors and multifactorial evidence are accounted for whilst engaging with self-
starvation.1261 The question is, why should doctors who are perfectly content with the 
established medical pathway incorporate or exclusively apply the alternative 
meaning-centered approach, underscoring cross-cultural experiences and respecting 
autonomous choices? This question can be analyzed in multiple dimensions; however, 
the first point to note is that the traditional system has revealed a broken clinician-
patient relationship. The first issue might be the implication of using the words 
“mentally ill patient” (enhancing medical labelling) to address a cross section of 
individuals who do not want to be relegated or pigeon holed as sick, helpless and in 
need of a saviour-doctor.  The legality and rightfulness of imposing treatments and 
medical labelling are still disputed by other disciplines.1262 The challenge and possible 
solution rests in applying an interdisciplinary approach, especially utilizing 
“overarching theories which reconcile the conflict or minimize the challenges”.1263 
The behavioural nature of anorexia is constantly changing, evolving and adapting as 
their experiences are altered or modified. The response of the anorexic body is 
therefore redefined by those changes and so is the underlying meaning, which 																																																								
1259 Guardian. ‘Anorexia not Just a Psychiatric Problem Scientists Find’ Available Guardian. ‘Anorexia 
not Just a Psychiatric Problem Scientists Find’ available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2019/jul/15/anorexia-not-just-a-psychiatric-problem-scientists-
find?CMP=fb_gu&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Facebook#Echobox=1563220022≥ [accessed 
12th April 2019] 
1260 Ibid. 
1261 Ibid. 
1262Carney, op. cit., p.2. 
1263 Ibid., p.3. 
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accompanies the basis for their self-starvation. Regardless of how constant the 
anorexic body alters or transforms, the medical-legal pathway remains the same with 
no variation applied to equal their current state. The inconsistency is intensified by the 
ultimate position of the law, confirming and approving involuntary treatments1264 
based solely on medical diagnostic without due consideration of the multi-
dimensional aspects of anorexia. 
 
Statutory provisions which establishes the legality of advanced decision making is not 
provided for under the current Mental Health Act 1983 especially with regards to 
statements which are written while the individual still possess capacity, such statutory 
provisions should also present clarity on the instances of refusals. Owen G. S et al 
notes that the introduction of advanced decision making into the MHA would “enable 
and promote the development and realisation of advanced decision making as a form 
of self-determination thereby removing ambiguity to enhance transparency in a 
complex and complicated area. 1265 There are minimal levels of adaptation of 
advanced decision-making in both the MHA and MCA however a crucial difference 
in physical and mental healthcare has to be established in other to reflect the balance 
in policy and principle.1266 Expressions of autonomy or autonomous actions is often in 
relation to self expression of the body hence the consideration of the rights to refuse 
treatment presented by the medical practitioners under medical law is intertwined into 
the fiduciary relationship that exists within.1267 Article 5 of the ECHR also lauded the 
exclusion of the right to refuse medical treatment. Deprivation of liberty can occur 																																																								
1264 Carney, op. cit., p. 1. 
1265	Gareth	S.	Owen,	Tania	L.	Gergel,	Lucy	.A.	Stephenson,	O.	Hussain,	Larry	Rifkin	&	Alexander	Ruck	
Keene,	‘Advanced	Decision-Making	in	Mental	Health-	Suggestions	for	Legal	Reform	in	England	and	
Wales’	(2019)	64	International	Journal	of	Law	and	Psychiatry.	pp.162-172.	
1266	Ibid.	
1267	Ibid.	
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within the perimeters of the procedures stipulated by law –sound mind and capacity to 
consent has emerged as fallen within the perimeters of exclusion.1268  The findings 
also reveal that need to rethink of how autonomy is applied in healthcare especially in 
addressing permanent misconceptions in medical law that anorexic bodies exists in 
perpetual state of incapacity therefore unable to exercise the right to refuse medical 
treatment. In addition to clarity what exactly constitutes unsound mind, there is also 
need to “determine which consent and refusals were owed legal respects….and which 
are not”1269 A step further is providing a legal identity for the anorexic body with 
decision making capacity at the time of advanced decision making which ultimately 
can be upheld under the MHA. 
 
This thesis has shown that the meaning-centred approach to the studies of anorexia 
removes the rigid clinical approach and interpretation of thinness and self-starvation 
and amplifies their experiences reflected in their values, choices and decisions. The 
meaning centred anorexic body exists within the parameters of expressions of 
autonomy and self-determination. There is still an identity attached to the individual’s 
experience and a greater understanding of these interactions as vital for progress and 
acceptance of their identity.1270 Metseagharun recognised that everything revolves 
around finding meaning and it will be futile to argue otherwise. Individual 
experiences are part of the consciousness and in every shape and form defines their 
reality. Every single moment, emotions, natural impulses (significant or otherwise) 
leave traces embedded in human DNA. This is unsurprising as the body an individual 
identifies with and creates is also the body subjected to the control especially within 																																																								
1268	Ibid	
1269	Ibid	
1270 Stefan E. Schulenberg, Lindsay W. Schnetzer, Michael R. Winters, and Robert R. Hutzell, 
‘Meaning-Centered Couples Therapy: Logotherapy and Intimate Relationships’ (2009) 40(2) Journal of 
Contemporary Psychotherapy pp.100-102. 
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repressive cultures where the body is objectified. Normative conceptions present 
various stages and signs that engage the values and choices the anorexic is 
accountable to which most times are opposed to clinical and societal standards. 
Making a meaning-centred identification enables an adaptation provision of 
personalized care and management for persons normalized in those tangible patterns 
of behaviour regardless of the stiff labels imposed by the Mental Health Act. 
Impressions across cultures continue to change and advance the experiences of the 
individual1271 until the significance of meaning is actualized. Considering a broader 
basis or meaning-centered approach, reoccurring themes across genres focus on the 
prominence of the individual as the author and controller of their experiences – 
actions, choices and value. To create meaning, historical situations are taken into 
consideration to determine within which framework individual meanings 
emerge.1272The individual controls the narrative and therefore can consciously assume 
the responsibility – assigning meaning and embracing the outcome. It is not difficult 
to find that in placing central emphasis on the individual’s choice to self-starve, for 
instance, there is recognition of their autonomous rights, bodily integrity and inherent 
dignity – affirmed through a human rights-based approach. Although certain 
limitations to individual freedom apply when the competence is actively contested or 
in question, it is almost impossible not to echo the same sentiments as Siber, who 
insists that autonomy and freedom of choice should trump any other 
considerations.1273 The underlying issue in anorexic behaviour is exercising control 
and dominance over the way the body is nurtured and developed.1274 The values of 
																																																								
1271 Temi Metseagharun, ‘“A Meaning-Centered Approach” to Patient Consultation is the same as 
Spirituality and Psychiatry’ (2010) 34(9) The Psychiatrist pp. 400-401. 
1272 Paaige K. Turner and Robert L. Krizek, ‘Meaning-Centered Approach to Customer Satisfaction’ 
(2006) 20(2) Communication Quarterly pp.115-117. 
1273 Silber, op. cit., pp. 284–285. 
1274 Ibid. 
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autonomy, ideals of consent, and inherent dignity are, therefore, very critical to the 
anorexic body and are also potent attributes in rights protection. 1275  The 
rationalisation behind embracing the ideals of consent validates the long-standing 
legal rule of conduct specifying the absolute requirement of procuring the informed 
consent of a person before any medical treatment.1276 Understandably, Kirby notably 
viewed informed consent as a ‘competing principle that reminds us of the privacy of 
human autonomy’.1277 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
1275 Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wick, and Clare Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights 
(New York, Oxford University Press 2014) pp. 2–6. 
1276 M.D. Kirby, ‘Informed Consent: What Does it Mean?’ (1983) 9(2) Journal of Medical Ethics p. 69. 
1277 Ibid. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Dear respondent,  
 Please complete this questionnaire honestly and independently. It is for 
research. Your answer is the best. Do not write your name. Your responses will be 
treated confidentially.  
 
Section A:  
Supply the following information about yourself.  
 
I. Institution:………………………………………………………………… 
II. Sex:………………………..Age: Below 18yrs……………………. Above 
18years:…………………….. 
III. BMI…………………………. 
IV. Body size: Very Thin:……………..Extremely Thin Bodies:…………... 
Plump:………………………… 
 
Section B: Extremely Thin Body Association with Mental Illness  
Tick "yes" or "No" to each of these statements: 
Statement Yes No 
1.  Do you associate your extremely thin body with mental illness?   
2.  Do you associate your self-starvation to mental illness?   
3. Are you able to function well (work, carry on everyday life) while assuming this 
extremely thin body? 
  
4.  Do you believe this is a form of exercising your freedom or autonomous right?   
5.  Do you exercise regularly to retain this slim body?   
6. Do you associate the expression of freedom to preserve your bodily integrity with 
mental illness? 
  
7.  Are you conscious or aware of your choice to become thin?   
8.  Are you conscious or aware of your choice to remain thin?   
9.  Have you been involuntarily treated?   
10. Do your friends laugh at you because of your thin body?   
11. Does any of your family members consider you ill?   
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SECTION C:  Extent of Contentment  
Tick "Yes" or "No" to each of these statements: 
12.   Has anyone advised you to go for medical treatment because of your thin  
body? 
 
13.   If possible, would you like to become thinner?   
14.   If you are advised by a clinician, would you change your body size?   
15.   Are there occasions you regret the anorexic body?   
16.   Would you change your extremely thin body to a normalized body in the 
future? 
  
17. Would you advise your plump friends to become extremely thin within 
meaning? 
  
18.  Do you feel any physical weakness as a result of being extremely thin?   
19. Do you ever feel the urge to cover up part of your body out of embarrassment?   
 
SECTION D: Reasons for Assuming Anorexic Body   
Tick "Yes" or "No" against each of these statements for what describes the reason for 
your choice to assume the slim body. 
 Yes No 
20. Take control of my body   
21. Resistance against cultural oppressive regime   
22. Expression of freedom (autonomy) over my body   
23. Mental illness   
24. Previous experience of a non-thin body   
25. Experience of others with non-thin body   
26. I have been involuntarily treated because of my extremely slim body   
27.The Nigerian environment provides the freedom to express 
autonomous right without the stereotype of mental illness 
  
28. The Nigeria environment provides the freedom for control over my body      
       without the stigma of mental illness 
  
29. To resist the cultural ideal beauty (regarding plump body as  a sign of beauty)   
30. To be admired more by the opposite sex   
31. Physiological/medical ground   
32. Because being extremely thin is not a mental illness   
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APPENDIX B 
Birkbeck University of London,  
Malek Street,  
Bloomsbury,  
London, WCIE 
8th May, 2018. 
 
……………………………….. 
………………………………… 
……………………………….. 
…………………………….. 
 
 
Sir/Ma,  
AUTHORIZATION TO COLLECT DATA FOR RESEARCH 
I wish to request permission to collect data from your female students for my 
research. The research is on anorexic body and reason for that feature. The 
information collected will be restricted to the study and will remain confidential.  
 
Please, I need a written acceptance to assure my university that I actually collected the 
data from your institution. 
 
Thanks for your anticipated cooperation.  
 
Yours faithfully,  
 
Chisom, Cynthia U. 
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																																																					Glossary	
	
	
 
Anorexia Nervosa               
An illness often resulting in dangerous weight loss, in which a person, usually a girl 
or woman, refuses to eat enough over a long period of time. 
 
 
Autonomy            
The ability to make decisions and choices without being controlled by anyone else. 
 
 
Autonomous                        
The ability to have the freedom to act independently. 
 
 
Bulimia Nervosa                  
Bulimia is an eating disorder characterised by a cycle of binge eating and compensatory behaviors 
such as self-induced vomiting designed to undo or compensate for effects of binge eating. 
 
 
Bioethics                              
The ethics of medical and biological research. It is study of the ethical issues 
emerging from advances in biology and medicine. 
                      
Biosocial                              
The interaction of biological and social factors. 
 
 
Behavioural                        
Involving, relating to, or emphasizing behaviour. 
 
 
Bradycardia                        
An  abnormally slow heart action. 
 
 
Diagnosis                             
The identification of the nature of an illness or other problem by examination of 
symptoms. 
 
 
Disorder                              
An illness of the mind or body. 
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Glucagon                             
A protein hormone that is produced especially by the islets of Langerhans and that 
promotes an increase in the sugar content of the blood by increasing the rate of 
glycogen breakdown in the liver. 
 
Hypothalamus                    
A region of the forebrain below the thalamus which coordinates both the autonomic 
nervous system and the activity of the pituitary, controlling body temperature, thirst, 
hunger, and other homeostatic systems, and involved in sleep and emotional activity. 
 
 
Hypothermia                          
The condition of having an abnormally (typically dangerously) low body temperature. 
 
 
Malnutrition                          
The lack of proper nutrition, caused by not eating enough of the right things, or when 
the individuals diet doesn’t contain the right amount of nutrients. 
 
Meaning Centred Study        
A way of understanding and uncovering meaning by focusing on the individualised 
reasons underlying the experience. 
 
 
Menstruation                           
The process in a woman of discharging blood and other material from the lining of the 
uterus at intervals of about one lunar month from puberty until the menopause, except 
during pregnancy. 
 
 
Misogyny                               
The dislike of, contempt for, or ingrained prejudice against women. 
 
 
Morality                                 
The principles concerning the distinction between right and wrong or good and bad 
behaviour. 
 
 
Nasogastric Tube                   
A tube inserted through the nose down the throat and esophagus, and into the 
stomach. It can be used to give drugs, liquids, and liquid food, or used to remove 
substances from stomach. 
 
 
Patient Centred  Approach   
A biomedical modelled relationship which focuses on the individual as solely 
accountable to the doctors who make sole decisions regarding treatment and treatment  
and treatment outcomes. 
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Periventricular Nucleaus     
An autonomic control centres in the brain, with neurons playing essential roles in 
controlling stress, metabolism, growth, reproduction, immune, and other more 
traditional autonomic functions. 
 
Prognosis                                
An opinion, based on medical experience, of the likely course of a medical condition. 
 
Stereotype                              
A widely held but fixed and oversimplified image or idea of a particular type of 
person or thing. 
 
 
Slouching                               
The action or fact of standing, moving, or sitting in a lazy, drooping way or position. 
 
 
Self Determination               
The process a person controls their own life and expresses their choice without 
external compulsion. 
  
 
Tour de force                        
An achievement or performance that shows great skill and attracts admiration.      
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